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Introduction: violence and the early 
modern world
Erica Charters, Marie Houllemare, and Peter H. Wilson
The history of violence and its restraint has been crucial to definitions of Western 
civilization and the modern world, often by contrasting them with barbaric pre-
decessors and the cultures that they claim to have tamed. Yet, evidence for the 
restraint of violence varies according to one’s viewpoint: the sharp decline of 
homicide in seventeenth-century north-west Europe, for example, diverges from 
the simultaneous rise in violence of Atlantic colonial societies. As histories of vio-
lence and restraint are usually written from national and nationalist perspectives, 
this volume brings global approaches to the study of violence to probe historical 
assumptions about the limits of violence and its decline during the early modern 
period. It thereby also questions narratives of the inexorable rise of the nation state 
alongside historical periodization of the ‘early modern’ and ‘modern’.
The study of violence offers a way to connect otherwise potentially disparate 
historical themes, since it relates to so many other aspects of human existence and 
its motives, acts, and effects all have social, economic, cultural, religious, moral, 
and military dimensions. Using social and cultural historical approaches, scholars 
have analysed the nature and frequency of violence in history, considering crimes 
such as homicides as well as their punishments, or examining the cultural context 
of practices such as duelling.1 These histories of interpersonal violence generally 
exist alongside – rather than as part of – the plethora of military histories. A key 
aim of this volume is to integrate methodologies of the study of violence into the 
history of war, thereby extending the historical significance of both areas of study.2 
Likewise, by expanding the geographical scope of the history of violence and war, 
this volume challenges both Western and state-centric narratives of the decline of 
violence and its relationship to modernity, highlighting instead similarities across 
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early modernity in terms of representations, legitimations, applications of, and 
motivations for, violence. Instead of a global synthesis, this volume offers thirteen 
case studies that outline the myriad ways in which violence was understood and 
used throughout the early modern period. These detailed examinations demon-
strate that the early modern world was not a random collection of barbarous bru-
talities, but rather a period in which violence was used brutally as well as rationally.
Defining the early modern
The concept of the early modern as a distinct epoch is deeply embedded in the 
widely held view that violence either diminishes or escalates as humanity marches 
into modernity. Many accounts are highly technologically determinist, present-
ing what amounts to a progress of destruction from ‘the slingshot to the megaton 
bomb’.3 Others emphasize revolutionary and radical violence of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, with the capacity of industrialized mass death in the case 
of the Holocaust.4 The alternative view is that violence has declined through some 
kind of ‘civilizing process’, as argued most famously by Norbert Elias.5 Though 
each arguing the opposite, both perspectives share broadly similar assumptions 
about change over time which are in turn related to Western concepts of historical 
time, especially interpretations developed since early modernity which see human 
history as a progressive process towards a ‘modern’ end point. In short, mainstream 
interpretations of violence are rooted in Western narratives of human development 
following essentially linear paths to modernity. The inclusion of non-Western histo-
ries in this volume calls into question the Western categorization of what is modern 
and pre-modern.
This volume defines early modernity as the period between the mid fifteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, while recognizing that all such attempts to delineate 
epochs face the difficulty of imposing a single framework on something as complex 
as the history of the world.6 Even with this important caveat, scholars have outlined 
historical models that permit comparisons across cultures within the early modern 
period. One such framework is the spread of ‘gunpowder empires’. First coined by 
Marshall Hodgson, this term was expanded to compare the Mughal, Ottoman, and 
Safavid empires by arguing that their success and longevity derived from the early 
adoption of gunpowder weaponry, especially artillery.7 The causal link between 
the use of firearms and imperial expansion appears convincing only in the case 
of the Mughals, while gunpowder technology spread far beyond empires and its 
adoption did not produce the same results everywhere. For example, as Richard 
Reid points out in this volume, the adoption of firearms by African armies ended 
a period characterized by close-order tactics and encouraged the use of looser, 
skirmishing formations. Yet even critics of the concept of ‘gunpowder empires’ still 
embrace it to describe the reliance on handguns and artillery in both land and sea 
warfare, and the way this encouraged the spread of permanent forces, sustained by 
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state structures and fiscal systems, across the early modern period.8 Historians have 
highlighted such transformations in naval gunnery, pointing out that – as with land 
warfare – these developments were organizational and institutional, as much as 
technological or tactical. Early modern naval power frequently required the coordi-
nated capacity to construct, crew, and maintain warships, and to provide dockyards 
and operational bases.9
Early modernity can also be defined politically, rather than technologically. The 
world had known large empires before, notably those of the Chinese, Romans, and 
Mongols.10 However, the period from the late fifteenth century was characterized 
by the emergence of seaborne empires like those of the Portuguese and Spanish, 
as well as continued overland imperial expansion, including by the Ottomans, 
Safavids, Mughals, Chinese, Russians, and several in Africa connected with the 
development of the slave trade. Early modernity is customarily identified with the 
consolidation of more stable, centralized, and institutionalized states and empires, 
a process which is deeply embedded in Western historiography and which has pro-
foundly affected studies of violence.11 Following Max Weber, the modern state is 
conventionally defined as the exercise of a legitimate monopoly of power (Gewalt) 
over a defined territory.12 ‘Power’ is often translated from the original German as 
‘violence’, though early modern Europeans in fact distinguished between Gewalt 
as legitimate authority, power (Potestas), and physical and symbolic Violentia that 
was often condemned as illegitimate.13
This definition makes the state the arbiter of legitimate force and illegitimate 
violence and assigns it a crucial role in what Western historiography has generally 
regarded as a linear modernization process: the state tames violence, curbing its 
‘illegitimate’ manifestations and channelling its ‘legitimate’ form as effective policy 
instruments to punish domestic malefactors and wage war on external enemies. In 
the classic narrative, a strong state was necessary to quell ‘anarchic’, feudal ‘robber 
barons’ and impose order among the population whose natural state, as Thomas 
Hobbes claimed in Leviathan, was ‘war of all against all’. Europe was ravaged by the 
extreme violence of an age of allegedly ‘religious wars’, from the Reformation until 
the Peace of Westphalia (1648), before bellona could finally be tamed by the rise of 
centralized, ‘absolutist’ states, epitomized in the ideology and representations of 
Louis XIV.14 The processes of eradicating armed non-state actors, disarming large 
sections of the population, and imposing discipline on the state’s own forces was 
directly connected to other social disciplinary efforts to compel subjects to be more 
pious, obedient, and thrifty. Gradually – according to this historical  narrative  – 
external coercion gave way to self-discipline as official norms were internalized, 
a process most influentially expressed by Elias and which has been claimed as 
the necessary precursor to industrialized modernity.15 Finally, the classic state-
centred modernization narrative concludes by emphasizing the upheavals of the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic era (1789–1815), spawning new forms of politicized 
revolutionary violence and, allegedly, the birth of total war.16 Having disciplined 
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its inhabitants and monopolized warfare, the nation(al) state proceeded to police 
the international order, curbing extraterritorial violence and stamping out piracy, 
slavery, and other activities it deemed illegitimate.17
As with gunpowder empires, the statist definition of early modernity reflects a 
Western narrative and Western fields of interest. Indeed, this pattern works only for 
Europe (if it works at all), at a time where these European states expanded their mil-
itary theatres of action all around the world and sent violent adults to use violence 
to conquer ultramarine spaces and to administer growing colonial formations.18 
Furthermore, the notion of the rise of centralized, absolutist states is often chal-
lenged by modern historical scholarship, in which even France under Louis XIV is 
defined through crucial collaboration with local elites.19 After all, warlordism and 
anarchy were also part of an imperial repertoire that associated strongly controlled 
zones with a large spectrum of spaces under indirect rule. Moreover, this state-
centred analysis does not preclude the existence of other less-constraining polities 
outside the reach of imperial states. European expansion created a new global geog-
raphy of violent empires that generated new frontier and buffer zones. These ‘zones 
of violence’ were complementary (and even instrumental, it can be argued) to the 
pacified state and imperial spaces.20 They were constitutive of a more constraining 
interimperial order that did not suppress what were often lawless oceans.21 Building 
on these works that question Western narratives about the advent of modernity, this 
volume applies the practice and concept of large-scale violence to the early modern 
period. It suggests that the prevalence of violence, and the efforts to restrain it, are 
central to the definition of a global early modern chronology.
Defining violence
Discussions of violence diverge as to how far non-physical and non-lethal forms 
should be included in a definition. Approaches to this issue vary widely, according 
to how contemporaries – and historians – perceive, define, and measure violence. 
For example, recent influential claims that long-term trends show a decline in 
violence are based on a narrow definition prioritizing lethality.22 By contrast, this 
volume endorses the broader view that violence includes both physical actions and 
coercive threats of physical action. As key theorists of violence point out, because 
‘threats of violence may be used to limit the use of actual physical violence, there 
is no simple way to measure the level of violence in a society’.23 From the perspec-
tive of coercion, people who are threatened with physical violence are similarly 
influenced by violence as those who are subjected to actual physical force. Violence 
is, in this respect, highly subjective. It is a social interpretation of a painful gesture 
directed against someone’s bodily integrity; it is likewise directed against one’s 
dignity and cultural beliefs. Neither the mere expression of instinct of emotions 
nor a purely rational construct, violence should thus be understood as a transgres-
sion that is socially defined. Indeed, historical analyses of violence draw on cultural 
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anthropology, which highlights the central issue of legitimacy in understanding 
violence.24 Descriptions of violence are particularly insightful in revealing cat-
egories and understandings of violence that can vary between perpetrator, victim, 
and observer.25 Historical analyses of violent situations thus locate the boundaries 
between behaviours deemed legitimate and illegitimate, and can question the valid-
ity of aggressive actions according to the actors themselves.
Building on this social and cultural methodology, this volume focuses on 
accounts of large-scale, or communal, violence. Large-scale violence can be dis-
tinguished from the interpersonal form by a measure of coordination and a clear 
group pattern, involving something approaching coherence and a certain degree of 
durability. The rationality of ‘crowd violence’, for example, has been fruitful in fram-
ing the discussion on the difference between organized and spontaneous violence.26 
Large-scale or collective violence is not so much a factor of the scope of the acts or 
size of a violent group, but of the organized patterns on display.27 For instance, as 
Alexander Osipian’s study of violence on trade routes in the steppe in this volume 
outlines, banditry is an accumulation of small-size non-state violence that reveals 
a broad pattern. Likewise, as Trevor Burnard’s chapter on Atlantic slave systems 
demonstrates, slave societies relied on large-scale violence that was socially organ-
ized but inflicted mostly at an individual level.
Large-scale violence should thus be understood as a societal act. It conveys a 
communal message to those inflicting it and to those on whom it is inflicted. It 
includes both lethal and non-lethal physical harm, as well as the coercive threat of 
force and symbolic violence. At the same time, reports, descriptions, and represen-
tations of violence are also arguments about lawfulness and legitimacy. Uncovering 
early modern meanings of violence provides insight into the structural and cultural 
worlds of early modern communities, while resisting the temptation to fit them 
into anachronistic narratives of modernity. Categories of large-scale violence – 
for example, whether something is a rebellion or a war – can serve as justification 
pre- or post-conquest. Such categories also capture cultural differences in styles 
of warfare, as well as differences in political protests. As the legitimacy of violence 
is dependent on context and perspective, historians need to be sensitive to how 
subsequent generations have classified and re-classified large-scale violence to suit 
their own agendas.
Many of the chapters here thus tackle analytical categories – such as notions 
of massacres, crime, and war – in their history of violence. For example, while 
war clearly requires organization and coordination, scholars disagree on whether 
it is distinguishable from other forms of large-scale violence.28 Distinctions often 
rest more on questions of legitimacy than the scale, level, or forms of violence 
employed, with ‘war’ being reserved for actions by states and other organizations 
claiming exclusive powers. Such polities, in turn, employ terms like ‘armed conflict’, 
‘insurgency’, ‘rebellion’, and ‘banditry’ to categorize violent actions of individuals 
and organizations they deem illegitimate.29 This hierarchy of legitimacy persists 
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even within war, in which some forms of violence have been thought more hon-
ourable than others. For example, early modern Europeans distinguished between 
‘major war’ centred on pitched battles and formal sieges intended to bring conflicts 
to a decisive conclusion, and ‘small war’ consisting of raiding and skirmishing.30 
The former was typically supposed to be fought by regular troops directed by 
states, whereas the latter was waged by irregulars, partisans, and guerrillas, all of 
whom were regarded as militarily, socially, and culturally inferior.31 Early modern 
imperialism often made use of this distinction between legitimate violence, in the 
form of war, and illegitimate violence, characterized as rebellion, atrocity, or crime, 
to justify colonial imposition – described, for example, as bringing law and order to 
pacify barbarian resistance or suppress local warlords. Western claims of civiliza-
tion frequently integrated a discourse of violence with discourses of pacification, 
law, and religion. Histories of interpersonal violence are thus linked to histories 
of state warfare and collective violence, and can highlight how claims about one 
form of violence explained and justified the application of another, as a form of 
legitimate force.32 This volume builds on scholarship that increasingly focuses on 
studying  violence as part of political and imperial narratives, considering it an ele-
ment of political rhetoric and claims to dominion, particularly colonial authority.33
Similarly, postcolonial histories use violence to undermine imperial claims of 
humanitarian or benevolent governance. Many of the more recent critiques of 
Western imperialism argue that Europeans exported their own violence, disturb-
ing more pacific or balanced conditions among the peoples they encountered.34 
For example, direct links have been drawn between the interethnic and religious 
conflict of late fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Europe, and the often extreme 
violence of early imperialism. A frequently cited case is the Spanish Reconquista of 
the Moorish kingdom of Grenada, which concluded in 1492 – the year Columbus’s 
voyage initiated the Conquista of Central and Southern America.35 However, we 
should not overemphasize Europeans’ propensity to violence, nor overlook it 
among their opponents. A close examination of the context, such as offered by the 
local case studies in this volume, reveal that problems often stemmed from misun-
derstandings, if not prejudicial interpretations, of specific violent acts. Rather than 
assessing legitimacy, this volume analyses how violence was described, defined, 
and measured across the early modern world, eschewing Western categories and 
narratives and applying a global approach in their stead. By focusing on large-scale 
violence, it highlights the fundamental relationship between violence and growing 
interconnectedness across the early modern world.
Defining global
Global history is often used as shorthand for non-Western histories. Yet, global 
history does more than simply broaden geographical scope. Primarily, it pushes 
historians to rethink perspectives, categories, and units of analysis.36 This volume 
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uses global history as a methodology to analyse large-scale violence more precisely 
by providing detailed case studies of violence in a range of local contexts, and to 
articulate the significance of violence in narratives of state- and empire-building, as 
well as in narratives of decline and fall.
Much of global history has been concerned with identifying transnational link-
ages and exchanges. As a result, scholars have correctly noted that the field has often 
neglected the role of conflict, war, and violence.37 This volume brings together local 
case studies of large-scale violence in an effort to demonstrate how a global meth-
odology can shape one’s understandings of the early modern period and its rela-
tionship to violence. By highlighting the complex and sophisticated nature of early 
modern violence, it suggests continuities with the modern period and questions 
broad narratives of either progress or decline. Our contribution to global history 
is to address the general challenge that violence is, and to reflect on the many ways 
communities, states, and empires used and responded to violence.
In the field of global history, detailed case studies offer fine-grained analysis 
of complex interactions that help to refine what might otherwise be broad-brush 
narratives or even structural generalizations that focus on transformations over 
the long term. For instance, where global histories of early modern Eurasia tend 
to highlight intellectual and cultural exchanges between Asia and Europe, detailed 
examination of particular encounters can uncover violent dynamics. Europeans 
often intruded in violent – but structured – international relationships in Asian seas, 
before imposing their own violence on other polities.38 More broadly, localized case 
studies help to disrupt simplistic narratives, of either progress or decline, offering 
instead historical examples that can question such entrenched generalizations.39
As outlined, violence and the definition of violence – often circling around 
Western definitions of war – have been central to Western narratives of progress 
and the inexorable march towards the modern and orderly nation state. As the sub-
title of Geoffrey Parker’s seminal monograph on early modern war and state forma-
tion indicates, this narrative of violence explains not only the formation of states, 
but also the rise of the West.40 The contribution of global history to this field is not 
in identifying parallel ‘military revolutions’ across the world, but in demonstrating 
that such narratives are products of Western political structures, scholarly interests, 
and historical periodization. As Wayne Lee’s chapter in this volume reminds schol-
ars, even categorizing political organization as ‘non-state’ presupposes state-centric 
historical explanations.41
Historians have thus revised traditional accounts of non-Western warfare and 
violence to highlight how representations, definitions, and categories of violence 
have been shaped by European assumptions and imperial frameworks. One of 
the more fruitful areas of analysis has been Anglophone scholarship on warfare in 
North America during the early modern period. Various studies have outlined the 
fluid nature of American colonial warfare, in which opponents responded to previ-
ously unknown forms of violence and adapted enemy tactics, often in escalating 
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cycles.42 Such analyses lay bare cultural assumptions about violence, showing how 
easily definitions of barbarous ‘crimes’ overlap with legitimate warfare, depend-
ing on perspective. Moreover, given that American colonists’ own revolt against 
British imperialism had its origins in what were deemed rebellious riots, scholar-
ship on colonial America has outlined the crucial role of rhetoric and legitimacy in 
the protean nature of large-scale violence. As with all rebellions, it was of immense 
importance whether a confrontation was categorized as a treasonous riot or a war.43
Considerable discussion surrounds the place of a permissive ideology freeing 
the imperial space from the normal constraints on violence because enemies were 
‘savages’ who did not adhere to accepted rules or had no rules at all.44 This argu-
ment actually masked an inability to understand local norms of violence, but its sig-
nificance has perhaps been exaggerated. The rhetoric of exceptional circumstances 
was often a legitimation strategy to justify extreme force borne of necessity.45 
Most societies had concepts of exception which they employed to justify violence 
against their own members – for example by the French revolutionaries against the 
Vendean rebels.46 It was almost always possible to think of ethnic, religious, politi-
cal, or other distinctions, real or alleged, to underpin arguments that opponents 
were so heinous that extreme measures were necessary.
The volume
This volume is structured through thematic, rather than geographic, approaches. It 
provides a meaningful geographical framework for rethinking Western histories of 
violence, with leading scholars of African, Atlantic, Asian, European, American, and 
maritime history. It does not intend, nor attempt, to be comprehensive. Instead, it 
provides detailed cases from a variety of locations, methodologies, and scholars. 
Histories of the role of violence on land and at sea, in war, slavery, state justice, 
massacres, and popular resistance outline the various ways in which violence 
was expressed, articulated, and used. A range of approaches to violence are also 
included: whether of its representation through visual material, its manipulation 
in intellectual discourse, or methods to measure its extent. The thirteen chapters 
are grouped thematically into three sections, the first of which examines the role of 
warfare, banditry, and other forms of large-scale violence in promoting or retarding 
power structures, including local and regional networks, as well as sovereign states. 
The second part examines the ideological, cultural, and practical limits to the use of 
violence, as well as what forms of violence have been considered as excessive  by 
different cultures and societies. The final part investigates the role of large-scale 
violence in defining communities and in distinguishing who belongs and who is 
considered an outsider, as well as how this anthropological process shapes control 
over human and material resources.
The first section, ‘Coherence and Fragmentation’, opens with Richard Reid’s 
overview of the crucial role of violence and its rhetoric in early modern Africa. It 
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traces how violence was shaped by global forces: the militarization of Africa had a 
significant but ambiguous impact on local dynamics, as interstate, intercommunal, 
and interpersonal violence were intertwined. Likewise, the chapters by Michael 
Charney and Vũ Đức Liêm illustrate how efforts by central authorities to monopo-
lize violence cannot be reduced to a simple clash between centre and periphery. 
State formation in precolonial Burma, as outlined by Charney, resulted in admin-
istrative violence imposed by provincial officials on local communities, especially 
in frontier or non-state areas, but the prevalence of violence was invisible to the 
royal centre of the kingdom. By contrast, the Vietnamese emperor was aware of the 
endemic rural violence across the early nineteenth century. However, his attempts 
to tackle militia by categorizing them as bandits increased local violence instead of 
reducing it. Indeed, such efforts could inadvertently fuel armed conflict and encour-
age warlordism, even if caused by the ambition of those at the centre to extend 
their authority into the parts of the realm previously largely beyond their reach – a 
common feature of many early modern states.47 Manu Sehgal’s re-examination of 
the East India Company, on the other hand, emphasizes the way this corporate 
state, a military actor in South Asia from early on, expanded its ambitions for sub-
continental conquest during the eighteenth century, thus itself becoming a violent 
colonial state. Likewise, Brian Sandberg identifies the preponderance of raiding 
warfare in sixteenth-century France by unbundling raiding from so-called primi-
tive war. He thereby links changing patterns of organized economic devastation 
through ‘small wars’ to a type of violence that was found throughout many other 
parts of the early modern world.
The second section, ‘Restraint and Excess’, examines the attitude of large polities 
towards violence, analysing how they responded to and used violence, as well as 
how they tried to channel, organize, and limit it. Anthony McFarlane transposes the 
idea of Pax Hispanica to Spanish America to frame the colonial period. Following a 
very violent conquest, he argues, violence was less prevalent than in early modern 
Europe. Only the early nineteenth-century imperial crisis led to insurgencies 
that swept away Spanish rule and favoured violence through the militarization of 
communities and the fragmentation of authority. Likewise, Pratyay Nath’s close 
examination of Mughal imperial ideology highlights its ambivalent attitude towards 
military violence: the sovereign, who was responsible for maintaining peace among 
his subjects, could use violence against civilians who resisted his rule – yet his 
responsibilities also included mercy and forgiveness. The universal ideology of his 
sovereignty meant that such ambivalence shaped policies towards all within – or 
potentially within – his empire. By contrast, the chapters by Alexander Osipian and 
by Adam Clulow and Xing Hang examine the nature of raiding economies, though 
in two very different contexts. By analysing brigandage on the Ottoman–Russian 
buffer zone, Osipian shows how non-state violence was encouraged by local author-
ities that engaged in the raiding economy. Similarly, Clulow and Hang outline how 
the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC), though sanctioned by the state, 
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acted on its own account, wielding violence as a policy instrument while seeking to 
curb its excesses, at least where these conflicted with their own interests.48 The case 
of piracy demonstrates how the oceans were (and partly still are) liminal spaces 
where the boundaries between war and peace were blurred, while jurisdictions and 
the legality of certain acts were hotly contested.49
In the final section, ‘Differentiation and Identification’, Trevor Burnard 
 underscores the centrality of violence to the Atlantic slave system, but also how 
sensationalist accounts of violence shaped abolitionist literature and modern-day 
scholarship. Contemporary sources – whether written or visual – often say more 
about the authors’ and readers’ understanding of violence than about the events 
themselves. As Michael van Duijnen shows, representations of Ottoman troops 
and violence were not necessarily intended as realistic, but assumed an allegori-
cal value, employing the symbol of the ‘terrible Turk’ to critique less-than-perfect 
Christian morality.50 Joseph Clarke demonstrates how French revolutionary sol-
diers transposed ideas formed through fighting the Catholic Vendean rebels onto 
Muslim opponents during Napoleon’s Egyptian campaign in 1798. In both cases, 
violence served to sharpen a sense of a clear divide between civilization and barba-
rism.51 Wayne Lee similarly compares a range of modes of conquest, outlining how 
mutual misunderstandings of military violence played a crucial role in early modern 
conquest. Unlike the previous focus on representations, Lee takes a structural 
approach, making use of archaeological and economic data to compare and con-
trast a range of types of societies, thereby suggesting a rational and material basis for 
a global understanding of violence.
Lee suggests that the early modern period saw increased contact between socie-
ties, thus encouraging both cross-cultural connections and conflict. Indeed, warfare 
frequently crossed so-called civilizational boundaries which were in fact porous and 
blurred, such as that between the Ottoman Empire and Christian Europe. While 
caution is always useful in suggesting global characteristics of historical periods – 
especially given that ‘early modern’ can be as Western-centric as ‘modernity’ – the 
emergence of more centralized states is an indicative feature of early modernity 
and one that was not restricted to Europe.52 However, as the chapters that follow 
demonstrate, this did not necessarily result in the constraint of violence. Such states 
were often the most potent wielders of force, capable of using violence on a far 
greater scale than any other actors. This volume offers cases that supplement estab-
lished state-centric perspectives with accounts of large-scale violence by non-state 
actors, since these were also defining features of the global early modern.
Collectively, the contributions to this volume underscore the importance of 
local contexts. But they also point out the significance of global structural simi-
larities, such as the raiding tactics noted by Sandberg and Lee. Trading companies 
have been rightly identified as agents of European, especially seaborne, imperial-
ism, but other armed non-state actors were more universal throughout the early 
modern world. Equivalents of the Burmese and Vietnamese militias feature in 
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the discussion by Sandberg of early modern France and by McFarlane of Spanish 
America, respectively, while the highwaymen studied by Osipian can be compared 
to those who  preyed on the Saharan caravan routes. As outlined by Clulow and 
Hang, the piratical activities of the Chinese Zheng cartel in the South China Sea 
had their equivalents on other oceans. Likewise, the slave trade involved multiple 
different armed actors, as indicated by Burnard and Reid. Indeed, as Clulow and 
Hang remind us, efforts to regulate violence were not restricted to states, but could 
emanate from local and regional actors. Armed non-state actors were not invariably 
opposed to states, while state claims to their inhabitants’ obedience and resources 
were backed up by the threat of force, encouraging some commentators to com-
pare them to protection rackets.53 Early modern non-state actors were not wholly 
indiscriminate in their use of violence which, like that employed by states, was situ-
ational, guided by ideas of restraint, function, and legitimacy.
Across the early modern period, violence remained endemic, even if its inten-
sity and form varied significantly over time and place. De-escalation and restraint 
hinged on how far it was possible to establish (or restore) mutuality. As several of 
the contributions to this volume make clear, negotiations were essential to limiting 
violence, but violence was itself a component of negotiations. In fact, violence was a 
form of communication, used to intimidate enemies into giving ground and to dem-
onstrate the futility of their continued armed resistance. Measures such as destroy-
ing crops or homes were not necessarily immediately lethal, but could become 
so if they destroyed opponents’ means of existence. The emergence of a relative 
balance of forces could foster restraint, as it became obvious that neither side held 
a clear advantage. Above all, the credible belief that opponents could retaliate could 
encourage restraint.54
Early modern violence was more complex than suggested by simple narratives of 
conquest and resistance. Moreover, key features of imperial violence apply equally 
to large-scale violence within societies. As the contributions to this volume indicate, 
violence was a continuum, ranging from small-scale, local actions to full-blown 
war. The latter was privileged legally and increasingly associated with states during 
early modernity, but its legitimacy was frequently contested and many of its violent 
forms, such as raiding and destruction of buildings and crops, could be found in 
activities not officially classed as war. As these chapters demonstrate, violence in 
the early modern world could take many forms, ranging from slavery and massacres 
to banditry and diplomatic threats. Examining these cases within wide-ranging 
regional contexts challenges narratives of both decline and increase in violence, sug-
gesting instead continuities in the nature and frequency of violence across the early 
modern and modern period. 
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‘None could stand before him in the battle, none 
ever reigned so wisely as he’: the expansion and 
significance of violence in early modern Africa
Richard Reid
Mwezi and Mirambo
The quotation in the title belongs to the nineteenth-century explorer and journalist 
Henry Morton Stanley, who was writing in the context of the Nyamwezi people, 
in north-central Tanzania, in the 1870s.1 Stanley’s larger concern was Mirambo 
(c.1840–84), who was either, depending on one’s perspective, a great warrior 
and would-be state-builder, or an outright bandit and emblem of Africa’s savage, 
backward condition. What is clear is that this was a period of profound political, 
economic, and military upheaval, a transformative moment for the Nyamwezi and 
one replicated across the continent in the course of the nineteenth century. But 
the Stanley quotation is not in reference to Mirambo himself: rather, it reflected 
local memories of Mirambo’s supposed distant ancestor, an ‘ancient ruler’ called 
Mwezi, and thus represented a desire on the part of the revolutionary Mirambo – 
and on the part of the Nyamwezi in an age of revolution – to discern historical 
gravity and continuity in turbulent times. Mwezi may or may not have been an 
actual historical figure; but more importantly, in many ways, he was interpreted 
by Stanley’s informants as embodying two critical characteristics – the unstop-
pable warrior with the ability to wield maximum force on the field of combat, and 
the wise, judicious ruler. On the one hand, Mirambo himself was keen not to be 
seen as a mere upstart with newly acquired firearms, but rather as the modern 
incarnation of an illustrious predecessor, his violence restorative and aimed at the 
 re-creation of unity and stability. More broadly, however, Mwezi exemplified, in 
the midst of a turbulent epoch, the ineffable connection between violence and 
sagacity and the need to frame founding  ancestors as the armed founts of the 
political and moral order.2
Expansion of violence in early modern Africa
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It was no coincidence that in the course of the nineteenth century a host of 
warriors and practitioners of violence, diverse in provenance and context, looked 
backward into the deeper past for sources of succour and constancy. The nineteenth 
century was a violent epoch – of change, rolling crisis, and anxiety, in part brought 
on by mounting external threats3 – and Africans sought reassurance from histories 
in which violence was seen to have moral meaning, was characterized by righteous 
fervour, and was practiced by those motivated by loftier ambitions. But this was no 
mere exercise in historical reinvention, although there was certainly something of 
that too. Nineteenth-century Africans looked back several generations to a period, 
broadly between the fifteenth and the eighteenth centuries, in which the exercise 
of violence had begun to change dramatically, and in which the deployment of vio-
lence was critical to the emergence, consolidation, and expansion of new political 
and cultural orders.
The concept of the ‘early modern’, around which this volume has largely been 
organized, might raise some eyebrows in the Africanist academy. I do not propose 
to dwell at length on this issue, though there is a discussion to be had about what 
‘early modern’ means in the African context.4 It is, of course, a primarily Eurocentric 
notion, but this does not mean therefore that it has no validity elsewhere. It is true 
that most Africans would not recognize the terminology: ‘precolonial’ remains a 
popular, generic term for much of what happened before c.1880. But perhaps any 
objection is a question of nomenclature, rather than of periodization itself.5 What is 
clear is that by the second half of the fifteenth century, much of the continent was 
on the threshold of a new and violent era, and the ensuing four centuries would see 
innovative forms of military organization, new wars, as well as new ways of fighting 
them, and novel cultures of militarism underpinning such systems. Certainly the 
evidence – though necessarily fragmentary, as I explain below – suggests that the 
early part of our period was a foundational ‘moment’ in modern African history. 
To the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries can be dated the emergence of some 
of the continent’s most robust and enduring polities and cultures, underpinned 
by new technologies, deployments, and understandings of violence. Along the 
coastal forest of southern Nigeria and Ghana, across the West African savannah, 
in the Great Lakes region of East Africa, and in the central and northern Ethiopian 
Highlands, there was a widening use of violence to underpin political expansion 
early in the second millennium – prior to the age of global interaction – and new 
political cultures forged around security and protection. The point at which the 
‘early modern’ became the ‘modern’ in Africa is perhaps a subject for discussion, 
though there is no question, again, that the nineteenth century was a transformative 
period which exhibited some continuity from the deeper past, but also a marked 
degree of rupture.
More broadly, of course, the reconstruction of Africa’s military history is ren-
dered particularly difficult as a result of methodological challenges. The operation 
and the impact of the Atlantic slave trade is relatively well documented,6 but even 
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here, of course, assessment of the relevant source material is routinely attended 
by a great deal of intuition and speculation. The key point is that we rely over-
whelmingly – if by no means exclusively – on European accounts, which are often 
problematic for all sorts of reasons, not least in terms of the profound racism and 
cultural miscomprehension which invariably characterizes these texts. But use is 
also made of African accounts, broadly under the somewhat unsatisfactory term 
‘oral traditions’, many of which were put in writing in the early twentieth century. 
In general terms, the volume of source material increases as time goes on – the 
nineteenth century, notably, is comparatively well documented, although there is 
dramatic imbalance in coverage within the continent – which does not necessarily 
mean an increase in the quality of the material (quite the opposite, sometimes), 
though it does often enable corroboration.
Finally, what are we dealing with in thinking about ‘violence’? In many ways, the 
most visible indication of levels of violence is warfare, and the practice of war forms 
a central plank of our discussion here. But this cannot be about warfare alone, and 
in any case it could be argued that war is not necessarily indicative of levels of vio-
lence more generally. However, it is argued here that military transformations and 
increases in the scale and intensity of armed conflict are paralleled – indeed, made 
possible – by a growth in the ability of ruling elites to exercise violent control over 
subjects, and to develop and support internal cultures of political violence. In other 
words, this is not just about military violence but the spread of ideas around vio-
lence against the undeserving individual or community. At the same time, however, 
well-armed, ostensibly violent societies also offer possibilities for restraint and pro-
tection for those who adhere to evolving systems and processes: in a sense, a form 
of social contract, or ‘elite bargain’. It is also worth noting that much of sub-Saharan 
Africa was historically underpopulated – the direct control of people, crudely put, 
was often more important than the direct control of land7 – which meant that kill-
ing, for example, was not necessarily sensible, or desirable. This placed something 
of an intrinsic constraint on extreme violence, although an important caveat is in 
order: killing is only the end point of a spectrum and violence is exercised in all 
sorts of ways designed to instil fear, subdue, suppress, and enforce loyalty. This was 
certainly how Mirambo remembered Mwezi.
A world of violence? From ‘pre-contact’ to external intrusion
The term ‘pre-contact’ is, of course, hugely problematic. What does it even mean? 
In this exposition, we are concerned with relative scale: in the African context, 
there are communities which are relatively self-contained – at least until the 
nineteenth century – and which are the product of largely endogenous dynamics, 
including the utilization of land, population growth, and regional migration. Pure 
indigeneity is not a concept in which I would normally trade, but for the purposes 
of this chapter – and of the larger collection of papers, focused as these are on the 
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global parameters of violence – I consider it significant, insofar as the overriding 
purpose is to assess the extent to which Africans experienced violence in a global 
context and as the result of external influences, in the early modern period. And so 
I begin with the stark idea that some parts of the continent, notably eastern Africa, 
were not influenced by external intrusions until quite late in our timescale. So what 
does the available evidence suggest about such communities?
In some cases, again, it is the evidence for broadly military change which is reveal-
ing. The linguistic, archaeological, and ethnographic evidence for west- central 
Africa, for example, suggests shifts in the practice and culture of violence which 
predates the external slave trade: a process of militarization is discernible over sev-
eral centuries, doubtless driven by gradual population increase and the attendant 
expansion in political and economic scale, involving greater military cooperation 
across wider areas, larger armies, and greater levels of destruction and bodily harm. 
By the fifteenth century, young men were commonly organized into age sets (dis-
cernible in coastal Angola, for example), pointing towards the heightened social 
significance of organized violence – or the threat of it – in underpinning political 
cohesion, while an increasingly diverse array of weaponry (throwing and stabbing 
spears, throwing knives, battleaxes, and, unsurprisingly, body armour) is indicative 
of increasing levels and more destructive forms of bodily violence.8
In the Great Lakes region of East Africa, political entrepreneurs in the first half of 
the second millennium ce used violence to build new states and societies and devel-
oped ideologies rooted in the notion that violence was necessary to the securement 
of ‘peace’ and social cohesion, as well as in the drive for economic expansion and 
exploitation of factor endowments.9 In Bunyoro, and later Buganda and Nkore, 
founding fathers were men of war, but simultaneously builders of coalitions and 
guarantors of collective security. In these new communities, created in the swirl 
of population movement across some of the most fertile land in the region, moral-
ity was central to the exercise of violence, as well as in its restraint. In the course 
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a string of small but potent territorial 
states between lakes Tanganyika and Victoria – Bunyoro, Buganda, Nkore, Toro, 
Rwanda, Burundi – boasted a capacity for rapid military mobilization and built 
traditions of martial prowess into their social and moral edifices. Kings needed to 
be war leaders, capable of protecting their peoples from outside attack, but equally 
able to command regular campaigns aimed at territorial expansion and resource 
extraction.10 The connection between external armed adventurism and cohesion 
at home was robust: in eighteenth-century Buganda, for example, war itself under-
pinned a thriving military culture at home, and a set of martial values according 
to which ‘good citizenship’ was measured.11 In a political equation familiar in 
our own era, security against outside aggression meant handing over to govern-
ing elites the right to exercise a degree of violence at home against dissidents and 
malcontents, real or imagined. The expansionist Ganda state was directed by an 
increasingly powerful kingship which, in the course of the eighteenth century, was 
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able to reward military loyalty and prowess with land and political appointments. 
At the same time, the violence exercised by kings – both random and punitive – was 
tolerated among the broader populace, even expected.12 Later, nineteenth-century 
European accounts were certainly at pains to describe a society seemingly inured 
to suffering, and in which violence could befall anyone within reach of the king’s 
whim.13 These accounts, of course, are problematic, and in any case the ruler who 
overreached himself might expect serious repercussions, up to and including armed 
ouster. There may well have been considerable tolerance of violence on the part of 
the populace, but only up to a point, as oral tradition relating to the punishment of 
wayward kings indicates.14
So much for those regions in which we can identify some measure of endog-
enously driven practice and cultures of violence. The fact remains, however, that 
the predominant driver of violence – in politics, in military practice, and in social 
relations – across swathes of the continent in the early modern era, was interac-
tion with global forces. This is emphatically not to suggest that violence on mul-
tiple levels was an external invention; that would be ludicrous. It is to argue that 
cultures of violence changed rapidly as a result of external exchange and led to 
new ideas about the value and the limitations of violence as a political and social 
process. Two examples from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries illustrate 
the dynamics at work, if in distinctive ways. The first, Ethiopia, certainly needed 
no external stimulus to violence, as its remarkable earlier history demonstrates. 
Political entrepreneurs were at work in the Ethiopian Highlands – frequently seen 
in terms of exceptionalism15 – where the Solomonic state rested on an overtly ide-
ological and religious deployment of violence in both subduing external enemies 
and moulding an internal, ‘national’ identity. Christian Ethiopia was particularly 
adept at mobilizing a dramatic historical vision – centrally, the notion that it was 
the New Zion, with a covenant with God – legitimizing both an expansion in the 
scale of war and new forms of violence against internal dissenters and backslid-
ers.16 The politicization of violence was spurred, too, by an influx of migrants 
into the highlands from the south in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: 
these were the Oromo, depicted in terms of fear and loathing by contemporary 
Ethiopian chroniclers who portrayed them as the embodiment of primordial sav-
agery, intent on the destruction of highland Christian civilization.17 But the early 
modern period also witnessed new external irruptions. Ethiopia was threatened 
by an increasingly aggressive Muslim presence in the Horn, emanating from the 
eastern lowlands and the Somali plains, and often bolstered by influences from 
Arabia. Notably, the jihad of Ahmad ibn Ibrahim in the 1530s brought the kingdom 
almost to the point of destruction, avoided in part by the arrival of several hundred 
Portuguese musketeers.18 The latter formed part of an expanding presence in the 
Red Sea and Indian Ocean, slowly but surely encompassing this vast region within 
a frontier of global violence. It was frequently the case in Ethiopia that an upsurge 
in violence – both externally, in the form of wars against encroaching antagonists, 
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and internally, against non-believers and the culturally unassimilated – was driven 
by a revival of religious consciousness. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-
ries, Jesuit missionaries infiltrated the highlands, won a number of converts to 
Catholicism from Orthodox Christianity, and instigated a crisis for the state which 
culminated in a bloody civil war in the 1620s.19
The second example is the central African kingdom of Kongo, an early par-
ticipant in the slave trade following the arrival of the Portuguese in the 1480s. The 
scholarly consensus is that a wide area was exposed to the predations of slave-
raiding armies equipped with muskets (sometimes accompanied by contingents of 
Portuguese soldiers), while Kongolese political culture incorporated an aggressive 
strand of militarism centred on the king. As provinces rebelled to protect them-
selves from the ravages of royal armies, violence ultimately consumed the old king-
dom in the course of the sixteenth century.20 Kongo demonstrates the early impact 
of the slave  trade, and in no arena is the transformation in violence more clearly 
demonstrable than in Africa’s Atlantic zone – defined here as stretching between 
Senegambia in the north and the Angolan coast in the south – for this vast region, 
encompassing a considerable hinterland, was transformed by the slave trade to the 
Americas between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries. There is considerable 
evidence that across key zones of global engagement – most obviously in Atlantic 
Africa including Senegambia and points further east, the Slave Coast states on 
the Bight of Biafra, the Kongo kingdom, present-day Angola, and as far south as 
the Cape of Good Hope, site of eventual European settlement – violence escalated 
dramatically and was used to both commercial and political ends.
Central Africa, again, illustrates a particular pattern. In the area of present-day 
Angola, a more or less direct outcome of external engagement was the emergence of 
new forms of violence, driven in large part by private armies under entrepreneurial 
warlords. The Imbangala, possibly originating from a subversive faction of a local 
Ovimbundu army and certainly arising out of slave-raiding violence in the late 
sixteenth century, were mobile bands of professional warriors who attacked and 
invaded the Atlantic coast in the 1570s and 1580s. In the decades that followed, they 
came to dominate much of the Ovimbundu region, and by the mid seventeenth 
century there were several areas under the control of Imbangala bands stretching 
across central Angola. Imbangala armies themselves had a ferocious reputation – 
theirs was a form of total war, involving widespread pillaging as well as the capture 
of people for sale – and were organized along complex lines of command; boys were 
taken when young and trained up to be fed into the system.21 Again, evidence from 
the military sphere is worth noting: the Imbangala frequently served as mercenar-
ies in others’ armies, and indeed the use of mercenaries was increasingly common 
across the Atlantic zone through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, another 
indication of growing military professionalism as well as of the privatization of vio-
lence itself and the opportunities for a career in violence. Smaller coastal polities 
such as Allada and Whydah, for example, made use of Akwamu soldiers from the 
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neighbouring Gold Coast region in the late seventeenth century.22 All of this cer-
tainly suggests heightened levels of destruction, as well as profound changes in the 
perception of violence – i.e., that it was ‘normal’, was seemingly tolerated, and had 
clear economic and political rationality.
The Imbangala exemplified a new kind of restless, predatory military culture, 
one generated by the slaving violence of the age. But other, no less predatory, 
political forms emerged with direct links to the external slave trade, in particular 
new territorial states with increasingly complex military systems and ideological 
approaches to the organization and interpretation of violence: the states of Oyo,23 
Asante,24 and Dahomey, most notably. Dahomey, in particular, was a dynamic and 
expansionist state, its roots in the slave trade and organized around a predatory 
militarism. Dahomey’s army comprised a series of well-drilled regiments equipped 
increasingly with firearms, in particular flintlock muskets. Each regiment made use 
of emblems and was sustained by a system in which young boys were assigned to 
soldiers for rigorous training. The kingdom fought wars for slaves, large numbers of 
whom were earmarked for export. Just as important were those needed for internal 
consumption, including for the sustenance of the domestic economy, but also, 
according to somewhat titillating contemporary European accounts, for sacrifice in 
public ceremonies exhibiting royal power and assuaging ancestors. Certainly such 
sources depicted a deeply violent, blood-soaked society – an increasingly common 
trope in European discourse about Africa in the early modern period. But, as in the 
eighteenth century, there was a distinction between those who – as part of the cam-
paign to abolish the slave trade – depicted Dahomey as the product of that nefarious 
commerce, and those accounts written by slave traders who sought to describe a 
kingdom which was naturally violent and which needed no external stimuli to be so. 
Still, there is little doubt that the authority of Dahomean kings was to a significant 
extent rooted in their ability to command armies, to capture people, and above all to 
inflict violence, up to and including death itself.25 Dahomey exemplifies the expan-
sion of centralized, militarized political power, in other words, which was attended 
by the increase in the capacity of that authority to wield various forms of personal 
violence; the rise of new military states, inextricably linked to the commerce in 
human beings, involved the increase and normalization of acute forms of interper-
sonal violence in the ‘domestic’ sphere, and Dahomey illustrates the pattern.
Meanwhile, the widening and increasingly skilful use of firearms – especially in 
coastal states and societies – undoubtedly facilitated new levels of violence. But 
caution is needed here: interestingly, there is some evidence that, on battlefields 
at least, the close military formations of the seventeenth century sometimes gave 
way to more open, fluid deployments in the eighteenth, often involving smaller 
and more mobile units. A number of African armies now sought to avoid close 
combat altogether and amassed musketeers at vantage points from which fields of 
fire were designed to overwhelm enemies at distance. Exceptions to this loosening 
up of battlefield formation were to be found in the frontier zones between forest 
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and savannah, where infantry armies were accustomed to facing enemies on horse-
back. Guns could unquestionably inflict horrific bodily injury, and the increasing 
frequency of gunshot injuries must have shaped, in very profound ways, percep-
tions of the power of such weapons over bodies and enhanced the threat value 
intrinsic to centralizing political and military authority. Still, it was just as often 
the sound and smoke of guns – when they worked – which generated an aural 
and visual violence just as critical to the success of armies and political elites: this 
was in many ways psychological warfare based on a fear of much greater violence 
than was sometimes realistically possible, even if – and the point is an important 
one – guns did not generally do any manifestly greater damage to bodies than 
existing, very sharp, very poisonous, very effective weapons. More broadly, in an 
increasingly competitive political and economic environment, the size of armies 
expanded and the nature of war itself changed. A general trend across the Atlantic 
zone was the deployment of archers as skirmishers in support of soldiers equipped 
with short spears, clubs, and knives, whose main aim was to close on the enemy 
and engage the latter in hand-to-hand combat.26 The close-range nature of much 
physical combat suggests the increasing prevalence of ideas about bodily destruc-
tion as necessary to the achievement of political and economic objectives. With 
military and political change, in other words, came implications for levels and 
forms of interpersonal violence, which in turn served as both representation and 
extension of the personalized power of kings and warriors.
At the same time, it is important to note that while slave raiding undoubtedly 
involved targeted killing – especially of the old and infirm – its primary objective 
was to take captives alive and relatively unharmed. Dead or badly injured slaves 
were wasted assets.27 In that sense, it might be suggested – counterintuitively, 
 perhaps – that the very nature of the slaving economy meant constraints on the 
infliction of violence. Slavery and slaving, in other words, also involved the exercise 
of restraint – notwithstanding the immediate and accurate association of slavery 
with a particularly odious and relentless form of physical violence. But, beyond 
a certain point, it was not economically advisable to inflict too much damage on 
slaves, and certainly not to kill them, although a certain death toll was evidently 
regarded as acceptable in the course of military operations. This of course relates 
to an earlier point – namely, the economic and demographic rationale for restraint. 
In historically underpopulated sub-Saharan Africa, people were more valuable than 
land, and in this context violence must be understood in more nuanced terms. 
Overt violence needed restraint and was selective, because it was vitally important 
to tie people to you as a political leader; land was plentiful, and therefore other insti-
tutions of implicit violence – slavery, polygamy – were necessary. African ideologies 
and religions made much of fertility and reproduction.28
The heightened and increasingly central role of militarism, cultures of arms, and 
the exercise of violence in West and Central African states and societies, were at least 
in part the outcome of sustained engagement with external dynamics – specifically, 
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the commercial and industrial societies of the North Atlantic. Innovations in vio-
lence in these vast regions intersected with Europe’s own revolutions in the exercise 
and culture of violence. The European military revolution facilitated the emergence 
of the nation state system, involved close linkages between trade and war, and was 
characterized by the deployment of violence for the purposes of both internal cohe-
sion and external expansion.29 There can be little question that African societies’ 
engagement with this violent revolution was at least in part, if not wholly, responsible 
for processes of militarization and widening deployment of violence in those socie-
ties. An equally interesting dynamic – though not one for which there is space to 
explore here – is the degree to which Africans’ use of violence influenced Europe’s 
own unfolding transformation: for it most certainly did, whether in terms of military 
tactics or of cultures of violence.
Much of the Atlantic zone can be considered a frontier of global interaction 
with major repercussions for the uses and cultures of violence. But that frontier 
was altogether more tangible at Cape Colony, established by Dutch settlers in 1652 
and rapidly becoming one of the most violent and militarized of African–European 
frontiers. Here, Dutch settlers’ seizure of Khoisan cattle prompted Khoisan 
counterraids and led to significant conflicts in 1659–60 and in the mid 1670s. Armed 
initially with matchlocks and then with flintlocks, the Dutch, or Boers (‘farm-
ers’), expanded onto Khoisan land from the late seventeenth century onward, 
compelling dispossessed Khoisan into a life of hunting and raiding. The Boers 
themselves would counter the growing Khoisan threat by forming militia units 
known as commandos, in what represented an escalation of frontier violence.30 
Across the eastern borderlands of Cape Colony, too, the Boers were engaged in 
cyclical conflict with the Xhosa, who represented a rather more robust obstacle to 
their seemingly inexorable advance than the Khoisan. Prolonged warfare, waged 
between Boer and Xhosa raiding parties, was fought over the Zuurveld, Xhosa 
grazing land, began in the 1770s and 1780s and periodically erupted throughout the 
nineteenth century.31 Along and within the expanding frontiers of the Cape, the 
growing racialization of violence was a harbinger of what was to come, in southern 
Africa and elsewhere on the continent, whether in terms of the settler approach 
towards supposedly genetically inferior enemies, or in the quotidian deployment 
of violence towards conquered and subject populations.32 To the north-east, in 
the Zambezi valley, Portuguese prazos – land grants, originally created for white 
settlers – were increasingly dominated by African-Portuguese warlords, or prazei-
ros, the product of local intermarriage and a hardy, militarized frontier culture. In 
the course of the eighteenth century, these warlords led armies of slave-soldiers 
(known as chikunda), not dissimilar in form and ethos to those of the West African 
hinterland, who spent much of their time feeding off burgeoning global trade, raid-
ing neighbours for tribute, and hunting.33 Here, too, was an emerging frontier of 
global interaction which brought with it opportunities for the fortunate and the 
brave – not least in terms of the fulfilment of new material aspirations – but one 
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of whose essential characteristics was also the exercise of unprecedented levels of 
physical and psychological violence. It was the age of commodities, but it was also 
the age of heightened anxiety and entrepreneurial might.
The memory of violence
These dynamics became all the more potent across the continent in the course 
of the nineteenth century, an era of military revolution and violent sociopolitical 
transformation. A military revolution during this epoch involved the centrality of 
power over violence on the part of rulers, with violence underpinning political and 
religious authority. In that sense, the expanded deployment of violence was both 
‘personal’ and state-level. This is the period, above all, when these dynamics con-
verge across the continent: whatever differentiation in drivers, purpose, and levels 
of external/global influence there may have been between the sixteenth and the 
eighteenth centuries, there is no doubt that ‘globalized’ dynamics, especially in the 
realms of commerce but in more general contact too, bred heightened levels of both 
interstate/intercommunity and interpersonal violence. New political orders were 
organized around new forms of violence, which was ever more central to social and 
cultural cohesion, as well as access to new forms of weaponry. Across Africa, there 
was a clear correlation between expanding warfare and the use of violence within 
societies. In an age of heightened economic competition which necessitated the 
creation of new means of social control, the internal and external uses of violence 
were indelibly intertwined.34
Yet this was not purely about naked coercion: violence was also moral, and the 
most common means of asserting that morality was in the construction of histori-
cal narratives to legitimize the use of force at home and abroad; states and societies 
in an age of violent upheaval sought historical gravitas by rooting themselves in the 
earlier era, seeking stability and legitimacy in antiquity. Instances of this proliferate 
across the continent – in neo-Solomonic Ethiopia;35 among the Ganda and Nyoro 
of the Great Lakes region;36 among the Zulu in the wake of Shaka’s rise;37 in the 
intellectual organization of the Sokoto Caliphate and other jihadist states in West 
Africa;38 and, as we noted at the outset, among the Nyamwezi under the insurgent 
warlord Mirambo. We cannot know for certain whether ‘Mwezi’ actually existed; 
what we do know is that Mirambo sought ancestry for his violence and identified 
figures in the deeper past who had supposedly governed extensive polities with 
teeming (but united) populations.39 The hunger for political and moral lodestars 
is evident in Buganda, too, where nineteenth-century kings ruled in the shadow 
of mythical founding father Kintu, who in most traditions had recourse to armed 
force to conquer the area for civilization, but who then became the exemplar of 
peaceable and moral governance.40 Ultimately, the historicization of violence 
reflected the ideological core of polity-building in the nineteenth century: the cre-
ation of political order, now as in the deeper past, was a moral process and involved 
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righteous violence exercised by pioneers and entrepreneurs who embodied certain 
ideal characteristics. They were spiritually righteous, morally sound, politically 
astute, physically courageous. In an era in which the expanding scale of warfare and 
numerous state-building projects, driven in large part by rapid economic change, 
involved rising levels of interpersonal and social violence, it was critical to believe 
that violence ultimately had pure and virtuous goals in the deeper past – that kin-
ship, citizenship, and ‘peace’ itself were guaranteed by the righteous warrior and 
his loyal adherents.
Something of a historical revolution attended social, political, and economic 
transformation in the nineteenth century. However, in the course of the twen-
tieth century, the trend was towards the steady foreshortening of Africa’s past 
on the part of colonial strategists and African elites alike, driven in large part by 
discomfort around the idea of violence in the deeper past and the eschewal of 
such histories in favour of a more positivist vision of the future based on ‘modern’ 
economic development.41 Violence in Africa during the nineteenth century, in par-
ticular – but in fact throughout the era under examination – was consistently mis-
understood by European observers and was used, ultimately, to justify European 
imperialism. Perceptions of African warfare, notably, became increasingly racial-
ized; outside observers did not see the sociopolitical creativity, or the develop-
mental potential, of African war, but only violent disorder which was symptomatic 
of racial backwardness and which needed to be brought to an end. As European 
discourse around the continent became increasingly couched in the language of 
race and progress, and as the European ‘civilizing mission’ took shape, centred 
on ideas about development and primitiveness, the ‘savage barbarity’ which was 
espied everywhere in Africa – not least the persistence of the ‘illegal’ slave trade – 
was used to validate armed intervention.42 It may not have been a direct cause of 
the partition, but it provided the essential cultural and moral framework within 
which imperialism was deemed not merely possible but necessary. This was a 
chronic misapprehension of what had been momentous events and processes 
across Africa, and it is a view which has persisted to the present, in various ways. 
The late nineteenth-century interpretation of much African violence as funda-
mentally barbaric and illegitimate has proven robust and has frequently prevented 
more nuanced understanding of the role and practice of warfare in the continent’s 
early modern history. Modern memory is problematic: while nineteenth-century 
military rulers often reached into the past and imbued violence with moral value 
and a deep sense of temporality, their twentieth- and twenty-first-century coun-
terparts have had a more diffident relationship with histories of violence. In some 
ways, a trend towards forgetting is wholly understandable, even desirable, as has 
been argued eloquently by David Rieff.43 Historical remembrance, he suggests, 
is sometimes burnished with a value which is in fact undeserved, and which in 
any case can go badly wrong – witness any number of atrocities in recent times 
which have been somehow justified by a particular version of collective historical 
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memory.44 Given the traumas facing Africans over the past two centuries, a bout 
of amnesia might be regarded as wholly fitting. Perhaps it is. However, in modern 
Africa the problem has been not so much one of forgetfulness, but rather of distor-
tion and misremembering.
Postcolonial African leaders certainly foreshortened historical memory, espe-
cially in terms of warfare and ideas about violence more generally. Such histories 
were eschewed in favour of more positivist, economic visions of the future – 
couched in ideas about modernity which was (ironically) conceived of in terms 
of peace and prosperity, in sharp distinction to the realities unfolding across 
postcolonial Africa. In the postcolonial age, builders of nations became altogether 
warier of the violent past – in large part because of their own violent present. 
Uganda illustrates the theme, with a president, Yoweri Museveni, who was vocal 
and forthright in his belief that ‘The Past’ was a problem to be left behind, that the 
precolonial age had seen no significant achievements in Africa but only ‘backward 
tribes’, and that history in any case was a ‘useless subject’.45 Museveni was wont 
to point towards the sectarian bloodletting which had characterized much of 
Uganda’s deeper past, and in so doing he effectively repackaged Dark Continent 
mythology for a local audience. He was not alone among early twenty-first-century 
African leaders in exhibiting nervousness about imbuing past violence with too 
much positive significance.46 But leaders such as Museveni could have taken 
comfort, had they looked more closely, from the utility of violence over la longue 
durée and from the fact that their predecessors’ aims were much in line with their 
own. Violence in early modern Africa was denied a developmental role, and indeed 
its place, as a critical part of human experience – not only in terms of the actual 
exercise of violence, but also in terms of restraint, which was such an essential part 
of unfolding experimentation in relationships between governed and governing. 
The rehabilitation of violence in Africa’s deeper past is a necessary part of ongoing 
political struggles and culture wars, though without question it is a challenging 
project and one fraught with risk.
Conclusions: a continent neither ‘merrie’ nor ‘dark’
The assessment of violence in African history is fraught with difficulty. On the one 
hand, the argument made in this chapter – that the continent in the early modern 
period was a pretty violent place, and increasingly so – is not one which will go 
down well in certain quarters. On a superficial level, it seems to reinforce a set of 
well-established tropes around a ‘Dark Continent’ which first emerged in Europe 
during the eighteenth century, hardened during the age of high imperialism in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, and which persist still in various popular 
interpretations of Africa in the Global North.47 I hope it goes without saying that 
this is not the intention of the argument here. It is, rather, my intention to inject 
a greater degree of sophistication into the analysis of violence in Africa’s history, 
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and to recognize the purposes it served. Often, those who would deny the idea that 
Africa has indeed experienced significant levels of violence in its deeper past tend 
towards the depiction of what Tony Hopkins once termed a ‘Merrie Africa’48 – a 
kind of idyll, before the intrusions of grasping foreigners.49 The external was clearly 
of enormous significance in some regions. But a reasoned, evidence-based approach 
disproves both ‘Dark Continent’ and ‘Merrie Africa’ mythology. Like many other 
parts of the world in the early modern period, Africa’s political, social, and eco-
nomic development was intimately linked to profound shifts in the culture  and 
practice of violence. In many ways this was ‘organic’, a natural part of population 
movement, settlement, and attendant political evolution; but it was also often, and 
by the nineteenth century almost everywhere, connected to global relationships 
which facilitated new – and in many respects more brutal – forms of violence.
Several years ago, the cognitive psychologist Steven Pinker argued that violence 
was in decline: this was the thesis presented in a mighty tome published in 2011,50 
and often cited by those who believe in the exorable march of progressive moder-
nity. It represents a kind of disturbingly Eurocentric optimism. Nonetheless, the 
argument represents something of a ‘new orthodoxy’, as termed by John Gray, 
who has also delivered one of the most devastating critiques of the book.51 In 
Africa, meanwhile, it can be demonstrated that violence has steadily increased in 
scale and expanded in purpose over the last half-millennium or more. It should 
not be the job of historians – and many others, including those with their hands 
on the levers of political power – to disguise this fact, or represent it as something 
other than what it is. The problem, rather, is that this broad trend has been mis-
represented and misunderstood, packaged within a set of racialized tropes current 
in Europe and the Global North since the nineteenth century about the intrinsic 
backwardness of African violence; or represented as imposed on a maligned con-
tinent by outside forces. Again, indeed, an Afrocentric audience would baulk at 
the idea of framing such violence in terms of political and economic development, 
or as something perfectly normal or understandable, and scholars who point to 
histories of violence in Africa at all are likely to be drowned out by cries of derision 
and accused of perpetuating old stereotypes about the continent.52 Yet violence 
attends change, generally, whether ‘good’ or ‘bad’ change, and it is rarely one or 
the other.53 In some ways, the righteous, putatively revolutionary violence of the 
mid and late twentieth century threw into shadow the notion that violence in the 
deeper past could be equally utilitarian and constructive in aim (if not necessarily 
in outcome).
The outcome of the process in motion between c.1500 and the late nineteenth 
century was an expansion in military scale, the professionalization of soldiery, the 
adoption of new weaponry, and the militarization of the polity – whether ‘state-
based’ or otherwise. The militarization of African polity and society was an ongoing 
process between the fifteenth and the nineteenth centuries, a period which in many 
ways witnessed the foundations being laid of modern African political systems. This 
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would culminate in a veritable military revolution in the nineteenth century, a trans-
formation in the organization and culture of violence, without which Europe’s later 
partition of the continent cannot properly be understood. The early modern era, in 
sum, witnessed the heightened use of violence internally and externally in pursuit of 
social cohesion and political consolidation; new forms of war and uses of violence 
were at the heart of many states, communities, and identities forged during the fer-
tile, foundational era of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. There were often 
different factors at work, and the key distinction between Atlantic Africa and the 
rest of the continent is the presence in the former of clear external drivers. But the 
organization of violence across early modern Africa had much in common, in terms 
of the aim to control factor endowments, to maximize population, and to construct 
enduring ideological systems, whether territorially or culturally defined.
One of the key concerns of this chapter has been the changing patterns and aims 
of war and the scope and scale of organized violence. But it is clear that this cannot 
be considered in some form of ‘military isolation’: we must also pay attention to 
the relationship between war and military organization on the one hand, and wider 
sociocultural and political norms and values around the exercise of violence on 
the other. Expanding political power meant militarization and expanding cultures 
of military command, which led to new ideas about what violence meant and how 
widely it could be exercised or controlled. Military transformations and escalations 
in war were paralleled by the growth and ability of ruling elites to exercise violent 
control over subjects and to develop internal cultures of political violence. At the 
same time, militarily organized societies also offered possibilities for restraint and 
protection to those who adhered to evolving systems and processes: the ultimate 
social contract. Of course, this relationship could be seen in more ambiguous terms: 
for example, did increasing militarization and military professionalism actually 
mean greater collective and individual security? Or was it in fact symptomatic of 
wider insecurity and of an increasingly indiscriminate use of violence (and celebra-
tion of violence) across society as a whole? Perhaps it is never quite so simple in 
terms of cause and effect; both scenarios are valid and can be valid simultaneously. 
Moreover, the infliction of bodily injury and punishment changed over time – not 
least because weapons themselves changed. But alongside this, cultures and repre-
sentations of such acts of violence altered too; in other words, levels of tolerance, or 
indeed intolerance, of certain forms of violence shifted according to circumstances 
and contexts. Political and military leaders commanded armies. But political and 
military authority increasingly extended into the exercise of interpersonal and indi-
vidual violence and the right, as well as the power, to inflict death and injury. What 
is also clear, of course, is that this was as much about fear, anxiety, and imagined 
threat, as burgeoning scholarship in the realms of emotions history indicates.54
Yet equally important was the moral rationale: reciprocal and collective secu-
rity and cohesion, underwritten in many ways by the fear of sanction. Thus there 
emerged idealized visions of kingship. Yet potent interpretations of the past in 
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the nineteenth century – a time of creative if violent energy – contrasted with the 
rather more diffident, selective, and even anxious visions of historical violence in 
the twentieth. In more recent decades, developmental agendas have generally pre-
cluded more nuanced, sophisticated, and robust discussions of the historical role of 
violence over Africa’s longue durée. 
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Both benevolent and brutal: the two sides of 
provincial violence in early modern Burma
Michael W. Charney
During a Buddhist festival in Rangoon at the Shwe Dagon Pagoda in 1809, the 
viceroy of Pegu (Min-Hla-Nawrahta), intent on providing a lesson that would 
prevent disloyalty spreading among his troops, had given orders for the execution 
of a number of men and their families. Four families were arrested: five men, four 
women, and three children. They were to ‘suffer cruel death’, having their bellies 
slit open and their legs removed at the knees. Although the viceroy would soon 
reduce the number to be killed, two men were taken out for execution anyway, as 
were their wives, ‘both young girls’ and one of them several months pregnant, as 
well as the three year-old daughter of one of the men. The viceroy believed only a 
‘severe execution’ would provide a serious enough example for his men.1 The two 
men were stretched out on the ground before a crowd. Their arms and legs were 
tied to stakes that had been pounded into the ground. In order to make the cutting 
easier, a thick board was placed under the back of each man. The women were now 
to be tied down in the same way, and similar boards were prepared to stretch them 
out as well and flatten their bodies to make things easier for the executioner, who 
stood above them. It was decided that the body of the three year-old girl was too 
small to need such a board or to be tied down at all. Presumably any blow would be 
sufficient.2
A British East India Company officer, Captain John Canning, acting on the 
request of the Ye-wun (deputy governor) of Rangoon, persuaded the viceroy to 
spare their lives, and the latter agreed to a pardon which had to be brought to the 
place of execution by messengers. The viceroy’s wrath was only half of the story 
behind the display of violence. The viceroy had warned that his own people in the 
crowd were so enraged against these men that they ‘would not only kill them, but eat 
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them’. In actuality, a great many in the audience were family members and friends. 
After the pardon arrived, an impending execution was still acted out. The execu-
tioner spent over a half hour after learning that the intended victims had been freed 
sharpening a knife as if about to execute them, and in a great burst of theatrics leapt 
over the men tied prostrate beneath him. Meanwhile the viceroy’s men,  officers 
of the government, moved through the crowd gathering contributions from terri-
fied friends of the victims to secure their release. One of those collecting this bribe 
money was the messenger who had brought the pardon. When 300 tickals had been 
collected and it was clear nothing more could be gained, the prisoners were untied 
and brought back to the jail where they were kept, along with the prisoners who had 
been pardoned earlier in the morning, until their friends and family paid more bribe 
money, which took them days to do. We are told that due to fright, presumably the 
constant fear that they were about to be executed, some of these women, who had 
already been ordered freed, went delirious. Only then was everyone freed.3 The 
viceroy is reported to have commented several times that the Burman population 
could only be kept under control through such ‘extreme severity’.4
Historians of the non-Western world might easily dismiss such observations 
by Company officials as the misinterpretations of Europeans who misunderstood 
indigenous culture and would not have been able to understand, at least fully, what 
they saw. Such early nineteenth-century accounts might also be taken as being influ-
enced by a tendency to view Asian governments as tyrannical. Such thinking often 
accompanied colonial conquests by Europeans who believed that they were ‘releas-
ing’ the general population from unfair servitude in favour of the more egalitarian 
opportunities afforded by rational Western rule and the introduction of capitalism.
Nevertheless, documentation for such episodes of violence, often including 
those found in European accounts, can also be found in the indigenous sources. 
Violence was an everyday part of living (and dying) in parts of early modern 
Burma, and this violence appeared to increase in many areas of the kingdom as this 
period progressed. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of violence per se in precolonial 
Burmese everyday life has not drawn much attention in the historiography. Nor 
has anyone explicitly used precolonial violence as a measure of Burma’s transition 
towards modernity. Instead, early modern Burma is seen as a period characterized 
by developments that would seem to have reduced violence, including increasing 
political centralization, and the introduction and enforcement of laws and central 
standards on behaviour that worked to stabilize society under the umbrella of the 
king’s protection of the practice of Buddhism and enforcement of the dharma, the 
moral law that sustains the Buddha’s dispensation. It looked, from the veranda of 
the royal palace, which itself was a metaphor for universal harmony, as if everything 
was under control.
The present chapter looks at early modern violence in Burma by decentring its 
historiographical lens away from the view of the court. Burmese chronicles mainly 
discuss developments in the royal court and the trials and tribulations of centrally 
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dispatched military expeditions to suppress rebellions in the provinces or to con-
quer foreign kingdoms. Most daily events outside of the royal centre are not dis-
cussed.5 We do have numerous other sources, including first-hand accounts and a 
fairly dense set of royal edicts from the period, which confirm why and when some of 
the episodes of violence occurred. Bringing sources together in this way can provide 
information and raise questions that relying on either indigenous source material 
or European source material alone cannot. But differences in perspectives regard-
ing these episodes of violence also indicate that provincial violence was viewed one 
way from the court and another in the province; the king saw in the execution of 
measured violence only the enforcement of royal will and the dharma, while pro-
vincial appointees saw in the threat of extreme violence a means of monetary gain. 
The coexistence of two perspectives on early modern violence in Burma were due to 
a particular irony of state formation in precolonial Burma – political centralization 
did not bring the village community closer to the court (or vice versa), but made the 
village more distant and autonomous from the royal court. This process involved the 
replacement of local royal and noble families with temporary, centrally appointed 
officials. The officials lacked the local networks, the ritual roles, and the traditional 
loyalties that had bonded local royal and noble families and the village together in 
the past. Yet these officials were also burdened with huge demands by the state for 
manpower and revenues. Moreover, these officials remained under threat by other 
rivals in the provinces who constantly sought to unseat them by causing problems 
between their rivals and the royal court. Temporary and insecure, outlying officials 
pushed local village communities to their limits for reserves of men and other 
resources, in ways that did not register with how just royal rule was maintained in 
the royal imaginary. Violence and the conspicuous threats of violence proved the 
only means that worked. Personal, bodily violence, whether merely threatened or 
actually inflicted, thus became an increasing feature of early modern state formation 
in outlying, frontier areas – the non-state spaces of the Burmese state.
This chapter will first examine the phenomenon of administrative violence in the 
Konbaung state’s outlying provinces, in particular the two ways in which the state 
viewed the place of violence in the kingdom and why this has obscured the signifi-
cance of everyday violence and its increasing prevalence in late early modern state 
administration in Burma. The second section looks at how the relationship between 
the state and the village changed over the course of the early modern period in ways 
that encouraged the use of violence. Finally, the chapter will examine how the appli-
cation of administrative violence provoked the mobilization of collective violence 
against the state.
Two Burmas beneath one king
Despite well-documented state expansion and centralization, by the early nine-
teenth century the court’s reach and capacity in different parts of the kingdom was 
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extremely uneven. Recent scholarship has dispelled the myth of oriental despotism 
at the beginning of the early modern period in favour of relatively weak regimes that 
developed administrative apparatus and relied on various additional structures for 
ruling the kingdom and collecting revenues. These structures ensured that, by the 
late early modern period, in the major lowland kingdoms of mainland Southeast 
Asia at least, royal rule did not have to depend on physical force in what might be 
called the state’s ‘political core’ close to the centre of power.
In Burma’s case, by the end of the early modern period, this core consisted of 
the lowlands north of the Lower Burma Delta. By 1830, as demonstrated by Victor 
Lieberman, the state template for modern Burma – that which would reconfigure 
itself under British colonial rule, and then as an independent state after 1948 – had 
been set.6 Like Lieberman, on whose work he draws, James Scott views the state’s 
expansion over lowland Burma as fairly complete by the end of the early modern 
period, forming an example of what he calls the ‘padi state’, because it was possible 
here to concentrate grain production. Scott uses ‘state space’ to refer to areas that 
are easily governable. Burmese state space paralleled the relatively easily traversable 
and governable lowlands of the Burmese dry zone.7 Here there was a concentration 
of extensive pockets of closer central administrative scrutiny; the royal court was a 
powerful force that exerted an immense influence over daily political, economic, 
social, and religious life. This was where most of the wealth of the kingdom, the 
major monastic centres, the main agricultural reserves of the kingdom, and most of 
the royal bondspeople (ahmudans) were concentrated. Here, much of the popula-
tion lived and remained relatively poor, pressured to till the land through various 
forms of what Johan Galtung has described for more recent states as structural 
violence in which the essential element is that ‘the power to decide over the distri-
bution of resources is unevenly distributed’.8 Governing institutions in precolonial 
Burma were devised to extract revenues and manpower and to keep people, if they 
were free, tied to the land to raise crops or, if they were service-people, to hold them 
to assigned occupations for the king or the other elites who owned them. Villages 
were assigned to the landed gentry for the latter to ‘eat’ the resources of the former. 
Anyone who had other aspirations in life found it impossible to move beyond their 
station in life, except in times of political collapse.
In the royal imaginary, the king sat at the centre of the world and maintained 
universal harmony. The king was the earthly equivalent of Indra, the king of the 
City of the Gods and the protector of the religion. The king maintained peace and 
harmony and supported the Sangha so that monks could keep accruing merit and 
continue on their path to enlightenment. Good kings succeeded and bad kings 
failed in this task. It was the explicit purpose of U Kala’s chronicle, the chronicle 
on which all others that come after it are based or informed by, to show the current 
and future kings the differences between bad and good rulership and the conse-
quences of both. In this imaginary, the only story lines of relevance were those that 
were directly relevant to the court; when outlying provinces entered into the story 
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they remained in focus only so long as they were relevant to the king’s own story. 
It should be no surprise that (1) mundane episodes of daily administration outside 
of the court rarely show up in the chronicles, and (2) that historiography which 
allows the chronicles to frame their discussions have a tendency to emphasize the 
stability of the court as the measure of stability in the kingdom. Certainly, few his-
torians, after the colonial period, relied solely on the chronicles for their accounts, 
but usually extra-chronicle evidence was merely used to verify the information in 
the chronicles. In terms of its spatiality, from the perspective of the court, the royal 
imaginary was supremely inclusive; in some utterances, the king was said to rule the 
world, but in more practical daily administration, merely the entire kingdom. Court 
histories are, as Scott has suggested, to a certain degree ‘histories of state spaces’ and 
they ‘neglect or ignore altogether’ non-state spaces.9
There was also another Burma characterized by land that was less easy to govern 
and where it was also difficult to concentrate grain production that Scott identi-
fies as non-state space. In the Burmese context, highland areas, part of the larger 
Southeast Asian massif, are non-state space.10 Scott admits that other terrains, 
including ‘swamps, marshes, mangrove coasts, deserts, volcanic margins, and even 
open sea, like the ever-growing and changing deltas of Southeast Asia’s great rivers’, 
can be non-state space for the same reason, but they do not attract his attention to 
the same degree as do the highlands, no doubt because they are not presented this 
way in the state sources or the resulting historiography.11 To steal a phrase from 
J. C. Van Leur, the early modern Burmese state presence in these areas was ‘never 
more than a thin, flaking glaze’.12 Lower Burma, like many parts of the kingdom, 
remained outside the immediate economic, social, and cultural life of the royal capi-
tal. To be sent out to the provinces meant a gap in time and space that made regular 
interaction other than written correspondence impossible.
In reality, the Burmese state could only claim dominion and depute men with 
royal grants of authority and a mandate to govern over these non-state space areas. 
Such appointees had a significant challenge before them, for the structures that 
overlapped to ensure popular submission to the state in the centre of the kingdom 
were nearly wholly absent in the non-state spaces. There were agricultural and 
trading colonies, and villages along rivers or in clearings in the delta, for example. 
Here, state demands were made with a lighter touch because villagers might rebel if 
they faced what were considered excessive demands, as they did in 1740, requiring 
a costly military expedition and possibly costing the local governor his head. Or, 
more commonly, a village would just move further out of reach of the local gover-
nor who was unwise enough to demand too much. This situation began to change in 
the 1790s due to the bloody wars of King Bodawhpaya (r. 1782–1819) against neigh-
bouring Siam, and a great famine in the central dry zone (1805–12) that contributed 
to labour flight. Combined, these two crises forced the court to find additional 
sources of manpower and foodstuffs.13 A light administrative touch in the delta area 
was no longer possible; the payment of taxes, the levying of troops, the securing of 
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food supplies and the like in outlying parts of the kingdom could only be achieved 
at the point of a sword.14
Despite their physical distance from the royal court, central appointees were 
the solder behind the royal imaginary that connected the royal centre to the 
provinces through daily administrative practice. On the one hand, these officials 
saw their main identity as appointees of the royal court and never identified 
too much with the local population. Once dispatched to the provinces, central 
appointees remained concerned primarily with court politics and their respective 
positions within court factions in ongoing power struggles. They saw their appoint-
ments as dependent on ever-changing court politics, which they kept tabs on and 
influenced through their wives and allies who remained at the court. Appointments 
were temporary, often of short duration, and usually viewed as a stepping stone 
on the path to a higher position somewhere else. Whether they achieved this or 
not mainly involved their success in gathering revenue and manpower, not the 
happiness of the local population, success in war when called upon, and, above all, 
their continued support by a strong faction in the court. When in the provinces 
local rivalries reflected court factional infighting, and local official competition was 
interpreted in this context.15
The main events examined in the present chapter occurred within the course of 
less than a year, beginning in about May 1809 in south-eastern Burma. The viceroy 
enjoyed, we are told, a status second only to the king and his heir apparent, with 
the powers of a king in the lower half of Burma.16 In May 1809, another official, the 
Atwinwun, was dispatched by the king with ‘broad powers’ to go to Tavoy, build 
up resources for a military expedition, and then lead an attack on Siam.17 Their 
rivalry set off a series of acts of violence that contributed to the near collapse of the 
kingdom.
The political contest between the two officials was partly waged through letter-
writing campaigns to the royal court. This began when the viceroy of Pegu and the 
governor of Martaban had challenged the Atwinwun’s right to gather resources in 
the area for the expedition because they had apparently outdated royal orders sug-
gesting the Atwinwun lacked such powers. The latter then wrote a letter to the king 
accusing the officials of obstruction. Other members of the Atwinwun’s faction 
in the court, mainly princes of the royal family, now sent a letter to the Atwinwun 
indicating that he was safe as the king had received his complaint and was going to 
remove the viceroy and the governor of Martaban from their positions. Moreover, 
the king had appointed as their replacements the Ye-wun of Rangoon as the new 
governor of Martaban and the king’s grandson as the new viceroy of Pegu.18
The viceroy and the governor of Martaban got wind of this and sent their own 
letters to the king in the hopes of changing his views. These letters recast the events 
in Lower Burma so that they would find context in the royal imaginary and thus 
capture the king’s attention and command his intervention. The Atwinwun, they 
claimed, was not acting as military commander or administrator as had been 
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ordered by the king, but instead was preparing to make himself king instead. The 
stockades were really more like the walls of a royal city and significantly included 
the twelve buildings that represented the cardinal points, a symbolic motif of the 
royal palace, and in the performance of duties, the Atwinwun had begun to use royal 
words for his own comings and goings. As the two men had expected, Bodawhpaya 
was enraged and saw these activities as threatening himself and his place at the 
centre of the royal imaginary. The king now ordered the viceroy to prepare for an 
attack on the Atwinwun by sending men to Martaban.19
The main underlying tensions between the officials in the provinces were actu-
ally issues regarding personal control over local reserves of men and the resources 
necessary to support it. In a low population country, it was difficult to keep bonds-
people from fleeing to the service of another patron who offered a better deal. 
Local elites competed fiercely locally for control of manpower, but lacked the royal 
court’s range of mechanisms to keep them in place. All the officials discussed here 
sought personal bondspeople and needed the money extorted through violence 
and the threat of violence to maintain growing retinues. In the opening example, 
the cause of the viceroy’s unhappiness was that four of the men sentenced to death 
had been his bondspeople who had deserted to the service of long-time rival the 
Ye-wun. Canning’s intervention in the execution was motivated not only by his 
personal distaste, but a request from the Ye-wun to do so.20 In this case, violence 
was not only a means of extortion, but also what Stuart Carroll calls vindicatory vio-
lence,21 in the context of a feud between the viceroy and the Ye-wun. The Atwinwun 
now wrote to the king, promising to establish the truth of the matter once his mili-
tary campaign was finished. The king agreed, ordered the troops who had been sent 
to Martaban recalled, and the Atwinwun moved against Siam, took the town and 
island of Phuket, and was rewarded by the king with the title ‘Maha-Thiha-Thura’, 
inscribed on a gold nameplate, and seven scarlet-coloured victory drums.22
With the Ye-wun’s help, the Atwinwun now had his revenge on the viceroy. They 
did so not by pointing to the viceroy’s local transgressions of administrative pro-
priety, but by, like their rivals earlier, depicting the viceroy as being guilty in ways 
that would register as violating the royal imaginary. The Atwinwun and the Ye-wun 
wrote letters to the Bodawhpaya accusing the viceroy of being unfit to command by 
claiming he did not maintain discipline among the royal troops. Worse, the viceroy 
violated royal orders by allowing them to smoke opium and drink alcohol publicly. 
By contrast to the king’s concern earlier that the Atwinwun was putting too many 
people to death, these letters accused the viceroy of not executing enough people. 
As they claimed, the viceroy had ‘taken off few or no heads since his arrival’, indicat-
ing that no discipline must have been enforced at all. According to palace sources, 
when the king received the letters ‘he grasped his sword and spear (the usual signs 
of fury)’.23 The viceroy was removed from office and all other dignities, as was his 
brother, the governor of Bassein, both were ordered to come to the court with 
chains around their necks, and the governorship of Martaban was now finally given 
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to the Ye-wun.24 In order to ensure that the viceroy obeyed the royal order, the 
Ye-wun took the precaution of first arresting all of the viceroy’s ‘principal vassals 
and adherents … together with their families’. The slightest resistance, the Ye-Wun 
warned, would bring the ‘immediate destruction of these people’.25 The Atwinwun 
now received all of the viceroy’s old powers, in addition to retaining those already 
possessed as the commander of the army in the south, as well as other powers and 
honours.26
Changed obligations
Demonstrating why the enforcement of state demands on local populations relied 
increasingly on violence in places like Lower Burma requires a look at how the rela-
tionship between the village and the state changed between the fifteenth and early 
nineteenth century. Although the royal imaginary remained a superficial overlay, 
changes occurred in the outlying parts of the kingdom that made it possible for local 
officials to abuse their charges. Provincial violence demonstrated some of the ways 
in which early modern state formation changed everyday life. Political centraliza-
tion ended the presence and the patronage of local families with claims to royal 
status and a place in local rites. In the fifteenth century, for example, the counter-
parts of eighteenth-century centrally appointed officials were local royals, members 
of independent royal or noble families, or branches of the main royal family. These 
people undertook the expectations of royalty and nobility in society, providing for 
festivals, patronizing monks and pagodas, and heeding the basic tenets of good 
rulership by not pushing their charges to the point of starvation, because they were 
more susceptible to being overthrown by local rebels or displaced by a neighbour-
ing ‘small king’ who could easily legitimate his campaign as one of restoring peace 
and ensuring universal harmony.
Under the Konbaung dynasty, however, centrally appointed officials in the 
provinces owed their posting instead to the court, which monopolized all royal and 
ceremonial functions, performed on behalf of the kingdom as a whole in the royal 
capital, out of sight and mind of much of the rural population. If they chose to do so, 
central appointees might patronize the local religion on behalf of the community, 
sponsor great festivals, or conduct their rule with a view to the tolerance of the local 
population. The two problems of this path were its inherent political dangers and 
its certain ineffectiveness. First, while acting as patron to local communities and 
religious life might induce villagers to meet the central court’s military and financial 
demands, it also risked arousing suspicions that the official was either endangering 
resource-extraction by growing too close to the population, or that he might have 
pretensions to the throne. From the court’s perspective, its officials in the provinces 
were to do the king’s bidding in the provinces, not to become patrons of village 
communities. Second, many provincial appointees were not in place long enough 
to develop the kinds of loyalties and degree of patronage that would be necessary to 
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win local cooperation. These pressures forced them to pursue the most immediate 
and effective means to fulfil the court’s expectations.
As the Konbaung state centralized, it effectively pushed provincial villages fur-
ther away, rather than pulling them closer to the court. The limited development 
and clarification of provincial administrative organization in Burma, even by the 
early nineteenth century, meant that in several cases where officials were dispatched 
to prepare for especially important military campaigns or administrative charges, 
the authority granted them to meet their responsibilities remained vague. Worse, 
it could be dangerously extensive in order to allow them the freedom to deal with 
any obstacle that lay in their way. These assignments were often uncoordinated and 
created a range of problems, including everything from jealousy among other offi-
cials to genuine jurisdictional issues. Lacking credentials backed by anyone other 
than a distant royal court, and without access to networks that transcended local 
village communities (as discussed further below), Konbaung officials depended 
on regular, spectacular, and local displays of violence, both to obtain resources and 
to reconfirm their authority – and these displays grew fiercer as demands of state 
were placed more heavily on themselves. As Martin Thomas has observed regard-
ing colonial policing, ‘coercive policing … was a powerful indicator of the colonial 
state’s limited reach’.27 This could also be asserted for provincial administrators in 
the early modern Burmese state for the reason that they had few other means at 
their disposal.
Such officials were thus often merciless in their imposition of demands for 
soldiers for royal campaigns, but in particular for revenue.28 Those who could not 
pay the taxes or provide the supplies were sold off as debt slaves.29 In terms of 
remuneration, there were no limits to what Konbaung officials in the outlying prov-
inces could wring from local populations so long as nothing occurred that would 
 challenge the harmony and royal benevolence emphasized in the royal imaginary. 
Using the threat of execution in this way offered a perfect means of doing so. Those 
threatened with execution were charged with crimes, and thus criminalized, and 
within the Buddhist context that informed the royal imaginary; releasing some-
one from captivity or death, or securing this release, accrued merit. In addition to 
securing funds, an official could also present himself to the king as a benevolent 
administrator whose actions helped to contribute to the field of merit that sustained 
the religion in the kingdom. By sending funds to the court, the official could also 
represent that they were an effective administrator as well, so long as once in a while 
someone was actually executed for an offence.
Going too far did indeed bring royal suspicion that something was amiss. Viewed 
from the royal court, the Atwinwun was a royal army commander who had been sent 
to south-eastern Burma to raise troops and build an army that would then attack the 
Siamese, secure the frontiers of the kingdom, and hopefully also deliver booty to 
the royal court. The Atwinwun appears to have gone through the motions of acting 
out this role, but prioritized the enhancement of his political strength through the 
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acquisition of manpower and wealth to support it.30 When opposed, the Atwinwun 
was also fairly violent in his response. The Atwinwun charged twenty opponents 
with attempted assassination and had them put to death. In fact, the Atwinwun was 
putting so many people to death that it roused the concern of the royal court. The 
king finally intervened when the Atwinwun began to execute soldiers who had been 
defeated in battle. He gave orders for all of the Atwinwun’s prisoners to be released, 
and ordered an investigation into why so many executions were taking place.31
Early modern Burma differed from Europe where the church transformed 
gender relations, and where female violence came to be regarded as a male respon-
sibility.32 Burmese women were legally the equal of men, and were as responsible 
for the behaviour of their husbands as their husbands were for theirs. This provided 
much incentive for women to play major roles at the court in promoting the careers 
of their husbands sent out to the provinces, and to participate in court intrigue 
and act as negotiators on their behalf. In his initial moves to punish the Atwinwun, 
for example, Bodawhpaya had also arrested and imprisoned the Atwinwun’s wife, 
who had remained in the royal court and who would play a key role in the collec-
tion of money and the payment of bribes to the right people to save both their 
skins.33 Violence also further reinforced equality between men and women in the 
provinces. Burmese peasant women were, like men, expected to work in the fields, 
in addition to responsibilities in the home and in the marketplace. They had equal 
rights under the law to property and inheritance, and equal responsibility for taxes. 
Violence by officials – legal and extralegal – directed against the village, also had to 
put men and women (whether adults or children) on an equal footing regarding 
corvée labour impositions and taxation demands because it was mainly women who 
remained in the village. Additional abuses included rape and the forced enslave-
ment of the children of households that could not pay their tax.34
Violence or its threat were also used to extract wealth from the extended families 
of the soon-to-be-punished. The Atwinwun had secured some bribe money from 
the families of men defeated in battle and sentenced to death as a result, before the 
royal orders contravening their death sentences arrived. In the case of the officer 
Zeya Suriya Kyaw, his wife paid the bribe to the Atwinwun’s wife back at the royal 
court.35 But had these death sentences remained only threats, they would have lost 
their power of persuasion very quickly. What made them so frightening and per-
suasive was that such punishments were indeed frequently carried out. In February 
1810, the royal court issued orders that anyone caught using golden umbrellas, the 
peculiar appurtenance of royalty, should be arrested and brought back to the capi-
tal.36 As one account describes the execution of several men apprehended for this 
crime:
we went to the spot and saw the bodies of three men who had been beheaded lying 
at full length, their bellies, which had been ripped open, being next the ground, with 
stakes driven into it through their left sides, the viscera also appearing between the 
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bodies. The heads were laced to their respective necks, the faces being upwards as if 
staring at you, having also a stake driven through the mouth and throat into the ground. 
In this state they are to continue three days, exposed to the action of the sun, which will 
greatly add to the horridness of their appearance.37
Observers commented that what was more shocking than the scene described 
was the ‘indifference with which the Burmans regarded this tragic scene’.38 Such 
violence then was probably a normal part of everyday life in such outlying parts of 
the kingdom.
Popular responses: flight and fight
Collective violence was an increasingly popular response to the application of vio-
lence in administration in Lower Burma. It is difficult to identify where a line can 
be drawn between the quotidian violence and collective violence in Lower Burma 
at the end of the early modern period. Periodic displays of violence represented 
one way to bridge the chasm between the village and the centrally appointed offi-
cial, but while this violence was accepted as legal, it was not considered legitimate, 
provoking entire villages to move further out of the reach of the state (and by this 
period, this meant leaving the kingdom altogether) when they could, or turn to 
banditry and rebellion. As Konbaung administration in the outlying provinces was 
‘light touch’, unofficial low-level violence between villages was fairly common as a 
means of working out local disputes, but when it turned on the royal centre (against 
the state) it threatened the stability of the kingdom. Either course indicated the 
weak subscription that villages in places like Lower Burma maintained to the royal 
imaginary.
As mentioned, Konbaung state administration in the provinces represented only 
a thin layer over a countryside dotted with self-contained villages.39 The basic units 
of social organization remained village communities. It was the village headmen 
who answered the demands of the state and local state officials, but who came from 
the village, owed their position to it, and always saw the village and its survival as 
their first priority. Even at this late stage of early modern Burmese state develop-
ment, headmen’s reports remained the primary source of information which fil-
tered through other centrally appointed officials to the court, when the king wished 
to know how much manpower, resources, and revenue remained in the king-
dom to be tapped.40 Further, by the early nineteenth century, the king commanded 
that each headman in the kingdom send a report directly to the court, giving them 
two to three months to fill out specific royal forms to do so, the difference in time 
depending on the distance of the village from the royal court.41 The village head-
men’s report was also an imaginary of the village and what it could offer the state. 
This made it possible for the headman to protect the village from excessive state 
demands, by understating its resources. The state could get around this by simply 
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placing increasing demands on it, regardless of what its stated resources were, until 
the village could tolerate no more.
Unhappy bondspeople and overstretched villages were different phenomena 
that worked themselves out in different ways. Bondspeople sought personal refuge 
by fleeing the service of one master for another, the occurrence of which was fre-
quent and well documented, including the examples discussed here. Despite sug-
gestions that the villages themselves were porous and always changing,42 so far as 
we have documentation, villagers did not generally flee local areas on their own, as 
this would entail leaving family and friends. Instead, village communities moved 
together out of areas with excessive demands into areas on the frontier further out 
of the reach of state officials, which gave them more autonomy. As the Konbang 
state’s reach expanded over the full extent of the Irrawaddy Delta, fleeing (as 
opposed to resisting) excessive demands of outlying officials increasingly required 
fleeing the kingdom altogether, leaving numerous villages along the Irrawaddy 
River abandoned or depopulated.43
Without much direct management of local affairs, provincial appointees had 
few incentives to intercede in local conflicts between villages. Although intervil-
lage conflict might be rare in the kingdom’s core area, in the outlying provinces it 
was fairly common as villages fought out issues regarding everything from access 
to particular forests, control over spirit shrines, and water rights. Various forms of 
raiding of other villages occurred even in good times, but especially in bad times. In 
the period examined here, villagers moved out of areas in the face of excessive exac-
tions by Konbaung officials, and looked further afield. When delta villagers pushed 
north into the dry zone closer to the royal centre they found security measures 
much weaker than they had in the delta. The Irrawaddy River that connected Upper 
Burma, the central dry zone, and the southern delta together, no longer remained a 
safe channel of communication, requiring the appointment of a special officer – the 
town officer in charge of the ‘nine towns’ – with an armed force to patrol the river 
and protect important shipping. Within the first four months in the post he had 
publicly executed over seventy captured river pirates.44 As mentioned, members of 
dacoit bands who were caught were punished with death, unless redeemed at the 
place of execution.45
The rolling effect of administrative violence in the south had thus rippled 
back towards the royal centre as towns on the edge of the royal city now suc-
cumbed to the depredations of ‘numerous bands of dacoits, robbers, [and] insur-
gents’ in the 1809–10 period.46 There is substantial evidence that this violence, as 
it turned back against the royal centre, shattered the royal imaginary and caused 
a crisis of kingship. Manifest violence within the kingdom was taken as a sign that 
the religion was in crisis, and that the current king had an insufficient store of merit 
and thus would have been viewed as unsuitable to remain on the throne. In 1811, 
the king sought to distance himself from the bad karma of the existing royal capi-
tal by building a new one at Mingun, as well as constructing what, if it had been 
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finished, would have been an unprecedented work of merit, the Mingun Pagoda, 
followed in 1812 by defrocking the monastic leadership and declaring himself the 
next Buddha. Although the king would abandon this effort in 1817, and die in 1819, 
the resulting instability of the kingdom was not reined in, and Burma succumbed 
to British arms in the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–26), waged over the issue 
of punitive expeditions against rebel villagers in two other difficult Burmese 
 frontiers – Arakan and Assam.
Conclusion
Burma’s early modern experience with violence was profoundly shaped by the dis-
tinction between the core and the provinces. The former depended on experienced 
administrative rationalization, economic growth, the homogenization of culture 
and language, the adoption of orthodox observances of Buddhist practices, and pur-
suit of the ideals of Buddhist kingship, all of which contributed to compliance with 
state demands and a greater ability to meet the latter. By contrast, in the provinces 
the demands of early modern state formation drove officials to grind down local 
communities for resources with ever more conspicuous displays of violence, both 
threatened and real. As a result, the kingdom experienced population dislocation 
and collective violence that were more consistent with disintegrating societies than 
political stability.
Villagers obeyed state officials because of the threat of execution and its imple-
mentation, presumably fluctuating in the density of its occurrence. In especially 
bad times, when central demands were heaviest and officials in the provinces 
were hard-pressed to both deliver resources to the court and pocket a sizeable 
portion themselves, the frequency of execution and threat of it must have been 
extreme. But even in periods of lighter central demands, coercive violence prob-
ably remained an important part of the everyday life of the early modern Burmese 
state in the provinces,47 however much its enactment and the threat of its imposi-
tion was invisible to, or misunderstood by, the royal centre. In the royal court, the 
king watched over the people and judged the good and the bad, and the eyes of 
all in the kingdom were upon the throne. This royal imaginary gave cohesion to 
the kingdom within a moral system that emphasized unity, harmony, and peace. 
This imaginary blinded the court to the everyday activities of centrally appointed 
officials who abused the local populations under their charge for their own benefit. 
Abuse led to resistance and flight, which led to more violence and, in the end, 
undermined the security of the royal imaginary. Political centralization in early 
modern Burma, by replacing locally responsible royal and noble families with tem-
porary central appointees, encouraged, at least to some degree, increasing violence 
of this kind over time.
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Village rebellion and social violence in early 
nineteenth-century Vietnam
Vũ Đức Liêm
Ban cung sinh dao tac.
Misery creates banditry.
(Vietnamese proverb)
In summer 1834, Nguyen Khac Hai, the lieutenant governor of Bac Ninh province 
(forty kilometres to the north of Hanoi), led a mission to inspect local dykes. In 
the middle of the tour, Hai was ambushed by armed men who came to be known in 
the imperial records as ‘bandits’ (phi).1 Taken by surprise, most of Hai’s escort of 
officials and troops were killed before he retreated to a nearby village to summon 
help. Contrary to his expectations, the villagers not only refused, but closed the 
gates, trapping Hai outside where he was killed. Minh Menh (r. 1820–41), the 
second emperor from the Nguyen dynasty ruling unified Vietnam since 1802, was 
furious that his imperial subjects had ‘sat and watched’ while Hai, a third-grade 
mandarin (on the nine-point scale) appointed by himself, had been butchered. 
Imperial retaliation was swift: of the ‘bandits’ and village gatekeepers, twenty were 
executed and ten exiled.2
The monarch’s fury deserves an explanation. Ruling the realm as emperor and 
regarding himself as ‘Son of Heaven’ (thien tu), Minh Menh was born with the 
belief that ‘under the Heaven there is no land that is not the emperor’s land; there 
are no subjects who are not the emperor’s subjects’.3 In that world, opposing 
the state was a severe act of rebellion subject to severe legal penalties.4 The 1834 
incident, however, was among many that haunted Hue’s rule over thousands of 
villages in northern Vietnam. The influx of landless peasants and hungry migrants 
into the region generated waves of social violence, undermining the dynasty’s 
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control over villages, the basic form of social organization. The violence sweeping 
the empire in the mid 1830s posed the first truly existential crisis since the dynasty’s 
foundation, and prompted military retaliation on a massive scale.5 After seemingly 
endless pacification campaigns, the emperor demonstrated his determination to 
end all further treasonous behaviour by ‘cultivation’ (giao hoa) of his subjects. One 
month after the Bac Ninh’s assault, the lengthy and carefully drafted Ten Moral 
Maxims were disseminated to every village to serve as a benchmark for proper 
behaviour.6 The Instruction showed Hue’s awareness of the epidemic violence in 
the Red River Delta and potential threat of further uprisings across this densely 
populated region.7
This is a story of local militarization, social violence, and deterioration of cen-
tral power in early modern Vietnam. It demonstrates how human mobilization, 
facilitated by the development of regional militias, weakened the central state and 
provided a breeding ground for social disorder and violence. Local gentry exploited 
the state’s Achilles heel of administrative and military weakness and built up tran-
sregional networks across twelve provinces in northern Vietnam. The situation 
was more complex than Charles Tilly’s formulation that ‘war made the state and 
the state made war’.8 In this story, the state’s attempt to arm itself against social 
revolt impaired the traditional centralized authority and encouraged gentry-led 
 fragmentation on the eve of Western colonialization.
In illuminating these developments, this chapter examines the role violence 
plays in shaping human organization. It argues that local militarization, as the 
most significant sociopolitical phenomenon in early nineteenth-century Vietnam, 
severely challenged the Nguyen state and fuelled violence across the realm. Aiming 
to reduce the scale of insurrection, Hue mobilized troops to suppress rebellions and 
exile captured rebels. The strategy proved counterproductive as social discontent 
spread to involve the highland communities, rural peasants, coastal Christians, and 
Lower Mekong Khmer.9
Among the dynasty’s key failures were the loss of control over local militias 
and shifting demographic geography. The interaction between ‘human mobility’, 
‘violence’, and ‘state-power devolution’ transformed Vietnamese politics, under-
mining traditional-style statecraft during the 1830s. Minh Menh’s projection of 
administrative centralization, territorialization, and cultural assimilation stirred 
tremendous local hostility towards the central elite. The local gentry were drawn 
into politics, shifting the balance of power between the centre and localities and 
threatening the survival of both dynasty and state. By focusing on the militias 
and local violence, this chapter offers new insights into the social and political 
 character of early modern Vietnam. In doing so, it reappraises the role of coercion 
in the decline of traditional political structures as part of a longer-term social 
and political change linking the early Nguyen to the broad trends of Vietnam’s 
modern history.
The modern state, as defined by Max Weber, is ‘a human community that 
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 (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a 
given territory’.10 The Nguyen certainly claimed a monopoly of legitimate coercion 
by labelling all others who used violence as ‘bandits’. This assertion of authority by 
no means came close to the dynamic nature of the actual violence. ‘Calling some-
one or some group a bandit lays bare a political language that otherwise dresses vio-
lence in the drag of civilization.’11 However, ‘until the lion can tell his own stories, 
tales of the hunt will be told by the hunter’.12
This chapter is a search for the lion’s lost voice. It looks for the village’s way 
of making violence in response to a waning state. The dominant state-centric 
narratives generally see ‘banditry’ as a defined and homogeneous form of social 
insurgency. By contrast, this chapter investigates the role violence plays as a form 
of human interaction. The more Hue attempted to assert its monopoly, the fur-
ther violence spread across the Red River Delta. Here, this chapter challenges the 
conventional nationalist interpretation of villages’ historical role. Inspired by nos-
talgia and romanticism, the rural landscape is presented as a harmonious, peaceful 
world, and a reservoir of beautifully traditional values. The labouring peasants 
are depicted as kindly, peace-lovers who supported revolutionaries against an 
oppressive elite. In contrast, the following pages reveal the ‘rebellious’ character 
of that rural world and recognize that the countryside was a major source of social 
violence.
State and village in Vietnam, 1500–1800
The king’s law bows to the village’s rules.
(Vietnamese proverb)
The French scholar Paul Mus argues that ‘Since time immemorial, these vil-
lages  have become the key to the social structure of the country and to its out-
look  on life.’13 The Nguyen rulers clearly thought the same. Emperor Gia Long 
declared, ‘the state is constituted by villages’.14 The countryside was where most 
of the population dwelled, most taxes were collected, and most soldiers were con-
scripted.
The relatively low level of economic exchange and limited human mobility 
encouraged past historians to voice two firmly held views. First, that Vietnam’s 
villages protected their country’s identity throughout a thousand years of upheaval 
because no ‘foreign influence’ could penetrate their firmly self-contained struc-
ture. Second, that the villages could be turned into effective military fortresses 
to oppose foreign invaders. In other words, they were invincible foundations of 
culture and the source of social security, where the best Vietnamese values resided. 
This conventional view accords with the scholarly emphasis on socio-economic 
durability. Empires and dynasties came and went, but the villages remained in the 
same place with the same name. These conclusions underpin the historical asser-
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tion that ethnic Viet prevailed in eastern mainland Southeast Asia because of the 
power of their  villages that allowed Vietnamese colonization of Central Vietnam 
and Lower Mekong between 1400 and 1850s. The villages’ way of social formation 
and economic production qualified the Vietnamese who ‘flowed across Indochina 
like a flood carrying off other peoples wherever they occupied lowland rice fields or 
where it could be put under rice’.15
In reality, villagers’ behaviour, however, was not always peaceful and con-
structive. Shifting demography, natural disasters, and political suppression 
spurred frequent unrest across the rural world. The Red River Delta during 
the last eight centuries witnessed considerable human mobility. Three mil-
lion people left the basin in the fifteenth century alone.16 However, the region 
remained among the most densely populated deltas in the world.17 Village struc-
ture and its  relationship to the state were also dramatically transformed. The 
decline  of  nobles’ estates in  the  fourteenth century changed the rural economy 
by creating  a market in  which communal land could be bought or sold, and 
thus  turned  into  private  property.18 The  spread of private land ownership and 
the emergence of influential regional  families clashed with the state’s agenda of 
turning  villages into administrative institutions by maintaining a good ratio of 
communal to private land to support taxation, corvée labour, and military conscrip-
tion. Such balance was the foundation of state stability and social security.19 The 
growing concentration of rural land in the hands of local elites broke the state–
village balance, triggering a decline in  the central authority based in Hanoi, and 
prompting incessant warfare between 1527 and 1802. The coincidence of division 
in the political centre and militarization of the countryside through rural militias 
turned ‘the capital into fishing zone and hunting ground’, as stated by the dynastic 
chronicle.20
The Nguyen family, which ruled after 1802, began their rise to power as loyal-
ists of the Le dynasty ruling Vietnam from 1428 to 1788. Internal conflict divided 
the Nguyen and one member left to found the autonomous Cochinchinese state 
in Central Vietnam.21 From that domain, however, one of its rulers, Nguyen Phuc 
Anh, finally claimed supremacy over all Vietnamese and declared himself Gia 
Long emperor (1802–20). As a southern warlord, he viewed the hostile north with 
suspicion. Northerners, meanwhile, regarded the Nguyen as frontier officials who 
had rebelled against the Hanoi-based Le emperors. Furthermore, the Nguyen army 
arrived in Hanoi when the delta inhabitants had already tasted the bitterness of 
many bad governments and therefore opposed all state power.22 As the chief vic-
tims of the turbulence between 1750 and 1802, villagers increasingly regarded the 
state as an ‘enemy’ rather than a ‘protector’. Under the Tayson period (1770–1802), 
for instance, the delta was ruled by a non-local and military-oriented regime whose 
extraction of soldiers, corvée labour, and resources exhausted the river basin. 
However, worse was to come as the Nguyen era heralded further misery, flooding, 
famine, and violence.23
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Village bullies, local strongmen, and rural militarization
At the root of rural violence were two social archetypes who were not nec-
essarily mutually exclusive: ‘village bullies’ (hao) and ‘local strongmen’ (tho 
hao). Their possession of political and economic power dominated rural society 
through direct manipulation of peasant life and their authority ranged from organ-
izing village defence to creating surtaxes and conducting land-grabbing. They 
were very familiar with violence. In 1485, Le dynastic records already mentioned 
‘epidemic local bullying’ and ordered those responsible to be subjected to the 
law.24 Hue’s failure to govern the villages after 1802, however, led to unprecedented 
hardship.
The unique nature of Nguyen administration allowed early nineteenth-century 
local gentry more space to exercise their dominance over the countryside. First, the 
state law code enforced in 1813 was largely based on that of the Qing, which was 
designed for the Manchu’s minority rule over the majority Han ethnics.25 That legal 
framework offered considerable autonomy to villages. Gia Long’s son, Emperor 
Minh Menh (r. 1820–41), realized the danger and ordered the Code revised, but 
this was never fully completed.26 Secondly, both rulers treated northern Vietnam 
lightly, fearing its disloyalty, hostility, and military threat. Based in the capital Hue, 
a relatively small city occupying a narrow coastal strip, Gia Long was poorly placed 
to manage the two economic and demographic powerhouses of the Red River Delta 
and Mekong basin, which were 700 km to the north and a 1,000 km to the south 
respectively.27 The most obvious challenge was to mobilize resources and troops for 
administrative operations and military campaigns.
The power vacuum opening in the countryside was immediately exploited by 
local chiefs across the northern delta where the office of governor-general (tong 
tran) was established. Militias had emerged between the 1780s and 1800 to pro-
tect northern villages during the constant shifts of power in Hanoi. Regardless of 
whether they supported or opposed the Nguyen, all quickly exploited the new 
imperial dynasty’s weakness to squeeze more resources from the rural population. 
After 1802, some cooperated with Hue in suppressing revolts and banditry. They 
came to be known as ‘local chiefs’ (tho hao). Their followers were hired as local 
troops (tho binh), guarding posts, traffic roads, and protecting villages.28 By the 
1810s, local militias took great responsibilities for the delta’s security, both along 
the coasts and the highland corridor stretching from Nghe An to Son Tay, and after 
Gia Long’s death (1820) they were ordered to assist metropolitan troops, station 
strategic traffic routes, and monitor vulnerable villages.29
Those opposing the state were officially castigated as ‘bandits’ (phi). It is clear 
that the state saw the ‘local bullies’ controlling these militias as their greatest com-
petitor in the rural world.30 In an edict issued in 1827, following the Phan Ba Vanh 
rebellion (1821–27), Hue analysed the violent nature of the Red River Delta where 
rural bullies were accused of manipulating local officials and exercising coercion 
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over poor villagers.31 Yet the state simultaneously depended on local militias to 
provide security, collect taxes, and fight Chinese pirates.32
This strategy had serious unforeseen consequences in allowing local soldiers 
to play a bigger role, while legitimating the militarization of the delta villages and 
fuelling the growth of decentralized, autonomous warfare. The move immediately 
alarmed provincial officials who saw legitimate local militarization as threatening 
state security. There was, however, little they could do, particularly after the acces-
sion of Minh Menh. The menacing prospect of violence remained, including the 
emergence of those claiming loyalty to the displaced Le dynasty.33 In Thanh Hoa 
and Ninh Binh, between 1816 and 1836, several groups proclaimed loyalty to the 
dethroned family and recruited thousands of armed men along a 250 km corridor 
of midland from Nghe An to Son Nam. For instance, the so-called ‘bandit’ leader 
Nguyen The Chung, the son of a doctoral-degree holder, proclaimed himself 
‘ commander general’ of Son Nam in 1822.34
The alarming violence was also fuelled by the collusion between corrupt 
officials and rural law-breakers. One prefect from Son Tay reportedly provided 
money to the outlaws who kidnapped villagers and placed them outside the 
city’s wall. Pretending the victims were rebels, the official went on to execute 
them and reported to Hue for promotion.35 The active and practical mandarin, 
Nguyen Cong Tru (1778–1858), was aware of the linkage between local bullies 
and social violence.  From 1826, he was authorized by Minh Menh to pacify the 
delta. As governor-general of Hai Duong, the delta’s flooding hub, Tru was greatly 
concerned  by  the villagers’ economic condition and saw the danger posed by 
the untamed local bullies and militias. In a long and carefully analysed memo-
rial, he suggested that regional chiefs and their hired men should be replaced 
by  metropolitan troops for security duties.36 Three months later, the Board of 
Revenue initiated new discussions on military expense and questioned local 
forces’ efficiency in economic and security terms.37 Unfortunately, Hue lacked 
any viable alternative to the local forces and was forced to continue its policy of 
sanctioning rural  militarization.
The Phan Ba Vanh insurgency demonstrated how the interaction of rural mili-
tarization and local power struggles could encourage the escalation and spread of 
violence. During his rebellion against Minh Meng in 1826, Phan Ba Vanh, a native 
of Minh Giam village, mobilized 5,000 men from the rim of the river basin.38 This 
midland area of Thai Nguyen, Hung Hoa, Son Tay, Ninh Binh, and Thanh Hoa, 
sandwiched between the lowlands and mountains, had experienced a rapid growth 
in militias and local bullies who received monthly payments of copper coins and 
grain from the court.39 Unsurprisingly, the same area was also the cradle for most 
of the revolts between 1832 and 1837. In 1835, Minh Menh finally ordered a compre-
hensive inspection of the delta’s militias. Only fifty-three local guard posts were 
retained, and their garrisons were limited to fifty armed men each.40 This measure 
was intended to extend monarchical authority over the local forces by merging 
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them with the metropolitan army, with the militia leaders receiving official titles and 
the armed men becoming state soldiers.41
The source of weaponry
Rising social violence was fuelled by new sources of modern weapons pouring into 
rural communities. The highlanders played important roles in this supply chain 
providing locally made muskets (dieu thuong) and gunpowder. Alarmed by this 
lowland–highland weapon exchange, Minh Menh declared that the number of con-
fiscated guns had reached tens of thousands by 1837.42 The increasing availability of 
modern firearms had been a steady trend since the Tayson regime, however. Local 
militias along the coastline, for instance, had been heavily armed since the late eight-
eenth century when they encountered Chinese pirates operating from the maze of 
islands and costal terrain stretching from Fukien (China) to the Gulf of Tonkin.43 
There they received the Tayson’s protection, whose patronage  encouraged piracy 
penetration into the delta’s porous coastline.44
The regional network of weapon exchange was a major source of the arms used 
by local forces to attack the state’s own army. The number of confiscated firearms 
gives some indication of the rebel armaments. In 1837, 1,500 muskets and six can-
nons were reportedly handed over voluntarily after a campaign in Ninh Binh, indi-
cating just how prevalent firearms were in the delta and its surrounding highlands.45 
Phan Ba Vanh was able to capture large numbers of weapons from the government, 
as well as gather up to 200 ships and construct a fortress to resist a major court 
army’s siege.46
The spread of Western-style weapons prompted Minh Menh to ban firearm 
sales in summer 1837, arguing that muskets were useful military equipment, but 
were harmful if they fell into civilian hands. Knowing that most of these weapons 
were made locally, he warned local officials to remain alert to gunmaking in their 
jurisdiction and threatened producers with the death penalty.47 The measures were 
extended to gunpowder later that year, when all sulphur and saltpetre mines along 
the Sino-Vietnamese border were closed. The gunpowder trade was banned in the 
northern region, and those owning more than 600 grams were threatened with 
severe penalties.48
Human mobility and rural militarization
Northern Vietnam experienced considerable demographic fluctuations during 
early modernity, with a significant exodus of peasants from the provinces along the 
Red River’s northern bank due to natural disasters and seasonal migration.49 These 
movements spread not only hunger and disease, but violence too. Whether a prod-
uct of state design (displacement of native soldiers and exiled prisoners) or invol-
untary waves of starving famers, migration facilitated both regional  conflicts and 
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opportunities for transregional insurrection. In this environment, local  militias 
became both highly mobile and trans-provincial.
The state’s practice of forcible relocation complicated the demographic picture. 
One form was the posting of large numbers of troops recruited in the north to 
duties in the south.50 Many of these troops were former rebels or bandits. Another 
was the growing use of exile to punish criminals and outlaws. The Nguyen legal 
code offered five categories of punishments, with exile (luu) placed second after 
the death penalty. The practice offered provincial officials a seemingly easy way 
of ridding themselves of troublemakers and thus boosting the numbers into the 
thousands each year. However, it simply shifted the problem to other regions, while 
unintentionally forging transregional networks among displaced former outlaws.
A third form was the impressment of captured rebels and bandits. Ringleaders 
were generally executed, but their followers were commonly drafted into the state 
army. Ostensibly, this strategy asserted control over thousands of non-registered 
males and outlaws who were now legible to the state radar. In reality, it furthered 
the process of political decentralization, because the loyalties of those former ban-
dits and rebels shifted not to the state, but to the general who pardoned them and 
tolerated their continued wicked behaviour. Their deployment to remote provinces 
provided opportunities for them to spread violence elsewhere, especially if they 
later deserted.
This practice developed in two stages, beginning with the drafting of local men, 
including outlaws and convicts, to make up for the lack of conscripts. Dispatched to 
Nghe An and Thanh Hoa to suppress rebels, Hue’s most powerful generals, Le Van 
Duyet and Le Chat, saw an opportunity to expand their own forces. Nine hundred 
‘bandits’ turned themselves in at Duyet’s camp in 1819 and were promptly formed 
into four new divisions optimistically titled ‘Thanh Hoa-obedience’, ‘Northern obe-
dience’, ‘Nghe An-obedience’, and ‘Returning to goodness’.51 Chat even pardoned 
criminals and encouraged local militias to recruit men and join his army directly by 
awarding titles to local leaders according to how many men they could find.52 Such 
exercises offered ambitious generals a quick route to victory and the chance to win 
favour and reward at court.
Despite these obvious problems, Minh Menh pressed ahead with this practice 
after 1820 and sent Duyet’s new divisions to the Lower Mekong. However, the 
complication of maintaining such troops soon became apparent as many simply 
ran away.53 As Minh Menh’s adviser noted, the policy was unfeasible because the 
bandits were the ‘neighbours and relatives’ of the people where they had been 
posted.54 By 1824, Minh Menh decided to station all soldiers outside their home 
area. Subsequently, dislocation of the exiled and surrendered bandits became 
a crucial part of Hue’s pacifying strategy. Although the king was aware of the 
potential risks when moving those ‘rebels’ around, his officials believed they could 
monitor them by threatening deserters with death. Results fell far short of expec-
tations. Insurgency returned to Thanh Hoa, Ninh Binh in 1826, 1827, 1828, 1833, 
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1835, and  1836. The Le Van Khoi rebellion in the Lower Mekong in 1833 amply 
demonstrated the  problem: thousands of Christians, Chinese, highlanders, exiled 
prisoners, and deserters gathered within a week and controlled the southern 
administration for three years, before being brutally suppressed.55 By 1834, facing 
empire-wide insurrection, Minh Menh called on provincial officials to change 
their practices and blamed his generals for recruiting and patronizing treacherous 
troublemakers.56 Much of the emperor’s complaint was true, but Hue was to a large 
extent itself responsible for initiating the policy.57
Lack of conscripted men was a major factor behind this.58 When Le Chat 
requested permission to collect local male residents in Hung Hoa, Minh Menh had 
no choice but to approve.59 Despite official efforts, many dodged the draft, includ-
ing those who were not registered or had become outlaws.60 Even men who were 
recruited often subsequently decamped, with the desertion rate reaching an alarm-
ing 50 per cent by late 1826.61 This put more pressure on conscription and the need 
to maintain southern troops in the north. The state treasury was the first to feel the 
effects when the Board of Revenue reported insufficient grain for the soldiers’ salary 
and asked provincial officials to provide assessments of those local troops’ effi-
ciency.62 The demand was certainly not the last, but the dynasty was unable to find 
a better solution, and again in 1835 southern soldiers were transferred to  maintain 
social order in the north.63
Military and judicial reforms were introduced in the early 1830s in response 
to violent escalation and with the aim of boosting administrative efficiency. As 
turbulence spread across the Lower Mekong in 1833, Hue had no idea where to 
send northern prisoners. In fear of popular rebellion, Minh Menh first ordered 
them carefully guarded and then distributed among northern provinces. Aware 
of new uprisings in Thanh Hoa, Ninh Binh, Son Nam, Hung Hoa, and Cao Bang, 
the monarch was cautious with the treatment of prisoners and captured bandits. 
Blaming the chaos on his deceased generals (Duyet and Chat), he called for military 
reforms, including a reduction of flagbearers and purchasing Western gunpowder.64 
More importantly, he proclaimed, ‘recruitment of soldiers should focus on the real 
number’ of those capable, not a collection of vagrants and outlaws.65 By limiting the 
recruitment of hired militiamen, non-registered males, and captured bandits into 
the army, Hue unintentionally drove many of these men into insurgency across 
the northern delta as it could neither exile them to the south, nor draft them into the 
army. Haunted by the prospect that hundreds, if not thousands, of them were con-
centrating in provincial prisons, Minh Menh constantly sent confidential edicts 
to acquire information, give instructions, and finally exile them in small groups to 
 various northern provinces.66
This was a disaster. Infectious violence turned the river basin into a fertile 
breeding ground and sparked a new wave of uprisings from 1833 to 1837, which will 
be discussed further below. Transregional militias established lowland– highland 
networks, particularly around the ‘ring of insurgency’ stretching from Thanh 
 Social violence in nineteenth-century Vietnam 61
Hoa, Hung Hoa, Thai Nguyen, and Quang Yen. By 1834, Minh Menh decided 
that recruitment of vagrants and non-registered men was counterproductive and 
blocked his officials’ proposals to draft more of them into the army.67
The waves of starving migrants flooding across the delta reflected another aspect 
of social conflict. The great 1824 famine displaced huge numbers from Hai Duong, 
Thai Binh, to Nam Dinh.68 Unsurprisingly, the Phan Ba Vanh uprising sprang from 
this region. At its peak (1827), reports from Hai Duong showed that 108 villages 
had suffered demographic displacement, leaving 12,200 mau (1 mau = 0,36 ha) of 
rice fields abandoned.69 This indicates a profound relation between natural disas-
ters, famine, demographic dislocation, and coercion. In autumn 1832, Thanh Hoa 
officials reported that groups of northerners asked for food and that ‘many died 
along the way’. By the winter, 10,000 people travelled 150 km south from the delta’s 
flooding centres.70 In the same year, 3,000 people fled to Hai Duong. By the time 
the second memorial arrived in Hue, the number was 27,000. Officials were unable 
to feed this multitude and reported that many ‘died along canals and rivers’.71
Village rebellions and the deterioration of state power
Despite official relief efforts, the annual waves of displaced villagers spurred 
various forms of crime, banditry, and militarization across the northern delta. Land 
flight from the low-lying provinces became common during periods of frequent 
seasonal flooding.72 Failures in water management accounted for twenty-seven 
floods between 1803 and 1861, the highest incidence in the millennium following 
Vietnamese control of the delta.73 These environmental and social factors ensured 
that the Nguyen’s military victory over rival political elites in 1802 did not necessar-
ily translate into their dominance over the countryside. Reliance on rural militias 
to exert authority over the villages unwittingly transferred control of taxation and 
army recruitment to the local gentry, who now pocketed a large share of taxation.74 
Rather than centralizing and consolidating power, Nguyen policies contributed to 
social turmoil and signalled state deterioration, while the widespread withholding 
of taxes by villages, coupled with local militarization, indicated just how difficult it 
was for the central authorities to reach into the countryside.
The impact can be gauged by assessing how the state’s judiciary and army 
responded to the two waves of violent unrest during the 1820s and 1830s. The early 
1820s saw a sharp rise in harsh punishments, with 450 new court cases in 1824 and 
740 individual death sentences pending, including some who had been imprisoned 
since 1821.75 By winter 1826, 800 prisoners in the north were awaiting the death pen-
alty, while 200 were executed in 1828.76 Alarmed, Emperor Minh Menh instructed 
local mandarins to treat his subjects more gently, and ordered those not already 
condemned to immediate execution to be held until his final verdict at the Autumn 
Assizes (thu tham).77 This failed to stem the growing use of the death penalty.78 
The reliance on imprisonment and confinement pending execution resulted in 
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overcrowded gaols, adding challenges to provincial administrations. Sixty convicts 
seized and destroyed Son Nam prison in 1830.79 Further riots followed in Thai 
Nguyen and Bac Ninh, responsible for Hue’s order of prison inspections. The results 
were nevertheless disappointing and encouraged the damaging use of exile which, 
as we have already seen, contributed to the numbers of displaced persons joining 
the insurgents.80 Punitive measures also failed to rectify the judiciary’s own prob-
lems. An imperial commission had executed one department chief and impeached 
ten officials for corruption at the Hanoi-based regional administration in 1827.81 
However, demoralized by underfunding and dysfunctional  administration, the 
judiciary continued to crumble during the 1830s.82
An examination of the Hue army underscores the central state’s vulner-
ability. At first sight, Nguyen military power appeared impressive. According 
to some Western reports, the standing army numbered 50,000 men, rising to a 
peak of a 115,000 in the 1820s.83 Military ‘innovation’ was part of Hue’s strategy 
to suppress its subjects and claim regional supremacy. Several dozen Western-
style citadels were built in key towns. In 1824, Le Chat, as regional commander, 
ordered two constructed in Bac Ninh and Hai Duong.84 Chat then recruited 
15,000 more troops, who were deployed in the provinces threatened by banditry.85 
The  most visible signs of Westernization appeared in soldiers’ appearance and 
armament: by 1822, nearly half of the line troops were dressed in English wool-
len uniforms, carried European-style muskets, and were trained according to 
European manuals.86
French handguns and British gunpowder, however, were not the right answer 
to the turbulence. Security management in the delta’s core was falling into local 
hands.87 Many of Gia Long’s bandit-suppression campaigns were joined by regional 
strongmen who were encouraged to raise their forces.88 Hue launched multiple 
campaigns between 1802 and 1826 across the northern region against a wide range 
of opponents, comprising Tayson remnants, Le claimants, and rural militias. In 
1808, Le Chat led a long operation against 3,000 insurgents in Ninh Binh.89 In that 
year alone, thirty engagements were fought from Thanh Hoa to Kinh Bac.90 The 
scale of these operations posed serious logistical and command challenges. Hue 
lay 700 km south of the northern delta – the main operating theatre – while rice 
and troops were collected from the Mekong Delta located roughly 1,700 km to 
the south of Hanoi. The state’s armies marched back and forth to Thanh-Nghe in 
1819 and 1824 against the Le claimants led by Duy Hoan, who had expanded into 
the delta through Ha Nam after 1816 by rallying support from local strongmen.91 
Seventeen years after Hoan’s execution in 1817, his son Duy Luong led a new revolt 
from the mountains of Thanh Hoa-Ninh Binh into the delta, where he rallied local 
 supporters.92 When Luong was killed, another Le claimant, Duy Hien, rebelled in 
1836, underscoring Hue’s inability to defeat its opponents.
Military modernization failed to address the underlying causes of rural revolts, 
which included corrupt officials and seasonal flooding. Hai Duong and Hung 
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Yen provinces were badly affected by the Thai Binh and Red rivers, but official 
malfeasance concealed the consequences from Hue and hindered effective coun-
termeasures. The court remained unaware that all nine counties of Hai Duong were 
suffering from famine and peasant displacement during 1824–27.93 The catastrophic 
flood of 1827 forced starving peasants to abandon hundreds of villages.94 Most 
moved east and south-east into the coastal region, already infamous as a bandit 
haven, where they swelled the number of insurgents to 5,000. Having defeated a 
Nguyen army on the coast, the insurgents allied with Chinese pirates, causing the 
first delta-wide crisis for the Nguyen since 1802.95
Haunted by the possibility that northern provincial citadels would be taken by 
the rebels, Emperor Minh Menh dispatched 2,000 troops to reinforce strategic 
garrisons and sent another force of 300 musketeers to confront the insurgents.96 
Officials were instructed to communicate directly and confidentially with Hue 
rather than the Hanoi regional administration.97 The reinforcements enabled the 
Nguyen army to capture the rebel stronghold of Nam Dinh, taking 760 prisoners, 
of whom 160 were beheaded and 400 sentenced to forced labour.98 Although Minh 
Menh attempted to relieve the consequences of famine and flooding by sending 
reputable officials to each village to placate peasants, the countryside was far from 
quiet: investigations revealed a list of 800 rebels, immediately prompting renewed 
punitive measures.99
Meanwhile, several thousand insurgents gathered in Bac Ninh and a pirate fleet 
of fifty ships launched attacks in Quang Yen.100 Hue responded by constructing 
a series of military posts, each manned by 30 to 100 soldiers along the 300 km of 
coastline from Nam Dinh to Quang Yen, to protect local communities from the 
pirates, prevent rice smuggling to China, and manage demographic mobility.101 Far 
from reassuring people, the increased military presence sowed growing discontent 
among the rural population who interpreted Hue’s actions as another form of 
coercive centralized control. The court now demanded quarterly reports on rice 
price and the security situation, and requisitioned sixty war elephants to enforce 
the delta.102 It also sent 1,476 cannons and 11,000 handguns to twelve provinces, 
representing a scale of arms distribution not seen since Vietnamese unification.103
A second wave of violence followed between 1832 and 1837, caused partly by 
the continued efforts of Le claimants, but mainly by the government’s failures in 
water management. Following flooding in 1825 and 1827, considerable resources 
were invested to improve flood defences, and 952 km of dykes were built by 1829, 
representing the bulk of all construction under the first two Nguyen emperors.104 
However, these endeavours failed to prevent serious floods in 1833 and 1835. 
In frustration, Minh Menh deposed the dykes commission and summoned an 
empire-wide discussion on the hydraulic problem. Then, thousands of coolies were 
deployed in 1835–36 to dig a 20 km canal through the most low-lying area. The pro-
ject proved disastrous, bringing more water into the delta and submerging Hung 
Yen and Hai Duong provinces to a depth of 2 m.105
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This time the crisis was empire-wide. A military insurrection erupted in 1833, 
and the biggest citadel of the Lower Mekong, Phien An, was captured and held for 
three years. These rebels were assisted by five Siamese invading armies crossing the 
Vietnamese–Cambodian and Lao frontiers.106 In the north, around 650 insurgents 
reassembled in Son Tay and established close contact with discontented groups in 
the delta’s rimland during the summer of 1834.107 Meanwhile, 100 km to the south, a 
new Le claimant gathered thousands of followers in Ninh Binh and Thanh Hoa, and 
ethnic highlanders attacked provincial offices along the Sino-Vietnamese borders. 
This time, the rich, populous northern delta was threatened from three directions.
Sensing trouble, Minh Menh sent confidential requests to all senior provincial 
officials to provide information on bandits and outlaws.108 Regular troops and 
reserves in Ha Tinh and Hai Duong received orders to train and deploy in early 
1834, while trusted southern troops were mobilized north to the delta.109 The 
emperor even took the rare step of summoning key ministers to establish a Privy 
Council to debate military matters.110 The Nguyen had clearly learned their lesson 
from 1825–27, and proceeded to isolate the delta from the hostile ethnic minorities 
in the surrounding highlands. The gunpowder trade was banned, and the sulphur 
and saltpetre mines were closed to cut the flow of arms and munitions to the 
delta. New networks of military posts and communications were set up along the 
coastline and the western corridor stretching from Son Tay to the south, block-
ing  intruders from entering the lowland.111 Finally, in 1836–37, some of the most 
capable generals were sent to pacify rural communities and display imperial sym-
pathy for local inhabitants. These hand-picked commissioners not only conducted 
counter-insurgency operations, but also reorganized local administration, deposed 
corrupt officials, and boosted people’s confidence.112
Conclusions
Although the Nguyen regime outwardly defeated both waves of rebellion, its appar-
ent victory entailed relinquishing much of its authority in the countryside to the 
gentry and other armed ‘bullies’. This encouraged a decentralizing cycle, placing tax 
revenues and army conscripts further from its reach. Hue remained an underfunded 
state relying on old-fashioned institutions and political philosophy to address the 
modern age’s dynamic agenda. Like Qing China, Nguyen Vietnam failed to develop 
as a ‘fiscal-military state’ based on effective resource extraction for bureaucratic and 
military modernization.113
This chapter has argued that the idea of a society of stable villages projected by 
imperial political belief has deceived us about the Vietnamese state’s ubiquitous 
control of violence and its ability to coerce at will. Certainly, the Nguyen state 
claimed a monopoly of legitimate violence, but we must look beyond central 
institutions to test this. The conventional interpretation portrays Asian ‘rural com-
munes’ as small, static, and stagnant in time and space.114 As part of the narrative, 
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modern Vietnamese nationalist historiography romanticizes the rural landscape 
with peace-loving residents and a reservoir of tradition. These approaches under-
estimate the role villages played in generating social violence and their durable 
capacity for violent resistance against the state. Early nineteenth-century Vietnam’s 
villages indicate how vibrant human mobility and local militarization can provide 
counter-evidence to mainstream Western historical thought, including notions 
of Oriental despotism championed by Montesquieu, Hegel, Marx, and Wittfogel, 
as well as theorists of state-making, notably Max Weber and Charles Tilly, who, 
in both cases, place legitimate coercion in the hands of despots and state-builders. 
In these views, both violence and state-making are aligned as a common top-down 
process.
Local militarization in the Red River basin suggests that villages played a 
significant role in challenging a declining state in early modern East Asia, espe-
cially in densely populated deltas where peasant society was not, by any means, 
‘an inert sackful of potatoes’,115 but a highly interconnected and volatile social 
space. Vietnam’s experience was far from unique. In rural China, the rise of local 
gentry-led militias between the 1790s and 1860s prepared the ground for the Qing’s 
downfall.116 As Sidney Tarrow argues, there was a ‘broad nineteenth-century’ global 
disturbance which saw dynamic local forces ‘organize their relations with the state, 
reconcile or fight out conflicts of interests and attempt to adapt politically to wider 
social pressures’. Jack Goldstone presents this as waves of state failures.117
Vietnam’s experience is thus part of a wider pattern across the early modern 
world. Although, by the early nineteenth century, village rebellion was not a new 
phenomenon, the scale of violence soared to unprecedented levels. In the absence 
of urban centres, a burgeoning peasant mobility and growing rural market network 
made villages central to the generation and dissemination of conflict. By declaring 
war on the state, the countryside played an essential role in defining the violent cul-
ture of the age in their own terms. By grounding rural violence in its broader socio-
economic and cultural context, this chapter has revealed the boundaries between 
physical resistance as a daily ‘weapon of the weak’ and violence as a social collective 
response.118 The notion of rural violence not only demonstrates peasant economic 
and political behaviour, but also provides a window into their popular ideology, 
countryside politics, ideas of social order, law, and legitimacy during Vietnam’s age 
of ‘village rebellion’.
The violent deterioration of state–village relations not only weakened the 
Nguyen militarily, but forced central authority to partially retreat from rural areas, 
creating a vacuum filled by local chiefs and bullies who seized control of resource 
extraction. These local strongmen vividly illustrated that the state was not always 
able to monopolize violence in a world where coercion could be claimed by varied 
social forces to advance their own political visions. Dynastic decline from the 1790s 
interrupted a long-standing if tense balance between state and society, and dis-
rupted the restoration of order. As the state ‘stepped back’, villages acquired new 
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roles to play on the political stage. They were neither ‘peaceful’ nor ‘isolated’. They 
showed great capacity to generate collective violence and inflict damage on the cen-
tral authority’s foundations. Their use of violence was not simply a response to state 
repression but reflected a great historical transformation when the ruled themselves 
confronted the crisis of the times and fought for their own sociopolitical visions. 
The result was one of the most turbulent times in Vietnam’s history. The Nguyen 
state survived the turmoil, but its continued failure to modernize would cost the 
Vietnamese dear over the following decades.
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Towards a political economy of conquest: 
the changing scale of warfare and the making 
of early colonial South Asia
Manu Sehgal
Continuity and change in colonial war- and state-making
War-making and state-making have been understood to be closely interrelated and 
have been studied as such for the early modern period. The ‘bellicist’ origins of the 
modern nation state have continued to attract cross-disciplinary attention follow-
ing Charles Tilly’s influential formulation ‘war made the state and the state made 
war’.1 The case of early colonial South Asia is particularly significant for these long-
standing debates, especially given the scale of military activity towards the close of 
the eighteenth century. This rapidly changing scale of warfare, already impressive 
in itself, exercised a consequential impact on the career of the colonial state across 
South Asia’s long nineteenth century (1817–1919).2 Furthermore, the changes in the 
scale of warfare necessitated qualitative changes that in turn enabled an intensifi-
cation and expansion of military violence. Ideological justifications for territorial 
conquest as the engine of colonial expansion were fashioned to expand the scale of 
colonial war-making. Taken together – ideological structures, political justifications 
of territorial conquest, economic restructuring of the state apparatus, and a regime 
of laws that normalized prolific state-authored violence – these elements came to 
constitute a distinct early colonial order for South Asia.
Conquest as a violent transformation of territory has generally not received 
attention from historians of South Asia. The study of colonialism and the histo-
riography of colonial South Asia are riddled with several unexamined verities. At 
least two of these deserve to be highlighted at the outset – the extractive nature of 
colonial rule and the violence inherent to the colonial project – both of which were 
essential to the process of territorial conquest.3 In examining the changes in and 
potential limits to large-scale violence in the early modern world, the case of early 
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colonial South Asia is particularly instructive. The discussion that follows interprets 
large-scale violence through the prism of state-authored violence as represented 
by a series of military campaigns that came to characterize colonial rule towards 
the final quarter of the long eighteenth century (c.1775–1807). It is argued that 
colonialism marked a violent and sharp break in the historical trajectory of South 
Asia and that careful analysis of colonial warfare is the most sensitive register from 
which these profound changes can be observed. Across the wider early modern 
world, inflicting large-scale violence was hardly the exclusive domain of the state. 
The emergence of a territorially acquisitive company regime testifies to the useful-
ness of the bellicist origins of the modern state thesis. The relationship between the 
fabrication of state-like structures within the commercial edifice of a private joint-
stock company and its need, or ability, to organize large-scale violence deserve to be 
explored in much greater depth, towards which with this chapter seeks to provide 
an initial contribution.
Historiographical debates about the eighteenth century in South Asian history 
have stabilized along two opposing positions which can be neatly summarized as 
those characterizing colonial rule as a sharp, violent, and disruptive break, and a 
revisionist thesis arguing for broad continuity between the precolonial and colo-
nial periods.4 The revisionist thesis has gained wide scholarly approval, though 
its claims of economic rejuvenation accompanied by creative political realign-
ments and cultural effloresce have by no means gone unchallenged. It does offer 
an appropriate corrective to a presentation of the eighteenth century as an era 
of dismal post-Mughal imperial decline leading to unmitigated political chaos 
and economic enervation. The arguments in favour of retaining continuity as the 
dominant mode of understanding historical developments across the eighteenth 
century can be summarized as operating along two axes. The first traces the impor-
tance of late Mughal influences into the early colonial period, especially in terms 
of bureaucratic technologies of revenue extraction and political norms of govern-
ance, while the second analyses the ebbs and flows of economic activity below the 
substratum of political strife and violent transactions between competing state 
formations.5
Another line of revisionism addressed continuities in colonial practice, criticiz-
ing the earlier interpretation of the East India Company (EIC) as exclusively com-
mitted to ‘quiet trade’ and scrupulously maintaining itself above temptations of 
territorial acquisitiveness before the mid-century collapse of the Nawab of Bengal 
in the ‘Plassey Revolution’ (June 1757). Philip Stern has argued for understanding 
the ‘Company-state’ as a manifestly early modern formation, which engaged with 
the entire spectrum of political behaviours that are conventionally reserved for 
a later period of ‘high’ colonialism.6 This argument posits continuities between 
a late seventeenth-century company regime and its politically interventionist, 
militarily aggressive hegemonic avatar in the latter half of the eighteenth century, 
with the latter being understood as an important element of continuity that would 
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further undermine any sharp watersheds in mid-century Bengal. It is further 
argued that  a  range of political characteristics most closely identified with the 
late  eighteenth-/early nineteenth-century progeny of the Company regime were 
present in an embryonic form as early as the late seventeenth/early eighteenth 
century, including pretensions of exercising political sovereignty, tensions inherent 
to a post-1689 Revolutionary arrangement of civilian control of the military, pro-
clivity to entangle the EIC within political disputes, and an ideological edifice that 
justified garrisoning of its fortified settlements (the three presidencies of Bengal, 
Madras, and Bombay that constituted the territorial possessions of the Company). 
Understood as an early modern political animal, the Company-state presents 
itself as exhibiting many of the defining characteristics attributable to a much later 
period. However, such claims to continuity between a seventeenth-century early 
modern Company-state and what followed in the latter half of the eighteenth 
century, while generally persuasive, need to be qualified. The revisionist position 
itself needs further revision in order to better understand the scope and nature of 
violence that birthed the colonial regime.
The shift to a territorially based warfare state
Over the long eighteenth century, the Company emerged as a prolific author of a 
specific form of state-authored violence which can most accurately be described as 
colonial warfare. Relying on a large mass of military labour which had provided the 
ballast for state-formation during much of the medieval and precolonial periods, 
the EIC was able to mobilize ever larger pools of military materials by perfecting 
an extractive regime of coercive rule.7 Towards the end of this period (c.1807), the 
EIC could claim a hegemonic status over its indigenous rivals, many of whom had 
sought to emulate its military-fiscalist procedures to contest territorial claims made 
by an expanding colonial state-formation.8 By the final quarter of the eighteenth 
century, the EIC rested on the culmination of a number of important transforma-
tions. The most significant of these was its overwhelming reliance on territorial 
revenues as the main source of income. From the 1780s onwards, the political 
relationship between territory, conquest, and revenues was clearly changing. The 
origins of this change can be traced back to earlier debates about the legitimacy of 
the Company demanding revenues from subjugated political state formations.9 As 
late as 1783–84,  governors, like George Macartney at Madras, were still insisting on 
returning territories which had been acquired by the Company to pay for the rising 
costs of fighting the Second Anglo-Mysore War (1780–84).10 Yet, a mere decade 
later, the enactment of the Permanent Settlement (1793) presented itself as a bold 
experiment in creating a market in agrarian property, while generating a stable 
income for the EIC’s largest and most resource-rich presidency of Bengal.11 Despite 
its significance, the link between revenues extracted from the agrarian produce of 
eastern India and the Company’s desperate search for a stable, predictable source 
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to fund its increasingly expensive military campaigns, has not been studied.12 In 
short, the colonial regime by the 1790s had become an expensive, expanding, and 
 insatiable war machine, and the primary concern of both the Company and its 
 critics was how to sustain it. It will be argued here that earlier attempts to explain 
and sustain colonial warfare were replaced by new arguments prioritizing resources 
for war. This was a change that was sufficiently dramatic for it to be observed, com-
mented on, and debated among contemporaries, and it is here located as the basis 
of a distinctly early colonial formation. This characterization of the eighteenth-
century Company-state as a colonial state formation is to be contrasted with efforts 
to study the Company as merely another early modern entity.13
Historians have struggled vainly to identify a series of ‘turning points’ to trace 
the transformation of the EIC from an armed merchant to an imperial hegemon. 
Interminable debates attest to the unprofitable nature of this exercise – no such 
point of departure has been identified, nor perhaps can be clearly established. 
Searching for such a turning point is asking the wrong question. Instead, we should 
recognize that the tensions between extracting surplus revenue for commercial pur-
poses or using it to fund warfare were perennial sources of contention. Territorial 
conquest in the final quarter of the eighteenth century not only aroused metropoli-
tan anxieties about the scandalous rapacity of empire-building in South Asia, but 
also caused growing alarm about the ruinous cost of such territorial acquisitions.14 
The EIC’s voluminous, yet opaque, financial records notoriously prevented any 
realistic assessment of its fiscal operations, especially as its original character as a 
joint-stock profit-seeking venture declined successively with each of its military 
campaigns.15 Scrutiny of the Company’s financial records was a necessary prerequi-
site of any metropolitan hopes of maintaining oversight and control over its military 
adventurism in India. The ‘India Budget’ was an important part of the response to 
the anxieties – moral and economic – about the rapidly changing complexion of the 
Company’s political presence in South Asia. Henry Dundas unequivocally signalled 
a profoundly important change in metropolitan attitudes towards accepting expen-
sive territorial conquests when he presented the East India Budget for 1787. In his 
private correspondence, Dundas communicated this to the new governor-general, 
Charles Cornwallis, that the ‘investment’ (resources reserved for the annual export 
trade with Britain) would receive support from the EIC’s surpluses in times of 
peace,
but in the event of War, the whole would be applied to the purposes of War and no 
part to Investment … if War necessarily comes upon you, from the restlessness of our 
European Rivals, apply the whole Revenues to the purposes of War and let Trade and 
Investment take care of themselves.16 
The changes embodied in Dundas’s statement were to have a lasting impact on the 
political economy of conquest in South Asia, even if they did not mark a watershed 
in terms of the EIC’s political career as a state formation.
 Scale of warfare in early colonial South Asia 75
The acceptance of the costs of conquest was an important step towards the 
broader British embrace of a colonial empire founded on military violence.17 For 
political actors in South Asia, the readiness to accept the cost of war acted as an 
accelerant fuelling the growth of violence. As a prolific author of war, the EIC was 
already engaged in military campaigns for nearly half of the half century since its vic-
tory at Plassey (1757–1807). Each campaign raised the cost of maintaining, fielding, 
and even demobilizing the large standing armies of its three presidencies of Bengal, 
Madras, and Bombay, culminating in the most expensive and ambitious military 
project – the Second Anglo-Maratha War (1803–05). This conflict embodied many 
of the features of earlier struggles, while exemplifying a new paradigm for how the 
Company would marshal resources in its pursuit of territorial hegemony over the 
subcontinent.
The disproportionate historical attention paid to the Second Anglo-Maratha 
War can largely be explained by the fact that its campaigns included celebrated mili-
tary victories of Arthur Wellesley, the future Duke of Wellington.18 Behind these are 
two rather more significant points: the Company achieved complete domination of 
the Indian littoral and, unlike previous military campaigns, this war was above all a 
subcontinental project.19 Local administrations and complex hierarchized chains 
of civilian/military command interlocked to a level that was unprecedented in 
terms of mobilizing resources for warfare. Transcontinental campaigns in the last 
quarter of the eighteenth century were characterized by the movement of detach-
ments sent out from different corners of the subcontinent, with materials of war 
and retinues of camp followers, bullion, and cattle following in their train. These 
spatial extensions of power and resources were riven with political contradictions 
and fissiparous exchanges between civilian officials and military officers as the 
latter were often deployed across legally shifting territorial zones of jurisdictional 
control. Fractious exchanges over defraying the costs of military expenses, and legal 
disputations over civilian control of the military were, in the case of the Maratha 
war, replaced by sweeping political cover for military operations, a transcontinental 
mobilization of resources, and an unprecedented commitment of resources to feed 
the Company’s ever more ravenous war machine. Thus, to paraphrase Tilly, the 
Second Anglo-Maratha War remade the Company-state which now made war on a 
subcontinental scale.
The emergence of war on an expanded, subcontinental scale was distinctive 
enough for contemporaries to comment on its transformative impact on colonial 
warfare. For an earlier generation of Company directors, the rising cost of mili-
tary adventures in India was much more than a cause for serious concern – it was 
understood as an existential threat to the Company’s political clout and financial 
solvency. Prominent among the critics of the inexorable privileging of the mili-
tary in the Company’s political and financial calculations was the figure of Jacob 
Bosanquet, who was elevated to chair the EIC’s Court of Directors on the eve of 
the  Maratha war.20 Engaged in a detailed statistical examination of two decades 
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of commercial and political policy, Bosanquet reviewed the fluctuating fortunes of 
the Company by asserting that ‘the total Debt in India … have been intailed [sic] 
upon the Company chiefly by territorial and not Commercial Pursuits’.21 The EIC 
had come full circle, from Henry Dundas assuring the governor-general that in 
times of war the revenue surpluses of the Company should be exclusively directed 
away from the trade of the Company, to two decades later when military expendi-
ture was cited as the pre-eminent source of its burgeoning debts. The Maratha war 
was a political success in terms of territories acquired by the Company. In terms of 
its financial impact, the war was an unmitigated disaster.
Feeding Leviathan: the Second Anglo-Maratha War
For contemporary Company officials, success in colonial warfare was essentially 
predicated on the state’s ability to extract and channel an increasing volume of 
resources towards military expenditure. Since land revenues constituted the prin-
cipal source of state income, the acquisition of territory – from which revenues 
were extracted – was deemed to be essential in order to sustain the expanding mili-
tary apparatus that came to characterize colonial rule in nineteenth-century South 
Asia.22 Thus emerged a quintessential logic of colonial rule/warfare –  territories 
yielded revenues which sustained the military apparatus of coercion even as the 
acquisition of territory wreaked havoc on the colonial state’s fiscal health. For con-
temporaries and historians alike, the Second Anglo-Maratha War may have been 
a political success in defeating the Company’s last major political opponent, but 
equally, for critics of the EIC’s military expansionism, war was  synonymous with 
fiscal collapse.
The most visible, public symptom of the fiscal imprudence of colonial warfare 
was the EIC’s exploding interest-bearing debt. In a little over a decade (1793–1804), 
the Company’s interest-bearing debt more than doubled – from £15 million to £31 
million.23 The criticism in Parliament about expensive war-making was echoed in a 
scathing review of the relationship between colonial warfare and the EIC’s worsen-
ing financial state:
It is difficult to conceive, what new pretences [sic] can be set up for absorbing the 
immense revenues of India in extra military charges … Tippoo Sultan is destroyed, 
the Mahratta empire is subdued and dismembered, the French are extirpated and the 
whole peninsula laid under contribution to the power of Great Britain. The hacknied 
[sic] plea of unexpected war and unforeseen expenses must fail at last in a country, in 
which an enemy in arms is not to be found and where it is impossible for an European 
power to attack us.24
Immediately below the surface of a hostile exchange in official dispatches and 
polemical pamphleteering was a complex world of financial strain which attested 
to the innovations that characterized the colonial regime’s capacity to organize 
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violence. Bosanquet calculated that by 1793 the EIC incurred a deficit between its 
financial resources and its territorial and commercial expenditure of £4 million. He 
emphatically pointed to how in the decade between the defeat of Mysore (in 1793) 
and the beginning of the Second Anglo-Maratha War (1803–04), the Company’s 
deficit had halved from £4 million to £2,104,621. By 1807, this deficit had again 
grown to £10.7 million. The inescapable conclusion was that, despite the acquisi-
tion of additional revenue-yielding territories, the Second Anglo-Maratha War had 
worsened the Company-state’s deficit by £8,661,443 – a fivefold increase in three 
years (1804–07), making this the most expensive as well as most extensive conflict 
in South Asia. Bosanquet averred that the expenditure on the Maratha war had 
absorbed any surpluses generated by the acquisition of territories.25 Verging on 
bankruptcy, the Company had to seek financial assistance from the British govern-
ment each year between 1806 and 1810, prompting Parliament to appoint a select 
committee to investigate.26 The question was not that war had ruined Company 
finances, but why this particular war had proved so expensive.
The Marathas – a complex political agglomeration of four ruling families and a 
titular head – has conventionally been described as a ‘confederacy’.27 The ruling 
families of Sindhia, Holkar, Bhonsle, and Gaekwad, owing nominal obeisance to 
the court of the Peshwa at Poona, dominated a territorial mass that, at its zenith, 
stretched from Delhi in the north to the edge of the kingdom of Mysore in the 
south. The war against the chiefs did not proceed along any evident rules of a con-
federated alliance – with Sindhia and Bhonsle fighting the Company in the first 
phase of the war (August to December 1803), followed by a desultory second phase 
(April 1804 to December 1805) which pitted Holkar against a shifting alliance that 
at various points included the Company, Gaekwad (who had stayed neutral in the 
preceding phase), and Sindhia. The Company fielded the largest military force 
assembled in South Asia – divided among two theatres of war – under Lieutenant 
General Gerrard Lake in the Gangetic plains of northern India, and a southern 
detachment under the command of Major General Arthur Wellesley. Wellesley’s 
nearly 10,000 strong force would subsume another detachment operating from the 
territories of the Company’s ally, the Nizam of Hyderabad.28 The main force serv-
ing in the Deccan under Wellesley required such extensive material and political 
resources that the term ‘logistics’ does not sufficiently convey the complexity of 
the extractive exercise.29 Reflecting the kind of painstaking attention to detail that 
would characterize his successful career against Napoleon in Europe, Wellesley had 
begun commandeering resources across peninsular India as early as January 1803. 
The forces under his command advanced north from Mysore into hostile territory 
in central India, supported by the treasuries and granaries of the southern penin-
sular tip of the Madras presidency. It was both logical and desirable that Wellesley 
should obtain resources locally from the western territories of the Bombay presi-
dency and the cotton-rich province of Gujarat (ruled by the Maratha court of the 
Gaekwad of Baroda).
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Away from the celebrated battlefield victories and below the surface of military 
manoeuvres,30 the Maratha war can be presented as a story of a contentious restruc-
turing of the Company’s administration in Madras and Bombay as it desperately 
sought to mobilize resources on an unprecedented scale. It is here we can see the 
validity of Tilly’s dictum: the pressures of war compelled the Company to adapt as 
its higher political and military authorities commandeered resources across the jeal-
ously maintained jurisdictional boundaries of its hitherto disjointed possessions. 
This transformation was sanctioned legally through the delegation of complete 
political authority to military commanders, further militarizing the Company and 
encouraging the expansion in the scope of its campaigns. By June 1803, Governor-
General Richard Wellesley had decided to disengage from the dilatory negotia-
tions with Sindhia and Bhonsle and to commit the Company to war. The military 
 commanders – Lake and Arthur Wellesley – were given sweeping political powers 
to operate independently of all civilian authorities – including the ‘superior’ 
 government of Bengal and the local administrations of Madras and Bombay.
This delegation of unqualified political authority addressed a persistent prob-
lem that had hobbled the Company’s ambitions of territorial  aggrandizement  – 
 commanders resented their theoretical subordination to civilian control in 
wartime, causing disputes and contributing to military disasters.31 The new, 
sweeping delegation of power extended down to local military officers who 
could requisition resources and ignore civilian officials, to whom they were no 
longer answerable, and contributed directly to the burgeoning scale of resource 
 extraction.
Logistical planning for Wellesley’s main force had begun in earnest as early as 
January 1803. Less than a month after his arrival in the Peshwa’s capital at Poona, 
Wellesley was complaining about the inadequacy of the resources allocated to 
him.32 Four months before open hostilities began, the Bombay presidency was 
struggling to sustain its military guests, with the garrison storekeeper Edward Moor 
defending himself by claiming that, while his ‘means are sadly cramped, half by 
scarcity of men and money’, he had scoured the hinterland to meet the army’s sub-
stantial demands.33 Such was the scarcity of resources that the governor of Bombay, 
Jonathan Duncan, admitted to being ‘alarmed at our growing difficulties in procur-
ing Money and for your Wants’. The civilian administration scrambled to corral 
financial resources to fund military operations, including appropriating £28,000 in 
silver dollars originally meant for the Madras presidency. Desperate measures like 
this impacted adversely on the Madras treasury’s ability to meet its own obligations 
to the army, Duncan advising Wellesley to directly draw on the Bengal treasury 
instead.34
The effect of war on the regional economies of western-central India underscores 
the more general point that conflict always has specific regional, political, commer-
cial, and financial constraints. Lakshmi Subramanian’s work on the indigenous net-
works of moneylending and mercantile exchange has illuminated a sophisticated 
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interregional matrix of relationships in which the Bania moneylenders (referred to 
as shroffs in contemporary records) played a crucial role in remitting capital across 
the peninsular landmass.35 By drafting hundis or bills of exchange drawn on the 
Bengal treasury, the main source of capital, the shroffs of Surat and Bombay could 
safely convey money to specified locations in a given local currency. Remittance of 
funds through this network obviated the need to rely on the hazardous alternative 
of moving bullion either by sea or by unsecured overland routes, and provided what 
armies operating in India needed most: ready cash. Reliance on these networks 
of exchange was inevitable, especially during periods of intense financial strain 
wrought by war. As an anonymous correspondent complained to the governor 
of Madras, Edward Clive, ‘it was known in the Black Town that the money was 
absolutely required for the Pay of the Army … the state of our Treasury is always 
known in the money market which gives the lender an evident advantage which he 
naturally converts to his own benefit and to the loss of the Public’.36
Thus, the growing scale of the Company’s military operations depended directly 
on local agents and financial networks. The difference in the values of local cur-
rencies gave additional, near permanent advantage to indigenous moneylenders, 
whose importance during periods of extreme financial distress was all too obvious 
to desperate Company administrators and military commanders alike. However, 
even after acknowledging this axiom to the political economy of colonial warfare, 
Subramanian’s assertion that ‘the ability to provide credit to the ruler made the 
banker the most important functionary in the politics of transition in the eighteenth 
century’ needs to be qualified.37 Untimely demands on the paymasters of a military 
force, the recalcitrance of an Indian moneylender, and the mutinous sullenness of 
Indian recruits impatiently awaiting pay, undoubtedly added up to the difference 
between a glorious military victory and a humiliating outcome.38 However, more 
significantly, it was the Company’s ability to extract and marshal resources in ser-
vice of its war machine that was ultimately determinative of the outcome of all con-
tests against their Maratha foes. It is being argued here that, while the importance 
of the availability of cash and assured transmission of capital cannot be overstated, 
the true significance of how the Company differed from its South Asian opponents 
only emerges when we consider other war-making resources as well.
Among the long-drawn-out acrimonious exchanges about the inadequate 
supply of arrack, cattle, fresh meat, iron, and coolies to carry supplies, the exam-
ple of rice in particular illustrates how the Company drained resources from well 
beyond its territories to increase its war-making capacity and defeat its oppo-
nents.39 Rice was essential to war as the principal foodstuff of all armies in India. 
As early as March, well before the arrival of the Company’s force from Madras, the 
Bombay garrison storekeeper admitted to his inability to provide supplies on the 
scale demanded. On the eve of his arrival at Poona, Wellesley had revised his esti-
mates for the stores required just by his force alone to encounter protests from 
the governor of Bombay that the civil administration simply could not cope with 
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the increased demand.40 Over the summer of 1803, while hostile forces manoeu-
vred across the Deccan, the rice scarcity induced by military demands worsened. 
The civilian population and administration of Bombay hosting the concentrated 
military forces already faced collapse by the time open hostilities commenced 
(6 August 1803). The growing supply crisis runs through official and private cor-
respondence in dissonance to the news of military victories. Governor Duncan of 
Bombay was compelled to defend his administration by explaining that the army’s 
demands had already exceeded the capacity of his rice and grains store by April. 
The acute shortage of rice was further exacerbated when, as early as May, Duncan 
admitted that his treasury had run out of money and issued rice in lieu of pay to 
the Bombay garrison. Reports of crop failures and a sharp increase in rice prices 
forced Bombay to send two ships to beg for rice from the south (Mangalore) and 
east (Bengal).41
Crop failures and steeply increasing prices were familiar challenges for the 
EIC’s bureaucracies, but the unprecedented scale of the new war began to dawn 
on the civilians. A mere month into the war, the Bombay government noted with 
alarm that there were ‘ground[s] to apprehend a very speedy and severe scarcity 
in the article of Rice, at a time when not only the local consumption is to be pro-
vided for, but ample supplies of this indispensable article required for the use of 
the armies under the command of the Hon’ble Major General Wellesley’.42 The 
beleaguered garrison storekeeper, Edward Moor, admitted he could not procure 
the seven months’ supply of rice demanded by Wellesley, and even if he could do 
so the scale of the necessary purchase would have destabilized the grain market.43 
Dismal reports on the grain markets alarmed the governor sufficiently for him to 
admit that western India would suffer a famine unless the Elphinstone returned 
with rice from Bengal.44 Just as news of Wellesley’s stunning victory over the 
combined forces of Sindhia and Bhonsle at Assaye (23 September 1803) reached 
Bombay castle, Governor Duncan attributed ‘the present scarcity of grain in the 
market’ to ‘the quantity purchased … for General Wellesley’s Army in the months 
of April and May last, which would have been our stock for the Rains’.45 The acute 
scarcity of resources was not restricted to rice as the custom master starkly recom-
mended that ‘unless a total Prohibition is put to … [the] Exportation [of rice]; 
an inevitable Famine will be the Consequence. I would also recommend an entire 
stop to the export of Ghee, Wheat, and every other sort of grain for the present’.46 
The subsequent bans on the export of wheat, coarse grains, and rice disrupted an 
extended network of trade in these commodities extending to Muscat and Basra 
across the Arabian Sea and to Madras in the Indian Ocean.47
The famine-inducing shortage of rice was symptomatic of a much wider and 
more serious problem – the complete exhaustion of the Company’s financial ability 
to transact warfare on a subcontinental scale.48 By the beginning of the next phase 
of the war against Malhar Rao Holkar (April 1804 onwards), the financial distress of 
both the Bombay (a theatre of war) and Madras presidencies (far removed from the 
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war) was crippling the Company’s overall ability to continue fighting. Already by 
January 1804, well ahead of the renewed hostilities, the governor of Madras, William 
Bentinck, abjectly confessed to his inability to ‘disguise … the very great embarrass-
ment, in which I have found myself involved … [with] a treasury entirely empty, as 
well as from the prospect of a very large Deficit in our Resources’. Wellesley’s force 
in the Deccan was raised and partially financed by the Madras presidency, which 
estimated that a quarter of its annual deficit was due to the exigencies of funding 
the first phase of the war. The Madras administration’s efforts to raise a loan to meet 
its increasing financial expenses had already failed in September 1803.49 By March 
1804, Bentinck was warning Bengal that the ‘the Military Expenses will be found to 
be underrated’.50 Less than three months into the renewed war, Madras was willing 
to follow Bombay’s example of ignoring orders and appropriating bullion aboard 
ships carrying £200,000 in specie from New York and Norfolk, originally destined 
for Bengal. Bentinck argued that, given that he had ‘discretion with regard to the 
money to be landed at Fort St George’, he was not in a position to judge whether, 
‘a supply of bullion will be more urgently required at Bengal than at this presidency 
in the early part of 1804/5’. Madras argued that, since the abrupt outbreak of war 
against Holkar was not budgeted, ‘the distance of the Theatre of War, [made it] 
necessary that … [the detachment in the Deccan] should be supplied very much 
in advance’.51
The financial crisis in Madras in 1804 struck before Bombay had recovered from 
its experience as the main theatre of devastation the preceding year. Financial 
exhaustion drove the Bombay council to due expedients, such as selling the 
Company’s cotton meant for export to Canton to a private company (Bruce, 
Fawcett & Company) and to buy two months’ food for the force operating in 
Gujarat.52 That force was currently embroiled in a protracted dispute over the 
authority to extract resources from the revenue-rich territories of the Gaekwad 
ruler of Gujarat. The local military commander, Colonel John Murray, insisted 
on operating independently of the Company’s local political agent and the civilian 
administration at Bombay, thus contributing to the incremental loss of civilian 
control of military operations. Murray complained that monies needed to main-
tain his troops were being diverted to paying arrears of the Gaekwad’s army.53 
Governor Duncan defended his administration by detailing its efforts to create a 
‘well-replenished Military Chest’ for the force in Gujarat.54
Like the Bombay presidency’s search for money in 1803, Murray’s dispute 
with its council in 1804 reveals the significant role of indigenous financiers in the 
Company warfare state; in this case, the influential Surat-based Brahman banker 
Tarwady Arunji Nathji.55 Murray’s problems also demonstrate the importance of 
distinguishing between the supply of money as opposed to its immediate availabil-
ity. Finally, this episode underscores the need to qualify the prevailing assumption 
that ‘even before the British prevailed over the Marathas in the military struggle, 
they had won in the financial struggle’.56 The secret of the Company’s success 
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lay in how it responded to the crisis of its own making by using private banking 
networks not just to remit cash payments to troops in the field, but to extend its 
financial reach to the distant corners of its rapidly expanding territorial empire 
and beyond. The importance of bankers like Tarwady is evident from his abil-
ity to negotiate substantial contracts to exchange money and supply cash to the 
Company’s forces in the field at markedly favourable terms by using networks con-
necting the Gangetic pilgrimage centre of Benares and the western port of Surat. 
Tarwady’s activities attracted complaints from the Bengal administration and 
Murray in Gujarat, indicating the continued friction between the different parts 
of the Company administration, as well as the ongoing civil–military tensions.57 
As late as December 1803, Murray believed that he could negotiate a more favour-
able contract independent of Tarwady’s dominance of the local money market of 
Gujarat.58 The plan to replace the Surat banker failed, but it nevertheless reveals 
the confidence with which the Company’s military was now willing to operate 
across western India. Contrary to Subramanian’s assertion, Tarwady’s problems 
with the Bombay council do not provide evidence of the former’s unassailable 
clout in prefiguring the outcome of the military contest that would follow, but 
rather indicate how the Company was expanding its ability to tap resources across 
much of India.59
Conclusions
The problems of mobilizing resources for territorial conquest encountered by the 
Bombay and Madras presidencies during the Second Anglo-Maratha War were not 
entirely new, but they were on an unprecedented scale and they forced a new level 
of innovation and political development within the Company-state as a whole. This 
is to be contrasted with historiographical claims for broad continuities between sev-
enteenth-century late/post-Mughal regimes and the EIC as yet another ‘successor 
state’ to the Mughals. Conquest and the warfare that created a distinctive colonial 
regime in the final decade of the long eighteenth century was in marked contrast to 
its early/mid eighteenth-century predecessors and its contemporary Indian rivals. 
Much of the administration’s response was ad hoc and expedient, such as divert-
ing bullion meant for other presidencies, selling export cotton to private traders, 
and sending begging expeditions to stave off famine. But beneath these contingent 
and often panicky measures, the underlying shift was unmistakable: the Company 
had become a territorial hegemon dependent on violent conquests to sustain itself. 
As Murray’s underfunded contingent conquered the principality of Godhra (in 
Gujarat) from Sindhia, the colonel gestured towards the ultimate bedrock of the 
colonial warfare state: its ability to conquer districts ‘in the highest state of cultiva-
tion’ and then to urgently generate ‘every information relative to the revenue to be 
collected’.60 At a much higher level, the governor-general was keen to assure his 
metropolitan overseers that:
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The rapid and brilliant success of the British arms in the present War has already added 
to our Possessions in India the Fortress and District of Ahemdnagar; the Fortress of 
Barroach with the adjoining Districts the Territory heretofore possessed by Dowlut 
Rao Scindia in the Dooaub of the Jumna and Ganges, the City of Delhi and adjacent 
Territory and the valuable Province of Cuttack in Orissa and no doubt can be enter-
tained that a Revenue will be derived from these acquisitions in the present year, 
whatever portion of the Conquered Territories may be retained at the conclusion of 
Peace.61
The political economy of conquest operated by conquering revenue-yielding ter-
ritories and rapidly incorporating these into the state cadaster as the most aggres-
sively pursued source of state income. This was supplemented by the manipulation 
of indigenous financial networks to ease cash-flow problems during crises. The 
Company had become trapped in a loop of continued violent expansion and per-
manent financial crisis from which the only escape seemed to be to plunge forward 
into a fresh campaign of conquest.62 The logic of colonial war- and state-making 
expanded the scale and scope of warfare on the subcontinent. To paraphrase 
Tilly – much like its early modern peers, war made the Company-state, but more 
importantly it transformed it into a distinctive early colonial state formation. 
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Ravages and depredations: raiding war and 
globalization in the early modern world
Brian Sandberg
‘A raid is hardly more of a war than is modern burglary.’1 So argued anthropologist 
Harry Holbert Turney-High in his influential book, Primitive War: Its Practice and 
Concepts, published in 1949. Turney-High portrayed raiding as the defining char-
acteristic of conflicts between hunter-gatherers of the prehistoric past and indig-
enous peoples in isolated regions of the modern world. He drew a sharp distinction 
between the ‘primitive war’ that hunter-gatherers practiced and the ‘true war’ that 
‘civilized’ states and societies waged. A ‘military horizon’, Turney-High theorized, 
separated the ‘primitive’ raiding from the ‘true’ military strategy and tactics that 
‘civilized’ armies utilized. The political scientist Quincy Wright, also writing during 
the 1940s, developed a parallel analysis of ‘primitive war’ as a stage in the historical 
evolution of warfare. In his classic work, A Study of War, Wright presents ‘primi-
tive war’ as governed by cultural mores and distinguishes it from ‘civilized war’, 
which he claimed operates based on international systems.2 The general success 
of Wright’s study of warfare ensured that the concept of ‘primitive war’ garnered 
a broad audience, while Turney-High’s theorization of ‘primitive’ raiding strongly 
influenced the anthropology of war.3
The characterization of raiding as ‘primitive’ reinforced modernization narra-
tives of ‘civilization’ and guided anthropological studies of warfare and social 
violence throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Anthropologists 
who studied violence among indigenous peoples portrayed raiding as a com-
munal activity and an aspect of ‘traditional’ culture. Anthropological studies of 
indigenous warfare in Papua New Guinea and the Amazon, including the much-
criticized ethnographic film Dead Birds, reinforced characterizations of ‘primitive 
war’ as ritualized, symbolic, and low-casualty.4 The PBS documentary War, and 
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its companion book, helped popularize the ‘primitive war’ notion of raiding for 
a broad public audience in the United States in the 1980s. Gwynne Dyer, author 
of the companion volume for the documentary, asserts that ‘though precivilized 
warfare served various ritual and magical purposes and may have had broader 
social functions, it was predominantly a rough male sport for underemployed 
hunters, with the kinds of damage-limiting rules that all competitive sports have’.5 
Many scholars, analysts, writers, and documentary film-makers have extended this 
characterization of prehistoric and ‘traditional’ raiding activity to describe small-
scale armed violence in pre-modern and modern historical contexts. As a result, 
raiding activity is often depicted as rough play, organized crime, or clan violence, 
and – in more modern contexts – as guerrilla warfare, low-intensity conflict, 
 unconventional war, or terrorism.
More recent anthropological, archaeological, and historical studies of pre-
historic and indigenous societies have dismantled modernization narratives of 
‘civilization’ and radically altered our understanding of raiding activity. Lawrence 
H. Keeley uses archaeological evidence to argue that prehistoric warriors utilized 
highly organized tactics in raiding warfare that could be quite vicious.6 Recent 
studies in conflict archaeology have demonstrated that pre-modern societies 
engaged in pervasive raiding for captives, including the seizure of women to serve 
as wives.7 Raiding warfare seems to have often played a significant role in the pro-
cess of ethnogenesis, defining ethnic communities and their demographic bounda-
ries.8 This new body of work on pre-modern raiding warfare has not completely 
displaced the concept of ‘primitive war’, however, even though the modernization 
narratives of ‘civilization’ that supported it have been abandoned.
Increasing evidence from the early modern period (c. 1500–1800) demonstrates 
that raiding activities were often highly organized, employing tactical systems and 
strategic objectives that suggest military organization. Anthropologists and histori-
ans have found numerous cases of indigenous societies reorganizing their military 
systems in response to commercial developments and colonial incursions during 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.9 Further, raiding warfare was hardly con-
fined to indigenous societies in the early modern period. I have argued in War and 
Conflict in the Early Modern World that historians need to investigate ‘the new forms 
of raiding warfare that emerged in response to global commerce and imperialism 
during the late sixteenth century’.10 In that book, I identify a transitional period 
between the 1580s and 1640s in which raiding warfare on land and sea increasingly 
intersected with the dynamics of imperialism, colonization, and globalization in 
diverse military systems and societies.
This chapter builds on my previous work on raiding warfare in the early modern 
world by considering French experiences of raiding violence, in detail, during this 
transitional period in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. During 
this period, pirates and privateers launched repeated raids along the French 
coastlines, while soldiers, militia bands, and bandits engaged in significant raiding 
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activities in the countryside and woodlands of the interior. These raiding parties 
inflicted violence and destruction that left traces in manuscript sources conserved 
in archives in Paris, Marseille, Montpellier, Toulouse, Bordeaux, and other cities. 
These sources include: provincial and municipal government records; reports 
of French consuls in Algiers, Tunis, and Malta; ambassadorial correspondence 
from Istanbul; correspondence and records of the city of Marseille; records of the 
Chambre de commerce de Marseille; papers of the admiral des mers de Levant; 
correspondence of the Knights of Malta; and other manuscripts.11 Many of these 
sources concern southern France in particular, but printed pamphlets, treatises, 
and rare books provide additional insights into the dynamics of raiding through-
out early modern France.12 Although there is not space here to fully explore all of 
these sources, early modern French evidence of raiding practices allows us to con-
sider how we might reconceptualize the notions of raiding war and globalization 
in the early modern period.
Raiding seems to have been pervasive in France during the late sixteenth and 
early seventeenth centuries, representing an important aspect of everyday life for 
many French communities. Early modern French evidence of raiding suggests that 
we should abandon the ‘primitive war’ conception of raids completely and instead 
investigate the complex dynamics of raiding practices and their social and military 
organization. I aim to develop an alternative model of raiding warfare that considers 
raiding activity transculturally and examines connections between raiding activities 
and other forms of organized violence. The chapter considers three major dimen-
sions of early modern raiding warfare: borderlands raiding, economic devastation, and 
maritime raiding.13 These three forms of raiding violence were organized by diverse 
individuals and institutions and involved distinct practices of raiding warfare on 
land and sea that were constantly evolving. Different forms of raiding warfare often 
overlapped and intersected in particular regions during specific conflicts. I will 
argue that early modern French raiding practices did not represent a distinct ‘way 
of war’, but instead exhibited broader global patterns of raiding in this transitional 
period, suggesting new ways of conceptualizing raiding war throughout the early 
modern period.
Confessional boundaries and borderlands raiding in southern France
Catholic and Calvinist armed forces engaged in pervasive raiding in the confes-
sionally mixed regions of France during the French Wars of Religion (1562–1629). 
Although Huguenot (French Calvinist) communities existed in various regions of 
France, southern France may arguably be considered a confessional borderlands 
region in this period due to the high concentrations of Calvinists living there. 
Indeed, the vast majority of the entire Huguenot population of France (perhaps 
80 per cent of the kingdom’s Protestants) lived in the southern provinces of 
Guyenne, Languedoc, and Dauphiné. The Catholic and Huguenot populations 
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in these provinces often lived in neighbouring towns within confessionally mixed 
regions, or even in mi-partie (divided) communities. Many towns and villages in 
the rugged mountains and forests of the Cévennes adopted Calvinism, creating 
localized confessional boundaries. Cities such as Bordeaux, Toulouse, Albi, and 
Béziers served as Catholic bastions and refuges for nearby Catholic villages. The 
close proximity and interspersed nature of Calvinist and Catholic communities 
created confessional borderlands regions. Catholic and Huguenot raiding warfare 
in confessional borderlands regularly targeted communities that were controlled 
by opposing confessions for attack.
Cavalry forces carried out much of the pervasive raiding in the borderlands of 
mi-partie southern France. Catholic and Huguenot nobles were the main organ-
izers of this form of raiding warfare, since they had the clientage relationships and 
economic means to raise and maintain cavalry companies of gendarmes (armoured 
heavy cavalry), chevaux-légers (light cavalry), and carabins (mounted carabineers). 
These military and social elites engaged in cavalry skirmishes and duelling over 
confessional disputes. Nobles could also act as military entrepreneurs in organizing 
raiding warfare.14 Southern French nobles directed confessionalized raiding war-
fare in ways that seem to parallel the violence organized by military elites in some 
other borderlands regions, where field armies and state administrations intervened 
intermittently.15
Catholic and Huguenot infantry garrisons also waged perpetual petite guerre, 
or small war, along confessional boundaries during the religious wars. Garrisons 
posted in nobles’ châteaux conducted raiding warfare within the religiously mixed 
regions of France, sometimes attacking the châteaux of their enemies. Garrison 
soldiers posted in town fortifications forayed into the surrounding countryside to 
raid villages inhabited by members of another confession or occupied by opposing 
forces. These garrison soldiers sometimes operated in tandem with town militias to 
conduct more expansive raiding operations against confessional opponents.
While confessional raiding was probably the most intensive form of border-
lands raiding in France during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, 
residents of southern France experienced other forms. French, Spanish, Basque, 
and Navarrese bandits operated in the Pyrenees mountains along the Franco-
Spanish frontier. Anne de Lévis, duc de Ventadour, who served as lieutenant-
général of the province of Languedoc, worried constantly about this border region, 
and received frequent reports of incursions by armed bandits in the early seven-
teenth century.16 Some of these bandits engaged in livestock raiding, attacking 
farming villages on both sides of the Pyrenees mountains. Complaints of goat- and 
sheep-raiding reached provincial officials, raising questions about the relationship 
between this raiding activity and the transhumance practices studied by Fernand 
Braudel.17 Bandits also stole horses, prompting comparisons with horse-raiding 
patterns in Eurasia, Arabia, North Africa, and the Americas. Cattle ranching was 
less prevalent in southern France than in Andalusia, but bandits seem to have 
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sometimes been cattle rustlers. This form of banditry may be compared with 
cattle raiding in Africa and the Americas, which have been studied by anthropolo-
gists and historians.18 Similar forms of borderlands raiding apparently existed in 
the mountainous regions of south-eastern France, along the border with Savoie, 
leading French officers to position carabinier companies near mountain passes to 
prevent incursions.19
Economic devastation in French war zones
Raiding warfare was not confined to borderlands regions of France, however. Field 
armies and military units inflicted economic devastation on civilian communities 
through systematic pillaging and plundering in war zones during civil conflicts and 
foreign wars. Military officers demanded contributions from selected towns and 
villages that lay in the path of their armies, raising money, food, and supplies to 
support their operations. Profit motives could be present in all forms of raiding, but 
financial dimensions of raiding war were most pronounced in targeted economic 
devastation that disrupted urban and rural society, sometimes forcing civilians to 
flee as refugees.20
Garrisons conducted organized petite guerre from their bastioned fortifications, 
gathering food, drink, supplies, and forage from villages in the surrounding coun-
tryside. Early modern field armies could orchestrate small war in conjunction with 
broader strategic goals.21 In such cases, the small war that we encountered with 
garrisons in confessional borderlands could take on a broader strategic significance. 
For example, raiding parties devastated the villages surrounding Châlons in 1593, 
and peasants and workers reported that they ‘suffered daily from great losses from 
seizures of their horses, cows, goats, and other animals’ that were seized by enemy 
garrisons at Vitry-le-François and several nearby châteaux.22 The same year, the 
échevins of Troyes complained that soldiers had ‘chased, pillaged, and ravaged the 
poor labourers and merchants’ working outside their city’s walls.23 These descrip-
tions are typical of correspondence from towns and cities suffering from sustained 
raiding warfare during the religious wars.
Field armies organized broader raiding campaigns to devastate the country-
side around blockaded or besieged cities during the French Wars of Religion. 
Prolonged sieges of cities such as Orléans (1563), Chartres (1568), La Rochelle 
(1573), Sancerre (1573), Paris (1590), Rouen (1591–92), Amiens (1597), Montauban 
(1621), Montpellier (1622), and La Rochelle (1627–28) prompted sustained raiding 
campaigns in the surrounding countryside. Field armies sometimes launched dedi-
cated campaigns of widespread economic devastation, burning crops and villages 
across an entire region.24
Methods of economic devastation gradually evolved during the early seven-
teenth century. French raiding parties had long extorted money and goods from 
communities, but the construction of royal roads and étapes (way stations) systems 
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in the early seventeenth century seems to have developed in conjunction with 
the use of formal contributions systems. Military units manoeuvring along road 
systems forced villages and towns to provide soldiers with food, lodging, supplies, 
and money.25 John A. Lynn has argued that French field armies and military contin-
gents imposed a ‘tax of violence’ on provincial communities in war zones and along 
étapes routes during the Thirty Years War.26 Formal contributions systems become 
even more elaborate by the mid-seventeenth century, as military entrepreneurs 
and munitions contractors operated on an increasingly large scale across Europe.27 
Much more research is needed on this pervasive form of raiding war in the early 
seventeenth century, since the patterns of small war in the period of Louis XIV’s 
wars are better understood, thanks to the work of John Lynn, George Satterfield, 
Jamel Ostwald, and others.28
Maritime raiding in the Mediterranean and Atlantic
Maritime raiding warfare was part of everyday life for coastal communities in south-
ern France during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Royal officials 
and municipal leaders alike complained frequently of maritime threats. French 
ambassador François Savary de Brèves complained in 1603 of ‘the ravages that the 
English and Barbary corsairs inflict on His Majesty’s [Henri IV’s] subjects in the 
seas of the Levant’.29 Around the same time, Charles de Lorraine, duc de Guise, was 
trying to ensure the coastal defences of Provence against pirate and Savoyard mari-
time raids. Records from early seventeenth-century Bordeaux reveal local admin-
istrators’ attempts to respond to raids along France’s Atlantic coast. Communities 
along the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts routinely faced pirate attacks, privateer 
raids, and armed incursions from amphibious landings. Numerous archival sources 
discuss the preparation of maritime defences in response to raids in the late six-
teenth and early seventeenth centuries.
These sources might give the impression that southern French communities 
were merely the victims of raids by Turkish and North African corsairs, English 
and Dutch privateers, and Spanish and Savoyard galleys. Yet French privateers, 
galleys, and naval ships frequently engaged in raiding expeditions of their own. 
French maritime raiding practices were already well developed by the late sixteenth 
century, even if the guerre de course (commerce raiding) waged by the French royal 
navy during Louis XIV’s wars are better documented.30
French galleys conducted frequent maritime raids across the western and cen-
tral Mediterranean by the late sixteenth century. Some of this raiding activity was 
sponsored directly by the French king and his admirals, facilitated by the gradual 
emergence of royal naval authority in France during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, which Alan James has traced.31 The French king and royal officials 
orchestrated naval expeditions, conducted peace negotiations, and formulated 
trade agreements. Royal family members periodically intervened in ransoming 
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negotiations, as when Louis XIII wrote to the Grand Master of the Knights of Malta 
regarding a 1619 case of slave taking by a French nobleman who had seized some 
Turks and left them at Malta.32
Maritime raiding warfare was largely organized by provincial military officers 
and city councils, even if they claimed to be operating under royal authority. Port 
cities such as Marseille supported French privateering and legitimized raiding war-
fare in the Mediterranean. Marseille officials played a significant role documenting 
maritime seizures of French vessels and organizing responses to maritime raids. In 
1632, a commissaire drew up a list of Provençal ships seized between 1613 and 1632, 
lamenting ‘the seizures and depredations inflicted by the Turkish pirates and the 
corsairs of Tunis, Algiers and Tripoli on Barbary Coast’.33 French slaves in Algiers 
appealed directly to the consuls of Marseille, urging them to act against the ‘bloody 
vipers’ of Algiers.34
Algerian and Tunisian corsairs retaliated, often targeting specific regions and 
ports in southern France that launched raiding vessels. For example, Amurat Bey 
complained to the consuls of Marseille in 1597 about a certain Pierre Pascal, who 
had allegedly stolen a number of horses from him. Pascal had travelled to Algiers, 
claiming that he was a domestic in the service of Henri I de Montmorency, duc de 
Montmorency, the powerful governor of the province of Languedoc. Amurat Bey 
threatened to punish slaves from Languedoc in Algiers unless Pierre Pascal was 
brought to justice.35
French maritime raiding activities and the policy documents they generated 
reflected the expanding global trading networks and long-distance raiding opera-
tions of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Consular records often 
note ships’ port of origin, as when one document reported the names and ports 
of origin for four ships whose crews had been taken slave by Algiers and later 
released. The ships hailed from Marennes, St Malo, and Calais, but reportedly had 
mixed French and ‘Flemish’ crews.36 French merchants and privateers navigated 
fluidly between Atlantic and Mediterranean waters, prompting complex legal chal-
lenges and contributing to early writings of international maritime law by Alberico 
Gentili and Hugo Grotius.37
In the Atlantic, French vessels engaged in extensive coastal raiding and attacks 
on Spanish shipping. The port city of La Rochelle emerged as a major base for 
Huguenot privateers, who sometimes operated along with English and Dutch 
privateers.38 Huguenot privateers were heavily engaged in the French Wars of 
Religion, although the Dutch privateers known as the ‘Sea Beggars’ and their opera-
tions in the Dutch Revolt are better known.39 Henri de Bourbon, king of Navarre, 
served as admiral de Guyenne from 1563–90, granting legitimacy to Huguenot 
 privateering through letters of marque.40
Huguenot privateers contended with Catholic privateers, who targeted English, 
Dutch, and Huguenot ships in the Atlantic Ocean and English Channel. Members 
of the Montmorency and Guise families served as admiral de France or admiral 
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de Guyenne during the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, allowing them 
to organize naval expeditions and authorize maritime raids.41 Catholic privateers 
could claim legitimacy for their attacks along the Atlantic coast by preying on 
Huguenot, English, and Dutch shipping.
Mediterranean raiding focused significantly on the seizures of captives, who 
were enslaved as galley slaves or sold off in ports for urban or agricultural labour. 
Much of the existing historiography on Mediterranean raiding warfare concen-
trates on the Barbary corsairs, portraying their maritime raids as blatant piracy.42 
Yet the Knights of Malta organized intensive raiding campaigns in the central 
Mediterranean that seized Turkish, North African, and Greek slaves, as Molly 
Greene has shown.43 Anne Brogini demonstrates that the galleys of the Knights 
of Malta actually included many French chevaliers and volunteers in their crews.44 
Mediterranean slavery studies centre on the conditions of captivity and the ransom-
ing processes, rather than raiding warfare and slave taking, in part due to the preva-
lence of captivity narratives and the literary studies of them.45 Surviving manuscript 
sources sometimes reinforce this focus on French subjects in captivity due to the 
extended epistolary campaigns to obtain their release. French officials in Algiers 
regularly reported on the status of French captives, and one consul lamented ‘the 
state of the poor French slaves in this city’ in 1623.46
Mediterranean slavery allowed for eventual release through ransoming agree-
ments and prisoner exchanges, which were often negotiated for individuals or 
groups of slaves on an ad hoc basis. For example, François Savary de Brèves negoti-
ated a treaty with Tunis in 1605 for the exchange of Muslim captives in Provence for 
French subjects held in Tunis.47 French religious orders became involved in ransom 
negotiations, gradually systematizing the ransoming process, as Gillian Weiss has 
demonstrated.48
Prisoner exchanges or resales of slaves were not easy to accomplish in practice, 
however. The Sainte-Anne, a polacre from Marseille, sailed for North Africa in 
February 1613, carrying merchandise and a number of moriscos who had been cap-
tured along the coast of Provence. As the Sainte-Anne navigated the island of San 
Pietro, off Sardinia, it encountered a corsair polacre from Algiers, who seized the 
ship and its entire cargo.49 Arnaud Blanc, the captain of the Sainte-Anne, had appar-
ently intended to trade his captive moriscos for French slaves in Algiers, but now he 
and his entire crew were instead captives, in need of ransom.
Mediterranean cities and states could organize dedicated raiding fleets with 
broader strategic aims. In May 1621, the French consul at Algiers reported ‘the 
incredible armament’ of the Algerian corsairs, marvelling at ‘their plans, their 
grievances’, and referred to organized raiding fleets.50 Another French consul 
at Algiers advised the consuls of Marseille in 1623 to ‘beware of Turks who have 
frequently taken refuge at Marseille’ and then later ‘mocked us’. He claimed that 
‘since the descent of the fleet from La Rochelle, [the Algerians] are in some fear 
of fleet’s arrival and of making themselves seen in these waters’.51 The proximity 
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of galleys and their visibility was vital to winning the release of French slaves and 
renegades ‘who are waiting every day for a hand from heaven’, according to the 
consul.52
Ambassadors, municipal officials, naval captains, and other agents attempted to 
manage maritime raiding warfare. Marseille officials attempted to limit excessive 
violence, as when municipal officials in Marseille considered complaints in 1620 
of the ‘depredations’ carried out by the Saint-Victor, which was allegedly operating 
out of their port.53 Algiers officials conducted frequent peace negotiations with the 
French, Dutch, and English involving slave exchanges and ransom payments. The 
complex relationship between the Ottoman Empire and Algiers was sometimes 
mediated by French ambassadors and consuls. The French ambassador in Istanbul 
reported that the Ottoman sultan was sending a representative to North Africa 
in 1620 to renew peace agreements. But, he argued that ‘I have always believed 
that rumours of arming ships under the command of monsieur de Guise or of the 
interdiction of commerce would have a good effect’.54 Two years later, he sought to 
promote French–Algerian peace in 1622, indicating that the Ottoman sultan would 
treat North African tributaries who violated the peace as ‘rebels’.55
French experiences generally mirror patterns of maritime raiding warfare across 
the Mediterranean in the early modern period, but with some particularities. 
French privateers and naval raiders maintained close relationships with the Knights 
of Malta in the central Mediterranean and could rely on them for maritime, logisti-
cal, and diplomatic support.56 Spanish intervention in the Catholic League wars 
affected French shipping in the Atlantic and western Mediterranean in the 1580s 
and 1590s, but the relative peace between France and Spain from 1598 to 1635 
allowed for more expansive French maritime raiding operations.
Conclusion
These French perspectives offer insights on an important transitional period in 
raiding warfare in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Borderlands 
raiding along confessional boundaries was often small-scale and localized, but 
could also be highly organized and militarized. Campaigns of economic devasta-
tion organized by field armies and regular garrisons could be more systematic and 
expansive. Maritime raiding involved seizures of ships and cargos in the Atlantic, as 
well as captive taking and enslavement in the Mediterranean. These brief examples 
of ‘ravages’ and ‘depredations’ from early modern France demonstrate that raiding 
constituted an organized, sustained, and targeted form of warfare, rather than a hap-
hazard series of robberies by marauding soldiers and sailors. Early modern French 
raids on land and at sea hint at much broader patterns of raiding warfare throughout 
the early modern world.
Catholic and Huguenot militants conducted pervasive borderlands raiding 
across confessional boundaries in southern France during the religious wars, 
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but raiding was also pervasive in other borderlands. Religious reform move-
ments produced confessional boundaries and borderlands in a number of 
regions of Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. But con-
fessional conflict was hardly confined to Christian regions, since confessional 
borderlands also existed within other religious communities. Raiding occurred 
along the  Sunni–Shia divide within the  Muslim world, which was reinforced 
by Ottoman–Safavid  rivalry  in  this  period.57  Incessant raiding also occurred 
along the interreligious borderlands, such as the Habsburg–Ottoman military 
frontier in Hungary,  which  attracted Catholic  and  Muslim raiding parties. Early 
modern borderlands raiding is often  associated with the Iroquois raiding in 
the Great Lakes region, eloquently  portrayed in Richard White’s The Middle 
Ground.58 Borderlands raiding took  on numerous forms in frontier regions and 
borderlands around the world,  usually involving  captive  taking,  enslavement, 
and ransoming. Notable examples of early  modern borderlands raiding include 
Iroquois ‘mourning war’, English  colonial militia  operations in North America, 
Portuguese  bandeirantes  forays in Brazil,  Cossack cavalry marauding, Balkans 
irregular warfare, and Arakanese slave raiding. James C. Scott’s landmark The Art 
of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia provides a 
model for examining stateless societies in these borderlands regions.59 By focusing 
on non-state historical actors, early modern studies can reveal the raiding activities 
of peasants and herders operating in localized pillage economies. Early modern 
French evidence of borderlands raiding reminds us that religious and confes-
sional borderlands should be considered in comparison with colonial and imperial 
 borderlands.
Early modern economic devastation involved pillaging and foraging by regu-
lar military units, small war conducted by fortress garrisons, and systematic 
contributions levied by field armies.60 French raiding parties and field armies 
conducted localized economic devastation throughout the late sixteenth and 
early seventeenth centuries, suggesting broader patterns of raiding during the 
European Wars of Religion (1560s–1640s). Military elites, mercenaries, and sol-
diers frequently organized plundering campaigns in war zones across Europe 
during this period. Some of these forms of economic devastation suggest com-
parisons with patterns of raiding warfare in other world regions. For example, the 
zamīndārs (rural nobles) in Mughal India similarly engaged in raiding warfare and 
plundering expeditions in seventeenth-century South Asia.61 In addition, recent 
research  suggests that village disputes in Mughal India often prompted peasant 
militias to retaliate.62 Indeed, many peasant revolts across the early modern world 
may have been responding to raiding campaigns that inflicted economic devasta-
tion on the countryside and exacerbated climatic changes, subsistence crises, and 
famines.63
French patterns of maritime raiding provide compelling evidence of the organi-
zation of commerce raiding, slave taking, and piracy defence by nobles and port 
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cities during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Better-known 
examples of early modern maritime raiding include the activities of English 
privateers, Maltese galleys, North African corsairs, Dutch East India Company 
warships, Chinese mariners, and Japanese ‘sea lords’ – all of whom could be 
accused of the crime of piracy. Privateering and piracy research has often focused 
on Caribbean buccaneers as freebooters, yet maritime raiding could be highly 
organized and expansive in this period. The Uskoks developed ‘raiding economies’ 
that altered commercial patterns in the Adriatic Sea in the sixteenth century.64 
Meanwhile, maritime raiding became pervasive in the Indian Ocean, South China 
Sea, East China Sea, and the Sea of Japan. Adam Clulow demonstrates that the 
Japanese port of ‘Hirado was at the centre of a great wave of Sino-Japanese piracy’ 
in the 1550s’.65 Localized maritime raiding was becoming increasingly linked to 
global commercial patterns that incorporated long-distance shipping routes and 
colonial trading post networks. Ship captains of the Dutch West India Company 
raided Spanish shipping mercilessly in the Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean 
in the early seventeenth century.66
The various forms of raiding warfare in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries were too complex, organized, multilayered, and deliberate to be described 
as ‘primitive’ or ‘traditional’. Many of the historical actors involved in early modern 
raiding warfare utilized multiple forms of raiding violence – and sometimes during 
a single campaign. Rethinking early modern raiding war requires engaging with 
interdisciplinary methods and several distinct lines of research in order to locate 
the relationships between these diverse raiding activities. Military and paramilitary 
forces that conducted retaliatory raids on each other can be described as ‘raiding 
clusters’.67 Raiding war zones can be categorized as ‘raiding economies’, or ‘pillage 
economies’, in which plundering became endemic and embedded in local ped-
dling and market exchanges.68 For example, new commercial networks and armed 
competition transformed the Melaka Straits into a contested space of maritime 
raiding in the late sixteenth century.69 Some early modern raiding practices might 
be effectively described using the insights from studies of small wars, insurgencies, 
civil wars, and revolutionary wars.70
Current research on raiding warfare is beginning to consider the processes of 
early modern globalization in the context of sweeping changes in the scale, scope, 
and practice of raiding warfare in the early modern period. New states and empires 
utilized urban credit, artisan labour, and protoindustrial production to produce 
artillery, maintain bodyguards, recruit mercenaries, raise permanent forces, and 
mobilize resources. Maritime voyages in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans expanded 
the dimensions of commercial exchange, social interaction, colonial develop-
ment, and global conflict. A global examination of the intersections of raiding war, 
culture, and society in the early modern period may be able to show how nobles, 
soldiers, militias, and privateers interacted with armies, navies, governments, and 
colonial administrations to reshape models of warfare worldwide.
 Raiding war and globalization 99
 Notes
 1 Research for this chapter was made possible by the generous support of a sabbatical 
from Northern Illinois University, a Fulbright Research Fellowship, and a residential 
fellowship from the Institut d’Etudes Avancées de Paris. H. H. Turney-High, Primitive 
War: Its Practice and Concepts (Columbia, SC, 1949).
 2 Q. Wright, A Study of War (Chicago, 1942).
 3  B. C. Hacker, ‘Fortunes of War: From Primitive Warfare to Nuclear Policy 
in Anthropological Thought’, in M. Anderson (ed.), Cultural Shaping of Violence: 
Victimization, Escalation, Response (West Lafayette, IN, 2004); A. Roland, ‘Technology 
and War’, American Diplomacy (April 1997): http://americandiplomacy.web.unc.
edu/1997/04/technology-and-war/ (accessed 10 Mar. 2020).
 4  R. Crittenden, ‘Aspects of Economic Development on the Nembi Plateau, Papua New 
Guinea’, Journal of the Polynesian Society, 96:3 (1987); R. Gardner and K. G. Heider, 
Gardens of War: Life and Death in the New Guinea Stone Age (New York, 1966); Dead Birds, 
directed by Robert Gardner (1963). 
 5  G. Dyer, War (New York, 1985), p. 10.
 6  L. H. Keeley, War before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage (Oxford, 
1996).
 7  C. M. Cameron, ‘Captives and Culture Change Implications for Archaeology’, Current 
Anthropology, 52:2 (2011); I. Armit, C. Knüsel, J. Robb, and R. Schulting, ‘Warfare and 
Violence in Prehistoric Europe: An Introduction’, Journal of Conflict Archaeology, 2:1 
(2006).
 8  A. D. Smith, ‘War and Ethnicity: The Role of Warfare in the Formation, Self‐images and 
Cohesion of Ethnic Communities’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 4:4 (1981).
 9  R. B Ferguson and N. L. Whitehead (eds), War in the Tribal Zone: Expanding States and 
Indigenous Warfare (Santa Fe, NM, 1992).
10  B. Sandberg, War and Conflict in the Early Modern World, 1500–1700 (Cambridge, 2016), 
p. 172.
11  Key collections include: the Archives départementales du Bouches du Rhône [here-
after AD Bouches du Rhône], Archives municipales de Marseille [hereafter AM de 
Marseille], and the Archives de la Chambre de Commerce de Marseille [hereafter ACC 
de Marseille]. 
12  Rare books and printed pamphlet collections at the Bibliothèque nationale de France 
[hereafter BNF], the Bibliothèque historique de la ville de Paris [BHVP], and various 
municipal libraries in France offer additional evidence.
13  Sandberg, War and Conflict, pp. 171–92.
14  D. Parrott, The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early 
Modern Europe (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 139–95.
15  P. S. Fichtner, Terror and Toleration: The Habsburg Empire Confronts Islam, 1526–1850 
(London, 2008); G. Agoston, ‘Information, Ideology and Limits of Imperial Policy: 
Ottoman Grand Strategy in the Context of Ottoman–Habsburg Rivalry’, in V. H. Aksan 
and D. Goffman (eds), The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire (Cambridge, 
2007); R. J. W. Evans, ‘Essay and Reflection: Frontiers and National Identities in Central 
Europe’, International History Review, 14:3 (1992).
100 Part I: Coherence and fragmentation
16  For examples, see letters of Anne de Lévis, duc de Ventadour, in BNF, Manuscrits fran-
çais [hereafter, Mss. fr.] 3589, f˚ 56, 71, 72 and 75–6; BNF, Mss. fr. 3562, f˚ 79.
17  F. Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, trans. 
S. Reynolds (2 vols, New York, 1972), I, pp. 85–102.
18  S. K. McIntosh, ‘Reconceptualizing Early Ghana’, Canadian Journal of African Studies/ 
Revue Canadienne des Etudes Africaines, 42:2–3 (2008); S. Marks and A. Atmore, 
‘Firearms in Southern Africa: A Survey’, Journal of African History, 12:4 (1971).
19  BNF, Mss. fr. 3571, f˚ 77–8: La Guiche to Henri I de Montmorency, duc de Montmorency, 
Lyon, 7 Dec. 1597.
20  Parrott, The Business of War, pp. 241–9.
21  E. A. Lund, War for the Every Day: Generals, Knowledge and Warfare in Early Modern 
Europe, 1680–1740 (Westport, CT, 1999), pp. 65–100.
22  BNF, Mss. fr. 3625, f˚ 63: Echevins de Châlons to Louis de Gonzague, duc de Nevers, 
Châlons, 6 July 1593.
23  Ibid., f˚ 64: Maire et échevins de Troyes to sieur Grammont, Troyes, 5 July 1593.
24 B. Sandberg, Warrior Pursuits: Noble Culture and Civil Conflict in Early Modern France 
(Baltimore, 2010), pp. 255–8.
25  J. A. Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army, 1610–1715 (Cambridge, 1997), 
pp. 132–9.
26  J. A. Lynn, ‘How War Fed War: The Tax of Violence and Contributions During the Grand 
Siècle’, Journal of Modern History, 65:2 (1993).
27  Parrott, The Business of War, pp. 196–259; P. H. Wilson, The Thirty Years War: Europe’s 
Tragedy (Cambridge, MA, 2009), pp. 399–407.
28  J. Ostwald, Vauban Under Siege Engineering Efficiency and Martial Vigor in the War of the 
Spanish Succession (Leiden, 2007); G. Satterfield, Princes, Posts and Partisans: The Army 
of Louis XIV and Partisan Warfare in the Netherlands (1673–1678) (Leiden, 2003); Lynn, 
Giant of the Grand Siècle, pp. 538–46.
29  BNF, Mss. fr. 3562, f˚ 23.
30  D. Dessert, La royale: Vaisseaux et marins du Roi-Soleil (Paris: Fayard, 1996); G. Symcox, 
The Crisis of French Sea Power, 1688–1697: From the Guerre d’escadre to the Guerre de 
course (The Hague, 1974). 
31  A. James, The Navy and Government in Early Modern France, 1572–1661 (Woodbridge, 
2004), pp. 32–54.
32  ACC de Marseille, G 50, n.f: Louis XIII to Grand Maître de Malte, Plessis, 14 Aug. 1619.
33  Ibid., E 60, n.f.: Mémoire entitled ‘Consolatz faictz sur la prinze de plusieurs vaisseaulx, 
polacres & barque par les turcz’, 1632.
34  Ibid., G 40, n.f.: Slaves in Algiers to the consuls de Marseille, Algiers, 4 Sept. 1635. 
35  Ibid., G 50, n.f.: Amurat Bey to viguier and consuls de Marseille, Algiers, 15 Apr. 1597. 
36  Ibid., G 40, n.f.: Blanchard to the consuls de Marseille, Algiers, 17 Jan. 1631. 
37  L. Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900 
(Cambridge, 2010), pp. 130–1.
38  On La Rochelle, see K. C. Robbins, City on the Ocean Sea, La Rochelle, 1530–1650: Urban 
Society, Religion and Politics on the French Atlantic Frontier (Leiden, 1997); D. Parker, 
La Rochelle and the French Monarchy: Conflict and Order in Seventeenth-Century France 
(London, 1980). 
 Raiding war and globalization 101
39  James, Navy and Government, pp. 11–31.
40  Ibid., pp. 15–16, 21.
41 S. Carroll, Noble Power during the French Wars of Religion: The Guise Affinity and the 
Catholic Cause in Normandy (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 174–6, 187; James, Navy and 
Government, pp. 11–31. 
42  R. C. Davis, Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters: White Slavery in the Mediterranean, the 
Barbary Coast and Italy, 1500–1800 (Houndmills, 2003); J. Heers, The Barbary Corsairs: 
Warfare in the Mediterranean, 1480–1580, trans. J. North (London, 2003).
43  M. Greene, Catholic Pirates and Greek Merchants: A Maritime History of the Mediterranean 
(Princeton, 2010).
44  A. Brogini, Malte, frontière de Chrétienté (1530–1670) (Rome, 2006).
45  D. J. Vitkus, Piracy, Slavery and Redemption: Barbary Captivity Narratives from Early 
Modern England (New York, 2001).
46  ACC de Marseille, J 1341, n.f.: F. Claret, French consul in Algiers, to the consuls de 
Marseille, Algiers, 7 Jan. 1623. 
47  G. Weiss, Captives and Corsairs: France and Slavery in the Early Modern Mediterranean 
(Stanford, 2011), p. 13. 
48  Ibid., pp. 27–51.
49  ACC de Marseille, E 60: ‘Consolatz faictz sur la prinze de plusieurs vaisseaulx, polacres 
& barque par les turcz puis le voyage faict a Thunis par mr de le Malthe en lannee mil six 
cens unze jusques au mois de feburier mil six cent treize se mantant a plus de’, 1632. 
50  Ibid., J 1340, n.f.: Chaix, consul à Algiers, to the consuls de Marseille, Algiers, 1 May 1621.
51  Ibid., J 1341, n.f.: F. Claret, consul à Algiers, to the consuls de Marseille, Algiers, 
7 Jan. 1623. 
52  Ibid.: F. Claret, consul à Algiers, to the consuls de Marseille, Algiers, 7 Apr. 1623. 
53  Ibid., E 60, n.f.: ‘Sur la requeste presantee a la cour par les consulz de la ville de Maresellx 
et depputtes de la depradation du vaiseau Saint Victor commande par Louis Morenc dict 
Frejus de ladt ville’. Arrêt, 1620.
54  Ibid., J 138, n.f.: Philippe de Harlay comte de Césy, ambassadeur à Constantinople, to 
the consuls de Marseille, Pera, Istanbul, 17 Feb. 1620.
55  Ibid.: Philippe de Harlay comte de Césy, ambassadeur à Constantinople, to the consuls 
de Marseille, Pera, Istanbul, 4 Sept. 1622.
56  BNF, Mss. Fr. 4044, f˚ 107–28: ‘Proposition en forme de remonstrance faicte par le grand 
maistre, seigneurs, et cheualliers maltois, au roy treschrestien de France et de Nauarre, 
Louis 13e et a tous les autres roys, princes et potentatz de la milice et republicque chres-
tienne’.
57  T. Krstić, Contested Conversions to Islam: Narratives of Religious Change in the Early 
Modern Ottoman Empire (Stanford, 2011), pp. 12–13.
58  R. White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 
1650–1815 (Cambridge, 1991). 
59  J. C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia 
(New Haven, CT, 2009).
60  Sandberg, War and Conflict, pp. 171–92.
61  J. J. L. Gommans, Mughal Warfare: Indian Frontiers and High Roads to Empire, 1500–1700 
(London, 2002).
102 Part I: Coherence and fragmentation
62  J. F. Richards, ‘Warriors and the State in Early Modern India’, Journal of the Economic and 
Social History of the Orient, 47:3 (2004).
63  G. Parker, Global Crisis: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century 
(New Haven, CT, 2013), pp. 26–36. 
64  W. Bracewell, The Uskoks of Senj: Piracy, Banditry and Holy War in the Sixteenth-Century 
Adriatic (Ithaca, NY, 1992).
65  A. Clulow, ‘From Global Entrepôt to Early Modern Domain: Hirado, 1609–1641’, 
Monumenta Nipponica, 65:1 (2010).
66  K. Lane, ‘Punishing the Sea Wolf: Corsairs and Cannibals in the Early Modern 
Caribbean’, NWIG: New West Indian Guide / Nieuwe West-Indische Gids, 77:3–4 (2003).
67  On the concept of ‘raiding clusters’ see: Keeley, War Before Civilization, pp. 127–41.
68  For ‘raiding economies’ see: Bracewell, The Uskoks of Senj.
69  J. Hooper, ‘Pirates and Kings: Power on the Shores of Early Modern Madagascar and the 
Indian Ocean’, Journal of World History, 22:2 (2011).
70 For an introduction to the vast literature on small wars, insurgencies, civil wars, and 
revolutionary wars, see: S. N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge, 
2006); F. W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and their 
Opponents since 1750 (London, 2001); J. A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the 
Early Modern World (Berkeley, CA, 1991). 
Part II
Restraint and excess
Part II: Restraint and excess

6
Breaking the Pax Hispanica: collective violence 
in colonial Spanish America
Anthony McFarlane
Historians have long been familiar with the concept of a Pax Imperial, a long 
period of peace and stability following the violent imposition of imperial rule. It is 
usually attributed to the ability of a large, dominant state to eliminate war among 
smaller polities and to impose hegemony over subjugated peoples through a 
combination of coercion and legitimacy. Such a claim might, indeed, be made for 
Spanish rule in the Americas, where, after the conquests of the early sixteenth cen-
tury, Spain appears to have inaugurated a ‘Pax Hispanica’ that endured, with only 
local interruptions, until the wars of independence in the early nineteenth century. 
Concepts of imperial peace of this kind are of course vulnerable to many criti-
cisms, not least of which is the fact that, within any ‘imperial peace’, colonial rule 
generates multiple forms of violence.1 The notion of a Pax Hispanica is nonethe-
less a useful starting point for discussion of collective violence in Spanish America, 
since it prompts us to enquire into the forms of coercion and violence associated 
with Spanish colonial rule, to consider how the American experience of violence 
resembled or differed from that of early modern Europe, and to trace changes in 
the character and incidence of collective violence over time.
The Pax Hispanica
The Pax Hispanica in Spanish America originated in the overseas extension 
of forms of violence that were common in early modern Europe, as Spaniards 
deployed European techniques of warfare to subjugate American peoples and 
polities whose resources they coveted. Indeed, in the Americas, armed violence – 
invariably organized by individuals who acted in the monarch’s name, rather 
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than directly by the state – was crucial to the foundation of Spain’s empire. First, 
European weaponry and tactics, unknown to indigenous peoples, gave Spaniards 
a military edge that enabled them to assert control and establish permanent 
colonies of settlement, built on systems of coerced labour. Secondly, the economic 
resources won by Spaniards fed back into Europe, where they provided the means 
to build state power, finance war, and found a transatlantic empire. This was 
accomplished with surprising speed: Spaniards overturned the major indigenous 
states in little more than a generation, and after the ‘age of conquest’ (c.1500–50) 
the levels of violence generated by the Spanish rush for riches receded. Spaniards 
rapidly consolidated their control over the main areas of indigenous civilization 
and embarked on transforming their inhabitants into Christianized participants in 
a European-style money and wage economy. This inaugurated the American Pax 
Hispanica, the long period of Spanish rule (c.1550–1780) in which Spain’s colonies 
were generally free from significant outbreaks of internal rebellion or warfare.2
Explanations of the transition from violent conquest to peaceful domination 
must take account of several factors, including divisions between indigenous 
peoples and the compliance of native peasantries accustomed to tribute pay-
ment. However, one great transformation made the Pax Hispanica possible: the 
catastrophic collapse of indigenous populations. The large, peasant-based socie-
ties of Meso-America (especially modern Mexico and Guatemala) and South 
America (principally modern Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia), all suffered 
from vertiginous demographic decline during the sixteenth century, caused by 
successive epidemics of Old World diseases to which native Americans had no 
immunity. And, as native numbers fell, resistance to Spanish rule was weakened 
by the destructuration of indigenous communities, the elimination of traditional 
leaders, and the willingness of native elites to accommodate to Spanish rule and 
accept Christianity.3
The accommodation between European invaders and native peoples was facili-
tated by the politico-legal system developed by the Spanish Habsburgs. Rather 
than allowing conquerors and early settlers to turn themselves into a quasi-feudal 
nobility, the crown sought to establish itself as ruler and arbiter of two civil spheres: 
the república de españoles and the república de indios. In the latter, the ‘indios’ were 
treated as natural subordinates, who had to pay tribute, adopt Christianity in place 
of their own beliefs and customs, and accept a subordinate position in the Spanish 
political and social order. However, ‘Indians’ were also given compensating rights: 
they held their own community lands, came under the authority of their own 
caciques (indigenous community leaders), and could appeal to the Spanish judicial 
system for protection and justice.
This royal policy of seeking to preserve indigenous societies within an ‘Indian 
commonwealth’, segregated from that of the ‘Spanish commonwealth’, was 
imperfectly realized. By the early seventeenth century, the indigenous people 
were increasingly integrated into the Spanish world of commerce and production, 
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while whites and mestizos encroached on indigenous communities. Nevertheless, 
the persistence of indigenous communities with their own resources and autono-
mous forms of government was a vital element of the Pax Hispanica. For, although 
Native Americans continued to endure coercive exploitation from expansive 
Hispanic settler societies, the implicit ‘colonial pact’, by which they accepted royal 
government and Christianity, provided a strong basis for social peace.
This stood in strong contrast to conditions in early modern Europe. For, at 
a time when popular unrest took on unprecedented proportions in Europe – in 
protests against landlords, seigneurial dues, and church tithes, further fomented 
by the effects of war and growing religious divisions4 – social and political frictions 
in Spanish America were restrained by both the effects of demographic disaster on 
indigenous societies and their leaders’ acceptance of a ‘colonial pact’. Moreover, 
the Habsburg monarchy not only secured loyalty among indigenous societies by 
providing some protection against unrestrained settler exploitation, it cultivated 
stability by other means too. By blocking the formation of a seigneurial nobility 
in America, the crown forestalled the development of a sociopolitical group that 
was a frequent cause of disruption and violence in European societies; by actively 
supporting the Christianization of Amerindian peoples, it further strengthened the 
foundations of social peace. For, while forced conversion was sometimes a source 
of conflict, the ability of Indian converts to adapt their own beliefs to a Christian 
framework, and clerical toleration of such syncretism, allowed the Catholic 
Church to impose an overarching religious unity, without the sectarian divisions 
of Reformation Europe. Indeed, the Church was central to the Pax Hispanica: the 
village church was a more characteristic feature of the landscape than forts or walled 
towns, and the parish priest a more effective agent of domination than the Spanish 
soldier or urban official.5
Violence within the peace
The Pax Hispanica was, however, always incomplete. For, while rare in Spain’s 
colonial heartlands, war and rebellion persisted on frontiers where independent 
Amerindians resisted settler encroachment. Resistance was particularly robust 
among peoples who had not been previously conquered, were not accustomed to 
paying tributes to a ruling elite, and/or had a nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle 
that made them less susceptible to attack and subjugation. Such peoples mounted 
powerful resistance in several regions (northern Mexico, on the Colombian and 
Venezuelan coasts, in the Amazon basin, the eastern Andes, and southern Chile), 
where new groupings emerged over the long term, in ‘tribes’ formed by peoples 
who changed their social organization in response to the European invasions, 
chiefly by becoming more organized for war.6
Violence on frontiers was never eradicated from Spanish America. It contin-
ued throughout the colonial period, particularly in the Mexican north and on 
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Amazonian and Patagonian frontiers, where indigenous groups rebelled against 
Spanish settlement and engaged in raiding wars. On the whole, however, frontier 
wars tended to become less frequent where the Spanish state encouraged strategies 
of accommodation with indigenous societies, often using missionaries as interme-
diaries, or accepted coexistence with independent peoples who were sufficiently 
strong to resist domination or assimilation. Across the eighteenth century, Bourbon 
ministers encouraged such strategies throughout Spanish America, particularly in 
areas where they feared that native peoples might form offensive alliances with for-
eigners, and their approach tended to curb violence on several important frontiers.7
If the emergence of a ‘colonial pact’ was one crucial element of the Pax Hispanica, 
the impermeability of Spain’s colonial heartlands to war with foreign powers was 
another. The competition among dynastic states that was such a potent cause of 
war in Europe had some repercussions in the Americas, especially when the Dutch 
and other Europeans sought to capture Spanish-American trade and follow Spain’s 
colonizing example. However, because they generally moved into regions where 
Spanish settlement was thin or non-existent, their intrusions did not necessarily 
lead to war with Spain’s American subjects. Indeed, although foreign colonies were 
sometimes used as platforms for assaults on Spanish-American territories, French 
and English settlers were generally more likely to go to war with indigenous peoples 
than with Spanish colonials. Even in the eighteenth century, when war between 
European powers increasingly spread across the Atlantic, Spanish America was far 
less exposed to the destructive effects of war than the British and French colonies 
in North America and the Caribbean. Concentrated mainly in the continental inte-
riors of North and South America, most of Spanish America’s peoples were safely 
insulated from the effects of external attack, thanks to the protections of geography 
and the inability of foreign enemies to penetrate inland.
What of violence within Hispanic colonial societies, away from its frontier 
peripheries? Our knowledge of the forms of intra-community and interpersonal 
violence is sparse, but sufficient to suggest that it was endemic in peasant com-
munities, where local authorities commonly used physical punishment and where 
disputes between individuals and within families often involved force.8 It was also 
common in urban communities, especially among the poor in large cities, which had 
high rates of mendicity and vagabondage. Violence against women was widespread 
too, given the tendency to regard domestic violence as normal and for only rare 
cases to face legal prosecution.9 Given the weakness of the state and the absence of 
effective policing, Spanish-American societies were no doubt violent places, though 
no more so than their European contemporaries. In fact, Spanish-Americans were 
less exposed to some of the kinds of violence prevalent in early modern European 
societies, where conflict among aristocracies, deep religious divisions, and exposure 
to rapid social change generated greater social frictions.
With regard to collective violence, most of our evidence comes from historical 
writing in two areas. One, not surprisingly, is the history of slavery, for violence was 
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intrinsic to slave trading and slave societies.10 Such violence varied, however, with 
the scale and character of slave regimes. It was most intense in the large-scale plan-
tations of the Caribbean, where slaves were subject to paramilitary discipline and 
constant intimidation, and occasionally goaded into violent retaliation. In Spanish 
America, slavery was on a smaller scale: these were ‘societies with slavery’ rather 
than ‘slave societies’, with slaves dispersed as domestics and artisans in cities and in 
relatively small concentrations in agriculture and mining. Given these conditions, 
Spanish-American slavery tended to be less overtly violent than the slave regimes 
of the Caribbean export monocultures, with their much larger and more volatile 
slave populations. And, where slaves resisted, they rarely joined in violent insurrec-
tions. They rebelled and ran away and sometimes established maroon communities 
in frontier areas; but they also turned to the king’s courts and, in matters of ill-
treatment and manumission, frequently appealed to the law against their owners.11
Another, much larger context for collective violence was found among the 
indigenous peasantries and castas (people of mixed ethnic origins), who formed the 
majority populations in most Spanish colonies. Where there were large indigenous 
peasantries, as in Mexico and Peru, their communities were subject to a predatory 
triad of caciques, landowners, and government officials, who competed for access 
to their resources, backed by the use or threat of physical force. Villagers defended 
themselves against abuses in ways comparable to the rural communities of early 
modern Europe (and other parts of the world), using legal and extralegal means 
to defend the local ‘moral economy’. Such peasant protests typically consisted of 
small-scale, highly localized riots or revolts which did not challenge government 
or seek social change, and inflicted limited damage to persons or property.12 They 
rarely developed into regional rebellions comparable to those of European regions, 
mainly because social and political conditions were better. Spanish America did 
not experience rapid population growth, and agricultural commercialization on 
the scale of early modern Europe and its peasantries consequently suffered fewer 
of the stresses found in European societies; Spanish America had no great territo-
rial nobilities to lead rebellion against the king, and its urban patriciates had little 
cause to disturb a political and social order where they dominated and manipulated 
crown policy in their own interests. Spanish-American societies were, moreover, 
largely untouched by the depredations of war and unaffected by the deep religious 
divisions introduced by the Protestant Reformation in Europe, where competing 
communities of belief justified violence as a religious duty.13
Late eighteenth-century challenges
The Pax Hispanica became more brittle during the eighteenth century, when popu-
lation growth placed more pressure on village lands. Incidents of village riot and 
rebellion seem to have multiplied, particularly among the indigenous communities 
of Mexico and Peru from the 1760s to the 1780s.14 Such protest generally remained 
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within the familiar pattern of local riots of the ‘moral economy’ kind, but in some 
regions large-scale rebellions challenged the ruling authorities on a broader front. 
The rebellion of the city of Quito (1765) and the Comunero rebellion in New 
Granada (1781) were reactions against moves to impose higher taxes and curb local 
autonomy – in line with Bourbon centralization – and both blended patrician and 
popular grievances. The rebellion of Tupac Amaru in Peru (1780–82) was also trig-
gered by Bourbon fiscal and administrative reforms, but merged several strands of 
regional revolt into a great rebellion which spread over a large area of the southern 
Andes (in modern Peru and Bolivia).
Did these late colonial rebellions challenge the colonial system in an upsurge of 
collective violence? Not necessarily. Neither the Quito nor the Comunero rebellions 
involved significant casualties or damage, and both demobilized peacefully. This 
restraint is best explained in terms of the rebels’ limited goals, leadership, and social 
composition. Their avowed aim was to restore the political and fiscal status quo 
and their rebellions were conceived within the conceptual framework of traditional 
Hispanic political culture. Creole leaders used rebellion to defend their political 
interests against Bourbon reform of the ‘unwritten constitution’ that allowed them 
to shape crown policies. Peasant and artisan participants understood their rebel-
lions as defence of a ‘moral economy’, where targeted violence was permissible in 
pursuit of legitimate grievances and where escalation was curbed by local patriciates 
through social networks. The rebels were, moreover, mostly whites and  mestizos 
who accepted Spanish hegemony, rather than imagining an alternative order. 
Government violence to curtail rebellion was also very restrained, partly for politi-
cal reasons (Spanish officials sought to conciliate creoles) and partly for practical 
considerations (military weakness forced officials to negotiate peaceful solutions).15
A larger and more violent threat to the stability of the Pax Hispanica emerged in 
regions where anti-Spanish feelings were aggravated by ethnic and cultural enmities 
and where Indian leaders offered alternatives to the Spanish system. The rebellion 
launched by Tupac Amaru in 1780 was the outstanding moment of indigenous 
anti-colonial resistance in late colonial Spanish America, for, as it developed, it not 
only ruptured the Pax Hispanica throughout the Southern Andes but also aimed 
to overturn the existing structures of Spanish rule. Tupac Amaru (an acculturated, 
mixed-race cacique who claimed direct descent from Inca kings) was at the heart 
of the insurrection, as both an actual and symbolic leader, but the rebellion had 
several distinctive regional strands, involving indigenous communities in different 
socio-economic and cultural environments. One, led by Tupac Amaru himself, 
was of Quechua-speaking peoples in the region of Cuzco, the historic centre of the 
Inca state; the second, led by Tupac Katari, involved Aymara-speaking communi-
ties around La Paz; the third, led by Tomás Katari, was among Aymaras around 
Chayanta.16
These rebellions vividly exposed the potential for widespread violence in socie-
ties where native peoples were conscious of ethnic identities and had a tradition 
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of asserting community rights against intruders. Tupac Amaru initially aimed to 
impose his authority by making alliances with creoles and mestizos in Cuzco and 
capturing the existing system of government; when this failed, he emphasized his 
right to kingship, invoked myths of the Inca past, and encouraged his followers to 
violence aimed specifically against Spaniards and related enemies.17 The upsurge 
in violence was particularly marked in the rebellion led by Tupac Katari, who drew 
on Tupac Amaru’s symbolic authority but went much further. He and his followers 
explicitly aimed at the extermination of ‘Spaniards’ (anyone deemed Spanish by 
language, dress, and custom); they justified killing on the grounds that Spaniards 
were impure Christians or heretics; and they used methods of violence (ritual 
beheading, drinking of victims’ blood, mutilation of bodies) that departed from 
European norms of war.
These extremes of violence reflected deep cultural divides. Like the peoples of 
the Cuzco region, the Aymaras had a long history of cultural resistance to Hispanic 
domination and their rebellion reflected an ongoing struggle to defend their local 
communities against Spanish and mestizo encroachments on their resources and 
systems of leadership. They were, however, more inclined to violence against 
whites and mestizos for social and cultural reasons. As their communities were 
often isolated from Hispanic society and culture, they preserved more of their own 
cultural norms, including rules which justified unrestrained violence in war. This 
cultural separation made it easier to regard whites and mestizos as aliens rather 
than neighbours, and, together with different rules for war, led peasant insurgents 
to demonize and exterminate those they regarded as ‘Spaniards’. Nevertheless, 
despite its apparent ferocity and unusual features, such violence was not shaped 
solely by Aymara culture; it was also retaliatory, imitating Spanish use of murder, 
massacre, torture, and public execution to instil fear among the enemy.18 Indeed, 
the rebellions all showed the degree to which indigenous communities had 
absorbed Christian religious beliefs and European ideas of governance and aimed 
to turn Spanish institutions to their own advantage, rather than merely tearing 
them down.
If the Spanish-American rebellions of the early 1780s suggests that the Pax 
Hispanica was becoming more fragile, they did not develop into secessionist civil 
wars – unlike the concurrent American Revolution (1776–82) – nor did they inflict 
lasting damage on the monarchy. However, although restored to equilibrium after 
the great rebellions of the early 1780s, the Pax Hispanica was increasingly threat-
ened by the repercussions of ‘globalized’ European war, especially after the Seven 
Years’ War, when Spain suffered the humiliating loss of Havana to British attack 
in 1762. To cope with the threat, ministers tried to reinforce American defences 
by reforms designed to enlarge and improve Spanish-American defences.19 These 
were, however, more impressive on paper than in practice. American defences 
were manned by ill-trained, inexperienced regular troops, supported by a system 
of militias that was rarely activated and had no culture of arms comparable to those 
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found in early modern European societies. When British military forces invaded 
Buenos Aires in 1806–07, they were ejected, not by the regular army or disciplined 
militias under government orders, but by forces spontaneously organized by urban 
corporations.20 Here, then, was a situation where the Pax Hispanica, however stable 
internally, was highly vulnerable to external shocks emanating from European 
interpower rivalry.
The disintegration of the Pax Hispanica and the propagation 
of collective violence
The situation in which Spain’s American subjects were mostly unaffected by war 
began to change around the turn of the century, as Spain was drawn into the convul-
sions caused by the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. At first, American 
loyalty seemed strong. There were few signs that the empire faced any serious inter-
nal threat; indeed, British-backed attempts to provoke uprisings in Venezuela and 
Buenos Aires in 1806–07 failed to attract local support. International conflict was, 
nonetheless, to overturn the Pax Hispanica. In 1808, Napoleon’s invasion of Spain 
and usurpation of the Spanish throne caused massive upheaval on both sides of the 
Atlantic, in a series of political and military shocks that generated violent conflict 
throughout Spain’s realms.
In Spain itself, the shock was felt immediately, as Spaniards rallied to the 
deposed King Fernando VII, established juntas (regional provisional governments 
which claimed sovereignty in the king’s absence), and mobilized troops against the 
French occupation. Repercussions soon registered in Spanish America too, as colo-
nial elites turned towards self-government to escape from the collapsing Spanish 
state, first in 1809, then much more widely in 1810, when the demand that royal 
officials transfer their power to juntas became widespread. Royal governments were 
pushed aside throughout much of South America (in New Granada, Venezuela, 
Chile, and Río de la Plata, but not Peru) and replaced by juntas which proclaimed 
their autonomy. In Mexico, political pressure to establish a junta in Mexico City 
failed, but then shifted to the provinces, where creoles incited popular insurrection 
to secure their goal.
Throughout Spanish America, the widespread rejection of Spain’s authority 
in 1810 was the result of imperial crisis rather than its cause, and at first the Pax 
Hispanica seemed set to survive the convulsion at the monarchy’s centre.21 In 
most South American cities, members of the social and political elites used the 
ancient institution of the cabildo (town council) as a vehicle for taking power from 
royal officials, and they generally achieved this in ‘velvet revolutions’, where force 
played little part. Their juntas did not immediately declare secession from Spanish 
rule; many creoles hoped for a peaceful realignment, in which they would exercise 
greater power while retaining connections to Spain. Spanish governments, too, 
hoped to preserve peace in the colonies, and when the Cádiz Cortes convened in 
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late 1810, it sought to win creole loyalty by promising representation for Americans 
in the elected parliament of a constitutional monarchy.
This situation contrasts sharply with the circumstances of British American 
rebellion in 1776. When North American rebels challenged Britain, they declared 
independence, founded a unified government, and declared themselves a sover-
eign power with a right to make foreign alliances against Britain; they also imme-
diately set about creating an army and navy to fight the British on land and sea. 
The Spanish-American juntas were more tentative. They claimed sovereignty in 
1810, but were not openly or unequivocally committed to independence and had 
no reasons to see war as the inevitable outcome of their break with Spain.22 The 
creole elites might have harboured enmity towards European Spaniards and dis-
like of the Bourbon monarchy, but many were reluctant to enter on a path to civil 
war, given they saw themselves as belonging to a shared Hispanic political and 
religious culture in which reconciliation was both desirable and possible. Indeed, 
the Spanish-American elites had grown accustomed to negotiation with the royal 
authorities during the long Pax Hispanica, and this tradition encouraged belief in a 
negotiated resolution of political differences. Moreover, they had little to fear from 
Spain’s military power in 1810. Unlike the Anglo-American rebels of 1776, who had 
confronted Europe’s leading naval power, capable of shipping large field armies 
across the Atlantic, imposing blockades and moving troops between theatres of 
war, the Spanish-American rebels of 1810 faced a metropolitan power enfeebled by 
international and internal war, with an inadequate navy and defeated armies.
Spain’s military weakness did not, however, preclude colonial war. For, although 
Spain lacked the means to launch military expeditions across the Atlantic, warfare 
broke out in regions where the defenders and opponents of Spanish rule both 
had the means to fight each other. In both Mexico and Peru, the viceroys retained 
control of regular forces and militias and used them as a base for building counter-
revolutionary armies. In other places – Venezuela, Upper Peru, the River Plate, and 
southern New Granada – small regular forces divided between opposing sides, and 
both royalists and juntas sought to supplement them by wider recruitment among 
citizens.23
In the opening stages of the internal wars that began in 1810–11, the contenders 
adopted conventional military methods and their violence was restrained. The first 
wars in Venezuela and New Granada were driven mainly by the juntas of leading 
cities (Caracas, Bogotá, Cartagena), which mobilized forces to impose their author-
ity on the regions where they claimed to inherit sovereignty from the old regime. 
Similarly, the junta of Buenos Aires sought to extend its authority over the regions 
of the former viceroyalty of Río de la Plata, by internal military operations aimed 
at winning provincial support for the repudiation of Spanish rule. Commitment 
to violence tended to be cautious in these early stages, when the contestants were 
clashing with their own kind. The juntas’ early military campaigns were essentially 
‘civic wars’, based on forces raised in rival cities, rather than wars of secession aimed 
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directly against the metropolitan power. These were wars where force was deployed 
to project power and win support, rather than to destroy the enemy.24
Urban collective violence was rare, as it had been under the Pax Hispanica. 
In some cities the ‘mob’ played a part in removing royal authorities when the 
advocates of juntas brought crowds onto the streets. Crowd activities of this kind 
were, however, usually choreographed by leading citizens who sought to pressure 
royal officials into resigning, while also showing that they acted in the name of the 
‘people’. This never involved the kind of violence associated with urban crowds 
during the French Revolution, where leaders used terror as an instrument for politi-
cal mobilization and radicalization. In fact, if violence affected cities, it was more 
likely to result from attacks from outside the urban precinct than from uprisings 
within it.25
Restraints on collective violence weakened, however, where popular rebellion 
occurred in rural areas, among Indian and mixed-race peasants for whom political 
conflicts provided opportunities to express their own grievances and defend their 
own interests. The outstanding example of popular violence springing from the 
crisis of Spanish government was the Hidalgo rebellion in Mexico (1810–11), which 
erupted in the Bajío, a region afflicted by both short- and long-term economic prob-
lems. Hidalgo and his creole co-conspirators planned to raise provincial militias 
against the viceroy’s government in Mexico City, but, on failing to win sufficient 
support, sought to build a popular ‘army’ by raising rural insurrection. Hidalgo 
marshalled tens of thousands of followers (perhaps as many as 60,000) for an 
assault on the capital, but when it failed, his forces were crushed by a royalist army. 
Violent insurrection was not erased, however, for it retained a strong following 
among Indian villagers, and under other leaders turned into a decentralized rural 
 insurgency that continued to challenge the authorities for another decade.
The insurgency revealed the fragility of the Pax Hispanica in Mexico in much the 
same way that Tupac Amaru’s rebellion had in Peru, decades earlier. At its heart 
lay peasant rebellion, driven by Indian villagers intent on defending the economic 
and cultural integrity of their local communities and who behaved in ways familiar 
from traditional local riots and revolts.26 Nonetheless, like the Andean rebellion, 
the Mexican insurgency differed significantly from the protests of the past. In size 
and geographical reach, it was on a new order of magnitude; its social impact was 
also unprecedented, as both insurgents and royalists drew on support that cut verti-
cally through the social hierarchy. Mexico’s insurgency was, moreover, a war which 
blended conventional and guerrilla warfare, particularly under Morelos, who man-
aged to build an army and an alternative government and, albeit briefly, to create a 
revolutionary situation.27
If internal war was new to Mexico, so too was the character of the violence that 
it propagated. As rebellion spread through the countryside, peasant rebels not only 
deposed local authorities and attacked property, but also gave vent to a violent 
Hispanophobia, expressed in assaults, murders, and at times massacres of whites, 
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especially the hated gachupines (European Spaniards). This Hispanophobia was 
fuelled partly by economic grievances against landowners and merchants, but also 
drew on a deep sense of cultural difference. Like the Tupac Amaru rebels, Mexican 
peasant insurgents perceived Spaniards as different beings, who were true to neither 
king nor religion and were therefore justly attacked and slaughtered.28 This created 
a climate of fear, fuelled by government propaganda that portrayed the rebels as a 
horde of ignorant and brutal ‘indios’ who threatened to overturn the social order.29 
Thus the lines were drawn for war between not only political opponents, but also 
between ‘civilized’ urban Mexico and the ‘barbarous’ indigenous countryside, a 
combination which made for a particularly violent counter-insurgency. And, of 
course, the very nature of rural insurgency and guerrilla war lowered inhibitions 
on violence. Insurgents and bandits raided towns, estates, and trade routes from 
bases in inaccessible terrain, attacking civilians as well as soldiers, and draining local 
economies of men and supplies. Royalist commanders retaliated by conducting 
campaigns of terror among civilian populations in order to isolate insurgents and 
starve them of supplies, while organizing campaigns, reminiscent of those used by 
French troops against Spanish guerrillas, to hunt them down with ‘flying columns’ 
of dragoons who gave and received no quarter.30
The wars of the Mexican insurgency were deeply disruptive, socially and politi-
cally. For the first time in its history, the viceroyalty of New Spain was swept 
by forces that not only unleashed armed violence, but also disrupted economic 
life, cut communications, and turned cities into places of refuge. The spread and 
destructive potential of such violence was limited by the ‘localocentric’ character 
of village insurgency and the inability of creole leaders to create an effective army, 
but it was, nonetheless, very difficult to eradicate. Deeply rooted in some areas, the 
rural insurgency persisted under leaders for whom it became a way of life, along 
with a government counter-insurgency which also became embedded. While the 
insurgents continued to raid and plunder, soldiers in royal armies, who were often 
unpaid and poorly supplied, lived off the towns where they were stationed. Indeed, 
in an increasingly militarized society, royalist officers used their power for personal 
profit, turning royal government in the provinces into corrupt military satrapies, 
where the law of force carried greater weight than the force of law.31
In the Spanish viceroyalties of New Granada, Río de la Plata, Peru, and their 
adjoining territories, war and its accompanying violence had their own local 
dynamics and characteristics, some resembling, some differing from, those of 
Mexico. An obvious difference was that there were no rural insurrections compa-
rable to Mexico’s Hidalgo revolt. Instead, political conflicts were initially played 
out among the social elites, who aimed to avoid disturbance to the social hierar-
chies they dominated. Nevertheless, where royalist and autonomous governments 
took up arms against each other, violence assumed an increasingly central role in 
 political life and tended to escalate as each side promoted militarization (i.e. the 
mobilization of men for war) as the only way to defend or advance their position.32
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Militarization
The first steps towards militarization took place when both royalist and independ-
ent governments sought to strengthen their military capacity, drawing on both 
existing and unused resources. Some had a core of professional soldiers, inherited 
from colonial governments, but the opposing forces consisted mainly of men new 
to military service. And, while political leaders might prefer recruits from the white 
population, military necessity encouraged them to mobilize among indigenous 
communities and free people of colour. When Buenos Aires’ armies entered Upper 
Peru, for example, they not only sought to rally whites and mestizos to their cause; 
their commanders also sought to persuade indigenous communities to reject roy-
alist rule, both by ceasing to provide the royal government with resources and by 
joining in the fight against it.33 Elsewhere, the mobilization and militarisation of the 
populace followed other ethnic contours. Creole leaders in Caracas and Cartagena, 
for example, engaged pardos and free blacks against royalism, while their royalist 
opponents did much the same, exploiting antagonisms against the rich creoles 
where they could, even in slave communities.34
These processes not only underpinned the establishment of new armies con-
trolled by contending governments, but also stimulated the development of 
informal forces under local leaders with their own ambitions. An early example 
of this phenomenon is found in Venezuela, where embattled Spanish officials 
sought support across a spectrum of social and ethnic groups and harnessed it 
to counter-revolutionary ends. On the coast, they recruited among poor white 
farmers, especially Canary Island immigrants who resented rich creoles; they also 
found allies among free coloureds and slaves who believed they would gain more 
from loyalty to the king than allegiance to the creoles of Caracas. In the interior, 
royalists gathered support in the llanos, the tropical plains where mixed-race llan-
eros on cattle-ranching frontiers joined in a royalist insurgency organized by José 
Tomás Boves, and fought republican armies with devastating effect. Neighbouring 
New Granada had enclaves of popular royalism, too, notably in the south, where 
Spanish commanders created forces from slaves and castas on the frontiers of 
Popayán, and where indigenous peasant communities took the city of Pasto in the 
name of the crown. Though smaller and less militarily capable than the llaneros of 
Venezuela, the rebels who chose loyalism as a means of defending the identities 
and interests of their communities played a key role in keeping royalism alive in 
these regions.
Informal forces were equally important to Spain’s enemies. While some groups 
of llaneros, led by Boves, fought under royalist banners in Venezuela, others, under 
José Antonio Paéz, played a crucial part in turning the war against Spain. In the 
south of the continent, where Buenos Aires engaged in a long war against royalist 
Peru, frontier areas were also potent incubators of armed mobilization and irregular 
warfare.35 Cattle frontiers – where the presence of government, the rule of law, and 
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the customs of Hispanic urban society were at their weakest – were places that sup-
plied ready recruits for armed conflict. In the Banda Oriental (modern Uruguay) 
and on the Argentine plains, the communities of cattle drovers and pastoralists 
known as gauchos were soon drawn into Buenos Aires’ wars. Successive govern-
ments in Buenos Aires sought to militarize these frontier communities in order 
to defend their borders against Portuguese armies from Brazil and Spanish armies 
from Peru, and found willing allies. The recruitment of such forces was a double-
edged sword, however, for, under leaders like José Artigas and Martin Güemes, they 
moved from fighting against royalist Spain to fighting for local causes, including 
independence from government in Buenos Aires.36
Slaves were another subordinate group for whom war provided unprecedented 
opportunities to fight for themselves, especially in areas where pressures from 
political conflicts destabilized existing structures of power and property.37 In 
coastal Venezuela, for example, slaves from cacao plantations responded to royalist 
commanders who encouraged them to rebel against their masters; on Colombia’s 
Pacific coast, slaves fought to improve their condition by fighting with royalist lead-
ers to secure protections from royal law; in the Banda Oriental and the Venezuelan 
llanos, on the other hand, slaves were also found among forces fighting against 
Spain. Wherever slaves fought to change their position in society, they tended to act 
in consort with others. Those who sided with royalism in New Granada’s southern 
provinces sought connections with royal authorities, offering their allegiance in the 
expectation that loyalty to the crown would be rewarded by the concession of a legal 
status comparable to that of Indian communities.38 Others were pressed into army 
service by coercion or recruited by promises of freedom: such, for example, were 
those who formed units of infantrymen in the ‘armies of liberation’ led by Bolívar 
and San Martín in their campaigns to end Spanish rule throughout South America.
Elsewhere, slaves were drawn into wars by local leaders and joined informal 
forces alongside Native Americans and castas. Like the maroons, they aimed at 
escaping from slavery rather than overturning the institution. Nonetheless, where 
news of the Haitian revolution circulated, radical ideas followed. In Venezuela, 
for example, it was said that the mulatto leader Manuel Piar intended to use his 
guerrilla force of blacks and free coloureds to fight for their own purposes, rather 
than those of the whites, and perhaps even to create an anti-slavery republic on 
the Haitian model. Slave rebellion of the Haitian kind was, however, hampered 
by the very different conditions of continental Spanish America. There were no 
Spanish-American equivalents to the French colony, with its very large popula-
tion of plantation slaves, its many first-generation Africans (including some with 
military skills and experience of war in Africa), and its consequent capacity to fuel 
large-scale rebellion, to produce autonomous forces of slaves and free people of 
colour, and to find allies among neighbouring foreign powers looking for advan-
tage over France.39 The contribution made by slaves to Spanish America’s wars dif-
fered considerably from that made by slaves in Haiti’s revolution. Consonant with 
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the character of Hispanic slavery, it was more localized, less violent, less physically 
destructive, and, though it eroded the foundations of slavery, did not bring it to a 
sudden end.
Where leaders on both sides were able to recruit among the ‘people’, from whites 
and ‘free coloureds’ to ‘Indians’ and slaves, they enlarged the theatres of war and 
unlocked reserves of violence which been contained under the Pax Hispanica. 
The removal of restraints stemmed in part from the character of conflict as civil 
war, where contestants regarded their opponents as traitors who should be wiped 
out, rather than as combatants with rights under the rules of war.40 And, although 
Spanish America lacked conflicting national or religious identities, violence was 
often aggravated by ethnic antagonisms. Spaniards routinely regarded peasant 
rebels as unruly, irrational people, subject to murderous passions, especially if they 
were Native American. On the other hand, European Spaniards were sometimes 
singled out for particularly violent treatment, because of their image as social para-
sites and bad Christians. In Venezuela, European Spaniards were also scapegoated 
as enemies of the people for political reasons, when Bolívar, seeking to define con-
flict in terms of American liberation from Spanish tyranny, called for their extermi-
nation in a ‘war to the death’.
This lethal polarization was particularly noticeable where political contest was 
strongest and where popular insurgencies and guerrilla wars were led by local men 
over whom governments exerted little control. Perhaps the most arresting example 
was that of the royalist llaneros in Venezuela, who acquired a singular reputation 
for ferocity. Boves and his followers fought without quarter, preyed on civil-
ians, and established such a reputation for rapine that thousands fled from their 
path. Their terrifying image owed something to the personality of their leader, 
for Boves was a Spaniard driven by hatred for creoles, eager to present himself 
as the scourge of ‘traitors’, and ready to inflict extreme punishment on those he 
regarded as the king’s enemies. The violence attributed to Boves’s warriors was 
possibly exaggerated by contemporary commentators, due to the racial composi-
tion of his forces and their way of life. In fact, plunder was the usual guerrilla tactic 
of living off the land, and llanero violence was shaped by life on frontiers where 
the writ of government ran thin.41 Theirs was an insurrection of poor, mixed-race 
frontier communities against the creole governments of coastal cities, and they 
brought the behaviour of semi-nomadic cattle drovers to the practice of war. Here, 
indeed, in Venezuela, we see the first stirrings of a kind of irregular warfare that 
was also found among the gauchos of the plains of the Río de la Plata. Conducted 
by llaneros and gauchos under local leaders, it drew on the experience of communi-
ties shaped by life on the fringes of the Pax Hispanica, with tactics and weapons 
familiar from raiding wars against independent Amerindians and from herding 
semi-feral livestock. These were rural communities fighting to defend their way 
of life against outsiders, with little regard for European ways of war or concepts of 
the nation.
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The violence that spread with wars for territory and militarization of the popu-
lace was to some extent curbed by the customs of the Pax Hispanica. Although 
popular pieties might sometimes justify murder and massacres, religious dif-
ferences neither motivated conflict nor aggravated violence. On the contrary, 
confessional conflict was absent and contending sides generally showed respect 
for religion and deference towards the Church. Nor was violence exacerbated by 
radical fervour of the kind found in revolutionary France: Spanish-Americans did 
not see their revolutions as the birth of a new man and a new society, and were not 
converted into cannon fodder for ‘total war’ of the kind associated with the French 
Revolutionary wars.42 On the contrary, citizens were often unwilling recruits with 
a strong inclination to desert when removed from their home localities. These 
characteristics helped to check the violence of war, as armies were never long 
in the field, fought brief battles, and tended to disperse rapidly when faced with 
defeat. Warfare could be more intense and protracted in fights over home territory, 
but the damage tended to remain within the local arena, rather than spreading over 
a larger scale.
Legacy
When Fernando VII was restored to the Spanish throne in 1814, and the insurgents 
retreated on many fronts, royalists hoped to recover the colonial peace. The Pax 
Hispanica was irretrievable, however, now that war had been socially embedded 
in several regions and Spain had revealed its military vulnerabilities. Where forced 
to retreat, insurgents in Mexico, Venezuela, New Granada, and Upper Peru simply 
shifted their ground, harassing their enemies from remote areas rather than con-
fronting them in pitched battles. Such warfare gave increasing importance to the 
local caudillo, the politico-military leader who was instrumental in mobilizing local 
and regional support, and such leaders played key roles in keeping hopes for inde-
pendence alive. Indeed, from the ranks of the caudillos came leaders who, intent on 
creating new states, built armies geared to fighting on European lines.43
In South America, this opened a new phase of war in which politico-military lead-
ers sought to create regular armies based on European models, and declared war 
against Spain as a foreign power. San Martín’s creation of his ‘Army of the Andes’ 
and invasion of Chile in 1817 opened this era, a feat that was followed, in 1818–19, 
by Bolívar’s offensive against Spanish forces in Venezuela and New Granada. Their 
expansion into Spanish-held territories cleared the way for the conclusive stage of 
the independence wars, in which the armies established by San Martín and Bolívar 
converged on royalist Peru. Now, with better-organized armies at their disposal, 
they conducted conventional wars and did battle with Spanish forces in the field. 
This was a crucial development. They not only defeated Spain’s armies, but did so 
with armies led by men for whom war was a political career, and whose armies were 
 seedbeds for the formation of new states.44
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However, if war was the crucible for forging independent states, the collec-
tive violence caused by prolonged internal wars left a legacy that complicated the 
transition to statehood. By the time that Bolívar defeated the last royalist armies 
of Peru and Upper Peru in 1824–25, the Pax Hispanica was already shattered by 
internal warfare, with multiple and enduring effects. It is difficult to measure the 
damage done by war, in terms of mortality and damage to economic and social 
life. But one thing is clear: the rebellions and wars triggered by competing claims 
for sovereignty had produced an unprecedented rise in collective violence in 
many regions of Spanish America, mobilized sectors of the population previously 
marginalized from power, sometimes on a large scale, and destroyed the bonds 
on which the Pax Hispanica had been based.45 Violence had become an indispen-
sable instrument of politics, and, after the overthrow of Spanish rule, continued 
to be used by the elites, old and new, to assert their ambitions and defend their 
positions.46 For at least a generation, military chiefs from the wars of independ-
ence became prominent political figures, establishing new states, defining their 
geographical boundaries, and shaping their constitutions. However, unlike the 
wars of early modern Europe, the Spanish-American wars of independence did 
not produce ‘military revolutions’, nor their political corollaries. They had, instead, 
tended to fragment the political order, dissipate authority, and disperse the control 
of violence away from the centre.47 And, now that the Pax Hispanica was finally 
erased amid intense competition for power, collective violence became a much 
more frequent feature of political life.
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Restraining/encouraging violence: commerce, 
diplomacy, and brigandage on the steppe 
routes between the Ottoman Empire, Poland-
Lithuania, and Russia, 1470s–1570s
Alexander Osipian
This chapter examines the large-scale non-state violence on the trade routes in 
the buffer zone between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania,1 the Grand Duchy of 
Moscow,2 the Ottoman Empire, and the Crimean Khanate. Though the rulers 
constantly declared their will to maintain the diplomatic contacts and protect 
the caravan trade between these states, execution of their orders was entrusted 
to those who actually committed the violent attacks – the Cossacks and the local 
dignitaries.
The violence on the steppe roads was not haphazard but well-coordinated. It 
was encouraged or, at least, tolerated by the local dignitaries who benefited from 
it and who provided the brigands with the necessary patronage. To avoid an open 
war with a powerful neighbouring state, these dignitaries sometimes detained and 
executed some perpetrators but never tackled the underlying causes of the brigand-
age (qazaqliq). Even the occasional imprisonment of the dignitaries themselves 
failed to stop brigandage since its preconditions remained in place: the frontiers 
were not fixed and guarded, the roads were not patrolled, the officials and service-
men were not paid or underpaid, and the rulers lacked tools to curb raiding and 
instead continued this hybrid war, simply shifting responsibility onto the so-called 
‘nameless’ or ‘master-less men’.
Social bandits or governors’ henchmen? Two approaches to brigandage
The Zaporozhe and Don Cossacks are among the best-studied topics in Ukrainian 
and Russian historical writing. Nineteenth-century Romantic and populist histo-
riography represented them respectively as brave defenders of the Christendom 
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against the Tatar-Ottoman menace and as communities of freedom-fighters who 
welcomed runaway serfs.3 Two discourses were further developed by Soviet 
Marxist historiography which emphasized the class struggle and stressed the lead-
ing role of the Cossacks in the great ‘anti-feudal uprisings’ and ‘peasant wars’ from 
the 1590s to 1770s.4
These romanticized Cossacks are close to Eric Hobsbawm’s Primitive 
Rebels (1959) and Bandits (1969). Hobsbawm defined social bandits as peas-
ant outlaws whom the lord and state regarded as criminals.5 Anton Blok criti-
cized  Hobsbawm’s  approach, pointing out that all outlaws require protection 
to  operate as bandits. Blok argued that they were protected by local rulers with 
whom they shared the booty.6 The links of bandits to wider society, and particu-
larly to central and local authorities, have been diligently examined in some case 
studies.7
The early Cossacks lacked many important features necessary to be identified 
with Hobsbawm’s social bandits. In the early stage, between the 1470s and 1570s, 
they mainly appear in the sources when they attacked merchant caravans and 
ambassadorial trains. The contemporary sources interpret the very word ‘Cossack’ 
(kazak or qazaq) as ‘outcast’, ‘freebooter’, ‘vagabond’, or ‘expellee’.8 Though the 
early Cossacks were outcasts from the Tatar Hordes, they included princes, noble-
men, and ordinary nomads,9 not the runaway serfs as later in the seventeenth 
century.10 The Cossacks were hired by the states of East Central Europe for vari-
ous tasks, but frequently brought their employers to the brink of war through their 
behaviour. By exploring their activity, this chapter examines in turn the scale of 
violence, the diplomatic discourses of sovereignty and (ir)responsibility over the 
steppe routes, management of violence, and formation of the networks assisting the 
brigandage.
The scale of violence
The Golden Horde’s khans benefited from the long-distance trade and protected 
the merchants in their domains.11 The disintegration of the Golden Horde in 
1420–80 caused the rise of brigandage on the steppe.12 The Ottoman conquest 
of the Genoese colonies in the south Crimea (Caffa, Soldaia, Chembalo) in 
1475 changed the balance of power in the region.13 Mengli-Giray, the khan 
of Crimea,  accepted Ottoman vassalage and with the sultan’s blessing allied 
in  1480 with Muscovy  against Lithuania, making annual incursions into 
Lithuanian  domains until 1505. Lithuania, in turn, allied with the Great Horde 
against Muscovy and Crimea. In the next decades, the region’s contested status 
opened it to the Cossacks of Muscovy, Lithuania, Crimea (Perekop), Azov, 
Astrakhan, and the Great Horde who attacked the caravans and ambassadorial 
trains. This complicated situation allowed each ruler to blame others for these 
assaults.
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The Crimean khan shifted his loyalty after 1507 and henceforth the Tatar raids 
devastated the southern provinces of Muscovy.14 Raiding proved so destructive 
that Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy sent yearly gifts (уПоминки) across the next 
two centuries to the Crimean khan for him to desist.15 On the other hand, the 
governors of Polish and Lithuanian frontier castles frequently raided the Ottoman 
settlements and Tatar encampments between the rivers Dnister and Dnipro.16 And 
the Cossacks were involved in these raids too.17
Sixteenth-century commercial, diplomatic, and military communication between 
Moscow and Crimea ran along several routes between the rivers Dnipro and Don.18 
The westernmost led from Moscow via Chernigov, Oster, Kiev, Kanev, Cherkasy, 
the ferry of Tavan’, the isthmus of Perekop, and finally to the main seaport of Caffa.19 
A second route led from Moscow to its border town Putivl’,20 from where travellers 
crossed the Dnipro river at Kanev, Cherkasy, or another suitable place downstream, 
then once again at the ferry of Tavan’ to reach Perekop. The third route went from 
Putivl’ through the steppe on the left (east) bank of the Dnipro to Perekop. In 
these three cases the travellers crossed the areas under Lithuanian control. A fourth 
route led through the Muscovite border town of Kursk, then down the Severskiy 
Donets  and Don rivers to the Ottoman city of Azak (Azov), and then by the 
Sea of Azov to Caffa. On the fifth easternmost route, travellers sailed down the Don 
to Azov. The same area was crossed by several routes (called shlakh or sakma) used 
by the Crimean Tatars for their incursions into lands to the south of Moscow. The 
most important, the Muravsky shlakh, had merged with the so-called ‘great ambas-
sadorial road’ along the hilly watershed divide between the Dnipro and Severskiy 
Donets.21
The attacks on the caravans were committed in the forest-steppe and steppe 
zones between the Dnipro and Don, particularly between the Dnipro and Severskiy 
Donets – that is, in the areas of the present-day Ukrainian oblasts of Kharkiv, 
Poltava, and the eastern part of Dnipropetrovsk oblast. This area was a buffer zone 
between Lithuania, Muscovy, the Crimean Khanate, and the Great Horde, and had 
a dubious legal status.
The merchants only dared to travel through the steppes organized into big, 
well-armed parties or convoys (caravans). Michalon Lituanus,22 in his treaty 
written c.1550, estimated the size of caravans circulating between Caffa and Kiev 
as up to a thousand men each.23 The caravan robbed in 1545 by the Cossacks of 
Kiev, Cherkasy, and Kanev certainly fits Michalon Lituanus’s description.24 That 
scandalous case was considered at the ducal court in Vilnius in the presence of 
the Crimean ambassador and twenty-seven merchants,25 whose names were men-
tioned in the records.26 Without question they were wealthy merchants, but the 
caravan also included less prosperous merchants (‘with other our companions’),27 
factors, assistants, servants, wagon drivers, and a military escort. In March 1489, 
Ivan III, the Grand Duke of Muscovy, complained to the Polish king, Kazimierz 
IV, about a caravan of Russian merchants from Moscow, Tver’, and Novgorod that 
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had been plundered on the Tavan’ ferry. The charter names six main merchants 
‘with companions, many people, all together 120 men, besides their people’.28 In 
total, there were 120 merchants in this caravan besides the assistants. An ambas-
sadorial instruction names six merchants from Moscow who, ‘with companions all 
together 45 men’, were plundered on the Severskiy Donets on their way to Azov 
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in 1495, by local Tatars who killed twenty-two and injured twenty-three others.29 
Jan Chrzonowicz, the governor (starosta, capitaneus) of Kanev, mentioned ‘a big 
caravan of about hundred wagons’ in November 1551.30 The Nogai embassy that 
arrived at Moscow in 1549 consisted of seventy members of the ambassadorial 
train accompanied by 200 merchants with 3,000 horses.31
The brigands were equally numerous. The Muscovite embassy of Prince Fedor 
Romodanovsky was attacked and robbed on the steppe in 1501 by the joint force 
of the Tatars of Azov, the Great Horde, and Turks of Azov, together numbering 
140 men.32 Several Ottoman and Crimean caravans were attacked in 1545 by the 
Cossacks of Cherkasy, Kanev, Bratslav, Vinnitsa, and other Lithuanian border 
towns who together fielded 800 men on the steppe near Cherkasy.33 The brigands 
were well organized. Their leaders (golovy, starshie, atamany) were recognized by 
the victims and frequently mentioned in complaints and diplomatic correspond-
ence. In many cases, the freebooters were well informed about the approaching 
caravans and embassies and coordinated their actions to mount ambushes on sev-
eral routes simultaneously.34
To minimize risk, merchants frequently joined an ambassadorial train, thereby 
increasing the defensive force of a convoy and hoping to benefit from the dip-
lomatic immunity and military escorts provided by the ambassador’s master 
and host. However, this frequently proved counterproductive, because brigands 
specifically targeted ambassadorial trains more than the sole caravans because 
of the double booty of merchants’ goods and diplomatic gifts. Eight Muscovite 
embassies were plundered in the area between the Dnipro and Don in just ten 
years, from 1493 to 1503.35 The journey across the steppe became so dangerous that 
the Muscovite ambassador Ivan Oshcherin waited more than a year in 1503–04 
in the border town Putivl’ until the Crimean khan provided him with a military 
escort.36
A sad fate befell the Russian merchants travelling from the Crimea in company 
with the Polish ambassador in 1488–89. The ferrymen at the Tavan’ crossing over 
the Dnipro, on the border between the Tatar and Lithuanian domains, refused 
to take the merchants across the river. Abandoned on the wrong side, they were 
attacked by ‘the people of Kievan governor Yuri Patsovich’ (Jerzy Pac) led by cer-
tain headmen – Bogdan, Golubets, and Vas’ko Zhila.37 The merchants were beaten, 
some killed, others captured, and their merchandise stolen.
Though the governor did not take part in the assault, Ivan III demanded on 
20 March 1489 that the Polish king, Kazimierz IV, investigate the case, punish 
 offenders, and offer compensation for the damage and murder.38 At that time, 
Lithuania and Muscovy were in a state of undeclared war (1487–94) and were 
making mutual military incursions into the borderlands. Nevertheless, Kazimierz 
IV at least replied to the Muscovite ambassador in 1490, but claimed that the 
investigation revealed that only the Turkish merchants with the caravan had been 
robbed, while the Muscovite subjects had received their merchandise back and had 
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even been given some of the Turkish goods.39 Referring to Ivan III’s claims that 
individual Muscovite subjects had been robbed by Jewish toll collectors in the well-
populated Lithuanian domains, Kazimierz IV explained that the Russian merchants 
deliberately avoided the custom offices of Smolensk and Minsk by choosing the 
‘new roads’. It was no surprise, according to the Polish king, that these merchants 
were detained and forced to pay tolls in Lithuania, just as his own subjects were 
required to do when travelling in Muscovy.40
Pillage, responsibility, and compensation: a case study
While Kazimierz disputed Muscovite claims, it was clear that the authorities 
recognized that their subjects were often involved, as is illustrated by a case from 
1546 when Lithuania and the Crimean Khanate were once again on the brink of 
war. Khan Sahib-Giray wrote to King Sigismund August that the Cossacks of 
Kiev, Kanev, Cherkassy, and other border towns had plundered some caravans 
of Ottoman and Crimean merchants travelling between the Crimea and Moscow 
in 1545.41 The Tatar ambassador was sent to Lithuania, accompanying the twenty-
seven merchants who had been affected. Initially, Sigismund August intended to 
reject the merchants’ complaint, but changed his mind primarily because most 
of them were Ottoman subjects and the king was afraid to provoke the powerful 
sultan, Suleiman the Magnificent, who had just defeated the Habsburgs in 1544.42 
The fifteen merchants from Constantinople were most probably purveyors of the 
sultan’s court.43 Secondly, Sahib-Giray claimed that four of the Tatar merchants 
had been heading to Moscow with his money, and estimated their losses at 
862,000 coins.44 The khan threatened the king with possible military intervention 
by posing the rhetoric question: ‘whom should attack my Tatars if they can’t make 
war against Muscovy?’45 A compromise was found and the merchants were paid 
compensation.
Sigismund August’s reply to Sahib-Giray and the merchants’ acknowledge-
ment letter are important sources helping us to reconstruct the event, examine 
both sides’ discursive strategies, and illuminate contemporaries’ understanding of 
what constituted ‘trade routes.’ The king opens his letter with the promise to send 
gifts (Поминъки) to the khan, as it was done before for maintaining the friendship 
between two states.46 Then Sigismund August states that, even before Sahib-Giray’s 
complaints arrived, he had initiated the investigation following reports from his 
borderland governors. Based on its results, the king declares that the attacks on 
the khan’s domains and subjects were made by Muscovite Cossacks from the 
border castles of Putivl’, Chernigov, and Novgorod-Severskiy, who had falsely 
put the blame on the king’s own Cossacks.47 According to Sigismund August, the 
Muscovite Cossacks attacked the caravan on the steppe when it crossed Sanjary 
ford on the Vorskla River, a left tribute of the Dnipro.48 The king’s Cossacks were 
in the same area pursuing their traditional economic activities (входахъ) of  fishing 
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and hunting, and with no knowledge of the approaching caravan. According to 
their own testimony, these royal Cossacks were attacked without provocation 
by the caravan merchants, along with some Tatars – probably the military escort 
they hired in the Crimea. Other royal Cossacks arrived and attacked the Tatars to 
free their comrades. They found that the caravan was being pillaged by Muscovite 
Cossacks, who had probably been captured by Tatars during previous incursions, 
and were now being led to Moscow for ransom or exchange. The Muscovite cap-
tives liberated themselves, stole the merchandise, and fled to Moscow, while the 
king’s Cossacks only obtained small booty.49 The apologetic headline of this story is 
evident: the blame is put on the Muscovite Cossacks in the same way as, according 
to the king’s statement a few lines above, the Muscovite Cossacks put the blame on 
the king’s subjects.
The key point in the king’s letter is that ‘those merchants are guilty themselves 
because they left their customary old roads and went with their goods, not in 
accordance with the old habit through the castles of His Grace – Kiev, Cherkasy, 
and Kanev – as it was before, but by other new uncustomary roads where is great 
insecurity’.50 Nevertheless, the king, because of his friendship with the khan and 
‘despite the custom’, did ‘what he should not do’ and ordered the investigation, 
compelled the Cossacks to return the goods to the merchants, and paid them 
considerable cash compensation for the remainder of their lost merchandise. At 
the same time, Sigismund August noted that if the merchants ‘would apply to the 
law court they will never get the same [favourable] legal resolution because they 
left the old roads’.51 The idea that the merchants were themselves guilty because 
they took a new uncustomary road to evade toll payment was repeated several 
times in the king’s letter, as well as in other documents. The king thereby empha-
sized that the compromise reached in 1546 was something exceptional, and not to 
become a precedent for future cases.
Finally, Sigismund August added instructions explaining the sequence of actions 
the merchants needed to follow in future to escape pillage. The khan was to order 
that they follow the old roads. ‘In accordance with the old habit’, merchants 
approaching the Tavan’ ferry were to notify the voivode of Kiev and governor 
(starosta) of Cherkasy and Kanev that they were going to Lithuania, or through it 
to Moscow. The voivode and governor were then to send an escort. After paying 
the toll, merchants were to be convoyed to the border with Muscovy ‘without any 
obstacles’ (зачепПъки). If the khan’s merchants or Turkish caravans used ‘the new 
and uncustomary roads, sending no news to the voivode and governor’, the king 
disclaimed any responsibility for their security ‘and whatever damage will happen 
to them he shifts responsibility on his brother the khan and wants to know nothing 
and nihil debet to his brother and the merchants’.52
In their acknowledgement letter, the merchants accepted the king’s version of 
events and recognized their primary responsibility for bypassing the royal castles 
to avoid the tolls and going ‘not by the road, but through the virgin steppe where 
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neither our ancestor merchants, nor we ourselves ever travelled’.53 The merchants’ 
acquiescence is unsurprising, since they recovered their goods and money. On the 
other hand, they acknowledged in future that ‘His Grace the Sovereign does not 
want to consider such complaints, because it is not the Sovereign’s obligation to 
safeguard the virgin and desert steppe where no customary road ever passed.’54 The 
king’s message is evident: no tolls, no protection.
On the surface, it looked as if the Cossacks were simply given carte blanche to 
pillage caravans which avoided the tolls, but that was not the case. As the merchants 
refused to leave Vilnius without receiving their full compensation in cash, it was 
paid from the state treasury.55 The two quittances issued by the king and Senate 
to the treasurer are revealing here since they were written for domestic use only. 
First, there is no mention of the Muscovite Cossacks. The whole responsibility 
is put squarely on the king’s Cossacks whose unprovoked assault risked military 
conflict with the Ottomans and Tatars.56 Second, the king expressed the belief that 
the Cossacks roamed the steppe and pillaged caravans on the instructions of some 
borderland governors (державъцы Украиные), and he held both them and the gov-
ernors responsible for the royal expenses. Therefore, the king and Senate ordered 
that ‘the governors who sent the Cossacks to the steppe and got their share of booty 
as well as their officials, captains, sergeants, landlords, burghers, Cossacks, or any 
other subjects … all of them must pay the sum of money … to the Royal Public 
treasury without exemption and postponement in order to hold them from doing 
such damages in the future’.57
This case raises some important issues requiring further examination: 1) the 
legal regime on the trade routes; 2) discursive strategies – formal replies and 
false statements – made by rulers and high officials to shift responsibility; 3) com-
pensation paid for damages and punishment of the highwaymen; and 4) engage-
ment of the borderland governors and large groups of the population in the ‘raid 
economy’.
Translation of violence in diplomatic terms: the steppe routes as 
a discursive and legal category
The court records and diplomatic correspondence reveal that the trade routes – 
particularly the steppe roads – were considered by contemporaries as special traf-
fic streams with their own legal regimes and conditions of use and responsibility. 
The distinction between ‘customary/public’ and ‘uncustomary/hidden’ roads 
was widespread in the diplomatic correspondence, as well as interstate treaties. 
For instance, the capitulations sent by Sultan Murad III to the Polish king, Stefan 
Batory, in 1577 read:
When Armenians and other infidel merchants living under the royal hand [i.e., the 
subjects of the Polish king] want to come to Moldavia and my other well-protected 
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dominions and practice trade, they should not travel through deserted and wild areas 
or use hidden roads, but they should come by the direct public road which has been 
customarily traveled by merchants.58
Public roads in the Ottoman domains were well-travelled, frequently patrolled, 
and consequently safer. Unlike the Ottomans, the rulers of Eastern Europe absolved 
themselves of the responsibility for security on the steppe roads. The Nogai prince 
Yusuf complained in 1549 that his merchants were robbed on their way back from 
Moscow by Russian bandits on the Don river.59 Ivan IV replied that
your merchants may come to us with no fear. When going by road they must safeguard 
themselves since, as you know yourself quite well, on the steppe there are always many 
villains from different states. Who can identify these villains? No one robber ever 
reveals his name. So, your merchants must defend themselves during their journey. 
And we are not able to protect them on the steppe, but only in our domains.60
At the same time, rulers held their counterparts responsible if an assault was com-
mitted in their section of the steppe route. When the Muscovite embassy to the 
Crimea was pillaged and captured by Tatars of the Great Horde in 1501, Ivan III 
wrote to the Crimean khan Mengli-Giray that ‘you, brother, know better how to 
liberate them because they were captured on your route’.61
The authorities sometimes used the dangers of the steppe routes to extort money 
from foreign merchants. For instance, in 1500 Mengli-Giray used the pretext ‘that 
there are Cossacks of the [Great] Horde on the road’ to refuse a permit to Stepan 
Vasiliev, a Russian merchant returning from the Ottoman domains to the Crimea 
where he wanted to join the merchants of Kiev to go together to that city. Vasiliev 
complained to Ivan III, who in turn wrote to Mengli-Giray disputing the khan’s 
claim. The khan replied personally to Ivan III that he let Vasiliev leave the Crimea 
after the merchant had paid him 2,000 silver coins ‘with no coercion and harass-
ment’. Ivan III replied sarcastically to his Tatar ally: ‘Once you took two thousand 
coins, the road became free and there were no Cossacks on the steppe. Could it be 
more coercive and harassing if our merchant was overtly forced to pay?’62
These quite sophisticated formal replies were elaborated in state chancelleries 
which regarded the steppe as a neutral buffer zone and a field of operations for 
diverse Cossacks, rendering it impossible to identify the actual perpetrators of 
specific crimes. When the Nogai prince Kel-Mahmet complained in 1538 to Ivan 
IV about the evil deeds committed by Muscovite Cossacks, the latter replied that:
you know quite well that the villains are everywhere. There are many Cossacks roaming 
the steppe – the Cossacks of Kazan’, Azov, Crimea and other troublemaking Cossacks. 
And those from our borderlands mix with them and likewise go to the steppe. These 
men are thieves and villains for you as well for us. No one instructs them to commit the 
crimes. And after committing some crime, they return to their lands.63
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In August 1549, Ivan IV responded to the Nogai prince Yusuf that the Don 
Cossacks were beyond his control, ‘and these villains are living on the Don with-
out our permission because they are runaways. We have often sent our men to 
capture them. However, our men could not catch them … And if your men will 
catch some of the villains, then send them to us and we will order them executed.’64 
Interestingly, that June, Ivan IV had already written to another Nogai prince, Kasay 
Mirza, that ‘owing to the friendship between us, I sent my Cossacks to attack the 
Crimean domains’.65
Such excuses were employed to deny responsibility and consequently escape 
obligations to make recompense to those affected. For example, King Alexander 
blamed ‘nameless men’ in a letter to Mengli-Geray when merchants from Caffa, 
travelling with the envoys of the Crimean khan and the sultan of Caffa, were plun-
dered by Cossacks on the Tavan’ ferry in 1504.66 Nevertheless, the king persuaded 
the khan that he had already sent to Kiev and Cherkasy to investigate the case, 
suggesting that he well knew who could commit the assault. Alexander promised 
that if the Crimean ambassadors arrived at Kiev, the captured perpetrators would 
be executed in their presence and any plundered items would be returned to the 
merchants, who in any case had already received reimbursement for their lost 
 merchandise.67
These cases indicated that merchants were most likely to be reimbursed if they 
were subjects of a powerful ruler who might otherwise retaliate, as exemplified by 
Poland-Lithuania’s concern to maintain peace with the Ottomans and to prevent 
Tatar raids. The formal replies and excuses were employed if the plundered mer-
chants were the subjects of minor rulers, as it was in the case of Muscovy and the 
competing Nogai princes, or if a ruler was dependent on the military alliance with 
his counterpart, as illustrated by the relations between Muscovy and the Crimean 
Khanate in the 1480s–1500s.
Networks of plunder: the management of violence and the social 
benefits of brigandage
This formal system of official routes and protection relied on local officials who 
were often directly engaged in brigandage or benefited from it in many ways. 
Michalon Lituanus noted around 1550 that various residents of Kiev – toll col-
lectors, merchants, moneychangers, boatmen, wagon drivers, innkeepers, tavern 
keepers – were profiteering equally from the caravans going through Kiev by the 
old road, as well from those plundered in ‘the pathless steppe’ (campis inviis) or 
entombed there under the snowdrifts in winter. He believed these practices were 
the true source of the abundance of precious silks, zibeline furs, and spices sold at 
low price in the kiosks of Kiev.68 However, he did not mention the local dignitaries 
who were the main beneficiaries.
As early as 1499, Grand Duke Alexander stipulated in a charter that Cossacks 
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returning from Cherkasy or the steppe were obliged to give a tenth of their booty 
to the voivode of Kiev.69 This practice of granting border dignitaries the right 
to maintain themselves by levying tribute was known as kormlenie (provender 
rent) and was widely used in Lithuania and Muscovy.70 Moreover, many dignitar-
ies organized and led freebooter raids into the Ottoman and Crimean domains 
employing Cossacks as their henchmen.71 The Crimean envoy saw merchandise 
plundered from caravans for sale in Cherkasy in 1545.72 Armenian merchants, who 
were Ottoman subjects, complained to the Polish Diet (Sejm) that they had been 
plundered in 1568 on the Lithuanian–Muscovite border by Cossacks from Kiev, 
who delivered the stolen goods to the voivode of Kiev.73
It was the same picture on the opposite side of the steppe. Muscovite–Tatar 
diplomatic correspondence reveals the networks of dealing in stolen goods in the 
Ottoman cities of Caffa and Azov. In 1500, Yushko, the Muscovite clerk in Caffa, 
discovered that two Tatar merchants were trading zibeline furs looted from the 
embassy of Ivan Oshcherin.74 The latter was sent by Ivan III, in 1497, to Moldavia, 
and plundered by the Tatars somewhere in Polish Ukraine.75 Yushko petitioned 
the Ottoman governor (paşa) of Caffa, who ordered the merchants to be impris-
oned and delivered the furs to the local chief of police (subaşi). The governor told 
Yushko that the Crimean khan would personally interrogate the merchants when 
he arrived in Caffa, but when Mengli-Giray appeared, the governor and police chief 
claimed that the suspects had been released on bail, but had fled along with the bails-
men. They delivered the furs to the khan, who refused to give them to Yushko under 
the pretext that they were moth-damaged.76 One can suppose that the Ottoman 
officials were either bribed by the merchants or patronized the whole network.
An even more confusing case occurred in Moscow in 1502. There, two Turkish 
merchants from Caffa and Tokat sold goods stolen from the Muscovite embassy 
of Ondrey Kutuzov, who had been killed by Azov Cossacks the year before. The 
goods were recognized by some merchants and officials who had been members of 
the embassy. The two merchants were interrogated in the presence of the Ottoman 
and Crimean ambassadors, who were in Moscow at that time. They claimed to have 
received the stolen goods from Ottoman officials in Azov – a supervisor of bazaars 
and trade (muhtesib), and a janissary officer (mukhzir). Two pounds of silk were 
confiscated, sealed by the Ottoman ambassador Alakoz, and given to the Muscovite 
ambassador Olesha Golokhvastov, who was going to Caffa.77 According to his 
instructions, Golokhvastov was to speak to the sultan of Caffa and governor, claim 
back the pillaged goods, and demand punishment of the perpetrators. A note in the 
instructions unravelled the whole network: ‘all the officials of Azov are helping the 
Cossacks of Azov and of the [Great] Horde. The officials let the Cossacks go to the 
steppe and what the latter loot they split with the former.’78
The last sentence corresponds with Mengli-Giray’s letter to Ivan III in 1500 when 
the Muscovite and Crimean ambassadors were robbed on their way on the steppe 
by the Azov and Astrakhan Cossacks, and sixty-four of the party were captured. 
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The Cossacks sold the captives, merchandise, and diplomatic gifts, valued at 3,985 
roubles, to the Turkish merchants in Azov.79 Mengli-Giray advised Ivan III to raise 
the matter with Sultan Bayezid II’s ambassador, who was on his way, and to ‘tell him 
about the chiefs of police (subaşi), fortress commandant (vizdar) and merchants of 
Azov; all the evil is because of them, they are instigating the evil-doers and sending 
them to Rus’ and sharing [the spoils] with them’.80
Finally, in 1503 the sultan of Caffa sent his troops and official investigators to 
Azov where they destroyed the whole network of freebooters and dealers in stolen 
goods. The Azov officials, who had protected this network in return for a cut, 
were imprisoned in Caffa, while the Cossacks were defeated on the steppe and 
executed.81 However, the effects of this punitive action were only temporary, and 
already in 1515 Muscovite envoys in Azov could not get any escort because all the 
Cossacks were away raiding.82 Much later, in 1570, Ivan Novosel’tsev, the Muscovite 
ambassador, on his way back from Istanbul to Moscow, noted in Azov that most of 
the local Ottoman officials who greeted him before were now absent. Novosel’tsev 
discovered that they had joined Tatars to form a 1,200-strong party led by the 
raider-voivode (вылазной воевода) to ravage the southern provinces of Muscovy. 
When Novosel’tsev addressed the governor (sanjak-bey) of Azov, the latter replied 
that the Tatars were acting despite his orders.83
The merchants’ choice of ‘new/uncustomary/hidden’ roads was perceived by 
the Cossacks – and their patrons – as a fair excuse to plunder the caravans. But 
caravans were more often plundered at the Tavan’ ferry on the ‘old habitual’ road. 
According to evidence from 1456–5784 and around 1550,85 there had once been a 
customs house in the time of Grand Duke Vitautas (1392–1430), which was now 
described as an abandoned building. All the attacks on the caravans examined in 
this chapter were committed at the main fords. One can suppose that there had 
been customs houses at these points under the Golden Horde, but that these were 
abandoned after the collapse of this state. Memories of these custom houses, some-
times reinforced by the buildings themselves, survived until the late sixteenth cen-
tury.86 Probably, the Cossacks pretended to collect ‘the old tolls’ from the caravans. 
When their claims were rejected by merchants accompanying ambassadorial trains 
or with a hired military escort, the Cossacks considered plunder an appropriate 
response. Nonetheless, the frequent attacks on caravans indicate that, by the six-
teenth century, foreign merchants considered Cossacks as having no right to claim 
tolls. Much later, when the Zaporozhe Cossack Host was well-institutionalized, 
foreign merchants paid the tolls at the fords, as well as to the obligatory Cossack 
escort imposed on them.87
From the 1570s, both Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy tried to establish central 
state control over the Cossacks and, thereby, reduce violence on the steppe. King 
Stefan Batory recruited 600 Cossacks in 1578 to patrol a frontier on the Lower 
Dnipro. The king and his successors sent a banner to the Cossacks. Since the 
number of these ‘registered Cossacks’ never exceeded 10 per cent of the host, the 
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former were paid by the king to prevent the latter from raids against the Tatars and 
Ottomans. Muscovy reformed its defence of the steppe frontier in 1571 after Ivan IV, 
for the first time, paid a subsidy of money, fabrics, saltpetre, and lead to a group of 
the Don Cossacks for escorting Muscovite and Ottoman ambassadors to Azov the 
year before. The tsar also promised a subsidy to all the Don Cossacks if they assisted 
his ambassador during the trip.88 In 1594, Tsar Fedor sent a subsidy of fabrics, salt-
petre, sulphur, lead, and grain to the Don Cossacks for their raids against the Tatars 
of Crimea and Azov and Nogais. He also promised more subsidies if the Cossacks 
escorted his and the Ottoman envoys to Azov and kept peace with the ‘people of 
Azov’ until the Russian envoy returned from Istanbul.89 Thus, one can suppose 
that the rulers of Muscovy abandoned efforts at direct control and instead paid the 
Cossacks for safe conduct of its ambassadors across the steppe, while the tsar’s sub-
sidy supplied the foodstuffs and materials they needed to produce gunpowder and 
bullets, thereby encouraging their raiding economy.
Ultimately, all these measures proved ineffective, and the late sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries witnessed the spread of Cossack brigandage. The Zaporozhe 
and Don Cossacks started naval raids in the Black Sea during the 1580s.90 The Don 
Cossacks also spread their brigandage to the Volga region and the Caspian Sea. The 
Zaporozhe and Don Cossacks devastated many provinces of Russia during its Time 
of Troubles (1604–18). The Polish crown’s prohibition on Zaporozhe Cossacks’ 
raids ‘in the steppe and sea’, imposed in 1638, was among the main reasons for 
their great rebellion in 1648–54, and resulted in the Host’s secession as the de facto 
state of the Hetmanate. The great Razin’s rebellion started with the pillaging of a 
merchant caravan in the Volga region in 1667 that belonged, in part, to the tsar and 
patriarch.
Nonetheless, central state control was finally established in the early eighteenth 
century and the violence on the steppe was ultimately restrained. The key fac-
tors behind this were the development of Russian military colonies through the 
building of fortified lines with soldier-settlers, and the establishment of fixed bor-
ders between the states, as well as between the Cossack Hosts. Roadblocks were 
erected in frontier districts to check the flow of refugees to the steppe and control 
Cossack movement to the borderland towns. Finally, the regular tsar’s subsidies 
and shipment of military materials made the Cossacks dependent on central state 
control.91 By promoting border patrols, migration control, bureaucratic regulation 
of cross-border contacts, and deportation of dissidents, Peter I accomplished the 
delegitimization of non-state violence in the steppe and accepted responsibility for 
trans-border violence emanating from his territory.92
Conclusion
A sovereign providing letters of ‘safe conduct’ to merchants and other travel-
lers was regarded as the main guarantor of secure travel in his domains. Many 
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merchants had good connections with the ruling elite; some of them were sup-
pliers to the court. The luxury commodities they transported between Moscow 
and the  Black Sea ports, such as furs, silk fabrics, spices, and decorated arms, 
were consumed exclusively by the upper-classes as symbols of social prestige. 
Thus, plunder of these items immediately prompted diplomatic correspondence. 
However, the absence of stable central control over the means of violence in the 
buffer zone rendered preventive measures largely ineffective. The rulers preferred 
to avoid awkward responsibility by relinquishing their sovereignty over the steppe 
routes.
This too, was ineffective, since the equivocal rhetoric used in the interstate cor-
respondence failed to persuade the addressees, who were in a similar situation. 
Rulers frequently employed Cossacks to raid their neighbours’ domains during 
both peace and war, depopulating whole provinces. The permanent hybrid war in 
the desert steppe made the Cossacks an indispensable, effective, and inexpensive 
military force for the rulers. Thus, the plunder of a caravan was regarded as a lesser 
evil when employing these poachers turned gamekeepers to restrain large-scale 
violence.
The growth of the brigandage on the steppe routes continued because of the 
patronage of the local authorities and the support of networks of assistance. 
Violence on the steppe, including borderlands raids and plundering along the trade 
routes, was a profitable business for those who managed, protected, and assisted it 
in various ways. The local governors provided the brigands with necessary patron-
age. While some merchants bought stolen goods from the freebooters, others 
provided the Cossacks with a livelihood and military ammunition. The alehouse 
keepers and ransom-brokers were also in the list of profiteers. 
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Restraining violence on the seas: the Tokugawa, 
the Zheng maritime network, and the Dutch 
East India Company
Adam Clulow and Xing Hang
In 1665, the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie or 
VOC) called in its fleet. Intended to strike back against the sprawling Zheng 
maritime network, which had successfully evicted the Dutch from their colony 
on Taiwan, the fleet had been sent to restore the Company’s damaged prestige in 
the region while netting valuable goods. Instead, the governor-general had been 
forced to declare that all Zheng shipping sailing to Japan, the richest market in the 
region, would be safe from attack. It was a sudden ending for a campaign that had 
begun in 1662 with oversized plans of carrying the war against Zheng Chenggong, 
or Koxinga as he was widely known, into the coastal waters of Japan itself, striking 
vessels where they were most vulnerable as they entered and exited key ports. The 
decision to halt the campaign stemmed from concerted pressure applied from 
Nagasaki. There, prohibitions against attacking Chinese vessels on their way to 
Japan, first articulated over a decade earlier, had been repeated with increasing 
frequency by Tokugawa officials determined to secure vulnerable shipping lanes. 
From the Company’s perspective, such injunctions were an essentially illegal 
action taken by a regime that was determined to favour a group they described 
as the ‘Koxinga Chinese’ over all others, while preventing the organization from 
taking its ‘lawful revenge’ for the loss of Taiwan.1 But, fearful that its ships would 
be arrested, its assets confiscated, or its merchants expelled from Japan, VOC 
 officials were forced to step back.
The cessation of the campaign against Zheng shipping shows how a territorial 
regime with no navy to speak of could still exert influence over the waves, effec-
tively restraining seaborne violence on key shipping lanes. Less than a decade later, 
however, Tokugawa officials faced a different threat that proved far more difficult 
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to manage. In late 1672, news reached Nagasaki that a tributary vessel from Ryukyu 
had been captured on its way from that island archipelago to China.2 The Ryukyu 
kingdom (modern-day Okinawa) held an ambiguous political status. It was con-
nected both to Tokugawa Japan, which held military dominion over the territory 
via Satsuma domain and to China (first Ming then Qing), to which it dispatched 
regular tributary embassies. But while its exact political status was kept deliberately 
vague, ships from Ryukyu sailed under the protection of the Tokugawa military 
government (Bakufu), which relied on the territory as a valuable source of informa-
tion and an unofficial conduit to China. Now, however, Tokugawa officials received 
word that a Ryukyuan ship had been captured, its cargo confiscated, and most of its 
crew massacred, their bodies dumped overboard.
Tokugawa officials had been dealing with violence on the sea lanes criss-crossing 
East Asia for years, but there was something different about this episode. The ship 
from Ryukyu had not been attacked by a European overseas enterprise like the 
Dutch East India Company operating with a flexible dispensation for privateering. 
Instead, it had been seized by vessels attached to the Zheng state on Taiwan.3 By 
1672, when news of the vessel’s capture reached Nagasaki, Zheng Chenggong, who 
had evicted the Dutch from their former colony, had been dead for a decade, but his 
son and successor, Zheng Jing, was in the process of constructing a mercantile polity 
on Taiwan with a long reach that extended across the region and into Southeast 
Asia. Outraged by Zheng actions, Tokugawa officials in Nagasaki responded with 
a familiar set of tactics by arresting vessels and seizing compensation. This time, 
however, the aftermath played out very differently. Whereas the Dutch East India 
Company had always capitulated by staging a swift retreat in the face of Tokugawa 
action, Zheng Jing pushed back by sending ships to patrol the sea lanes leading into 
Nagasaki. The result was an impasse and a precipitous drop in Nagasaki trade as the 
Zheng blockade began to stifle maritime routes leading into the port.
As has been well documented, maritime violence was at the centre of the 
European push into Asia.4 To borrow Carlo Cipolla’s words, guns, sails, and empire 
were bound tightly together.5 The overseas enterprises that began to move into 
Asian waters in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were maritime organiza-
tions that were geared towards seaborne warfare, and they brought with them 
a formidable technological combination of heavy guns and robust ship design. 
Because of this, European overseas enterprises were, from the beginning, heavily 
dependent on the use of maritime force to attack competing merchant groups and 
pry open port cities. In such cases, seaborne violence formed a potent and much 
used  bargaining chip to improve trading conditions.
At times, such tactics could yield immediate results, inflicting devastating 
defeats or forcing dramatic shifts in policy, but this was not always the case. 
Seeking to push back against oversized notions of European power in early 
modern Asia, revisionist scholars have shown that European advantage was just as 
often curtailed as it was deployed to maximum effect, and that sporadic successes 
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did not translate into a consistent broader picture of victory. They have examined 
the ways in which the capacity of European fleets to seize ships belonging to, or at 
least claiming ties with, Asian states was constrained by a fear of reprisals on the 
ground in a dynamic that Ashin das Gupta first labelled a ‘balance of blackmail … 
between land and sea’.6
While such analysis has offered a highly valuable corrective, it rests on a con-
tinuing focus on European overseas enterprises as the sole source of maritime 
violence. In recent years, historians such as Tonio Andrade have called for a shift to 
examine the activities of non-European maritime powers, such as the Zheng or the 
Ya’rubi dynasty of Oman, that were capable of challenging Europeans at their own 
game.7 This chapter seeks to build on that discussion but to push it in a different 
direction. If Andrade has called attention to the role of ‘Asian counterparts to the 
Portuguese, Dutch and English Empires’, then it raises a question as to how local 
states responded to the activities of these aggressive and well-armed indigenous 
maritime powers.8 The attack on the Ryukyu junk presents one case study, provid-
ing an example of an Asian state, Tokugawa Japan, that was compelled to respond 
to violence from an Asian maritime power, the Zheng network.
This chapter focuses on Tokugawa reactions to two maritime operations: the 
first carried out by a European overseas enterprise, the Dutch East India Company, 
and the second by its great Asian rival, the Zheng. By comparing the very different 
ways these responses played out, we seek to make two points. First, we argue that 
the rise of Asian maritime powers like the Zheng presented a new challenge for 
polities across Asia, even for those like Tokugawa Japan that had dealt successfully 
with European maritime violence. In this case, the regime was forced to confront a 
sudden escalation that threatened key trade routes. But second, we suggest as well 
that such crises could be more easily defused as long-standing ties provided oppor-
tunities to settle on improvised solutions capable of satisfying different parties. 
While the situation degenerated quickly after the Zheng enforced a blockade on 
incoming shipping, it also snapped back with surprising speed. In this way, the case 
of the Ryukyu junk shows something else: how a dangerous impasse could be 
unexpectedly resolved via an ambiguous compromise in which multiple sides could 
claim to have emerged victorious. The rapidity of the settlement depended, we sug-
gest, on a common language of diplomacy that facilitated a rapid convergence on a 
convenient consensus.
The early modern world was characterized by new and more lethal ways to wage 
war on land and by sea. The Dutch East India Company and the Zheng maritime 
network, which provide the focus for this chapter, were both formidable organiza-
tions with a reach that would not have been possible in earlier centuries. But local 
states found, at the same time, new ways to restrain violence by deploying a range 
of mechanisms. This basic tension necessitates a more expansive understanding of 
the ‘balance of blackmail’ that stretches beyond the standard binary of European 
violence and Asian response to encompass different permutations.
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Containing the Company
By 1600, East Asia had long been a centre for global piracy, home to successive waves 
of large-scale predation that targeted first the Korean and then the Chinese coast.9 
The arrival of the Dutch East India Company, however, signalled a new phase as 
the organization’s gunned vessels allowed the initiation of prolonged campaigns 
on the open sea. When it was chartered in 1602, the VOC had been given the right 
to recruit and deploy its own military forces. By the time it arrived in Japan seven 
years later, the Company had become a potent maritime power in Asian waters, its 
ships augmented by an elastic legal framework that could be wrapped around even 
the most hastily improvised of campaigns. The result was to make the Company the 
‘world’s largest and best-capitalized privateer enterprise’.10
In the Tokugawa Bakufu, which was the effective hegemon over Japan from 
1600, the Company encountered a state with very limited maritime resources. 
Once in Japan, however, the VOC became entangled within a Tokugawa legal 
order in which its freedom to act against its three primary competitors, Japan-based 
merchants, the Portuguese, and Chinese traders, was significantly constrained. The 
Bakufu succeeded in containing VOC violence through a series of ad hoc edicts 
that served to create vaguely defined, but nonetheless highly effective, zones of 
maritime protection. In 1621, for example, and responding to a string of encounters 
or near-encounters close to its shores, the Bakufu decreed that all merchants in 
Japanese coastal waters were entitled to protection if they were attacked, regardless 
of whether or not they carried a maritime pass issued by Tokugawa officials.11 In 
response, VOC officials, who had previously discussed sending their ships directly 
into Nagasaki harbour to attack Portuguese shipping there, were forced to abandon 
any attempt to patrol Japanese waters looking for prizes.
With the expulsion of the Portuguese from Japan in 1639, Chinese merchants 
sailing to Nagasaki from the China coast and Southeast Asia moved aggressively 
to fill the space left open in Japan’s commercial’s networks. For the VOC, which 
had anticipated a lucrative surge in trade following the eviction of their primary 
European rivals, the increase in Chinese shipping, much of it connected to the 
Zheng mercantile network, represented a source of consistent frustration. The 
result was sporadic conflict along the sea lanes leading into Japan. Over time, a 
pattern began to emerge as VOC attacks on Chinese vessels spurred protests and 
petitions from the victims as well as Zheng representatives. In the aftermath of 
such encounters, Chinese mariners sought both protection and restitution from 
the Nagasaki governor (bugyō), a key Tokugawa official posted in the port city and 
tasked with overseeing foreign trade.12 After investigating these cases, the bugyō 
issued repeated warnings to VOC officials not to harm Chinese shipping coming 
to Japan.
In the 1650s, such episodes became more frequent as competition between the 
Dutch East India Company and the Zheng ramped up, and Tokugawa warnings 
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became more insistent. Part of the conflict centred on the deerskin trade, which 
had emerged as a significant point of friction between these organizations. While 
deer has been hunted for millennia, seventeenth-century Asia witnessed an unprec-
edented boom that turned deerskins into one of the most heavily traded com-
modities across the region, with tens of thousands of skins regularly shipped out 
each year from Ayutthaya (Siam), Cambodia, and Taiwan, which emerged as the 
three most important points of supply. In Ayutthaya, successive kings had granted 
monopoly rights over the deerskin trade to the Dutch in 1634, 1645, and 1646.13 
Although these agreements promised control over the deerskin trade, they proved 
extremely porous and were filled with holes that could be readily exploited by a 
combination of local officials and rival traders, usually acting in tandem. Chinese 
merchants became especially adept at buying up large numbers of deerskins and 
shipping them out to Japan in secret. In response, the VOC attempted to police 
maritime traffic leaving Siam by inspecting ships as they departed and confiscating 
any goods that violated its claimed monopoly.
Such conflicts reverberated out to Japanese ports. In July 1653, a VOC ship, 
the Gecroonde Liefde, lifted 26,366 deerskins from three Chinese junks that were 
stopped a few miles off the Siam (Chao Phraya) river.14 When the mariners that 
had sailed aboard one of these vessels arrived in Japan, they proceeded to complain 
to Nagasaki officials. According to the head of the VOC factory, ‘the people of the 
[recently arrived] junks, making a great noise, went together with some Japanese … 
[who were included] to make the crowd seem larger, to hand over a written com-
plaint to the governors’.15 Eager to defend the legality of such actions, Company 
agents explained that they had been given these rights by a ‘certain charter from the 
Siamese king’.16 They found little support from Bakufu officials, who insisted that 
any attack was unacceptable. By November 1653, Dutch representatives in Nagasaki 
were cautioned that VOC vessels should neither attack nor in any way damage 
Chinese vessels on their way to Japan’.17
In Batavia, the Company’s headquarters in Asia, the VOC hierarchy concluded 
that Tokugawa officials were determined with ‘either justice or injustice to protect 
the Chinese, though they are a rot and ruin to the Company’s trade everywhere’.18 
Fearful of the consequences that might flow if such prohibitions were violated, 
they explained that ‘Japanese exactitude in this matter must be satisfied’. Because 
of this, they had no choice but to let ‘the Chinese junks, who sail and trade in our 
enemies places, pass and repass (upon return) without damaging them’.19 In 1659, 
the Bakufu went a step further. In October of that year, Zacharias Wagenaer, the 
Company’s senior merchant in Japan, was instructed that the Dutch ‘shall not 
pirate [bahan] Chinese ships [tōsen] coming by sea to Japan’.20 If such orders 
were challenged, the Bakufu was prepared to take action by seizing assets in Japan. 
Once this edict was in place, Tokugawa officials moved to enforce it retroactively. 
In October 1660, they informed the Dutch that they should hand over a large sum 
to the chief merchant of a Chinese vessel that had, in a separate incident, been 
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captured three years earlier near the coast of Vietnam. Although the Company 
resisted, Nagasaki officials eventually forced VOC agents to pay up.21
Such episodes established a clear template for how to deal with maritime vio-
lence. Confronted with attacks on shipping, the Tokugawa regime moved to place 
maritime spaces and ships under its protection. If this protection was violated, the 
Nagasaki bugyō was willing to confiscate goods from European assets stored in 
Japan and force compensation. The 1659 edict referred to the general category of 
Chinese vessels or tōsen, but the benefits of this protection were conferred dispro-
portionately on vessels attached to the Zheng maritime network. The importance 
of Tokugawa protection to the Zheng has been a central theme in our own work, 
and it has been underscored in a sweeping study by Cheng Wei-Chung, who argues 
that ‘by issuing a proclamation that no Chinese vessels should be harmed in the 
waters between China and Japan, … Japanese authorities spread a protective 
umbrella over the trading junks of the Cheng regime, keeping them safe from Dutch 
attacks’.22 In this way, Tokugawa protection settled over Zheng shipping, ensuring 
that such vessels could not be attacked even when a state of open conflict existed 
with the VOC. The consequences played out most dramatically in the aftermath of 
the fall of Taiwan, when the Company’s attempts to launch a multipronged assault 
on Zheng shipping ran up against a wall of Tokugawa resistance.
Restoring the Company’s reputation
In April 1661, Koxinga landed at the head of an army on Taiwan, marking the begin-
ning of a campaign that would end nine months later with the surrender of Fort 
Zeelandia.23 Confronted with such a clear attack on its possessions, VOC officials 
in Batavia were adamant that prior restraints must now be lifted and Company 
warships should be free to attack Zheng vessels wherever they were encountered, 
including in Japanese waters. The VOC opperhoofd in Japan was instructed to 
inform Edo that the Dutch ‘could not refrain from the right, that nature has given 
all people, to do all damage [to Koxinga’s ships] that we are capable of, even in 
Japanese waters or elsewhere’.24 Such arguments seemed to be buttressed by the 
destruction of the Hector, a VOC ship that had been carrying cargo intended for 
Japan, by Zheng ships.25 If Koxinga’s forces could attack ships carrying goods 
intended for the Japanese marketplace, then what right did the Bakufu have to pro-
test when the Company did the same?
Although its economic importance had been gradually declining for years, the 
surrender of Fort Zeelandia in 1662 marked a significant setback for an organiza-
tion that had steadily expanded the boundaries of its influence since its creation.26 
Lacking the military resources needed to retake the island, Batavia was determined 
to strike back at Zheng shipping, both to gain some compensation for its conquered 
colony but also, VOC officials believed, to prop up the organization’s damaged rep-
utation in the region.27 To achieve these ends, the Company assembled a  powerful 
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fleet made up of twelve ships and placed under the command of Balthasar Bort.28 
In his instructions, Bort was specifically authorized to take the fight into Japanese 
waters if prizes could be seized there. His superiors explained that ‘we have estab-
lished and resolved in the council of Indies to attack Koxinga’s junks as enemies in 
Japanese waters regardless of Japanese wishes’.29 In drafting such orders, the VOC 
hierarchy in Batavia was well aware that Tokugawa officials might react badly to 
such actions, but they instructed Bort to disregard the potential consequences:
As we are still uncertain how our business will develop in Japan and that it could 
happen (in the worst case) that the Japanese receive our actions against Koxinga so 
badly, especially when we attack them in Japanese waters, that they go as far as seizing 
the Company’s ships, people and merchandize. You will nevertheless not reduce in the 
slightest the hostility against Koxinga, but continue pursuing them, without showing 
the least respect towards the said Japanese. All junks from Koxinga without distinction 
from which place they come from or where they are going must be treated as enemies 
with violence.30
In this way, the need to strike back against Zheng shipping outweighed all other fac-
tors. Even if the Company’s vessels, goods, or people were arrested, the campaign 
must continue.
Such ambitions faltered, however, in the face of Tokugawa resistance. On 29 
August 1663, a VOC ship, the Klaverskerk, encountered and destroyed a Chinese 
junk on its way from Chaozhou in Guangdong province to Japan.31 Although the 
Klaverskerk was not under Bort’s command, its actions formed part of the wider 
campaign against the Zheng. The sinking of a Chinese vessel on its way to Nagasaki 
generated a sharp reprimand from Tokugawa officials, who, although they refrained 
from taking direct retaliatory action, were clear that no further assault on Zheng 
shipping sailing to Japan would be tolerated.32 By 1665, VOC officials meeting in 
Batavia had resolved to suspend the campaign against Zheng shipping. Meeting 
on 25 April, they expressed their concern that, in the aftermath of the Klaverskerk 
episode, any attempt to continue the campaign against Zheng shipping might result 
in the Dutch being permanently expelled from Japan.33 The result was that they saw 
little alternative but to follow Tokugawa injunctions by refraining from attacking 
Chinese junks.34
In its deliberations, the governing council in Batavia had left open the possibility 
that operations might resume after a year’s interval. On 15 May 1665, however, the 
decision was made to call off the campaign altogether.35 Even as they agreed to halt 
operations, VOC officials were furious that they could not avenge the ‘damage and 
disgrace’ done to them by Koxinga’s invasion of Taiwan. It was against the ‘law of 
peoples’ (het volkeren recht), they declared, to prevent the Company from taking 
its ‘lawful revenge’ (rechtveerdige revengie) against the Zheng. And yet they saw no 
other choice, with VOC officials in Japan explaining that the governor-general had 
now given express orders not to harm Chinese vessels on their way to Japan.36 The 
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suspension of Bort’s campaign demonstrated the ways in which Tokugawa officials 
were able to effectively restrict and restrain violence. Such mechanisms would be 
challenged, however, when Zheng ships turned their cannon on a ship from the 
Ryukyu kingdom.
The case of the Ryukyu junk
In June 1662, having successfully ejected the Dutch from Taiwan, Zheng 
Chenggong died at the age of thirty-eight. He was succeeded by his son, Zheng 
Jing, who was faced with multiple threats from domestic rivals determined to 
seize power – from Qing forces, who wanted to eliminate the last remaining chal-
lenge to the legitimacy of the Manchu court, and from the Company, which was 
still determined to strike back against its old foes. By 1670, he had succeeded in 
consolidating his power in Taiwan, while rebuilding and expanding an extensive 
commercial network that stretched increasingly into Southeast Asia. Even as his 
overall position on Taiwan was strengthened, however, Zheng Jing faced a wors-
ening relationship with Japan and the Tokugawa regime, which had long acted to 
protect Zheng shipping.
This deterioration was driven by a range of factors. The first centred on a set of 
increasingly stringent restrictions placed by the Bakufu on the export of silver, which 
was a key commodity in East Asian trade.37 The second hinged on the opening up 
of tributary relations between Ryukyu and the Qing regime in China. Ryukyu occu-
pied an indeterminate political space in East Asia in this period. In 1609, Tokugawa 
Ieyasu had authorized an expedition to bring the Ryukyu kingdom, previously an 
independent maritime hub, into the Tokugawa diplomatic system as a vassal state. 
Forces attached to Satsuma, a powerful domain in Kyushu, captured the king and 
brought him to Edo to pledge his allegiance to the Tokugawa. In the aftermath of 
this campaign, Ryukyu was not, as might have been expected, incorporated directly 
into Japan. Rather it occupied what has been described as a position of ‘dual sub-
ordination’ to both China and Japan.38 This meant that the territory remained offi-
cially within the Chinese tributary system and continued to dispatch embassies to 
China, while all parties combined to obscure the fact that it had been conquered by 
Japanese forces. It made for an ambiguous status in which the Ryukyu kingdom was 
at the same time an independent kingdom and a vassal of both China and Japan.39
For decades, Ryukyu tributary missions had offered homage to the Ming 
emperors, but with the fall of the Ming, they adjusted to the prevailing political 
winds. From 1663, ships from the Ryukyu kingdom began (with Tokugawa per-
mission) to make regular voyages, including tributary missions, to Qing ports.40 
The decision enraged Zheng officials, who viewed the Qing as illegal occupants 
of the Chinese throne. Less than a decade later, in 1670, Zheng vessels captured a 
junk from the Ryukyu kingdom, killing most of the crew and seizing its goods. The 
exact circumstances of the attack remain murky. According to a subsequent letter 
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sent from Taiwan to Japan, the ‘Ryukyu vessel was paying tribute to the barbarians 
in barbarian territory. Our forces naturally attack barbarian ships. How could we 
have discerned whether or not it came from Ryukyu?’41 In this retelling, the attack 
was presented as the fault of the Ryukyuans for, first, operating in a violent zone in 
which Zheng and Qing forces had repeatedly clashed and, second, failing to prop-
erly inform Taiwan. As Zheng officials explained, the ‘Ryukyuans did not dispatch 
any ship with a letter to explain the situation’, hence making them responsible 
for any attack. What is not clear is whether the sinking of the vessel was an oppor-
tunistic action or part of a premeditated campaign designed to punish Ryukyu for 
opening relations with the Qing. Regardless, the episode was a direct product of the 
switch of tributary relations from the Ming to the Qing, which had turned vessels 
from Ryukyu into clear targets.
For months after the junk from Ryukyu disappeared, no one was sure what had 
happened to it: whether it had been captured or simply lost at sea. The lack of clear 
intelligence is not surprising. After their vessel was seized, Zheng sailors had mas-
sacred all its crew members aside from three or four youths, who were subsequently 
taken as prisoners to Taiwan. At some point, however, they managed to escape 
and make their way back to Ryukyu.42 Word of the attack travelled from there to 
Satsuma, where it triggered an immediate reaction. The sinking of the vessel threat-
ened Ryukyu’s role as a conduit between China and Japan and hence struck at 
Satsuma’s profitable intermediary position. Outraged, the lord of Satsuma rushed 
to the political centre to complain before the shogun. Once in Edo, he insisted that 
the Bakufu must take action for the ‘murder of his subjects’ or he would be forced to 
do so himself.43 Not only had Zheng actions resulted in the loss of lives, goods, and 
money, they were also a direct assault on Satsuma’s prestige.44
The Bakufu moved to respond quickly by borrowing a familiar page from the 
tactics it had used so effectively against the Dutch. In December 1672, Nagasaki 
officials seized three of the ‘wealthiest Koxinga junks’ belonging to Zheng-affiliated 
merchants, then anchored in Nagasaki harbour.45 They were stripped of their masts 
and held in the harbour under guard as Nagasaki officials proceeded to explain that 
Zheng actions were ‘a horrible and never before heard manner of procedure’ that 
must be punished severely.46 By 14 January, compensation had been set. Writing 
from Deshima, the VOC opperhoofd reported that the three vessels would only 
be permitted to depart once they had paid a total fine of 30,000 taels, split evenly 
between them. This sum would be forwarded to the Ryukyu kingdom via Satsuma 
‘in satisfaction for the damage that was done to the Ryukyus’.47
With compensation exacted, the Bakufu moved to more clearly define the status 
of vessels from Ryukyu, hence making sure there would be no further repeats of 
what had happened. In April 1673, VOC agents were summoned to receive their 
usual orders from Bakufu officials in Edo. To the standard clauses about not attack-
ing Chinese vessels and reporting dangerous activity by the Iberian powers were 
appended a new order specifically addressing the status of vessels from the Ryukyu 
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kingdom. If the Dutch should ‘encounter the vessels of the Ryukyu islands lying 
east of Formosa towards Japan we should not damage or assault them as they 
were subjects of the realm’.48 What exactly ‘subjects of the realm’ meant was, as 
so many aspects of Ryukyu’s status, open to interpretation. In the Dutch account, 
the Ryukyuans were described as onderdanen or subjects, a phrase that could 
encompass domestic subjects, while in the Japanese version they were referred 
to  more ambiguously as the inhabitants of an attached country (fuzoku no kuni, 
附属之国).49 But the overall significance was clear: Ryukyuan vessels were under 
Tokugawa protection and should not be attacked in any way.
The order not to attack ships from the Ryukyu kingdom was repeated annually 
for decades after 1673. In his famous account of his experience in Japan, Engelbert 
Kaempfer recorded instructions he received from Bakufu officials that the ‘inhabit-
ants of the Ryūkyūs are people that submit to Japan and you shall not capture them 
regardless of where you come across them’.50 It was a blanket protection that was 
stronger than that afforded to Chinese merchants, who were not given a specific 
status. Whereas past edicts had ordered that no Chinese ships should be attacked, in 
the Ryukyuan case it was the crew themselves who, as ‘people that submit to Japan’, 
fell under Tokugawa authority. And whereas the security of Chinese vessels was 
only guaranteed on their way to Japan, ships from the Ryukyu kingdom were placed 
under Bakufu protection wherever they were encountered.
By mid 1673, everything seemed to have been resolved. Compensation had been 
seized, the Zheng had been warned, and a new edict had placed all vessels from 
Ryukyu firmly within a zone of Tokugawa protection. Subjected to similar pun-
ishments in earlier decades, VOC officials had contemplated staging a maritime 
blockade to force the Bakufu to the negotiating table, but they had always retreated 
from such tactics for fear that any attempt to make use of superior maritime fire-
power would generate an even harsher reaction in Edo. Such reservations were 
clearly expressed by one Company official who wrote in response to the arrest of 
VOC vessels in Nagasaki harbour that ‘to maintain the company’s rights through 
reprisal and to engage in attacks against the Japanese is not advisable now or in the 
future’.51
Zheng Jing, however, reacted very differently. Furious at the Bakufu’s policy, 
he placed an embargo on Chinese shipping travelling to Nagasaki. The blockade 
was expansive enough that it was picked up and recorded by a range of European 
observers. English merchants at their newly opened factory in Taiwan heard reports 
of Zheng fleets roaming the waters outside the south-eastern provinces of Zhejiang, 
Fujian, and Guangdong, ready to intercept and seize ships.52 In Nagasaki, the effects 
were obvious. With the blockade in place, the number of Chinese ships travelling 
to Japan plummeted rapidly.53 Those few Chinese mariners who made it to Japan 
recounted harrowing tales of violent encounters with Zheng vessels.54 One captain 
reported in July 1673 that he had departed Canton with a handful of other vessels. 
Attacked, he had managed to escape, but at a cost of one dead and many injured. 
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The fate of the accompanying ships is unknown, but it seems likely they were taken 
by Zheng vessels.55
What was clear to all observers was that the ‘Tayouanese Chinese’ had now 
‘declared war on the Chinese junks that trade with Japan’.56 For the Bakufu, which 
had been largely successful in suppressing VOC violence, the response represented 
a significant and worrying escalation. A blockade, which the Dutch had occasionally 
threatened but never actually initiated, was now in place, with Zheng ships cutting 
off the flow of imports into Nagasaki.57 Bakufu leaders had long worried about an 
attempt to target Japan’s vulnerable trade routes.58 Now, one was in place, and it 
was not clear how long it would remain in effect or what was needed to lift it.
When it had first arrested the three Taiwanese vessels, the Bakufu had sug-
gested that an ambassador could be sent from the Zheng to Nagasaki to resolve 
the matter.59 Even with declines in Japanese supply, much of Zheng Jing’s trading 
network continued to hinge on silver from the archipelago. Because of this, an 
extended embargo threatened to hurt Taiwan’s economic interests as much as 
it did Japan’s.60 Not surprisingly then, Zheng Jing was willing to send an ambas-
sador, although he insisted that any settlement would have to be on his terms. He 
evidently hoped to effect a quick and painful punishment on the Bakufu, thereby 
forcing it to retreat from its past position. In late September 1673, an envoy, Wu 
Peng, arrived from Taiwan bringing with him a number of bargaining chips, includ-
ing a small group of Japanese mariners who had been driven onto Taiwanese shores 
by strong winds and imprisoned there. As further leverage, the ambassador’s ships 
carried within its hold an estimated 250,000 taels worth of cargo, consisting mainly 
of silk and silk-piece goods, which were in high demand in a market newly starved 
of access to precisely such goods.61
Wu Peng stayed in Japan for a number of months, before eventually departing 
in January 1674. While the limited sources do not enable us to trace the precise 
course of negotiations, the ambassador appears to have exceeded his instructions. 
He had been sent to force Tokugawa officials to pull back from their previous 
position, including the levelling of a 30,000 tael fine, by threatening further attacks 
on shipping coming to the archipelago.62 Instead, Wu appears to have adopted a 
far more conciliatory attitude. He released the Japanese mariners he had brought 
with him and accepted a return gift of 2,000 taels from Nagasaki officials.63 Even 
more striking, the ambassador appears to have suggested that the fault lay on his 
master’s side and that Zheng Jing would accept the shogun’s forgiveness for any 
mistakes he had made.64 The reasons for this strategy are not clear, but they likely 
stemmed from Wu’s own role in the Zheng hierarchy. As an official merchant, he 
had his own stake in preserving the flow of goods between Taiwan and Japan. He 
had borrowed capital and ships from Zheng Jing and other key members of the 
Taiwan bureaucracy to trade on their behalf. In exchange, he was entitled to repay 
the loan at a lower level of interest and acquire a share of the profits. Because of 
this, Wu, like his fellow official merchants, stood to bear the brunt of any losses if 
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the blockade continued indefinitely.65 As a result, he seems to have been a will-
ing collaborator with Nagasaki officials who also wanted to resolve matters in the 
swiftest possible way.
When Wu Peng arrived back in Taiwan, however, he received a very different 
response. According to reports received by the Dutch, the former ambassador was 
imprisoned for having made promises at odds with his initial instructions.66 With 
Wu’s guarantees apparently voided, things settled into an impasse and the block-
ade stretched on. Zheng Jing seemed to have no interest in settling the conflict on 
Tokugawa terms, while the Bakufu lacked the means to challenge Zheng vessels on 
the open ocean. Early in 1674, however, this situation was suddenly upended by 
fast-moving developments in China itself.
The catalyst for this sudden change was the outbreak of a revolt by Qing regional 
strongmen across southern China against the Manchu court. This massive upris-
ing, usually called the ‘Three Feudatories’ rebellion, created an opportunity that 
was rapidly seized for Zheng Jing to join forces with the rebels by moving troops 
back onto the continent. It also changed the political equation overnight. First, the 
immediate cause of the conflict was removed. It was no longer possible for Ryukyu 
to maintain tributary relations with the Qing, because its ships were cut off from 
access to the ports controlled by the rebel generals.67 The result was that the basic 
problem that had given rise to the dispute was erased. And second, the eruption 
of the conflict created an urgent need for Zheng vessels that had been used in the 
blockade to be deployed elsewhere.
Faced with the chance to move back into China, the conflict with the Bakufu was 
shifted far down the list of Zheng priorities. Despite this, it was still necessary to 
patch up relations so Zheng trading vessels could continue to access Japanese com-
mercial circuits, hence providing a source of income to prop up the war effort. It was 
a hurdle that many European overseas enterprises had struggled to clear after they 
attempted to re-establish relations after a period of conflict. In this case, however, 
the crisis was defused with remarkable speed.
In 1674, a new envoy was sent to Nagasaki with a missive from Taiwan. He car-
ried an unusual but effective document that seemed calculated to give something 
to both sides, mixing friendly sentiments with an aggressive insistence that Zheng 
forces had been fully justified in their initial attack on the tributary vessel from 
Ryukyu.68 Although the letter came from Taiwan, it did not originate with Zheng 
Jing himself. Instead, a revenue official called Yang Ying had penned it, because 
his superior ‘was away at the moment, personally leading troops’. While such an 
absence was certainly possible, the letter surely reflected Zheng Jing’s will but 
was, we can assume, presented as the work of a subordinate to minimize risks if it 
was rejected. The contents themselves were cryptic. On the one hand, the letter 
affirmed Zheng Jing’s good relations with Japan in glowing terms. The two poli-
ties had been, the letter insisted, bound together by good relations for years as if 
they were one family. Since ‘the subjects of Japan are just like our subjects’, Zheng 
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Jing had decided to return the 2,000 taels paid out to his ambassador. There was 
no reason, the writer insisted, to accept compensation simply for returning the 
shipwrecked sailors belonging to such a close ally. At the same time, however, 
Yang was clear that no blame could be attached to the Zheng for the initial attack 
on the vessel from the Ryukyu kingdom. Taiwan maintained good relations with 
Japan but not  with the Ryukyu kingdom, which must be considered an enemy 
because it had betrayed the Ming by going over to the Qing. If there was any cul-
prit for what had happened, it was surely the Ryukyu kingdom, which was directly 
responsible for ‘harming our neighborly ties’ when it failed to communicate its 
plans to Taiwan.69
Wu Peng, the overly conciliatory ambassador, received an intriguing mention. 
Yang explained that he had originally been slated to lead the current mission but 
had ‘contracted an illness and could not board the ship’.70 His replacement was Cai 
Zhuyi, another official merchant, who would hand over the disputed 2,000 taels of 
silver and place the letter in the hands of the Nagasaki magistrates for forwarding 
onto the shogun in Edo. The reference to the ambassador raises a number of ques-
tions, but it seems most likely that Wu Peng’s convenient illness was designed to 
conceal his ongoing imprisonment. This impression is strengthened by the fact 
that Zheng Jing was indeed returning the 2,000 taels that Wu Peng had originally 
accepted on his behalf.
The arrival of the letter signalled the sudden end of the dispute. Although 
neither side issued any clear statements, what seems most likely is that an 
improvised compromise that satisfied all parties had been reached. Ryukyu had 
received compensation for the loss of its vessel and its shipping could now travel 
securely under Tokugawa protection. The Bakufu had punished the offenders and 
arranged restitution, thereby bolstering its role as Ryukyu’s overlord and leav-
ing its prestige  intact while restoring a key trade route as Chinese junks started 
to pour back into Nagasaki.71 For Zheng Jing as well, it could be interpreted as a 
victory  of  sorts. The  anti-Manchu rebellion meant that Ryukyu could no longer 
send tributary vessels to the Qing, hence removing the original problem. At the 
same time, Zheng Jing’s envoy had returned the troublesome 2,000 taels, thereby 
loudly signalling his refusal to accept Bakufu authority, while reaffirming a key 
alliance with an important commercial and geopolitical partner. And he had done 
this while opening up the space to devote his full attention and resources to the 
campaign against the Qing.72 The result is that the brewing conflict was erased 
overnight.
The ‘balance of blackmail’ in Asia
The case of the Ryukyu junk, which escalated and then de-escalated so quickly, 
defies easy interpretation. In comparison to similar episodes involving the Dutch, 
where the Bakufu had emerged as the clear victor, the sudden resolution of the 
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conflict with the Zheng yielded a far more mixed result. On the one hand, it 
shows the power of well-armed Asian maritime powers like the Zheng. While 
the Tokugawa regime possessed some tools to force compliance, the power and 
reach of the Zheng maritime network made it a difficult foe to deal with. Unlike 
the Dutch East India Company, which deliberately refrained from such steps, 
Zheng Jing opted to blockade the coast in an attempt to force Tokugawa officials 
to give in. Whether such a tactic would have proven successful in the long term is 
difficult to know since Japan remained Zheng Jing’s premier trading partner, but 
it certainly worried Tokugawa officials, who confronted a sudden escalation of the 
conflict. Whereas the Bakufu had largely contained VOC maritime violence, the 
regime struggled to do the same with the Zheng.
And yet, just as it had escalated rapidly, the conflict ended suddenly as a letter 
written by one of Zheng Jing’s subordinates succeeded in papering over the dis-
pute with a hastily contrived settlement. The turnaround is striking, but in fact 
such resolutions were not as uncommon as they might seem at first. As has been 
well documented, diplomatic impasses in seventeenth-century East Asia were 
frequently remedied through a combination of pre-existing structures mixed with 
active interventions by local mediators and conveniently self-serving interpreta-
tions. Ronald Toby, Etsuko Hae-jin Kang, Gregory Smits, and Jiang Wu have all 
demonstrated how Tokugawa authorities resorted to ambiguity and even outright 
deceit in their dealings with Korea, Ryukyu, and the Ming and Qing regimes of 
China.73 Compared to the aftermath of Hideyoshi’s hugely destructive invasion 
of Korea, which was smoothed over by brokers from Tsushima domain shuttling 
between the two sides, the dispute between the Zheng and the Tokugawa was far 
less substantial, but its final resolution shared some similar features. Most impor-
tantly, compromises that enabled the re-establishment or continuation of relations 
invariably looked very different depending on perspective. Just as Chosŏn Korea 
and Tokugawa Japan had accepted a mutually beneficial resolution that seemed to 
address their very different, and fundamentally contradictory, concerns, so had the 
Zheng, the Tokugawa, and Ryukyu managed to engineer a compromise in which 
they all seemed to emerge as victors.
Across several decades, the Zheng maritime organization proved a formidable 
challenger to European powers. Before his disastrous adventure on the conti-
nent, Zheng Jing succeeded in creating a maritime state that could compete with 
Europeans at their own game. But we should be careful of assuming that any mari-
time power, however formidable, could act freely in a region crowded with powerful 
territorial states. Instead, there was a ‘balance of blackmail … between land and 
sea’ that restrained maritime violence from both European and Asian sources. The 
result is that any assessment of early modern violence must look not only towards 
those maritime powers active on the waves, but also to the territorial polities that 
clustered on the shores and which, even in the absence of their own navies, retained 
a significant degree of influence.
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‘The wrath of God’: legitimization and 
limits of Mughal military violence in 
early modern South Asia
Pratyay Nath
In 1568, an army under the command of the third Mughal emperor Jalaluddin 
Muhammad Akbar (r. 1556–1605) stormed the fort of Chitor in western India 
after a prolonged siege of six months. On the day of the victory, Akbar ordered a 
general massacre (qat..l-i ‘āmm) of the garrison as well as of the general population. 
According to contemporary texts, some 30,000 people were killed as a result. This 
event stands out as one of the most glaring instances of spectacular military violence 
in Mughal history, where not only the combatants but also a very large number of 
civilians were put to the sword. Abul Fazl, the principal biographer of Akbar, pro-
vides an official justification of this drastic action. He writes that in the final hours 
of the defence of the fort, a garrison of around 8,000 men received active assistance 
from around 40,000 peasants. He points out that when Alauddin, the Khalji sultan 
of Delhi, had conquered Chitor in the early fourteenth century, ‘the peasantry were 
not put to death as they had not engaged in fighting’.1 Abul Fazl argues that on the 
present occasion, they had to be punished because of the ‘great zeal and activity’ 
they had shown in defending the fort against the Mughal army.2
Was this incident just a plain act of revenge against an adversary that had offered 
dogged resistance against imperial expansion? What does this massacre tell us 
about the larger history of how the empire justified similar acts of military vio-
lence? Was the way Abul Fazl legitimized the massacre of the civilian population 
of Chitor different from how instances of violence against actual combatants were 
legitimized? What sorts of limits to military violence did Mughal imperial ideology 
prescribe and Mughal armies observe? In order to answer these questions, one must 
begin by understanding how Mughal imperial culture conceptualized sovereignty, 
kingly rule, and war.
Mughal military violence in South Asia
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In this chapter, I first explore the meanings of Mughal sovereignty and its ori-
gins in a particular strand of Persian political philosophy. Drawing on scholars like 
Muzaffar Alam, I argue that from Akbar onward, Mughal political philosophy was 
deeply influenced by the normative philosophy of the thirteenth-century Persian 
polymath Nasiruddin Tusi. Second, I unravel the duties and responsibilities of the 
sovereign within this ideological framework. Next, I argue that given the nature of 
the doctrine of sovereignty under the Mughals since Akbar, war was conceptual-
ized less as a princely whim for self-aggrandizement and more as an unavoidable 
means for fulfilling the duties of rulership. War, in other words, was perceived as 
a moral compulsion of the king. I then discuss some of the facets of the history of 
military violence under the ‘great Mughals’ since Akbar. I argue that in the conduct 
of war and the perpetration of violence, the Mughal state drew heavily on Nasirean 
ethical recommendations. Making and representing war in the name of the abstract 
category of justice within the all-encompassing framework of universal sovereignty 
allowed tremendous flexibility in unleashing as well as restraining military violence. 
Next, I study the limits of this violence both within the imperial ideological dis-
course and at a practical level in the course of military campaigns. Finally, I argue 
that although military violence was an important, frequent, and widespread aspect 
of Mughal empire-building, it was used more for defeating and co-opting adversar-
ies into the imperial body politic than for destroying or eliminating them outright. I 
conclude by pointing out that this particular dimension of Mughal military violence 
finds resonance with the tendencies of the Ottoman and the Qing empires, and 
marks a contrast with the early modern European experience.
Mughal imperial ideology and Nasirean ethics
Mughal emperors were firm believers in the political philosophy of universal sover-
eignty. At the heart of the Mughal brand of this philosophy lay a pronounced thrust 
on cosmopolitanism. This encompassed various aspects of the imperial experience, 
including religion, race, and language. Several scholars have noted that Mughal 
emperors scarcely favoured any one particular community when it came to patron-
age or employment. Ruling a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional land, they kept 
their imperial vision broad. They welcomed with open arms anyone willing to join 
their ranks. One of the main philosophical influences that profoundly shaped this 
Mughal version of cosmopolitan universal sovereignty was a particular strand of 
Perso-Islamic normative texts (akhlāq).
Muzaffar Alam points out that in early modern South Asia, it was Nasiruddin 
Tusi’s thirteenth-century Persian text Akhlāq-i Nās.irī that remained the most 
influential text of this normative tradition and the cornerstone of Mughal impe-
rial ideology. Tusi’s ideas can be traced further back to the tenets of Aristotle’s 
Nicomachea. In the Mughal Empire, knowledge of the Nasirean akhlāq spread 
through the circulation of Akhlāq-i Nās.irī. This was augmented by the writing 
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and reading of other works like Akhlāq-i Humāyūnī and Mau‘iz. ah-i Jahāngīrī, 
which closely followed and expanded Tusi’s ideas. Alam points out that Tusi’s 
text was one of several important works that Abul Fazl recommended to be read 
out regularly to Akbar. Akbar, in turn, instructed his officials and commanders to 
read this text closely. Alam argues that Nasirean ethics and political philosophy 
exerted a deep influence on Mughal political thought, something that is evident 
from several texts produced, and intellectual projects undertaken, at the imperial 
court.3 While several other normative paradigms of political philosophy coexisted 
in Mughal South Asia, Alam stresses that as far as the long-term self-fashioning 
of the empire was concerned, the Nasirean akhlāqī tradition exercised by far the 
most important and enduring influence.4 He sums this argument up by observing 
that ‘[T]he unmistakable imprint of Nasirean ethics that one discerns is thus not 
simply on the norms or principles of governance but on a very wide area of Mughal 
politico-cultural life.’5
At the heart of Mughal imperial ideology lay a particular conceptualization of 
the meanings of the universal empire and the role of the sovereign therein – one 
that drew heavily on Tusi’s recommendations. Writing in the late sixteenth century, 
Abul Fazl described the emperor primarily as the fountainhead of justice and the 
protector of harmony and equilibrium in the world. This association of princely rule 
with the administration of justice is one of the most enduring themes of political 
philosophy across Eurasian societies. The Perso-Islamic tradition that Nasiruddin 
Tusi was a part of was particularly strong and consistent in its emphasis on this asso-
ciation. Tusi’s work upholds justice as the highest form of virtue and locates it at the 
heart of human well-being and prosperity. He also points out that being just was the 
most important quality that a ruler must possess, since ‘in justice lies the order of 
the realm (qawām-i mamlukat ba-ma’dalat būd)’.6
Mughal imperial texts heavily borrowed from Tusi’s emphasis on justice as the 
cornerstone of sovereignty. Emperors were consistently portrayed in contemporary 
literature as approximations of the just ruler idealized in Tusi’s akhlāq. Narrating an 
incident involving Akbar, Abul Fazl describes how, on his way from Kabul to North 
India in 1589, the emperor discovered that a man had ‘dishonoured’ a peasant’s 
daughter. Akbar felt obliged – we are told – to dispense justice immediately. He had 
the offender executed. It was further discovered that one Sharif Khan, the son of 
an imperial calligrapher, was also partly responsible for the crime. Not deterred by 
the fact that the man was related to an imperial officer in his own employment, the 
emperor also punished Sharif Khan severely.7
This representation of Mughal emperors as the steadfast defenders of justice 
is also present in other imperial texts. In his autobiography, Akbar’s son Jahangir 
(r.  1605–27) records that one of the first things he did after his accession was to 
fasten a ‘Chain of Justice (zanjīr-i ‘adl)’. The chain, he wrote, was made of pure 
gold and held sixty bells. It stretched across the breadth of the Yamuna, from 
the walls of the Mughal fort at Agra to a stone post on the other bank of the 
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river. He declared that anybody in pursuit of justice ‘might come to this chain 
and shake it  so that its noise might attract [Jahangir’s] attention’.8 In several of 
the  allegorical   paintings  commissioned at Jahangir’s court, this chain makes an 
 appearance. All this resonates with the ideas of Tusi, who locates justice at the 
heart of social order and links it with the notions of equilibrium and unity.9 He – 
and, in his vein, Mughal ideologues like Abul Fazl – argued that one of the princi-
pal ways of ensuring the prevalence of justice in society was to replace multiplicity 
with unity.10
Justice and the role of the king
It is the method of the establishment of unity in society which brings the king into 
the picture most prominently in the ideological schema laid down by Tusi. Later 
texts produced in the Timurid and Mughal milieu echoed this thought. One exam-
ple is Akhlāq-i Jalālī, a fifteenth-century normative text inspired by Tusi’s Akhlāq-i 
Nās. irī. It argues along similar lines that ‘the maintenance of equity and reference to 
it, can only be effected by the ascertainment of a mean’.11 However, the author con-
tinues, determining this mean is extremely difficult and requires taking the recourse 
of divine law, since the origin of all unity lies in ‘the Supreme and Holy Divinity’.12 
In order to ensure the determination of the mean and the maintenance of equity on 
its basis, the mediation of somebody becomes essential.13 This can be none other 
than the just king (pādshāh-i ‘ādil).14 The author argues that it is for this reason 
that god selected the king and equipped him with a sword.15 This was done so that 
‘whosoever should be incompliant with the equation of money, seeking more than 
his right and overstepping the path of rectitude, with this trenchant sword he may 
be enabled to bring them to order’.16 In turn, this would help establish and preserve 
unity in the world. In the domain of politics, the duty of the king is to guide the 
people of the world towards pledging their political allegiance to a single person – 
himself, since he alone had been chosen by god – and thereby eliminate the evil of 
multiplicity of allegiances and motives. Writing almost a century later, Abul Fazl 
echoed the same argument. In the Akbar-nāma, he writes that great rulers devote 
their efforts to ‘the production of unity and to the [sic] removing the dust of com-
plexity by the water of simplicity’.17 He emphasizes that as one such great ruler, his 
patron’s ‘whole thought is to accept the obedience of mortals so that multiplicity 
(manshūr) may become unity (paiwast) and that mankind in general may have 
repose’.18
Through such a proposition, kingly rule was conceptualized as an instru-
ment necessary for the establishment of unity, equivalence, and justice in soci-
ety. Dispensing justice was conceived as the inherent obligation of the sovereign, 
not  an occasional favour that his rule might or might not bring to the world. 
Writing  in the  seventeenth century, the Mughal commander and scholar Baqir 
Najm-i Sani reiterated this idea by arguing that if  divine  favour had chosen 
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 somebody to be a ruler, he must value this decision and ‘hold the empire dear and 
venerable’.19 One particular passage from his text is worth  quoting at length as a 
typical example of his views on the rationale behind kingship:
In systemizing rules and in maintaining their procedures, he must exert the utmost 
care to achieve justice (‘adl) and impartiality (ins.āf). If the judge [ruler] does not 
regulate the affairs of the people, a clandestine rebel, abetted by tyranny, will destroy 
the lives of the nobility and plebeian alike. If the light from the candle of justice does 
not illuminate the sombre cell of the afflicted, the darkness of cruelty (z..ulmāt-i z..alm) 
will blacken the entire country just as it does the hearts of tyrants … Therefore, rulers 
must consider that they occupy the throne in order to dispense justice, not to lead a life 
filled with pleasure. They must consider justice (‘adl) and equity (ins.āf) as the means 
to survival of their rule (mūjab-i baqā’ī-i salt..anat), permanence of their fame (dawām-i 
nām-i nekū) and reward in the hereafter (ih. rāz-i s..awāb ākhirat). To them, nothing 
should be more binding than pursuit of the people’s welfare.20
It is interesting to compare such ideas about the ruler’s responsibility towards his 
people as presented by the writers of Mughal chronicles and normative literature 
with the debates around kingship that emerged in Western Europe around the 
same time. It is true that the kind of secularization that ideas of kingship went 
through in those parts of the world, especially in the formulations of John Locke or 
Thomas Hobbes, was absent in the official discourse of the Mughal Empire. Unlike 
in Locke’s propositions, Mughal political theorists did not give common people 
any right to judge their kings. The latter could indeed be judged, but only by the 
divinely mandated universal sovereign, whose realm – and hence right – was all-
encompassing. At the same time, Mughal writers – like the ones discussed above – 
did inscribe in the Mughal vision of kingship a very strong element of reciprocity 
that kings owed to their subjects in terms of maintaining peace, order, and justice. 
What this did is project the Mughal emperor as an absolutist, benevolent, father 
figure – something similar to what Peter Wilson finds in the case of kingship in early 
modern Germany.21
War and military violence as moral compulsion
Within this Mughal ideological paradigm, the sovereign bore a grave responsibil-
ity. Harbans Mukhia points out that in Abul Fazl’s imagination, the sovereign’s 
absolute power was tempered by his ‘responsibility to establish absolute peace 
among his subjects through the practice of non-discrimination and to bring about 
tranquillity and prosperity through paternalist care’.22 Problems would usually arise 
when rival political powers, whose allegiance the Mughals sought, would refuse to 
bow down to imperial authority. What might have seemed to be an expression of 
paternalistic care for the Mughals was quite understandably perceived as nothing 
less that rampant aggression by other powers. In many cases, these rivals would 
flatly refuse to accept Mughal suzerainty, much to the surprise and annoyance of 
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Mughal authors, who remained firmly convinced of their own divinely ordained 
mission and the promise of their eventual victory. Faced by such instances of what 
the empire saw as strange acts of ‘insubordination’, military violence did not remain 
a princely whim; it was conceptualized as a moral compulsion. If Mughal monarchs 
were to fulfil their kingly duties on earth on the lines suggested by Tusi, they did not 
have an option but to resort to military violence against their rivals. It is precisely 
such a vision that Abul Fazl expresses:
The sole idea (hamagī basej) of wise kings is day by day to refresh the garden of the 
world by the streams of justice and assuredly this design is accomplished whenever 
extensive countries come into the hands of one who is just and of wide capacity. And 
when an empire has been civilized by an enlightened and just ruler and the people 
thereof – small and great – sit in the shade of tranquility, it is unavoidable (nā-guzīr) 
that such a prince should cast a profound glance on the deeds of neighbours who 
have taken the path of dissimulation. He must look closely in order to perceive if 
their former conduct can be brought into line with love and order and if they can 
be induced to treat their subjects properly. If they do not, then the requirement of 
justice is such that (āyīn-i dādgarī ān-kah) they should be punished and their land 
taken from them.23
This important passage links the Mughal court’s legitimization of aggressive cam-
paigns and military violence with their dynastic ideology. Conquest and governance 
are shown to be not enough in themselves, but depicted as only an intermediate 
stage before further expansion was made essential by the moral and ethical compul-
sion of fulfilling the duties of kingship.
This moral compulsion was further magnified by the universalist aspirations of 
the Mughal emperors. This is where the Mughals assimilated Nasirean akhlāqī rec-
ommendations with their eclectic ideas about universal rule. The Mughal emperor 
was seen as the benevolent, just, yet strict paterfamilias in charge of protecting order 
and peace in the world, and guiding humanity towards the bliss of loyalty and true 
enlightenment. Although in actuality he ruled over the inhabitants of his limited 
territories, theoretically his dominions were supposed to encompass the entire 
universe. For this reason, he could not but concern himself with the welfare of all 
mankind.24
Conditions for waging just war
If violence was inevitable, what were the norms of initiating it? In Akhlāq-i Nās. irī, 
Nasiruddin Tusi lays down very detailed guidelines about when and how the just 
prince should open military offensive against another ruler. Tusi writes that the 
initial step for the prince should be to try and win over his enemies through per-
suasion, so that the need for war did not arise.25 War might be started only when 
such peaceful methods had failed. The prince was to make sure that he had ‘only 
Pure Good and the quest of the Faith’ in his heart and did not want ‘superiority 
 Mughal military violence in South Asia 167
or domination’ for himself.26 Tusi continues to argue that a state could wage war 
on its enemies under six conditions – that the enemy was innately evil and it was 
impossible to reform him; that fighting him was the only way out of the situation 
he himself had created; that victory of the enemy would only empower him; that 
unless given battle, he would escape with one’s material belongings; that fighting 
him would not involve any act of treachery or dishonesty; and finally, that there 
would be no condemnation of fighting the enemy ‘in this world or the next’.27 By 
laying down these detailed recommendations about the waging of just war, Tusi 
projected the use of military violence as a last resort. It was to be initiated only 
when all other methods had failed and the adversary had not shown any sign of 
‘reform’.
It is interesting how these recommendations perfectly match the economics of 
war. Waging war is an expensive business, where a state’s long-term investments 
in personnel, animals, and technology run the risk of annihilation in a very short 
span of time. Hence, across time and space, states have usually tried to avoid war 
and settle disputes through peaceful negotiations. However, given the extreme fre-
quency of wars throughout human history, what becomes striking is how frequently 
such negotiations have failed. Hence, waging war as a last resort was not entirely a 
novel idea that Tusi forwards; what is worth noting is the language he uses and the 
moral economy within which he locates such decisions.
Contemporary texts unanimously argue that Mughal rulers and command-
ers sincerely upheld this Nasirean principle of war as a last resort. These texts 
never forget to mention that before attacking any neighbouring ruler or chieftain, 
Mughal armies would always seek to persuade him to submit through peaceful 
negotiations. This is exemplified by a passage from Akbar-nāma, where Abul Fazl 
narrates the dispatch of a Mughal army against the Baluchis in modern Pakistan 
in the late sixteenth century. He writes that the troops were ‘first to guide them 
[the Baluchis] by wisdom-conferring counsels, and if these were not effectual 
they were to  enlighten their darkness by the flashes of the sword’.28 It is, how-
ever,  difficult to  ascertain whether these steps were actually followed on the 
ground, or  if they  were merely  literary conventions of Mughal court chronicles, 
 irrespective  of  what transpired in the real world. However, what we do know is 
that the Mughals were always willing to accept the submission of their adversar-
ies and to co-opt them afterwards. This meant that imperial armies would likely 
be  willing to  first try to convince their adversaries to submit before hostilities 
broke out.
This tradition continued well into the seventeenth century. Mirza Nathan – a 
Mughal commander who served on the empire’s eastern front in the early seven-
teenth century – goes on at great length in his autobiography to narrate how this 
line was toed in the Mughal military operations in Bengal and Assam in during 
his time there. One example relates to the sending of an expedition against an 
Afghan adversary – Khwaja Usman of Bokainagar. Nathan tells us that Islam Khan 
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Chishti – the s.ūbadār (governor) of Bengal – and his commanders agreed to first 
write to Usman, admonishing him. If Usman was to submit to Mughal authority, 
he would be forgiven; if not, the imperial army would invade his land.29 Nathan 
writes that as per this decision, a letter was drafted addressing Usman, ‘every word 
of which was a closet of peace’.30 It reasoned that the ‘well-being of both the worlds’ 
and the ‘main spring of better days’ for both him and his people would immediately 
ensue if he were to get over his ‘self-conceit and arrogance’ and bow down to the 
authority of ‘the protector of the world’.31
In the face of such diplomatic pressure that combined the hope of getting a share 
of the empire’s increasing resources and a threat of entering into serious armed 
conflict with a powerful state, many zamīndārs (chieftains) and rulers felt it wise to 
submit and accept Mughal suzerainty. This is what the Baluchis mentioned above, 
for instance, did when Akbar sent an army against them. Abul Fazl notes happily 
that violent means did not need to be adopted in teaching them a lesson in loyalty 
to the empire. He observes that the ‘sound of the approach of the world-conquering 
troops aroused the slumberers (ghunūd-gān-i pindār) and guided them to good 
service’.32
Conduct of war and military violence
If such diplomatic posturing was rejected, war would follow sooner or later. The 
chronicles give us the impression that in the course of campaigns, imperial armies 
always preferred to engage their enemies out in the open in frontal combat. For 
the Mughal court, this was the most honourable thing to do. This is something that 
Shah Jahan’s (r. 1628–58) biographer Abdul Hamid Lahori calls jang-i s.aff.33 Apart 
from the akhlāqī recommendations about honourable war, Mughals also knew that 
it was in such forms of engagements that their strength lay. Whenever the enemy 
refused to do this, and resorted to night attacks, surprise attacks, hit-and-run tactics, 
or used the cover of jungles and rains instead, Mughal texts would brand them as 
deceitful, treacherous, duplicitous, and cowardly.
Legitimizing violence against civilians was always more difficult than legitimiz-
ing that committed against combatants. One of the problems, however, was that in 
North India, a large number of peasants wielded weapons and served as combatants 
during the off season of cultivation.34 Not only peasants, but even a large number of 
religious ascetics also bore arms and hired out their services to states and armies as 
mercenaries.35 In fact, historical scholarship points out that a large part of the South 
Asian population was perpetually armed throughout early modern times. Douglas 
Streusand points out that this made Mughal empire-building remarkably different 
from similar contemporary processes.36 Given the unclear boundary between com-
batants and non-combatants, the issue of violence against civilians was much more 
complex in this part of the world than in others. The incident at Chitor that I began 
this chapter with is a case in point.
 Mughal military violence in South Asia 169
This ambiguity between a combatant and a civilian notwithstanding, there are 
several examples when large numbers of common people became the targets of 
Mughal military violence. In the course of campaigns, imperial armies often took 
recourse to systematic plundering of villages and terrorizing the general popula-
tion. This was especially true in cases where imperial armies feared that their adver-
saries enjoyed wide moral and logistical support of the local population or the local 
zamīndārs. Apart from lending military support, the latter would also often be 
responsible for supplying the local ruler – whom the Mughals had attacked – with 
food and other essential resources. In these cases, alongside pursuing the ruler, 
imperial armies would also direct their violence against these chieftains to dissuade 
them from supporting him and thereby resisting Mughal expansion.
Mirza Nathan’s memoirs provide us with a particularly large number of such 
examples from the Mughal campaigns in Kuch Bihar and Assam in the early sev-
enteenth century. The reason behind this is probably twofold. First, the fact that 
Nathan was involved in several of these raids himself in one capacity or the other 
meant that he saw the unfolding of the campaigns from a proximity unmatched by 
imperial chroniclers, who would usually be located far away from the action. As 
opposed to the overviews offered by the latter group, Nathan’s version provides us 
with a detailed and ground-level account of day-to-day events. Second, written of 
his own volition, Mirza Nathan’s account is relatively more objective in its narration 
of events than those writing in the direct employment of emperors.
For instance, Nathan writes that as an imperial army marched against Dhubri 
in Assam in 1612–13, he was sent at the head of a detachment to raid the areas of 
Bhitarband and Bahirband. He writes that he was instructed ‘to bring the ryots 
[peasants] under control; failing that he was to bring them as captives and drive 
them away from their lands’.37 Nathan records that he carried out these orders 
to the last word and notes that his soldiers ‘did not allow the natives any respite 
even to drink water, for a period of four days and nights’.38 Many were impris-
oned, their  property looted, and animals seized. This severe action forced the 
local zamīndārs to submit to the imperial army. They were allowed to remain in 
their territories only upon the solemn promise that they would not oppose the 
Mughal advance.39 After eventually consolidating their base in Hajo and Pandu 
in Kuch Bihar, Mughal armies tried to subjugate the ‘Eighteen Rajas’ of the 
Himalayan foothills. After conquering Rani, there was again serious raiding and 
plundering. All the forts of the Rajas were destroyed. Nathan records that Mughal 
troops executed all those who resisted them, while the rest were imprisoned. The 
soldiers and crew of the imperial fleet, who had suffered during the campaign due 
to a shortage of food, compensated for their hardship by looting and plundering 
the local villages.40
This kind of large-scale violence was legitimized in Mughal chronicles as an 
unfortunate but necessary condition for the Mughal mission of establishing jus-
tice and social order in the world. Normative texts produced during the first half 
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of the seventeenth century support such a justification. Baqir Najm-i Sani, for 
 example, writes:
If punishment and chastisement are non-existent, [state] affairs will be in ruin … If 
the sword of retribution (tegh-i siyāsat) is not drawn from the scabbard of vengeance 
(niyām-i intiqām), the roots of rebellion (bunyād-i fitna) are not eradicated and the 
basis of oppression (asās-i sitam) is not undermined. If the debris of tyranny (khas wa 
khāshāk-i bī-dād) is not burnt in the fire of [imperial] wrath (ātish-i qahr), the seedling 
of repose will not flourish in the garden of hope … Therefore, rulers should display 
mercy of God toward the virtuous and the reformers and the wrath of God toward the 
evildoers and the seditious.41
Of course, there was no telling where the ‘roots of rebellion’ or the ‘basis of 
oppression’ should be located. There was a great deal of merit in using such vague 
categories. Any measure of raiding, plundering, enslavement, or massacre that 
strategic concerns could deem necessary could also dovetail into this provision 
created by the akhlāqī tradition. Within the imperial ideological framework, these 
two logics – the logic of realpolitik and the logic of the akhlāq – were inseparable. 
There was no opposition between them, and the flexibility of the Nasirean akhlāqī 
tradition meant that the norms could be variously interpreted by the chroniclers 
and commanders to mean different things at different points of time to suit the 
imperial agenda.
Limits of Mughal military violence
Nasirean ethics recommended that if the enemy would surrender and seek 
pardon in the course of war, the righteous imperial soldiers were to treat him with 
 generosity – the noble quality that was ranked next only to justice.42 Imperial 
chronicles usually discuss in detail how this was precisely the way Mughal 
armies behaved. Well into the second half of the seventeenth century, when – 
under Aurangzeb (r. 1658–1707) – Mughal imperial ideology had taken a Sunni 
Islamic turn, these Nasirean recommendations were still upheld by the chronicles. 
Harbans Mukhia also points out that the image of the Mughal emperor as the 
justice-dispensing and caring paterfamilias endured throughout the greater part of 
Mughal rule.43 At times, precedence could be drawn from Islamic religious texts to 
justify the same action. For example, describing the treatment of defeated Ahom 
soldiers by Mughal troops, Shihabuddin Talish invokes Quranic verses not to con-
tradict what Nasirean ethics recommended, but to bolster it.44
Contemporary Mughal texts were always enthusiastic in stressing that in the 
course of military campaigns, imperial armies would go to great lengths to ensure 
that the life and property of the common people were not harmed. We are told 
that commanders frequently issued categorical orders to this effect. The Assam 
campaign of 1662–63 is a case in point. Shihabuddin Talish writes that Mir Jumla, 
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the commander of the invading Mughal army, issued an imperial decree at the very 
outset. It instructed his soldiers ‘not to plunder the property and not to be cruel to 
the women and children of the local inhabitants’.45 Talish claims that Mir Jumla 
enforced this rule with such severity, that during the entire period of the invasion 
‘none of the officers or soldiers had the courage to cast covetous eyes on the prop-
erty and women of the people of Aasham’.46 Whether or not this really happened, 
such stories gave Mughal chroniclers narrative resources to portray an image of 
imperial armies as the vanguards of justice and social order.
The chronicles narrate several instances where Mughal soldiers – found guilty 
of violating such decrees – were expressly brought to justice and punished publicly. 
One such incident is narrated by Talish from the time of the Mughal occupation of 
Kuch Bihar in 1661. When some soldiers of the imperial army were found guilty of 
defying a similar farmān forbidding the infliction of any harm to the life and prop-
erty of the people of the city, they were arrested and presented before Mir Jumla. 
Talish writes that as a punishment, ‘an arrow was passed through their respec-
tive nostril. The stolen goods were hung round their neck and they were paraded 
through the entire town’.47
Owing to the limited amount of information, it is difficult to gauge how far such 
incidents reflected the norm. It was obviously in the interest of the empire and its 
chroniclers to exaggerate the role of such decrees in shaping the behaviour of impe-
rial soldiers and keeping them on the righteous path prescribed by Tusi. How much 
of these ethical norms were actually observed in the heat of the moment and away 
from the watchful eyes of imperial supervisors is a matter of debate. It is likely that 
vernacular sources would tell a different story about the role of Mughal soldiers in 
the countryside over the course of prolonged military campaigns. For our purpose, 
however, it is important to note that Mughal chroniclers would like us to believe 
that imperial commanders regularly resorted to different methods to protect the 
interest of the common people, and that they were generally successful at this. After 
narrating the incident cited above, for example, Talish goes on to boast about how 
Mir Jumla’s prompt, strict, and public dispensation of justice restored the Kuch 
people’s faith in the Mughal army, and encouraged the ones who had run away from 
their homes to return.48
These ground-level measures mirrored the orientation of Mughal political ideol-
ogy. Harbans Mukhia points out that Mughal ideologues like Abul Fazl tempered 
the absolutist image of the justice-dispensing world-conquering emperor with 
‘paternalistic generosity and the spirit of forgiveness’.49 Once again, the genealogy 
of these traits can be traced back to the Nasirean ethical paradigm, where gener-
osity ranks right after justice as a quality desirable in the ideal sovereign. There 
are several instances cited in Mughal texts about emperors making public state-
ments about their generosity. In 1605, for example, three Rajputs of the Khachhwa 
house rebelled against imperial officers, taking up arms against them. Jahangir 
writes that his own officers demanded serious punishment for the offenders. They 
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reminded the emperor that had such acts been carried out in the Uzbeg realm, the 
‘whole family and connections of that band of men would have been destroyed’.50 
However, Jahangir decided to display his magnanimity instead of his vengeance. 
He retorted that ‘justice demands (muqtaz.ā-i ‘adālat nīz ast) that many shall not 
be chastised for the fault of one’.51 Abul Fazl makes a similar point while narrating 
the  episode of Akbar pardoning the Baluchis and calling back the army that had 
gone against them. The chronicler reiterates the idea that his patron did not intend 
to use military violence to fulfil his own selfish motives or just randomly; his deci-
sion to unleash violence was tempered by his inclination to shower generosity on 
anybody who was willing to submit to him.52
Mughal military violence in the early modern world
It is this aspect of Mughal statecraft that lent it a specific quality. On the one hand, 
the linking of military violence with the category of justice meant that the Mughal 
state could legitimize making war against anybody and everybody in the name of 
this abstract concept. Any act of perpetration of military violence – or the restraint 
of it – could be justified as something that justice demanded. On the other hand, the 
projection of the Mughal emperor as the benevolent, paternalist, universal sover-
eign committed to the cause of s.ulh. -i kul (peace with all) meant that he was open to 
forging alliances with almost anybody, irrespective of their race, religion, and other 
denominations.53 Recent scholarship on Mughal warfare and empire-building 
highlights this strong accommodative and inclusive dimension of Mughal state-
craft. Farhat Hasan argues that the reason the second Mughal emperor Humayun’s 
(r. 1530–40, 1555–56) conquest of Gujarat in the early 1530s proved short-lived was 
that he did not forge alliances with the various stakeholders and power blocks at 
local and regional levels. Four decades later, his son Akbar managed to found a 
more durable regime in the same region by co-sharing his resources and sovereignty 
with these people after his initial conquest of them. Douglas Streusand reasons that 
when it came to sieges, Mughals as well as their adversaries treated fortresses more 
as bargaining chips for striking political deals than as targets meant to be annihi-
lated. Finally, Jos Gommans stretches this argument the farthest and contends that 
large-scale military victories only had a symbolic value for Mughal empire-building. 
Spectacular victories – like those in the battles of Panipat (1526, 1556) and Khanua 
(1527) – merely served as trump cards in a political game largely dominated by forg-
ing and switching alliances.54
To say that wars and military violence played only a marginal or symbolic role in 
Mughal empire-formation is problematic. The instances of long-drawn-out violent 
conflicts involving very large numbers of combatants and casualties are simply too 
many in contemporary sources. However, what is indeed borne out by the latter is 
that the Mughals used military violence more to force their adversaries into submis-
sion and co-option, than for their outright destruction. Building their empire in the 
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multi-ethnic and multireligious region of South Asia, this inclusivity of the Mughals 
ushered in the development of a highly diverse and cosmopolitan empire. At the 
same time, the empire must have benefited from the projection of the sovereign 
as the defender of justice and military violence as a means of his establishing it. 
Linking war to the interest of a specific community would have created fissures in 
their diverse empire. But the definition of military violence as a means of defending 
justice helped motivate the extremely heterogeneous aristocracy and armies of the 
empire.
This inclusiveness of Mughal statecraft resonates with several other early modern 
empires. Karen Barkey argues that Ottoman empire-building revolved around a 
similar ideology of universal sovereignty. She contends that the Ottoman process of 
incorporation and assimilation of different political groups did not involve ‘much of 
the contestation assumed in the European model of state-making’.55 Peter Purdue 
argues that the Qing espoused a similar openness in China in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. He observes that their ‘ethic of inclusion, offering all who 
committed a proper place in a universal moral order’, set them apart from their 
Ming predecessors, whose ‘ethnically oriented policy’ characterized an empire 
meant primarily for the Han Chinese.56 Consequently, while the Ming had shut 
themselves off from the Mongol invaders of Inner Eurasia, the Qing sought more 
active engagements with the latter and were even prepared to absorb them into 
their empire if they were ready to submit. Perdue argues that it was this broad-
based inclusiveness of their universalist imperial ideology that helped the Qing state 
achieve territorial expansion to a degree unknown to any other Chinese dynasty 
before them.
It is also evident that the Mughal case marked a considerable divergence from 
early modern Europe in terms of the development of the norms for the conduct of 
war and the perpetration of military violence. In his now classic text on the changing 
ideologies of war in late medieval and early modern Europe, James Turner Johnson 
outlines this complex process. Johnson argues that throughout the medieval period, 
there existed in Europe a theological doctrine about the right to wage war and a 
chivalric body of thought about the conduct of war. These two doctrines merged 
together in the sixteenth century to form what has been called the classic just war 
doctrine. But soon after this, the new combined doctrine once again split between 
the proponents of war waged in the interest of religion, and those who argued in 
favour of war being waged for entirely secular political reasons. With the rise of 
the secular state over the following centuries, it is the second doctrine that found 
increasing currency in the domain of politics.57
Interestingly, in the Mughal case too, we find religion taking a back seat in 
justifying military violence, especially between Akbar and Shah Jahan. However, 
this did not amount to the increasing secularization of political philosophy found 
in Europe. The dominant discourse on kingship in the Mughal Empire still held it 
very much as divine, and the emperor continued to be seen as appointed by god. 
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But, as I have pointed out earlier, the rhetoric used to conceptualize this kingship 
transcended the boundaries of any specific religion. The overwhelming adherence 
to the Nasirean ethical norms created a state that was aggressively expansionist, 
yet cosmopolitan, tolerant, and most importantly, ready to ally with anybody. As a 
result, the military violence that it was ready to unleash was, in theory, infinite in its 
scope, but in practice, tempered by its universalism and inclusivity. 
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‘Sacrificed to the madness of the bloodthirsty 
sabre’: violence and the Great Turkish War in 
the work of Romeyn de Hooghe
Michel van Duijnen
In early modern Christian Europe, ‘the Turk’ played an important role in the 
imagination of violence. With the successful European campaigns of the Ottoman 
Empire in the sixteenth century, ‘Turks’ came increasingly to be seen as warriors 
that were equally cruel and formidable.1 Sixteenth-century German propaganda 
prints would portray Turkish raiders as beasts that impaled children on lances, 
collected trophy heads, and ate the flesh of their victims.2 In this way, ‘the Turk’ 
became a benchmark for excessive violence in the imagination of Christian Europe. 
During the wars of religion, both Catholic and Protestant factions would use this 
image of the Turk to denounce their Christian enemies. Rhetorically, heretics were 
described as just as cruel as the sultan’s soldiers – if not more bloodthirsty in char-
acter.3 Even the battle cry of some of the early Dutch Calvinist rebels in the Eighty 
Years’ War, who claimed that they would ‘rather [be] Turkish than Popish’,4 played 
on the general Christian-European fear of the ever-lurking Turkish threat.5
However, these older sixteenth-century images started to be rapidly reconfig-
ured during the Great Turkish War of 1683–99. In 1683, after a period of uneasy 
peace between the Austrian Habsburgs and the Ottoman Empire, Grand Vizier 
Kara Mustafa marched on Vienna in a spectacular show of military might. While 
the Ottoman army laid siege to the city, the king of Poland, John III Sobieski, took 
command of a relief expedition. After a gruelling siege of two months the relief 
force arrived and scattered Kara Mustafa’s troops. Defeated at the gates of Vienna, 
the Ottoman forces were now put on the defensive. Seeking to exploit the victory at 
Vienna, Pope Innocent XI set up an anti-Ottoman alliance under the banner of the 
Holy League, initially comprising the Holy Roman Empire, the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth, the Papal States, and the Venetian Republic. Soon, forces of the 
The Great Turkish War in the work of De Hooghe
180 Part III: Differentiation and identification
League entered Ottoman Hungary and made steady gains in pitched battles and 
sieges alike.
The newly found victories made their mark on the age-old trope of ‘Turkish 
cruelty’. No longer the perpetrator, the Turk was now imagined to be the unfor-
tunate subject of extreme violence, meted out by the forces of the Holy League. 
The storming and capture of Buda (1686) and Belgrade (1688) in particular were 
accompanied by large-scale massacres of Ottoman civilian populations, of which 
explicit and lurid descriptions circulated within the news networks of Europe. Such 
stories sparked the imagination of men and women far beyond the borders of the 
countries committed to the Holy League. In fact, many illustrated news prints and 
printed triumphalia were produced by artists and publishers based in the Dutch 
Republic, a neutral party in regard to the Great Turkish War.6 The Haarlem-
based artist Romeyn de Hooghe, an extremely successful and productive Dutch 
printmaker, was especially famous for his high-quality prints on the wars with the 
Ottoman Empire. An equally savvy businessman, De Hooghe worked together with 
printers from the Southern Netherlands, and alongside his so-called news prints in 
broadsheet format he produced a number of etchings for the propaganda efforts 
orchestrated by the local authorities in the Southern Netherlands.7
In this chapter, I will analyse how De Hooghe visualized the violence connected 
to the Great Turkish War. As will be shown, De Hooghe’s portrayal of the battle 
against ‘the Turk’ alternated between a triumphant exaltation of Habsburg power 
and a more ambiguous view of south-east Europe as a distant and distinctly violent 
place beset by ruthless Christian soldiers and warlike border peoples. De Hooghe’s 
work across a number of genres – news prints, triumphalia, and satire – shows how 
traditional tropes of Turkish cruelty were, paradoxically, increasingly projected 
onto the victorious Christian soldiery of the Holy League. This perspective on De 
Hooghe’s work will add to the broader historiography on a change in the conduct 
and representation of war in the course of the seventeenth century. According to 
Martha Pollak, the ‘“half-suicidal” excesses of the Thirty Years’ War’ spurred a post-
1648 drive to regulate warfare that went hand in hand with the creation of printed 
and painted orderly siege views providing a sanitized representation of war.8 In 
the case of the Dutch Republic specifically, David Kunzle has argued that already 
during the later stages of the Eighty Years’ War, Dutch printmakers promoted the 
siege as a civilized, sanitized, and benign form of warfare.9 However, in contrast 
to this scholarly narrative of an increasing drive to regulate the conduct of warfare 
during the course of the seventeenth century, De Hooghe consistently portrayed 
the violence inflicted by the Holy League, whether in siege or pitched battle, as 
unrestrained and uncontrollable in character. Thus, in De Hooghe’s print on the 
fall of Belgrade, none of the order supposedly invested in siege views is to be found. 
The spectator is presented with numerous impaled Turkish heads, the massacre of 
civilians by Imperial forces, and the full-scale slaughter of surrendering Ottoman 
troops (Figure 10.1). Instead of following a broader European trend in the ordering 
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and sanitizing of warfare in its representational forms, De Hooghe’s siege views, 
triumphalia, and satirical prints sought to explore the different faces of unrestrained 
violence. As I shall show here, the end result was an ambiguous image in which the 
victorious forces of the Holy League were bestowed with the stereotyped cruel 
character of their vanquished Turkish enemies.
Romeyn de Hooghe and his prints on the Great Turkish War
De Hooghe was one of the most prolific and famous Dutch printmakers of the 
late seventeenth century. Although there is no comprehensive inventory of De 
Hooghe’s work, it is estimated that his workshop churned out more than 4,000 
prints, mostly book illustrations, which covered a wide variety of distinct subjects.10 
Political events however, both historical and contemporary, would take a promi-
nent place within this enormous oeuvre – a preference that coincided with De 
Hooghe’s personal drive to amass fame and fortune.
While De Hooghe’s own political loyalties would always remain somewhat of 
a mystery, his work was clearly influenced by the prospect of participating in high 
society.11 During his career, De Hooghe would bind himself to powerful figures in 
European politics, providing a colourful collection of European sovereigns with 
baroque glorification in printed format. The beneficiaries of De Hooghe’s inven-
tive mind included not only the Dutch stadtholder William III, but also John 
III Sobieski, through his Amsterdam agent Franciscus Mollo, and the Austrian 
Habsburg emperor Leopold I. Though his prints travelled far and wide, De Hooghe 
himself did not. Other than a short stay in France, De Hooghe probably never set 
foot outside the Dutch Republic.12 For his many prints on foreign affairs, he relied 
either on his own imagination, stocks of existing images, or drafts from artists 
embedded with European armies.13
In his prints on contemporary politics, De Hooghe used a number of differ-
ent formats. The most straightforward one was the so-called ‘news print’, a his-
toriographical term used to denote a print that revolves around a contemporary 
event.14 These prints often related to important military feats such as pitched bat-
tles, sieges, and naval warfare, or ceremonial pomp, including marriages, burials, 
and coronations. In form, they mostly consisted of a printed image in broadsheet 
format together with a short text or poem that expanded on the scenes presented 
to the reader.15 The term ‘news print’ itself might be misleading in the sense that 
these prints could still be sold by publishers years after the relevant event had taken 
place. Already during the seventeenth century, some of De Hooghe’s news prints 
had become collectors’ items that were coloured by hand and carefully preserved in 
luxurious albums.16 At the same time, ‘news’ was often hardly the sole, or even the 
main aspect of the print. News prints were inevitably published later than written 
news reports and often focused more on spectacular sights and theatrical descrip-
tions rather than a precise portrayal of the events in question. Yet what they lacked 
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in terms of news, the large broadsheet-format news prints made up for in the fields 
of aesthetics and propaganda. In Dutch houses, broadsheet news prints were hung 
on walls, doubling as decoration and as a badge of political or religious allegiance. 
With many news prints costing only around 20 cents, it was a remarkably cheap way 
to liven up one’s home.17 This function was reflected in the size of the prints. For 
instance, the illustrated part of the Belgrade news print (Figure 10.1) was of signifi-
cant proportions, measuring 46.6 cm by 58.1 cm.
The second printed category De Hooghe was involved with can be classified as 
‘triumphalia’: etchings of allegorical scenes that celebrated particular sovereigns 
and their military prowess.18 Often, these prints would play on the broader category 
of triumphal imagery, mimicking in printed form either the triumphal arch, or a fic-
titious triumphal entry. Triumphalia could be found in the same broadsheet format 
as news prints, but were also inserted in a number of festival books by De Hooghe’s 
hand. This was, for example, the case with the booklet commissioned to capture 
the celebration of the conquest of Buda in Brussels, which opened with an allegori-
cal and fictitious triumphal entry of Leopold I. Whereas triumphalia were at times 
 created in response to particular events, such as coronations or military victories, 
they are set apart from news prints by their aim of capturing and translating the 
event mainly through the use of allegorical themes.
The third category, satire, did something quite different from triumphalia, 
primarily mocking the players in European power politics rather than glorifying 
them. De Hooghe played an important role in the development of modern satire 
and his satirical prints were as inventive as they were biting.19 Here, a special place 
was reserved for Louis XIV, the nemesis of the stadtholder-king William III, but 
many of Europe’s powerful men were fair game in De Hooghe’s satirical output. 
Unsurprisingly, De Hooghe’s satirical prints often remained unsigned, or appeared 
with the fake address of a foreign printer.
It is not always clear to what extent De Hooghe worked on his own initiative 
and to what extent his work was the result of direct commissions, either by pow-
erful patrons or particular publishers.20 In the case of the Great Turkish War, De 
Hooghe’s prints were distributed in a number of ways. For instance, many of his 
news prints on the conflict, including those concerning the sieges of Buda and 
Belgrade, were sold under the address of the Amsterdam publisher Aert Dircksz 
Oossaan. It is not unlikely that Oossaan himself had directly commissioned these 
prints. In 1686, Oossaan published a journal on the siege of Buda, in which he stated 
that the booklet was printed on his own initiative, aimed at ‘the community’ at large 
and aficionados of siege warfare in particular.21 In the address to the reader, he also 
promoted some of his other merchandise on the Great Turkish War, stating that 
he had recently commissioned a ‘curious print’ on the battle of Budua (present-
day Budva, Montenegro),22 which would be available for sale within ‘two or three 
days’.23 Oossaan had a broad market in mind for his high-quality merchandise; 
the print of Buda was published in two versions: one with a Dutch text and one 
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with a French text. In addition, copies of De Hooghe’s print of Buda were made by 
German workshops, attesting to its wide success and popularity.24
In the case of a publisher like Oossaan, commercial interest may have been 
the primary motivation. Yet in other examples, a noble patron can be identified 
more clearly. Franciscus Mollo is named as the commissioner of several of De 
Hooghe’s  prints that celebrated Polish victories over the Ottoman Empire in 
the Polish–Ottoman Wars (1672–76).25 And while the Brussels festival book on 
Buda is without a dedication or address, Dirk van Waelderen has argued that its 
focus on the splendour of the Thurn and Taxis family suggests that the commis-
sioners should be sought within the circles of higher authority in the Southern 
Netherlands.26
The anti-Ottoman works commissioned by Mollo in the 1670s were only a 
prelude to the flurry of production by De Hooghe during the Great Turkish War. 
Virtually all major battles and sieges would find their way to the drawing tables of 
De Hooghe’s workshop, complemented by prints that glorified or satirized the dif-
ferent warring parties. Yet in all three distinct formats, De Hooghe clearly sought to 
explore in visual terms the violence that washed over south-east Europe, framing its 
intensity both in terms of triumph and in terms of horror.
‘Without regard for sex or age’: norms for warfare with ‘the Turk’
Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Austrian Habsburgs had 
often traded blows with the Ottoman Empire, yet as Andrew Wheatcroft points 
out, these conflicts were not necessarily more intense than the bloody wars that had 
engulfed Christian Europe in the wake of the Reformation.27 However, in the after-
math of the 1648 Peace of Münster, conflicts with the Ottoman Empire became more 
bloody relative to the cooling interconfessional strife within Christian Europe. This 
would become increasingly clear after the unsuccessful Ottoman siege of Vienna in 
1683, as the sheer scale of the sultan’s campaign started to harden attitudes in the 
Austrian–Ottoman conflict. In 1685, the Imperial siege of Neuhäusel (Nové Zámky, 
present-day Slovakia) was fought to the bitter end, resulting in the massacre of the 
Ottoman garrison along with any remaining women and children.28 According to 
a contemporary Dutch news report, those trying to flee the city across the water 
next to the Vienna gate were killed by Hungarian soldiers waiting on the shores. 
The deaths, ‘both combatants and non-combatants, also women and children, were 
counted up to 2000’.29 An Italian reporting on the same massacre described that he 
had watched in horror as the triumphant Christian forces not only took the heads of 
Ottoman soldiers, but also those of the fallen women and children.30
Neuhäusel would become a bloody example for other protracted sieges that 
followed in its wake – most importantly those of Buda (1686) and Belgrade 
(1688). Both taken by storm, these cities had effectively forfeited any recourse 
to a negotiated surrender. The capture of Buda especially was an equally bloody, 
184 Part III: Differentiation and identification
strategic, and symbolic victory for the forces of the Holy League. With the capture 
of the capital of Hungary, the Austrian Habsburgs cemented their claim on the 
kingdom’s historic lands and throughout Europe the event was hailed as a victory 
for Christendom at large. In addition, many in the Dutch Republic hoped that 
a  conclusive victory over the Ottoman Empire would allow Leopold, an ally in 
the broad coalition against Louis XIV, to free up forces to put more pressure on 
France.31 In Amsterdam, the fall of Buda was met with the staging of plays, the 
printing of siege journals, as well as the publication of an exquisite print of the 
storming of Buda by De Hooghe.
Of specific interest here is a play staged in the Amsterdam theatre only three 
weeks after the capture of Buda.32 In itself this was already an unusual move, as 
explicit references to current political events were normally banned from the 
Amsterdam stage.33 The piece was written by Govert Bidloo, the future court phy-
sician of William III and a friend of De Hooghe. As a playwright, Bidloo was well 
known for his love of spectacle and equal disdain for the restraint of the Dutch 
adepts of French classicism. Lauding the members of the Holy League for their 
hard-fought victory, the play openly celebrates the recent conquest of Buda as a 
triumph for Christendom at large. All the same, the act that portrays the sacking 
of the city is quite explicit and is introduced by a tableau vivant of soldiers cutting 
open their vanquished enemies in order to find swallowed riches. Streaming into 
the city, the soldiers ignore their own safety as well as the orders of their officers.34 
Tellingly, it is the allegorical figure of Violence that narrates the gruesome sack of 
the city. Armed with torch and sword, Violence tells the audience that the rapacious 
soldiery had become completely uncontrollable:
too much set on booty and untamed murder,
the violation takes off, vengeance leads to atrocities
and law and reason now hang at the end of a rapier
everything is offered up to escape chain and death
here the Christian lights the houses [on fire], there the Turk
victory separates them and lets the Roman [i.e. Holy Roman] gangs
wallow in booty, blood, in terror, in chains and in screams35
Strikingly, a 1688 news print on the capture of Belgrade illustrated by De Hooghe 
described the sack of the city in similar terms, drawing on the same image of an 
uncontrollable and violent sea of soldiers flooding into the city (see Figure 10.1). 
With a colourful and highly theatrical description, the accompanying text states 
that:
the Turks threw down their weapons and cried for quarter, but the soldiery was too 
heated to grant it to anyone and the fury so great, that without regard for sex or years, 
all [before them] were hacked into pieces. The blood streamed off the heights of the 
castle and within the hour, 10,000 Turks of all sorts, were sacrificed to the madness of 
the bloodthirsty sabre.36
Figure 10.1 News print on the capture of Belgrade by the Holy League in 1688. Romeyn de Hooghe, Belgrado met syn slot en  
voor-steden stormenderhand verovert door de keyserlyke machten. Den 6 sept: 1688. 
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In the print itself, the massacre is not shunned, but shown in the finer details of 
the onslaught taking place around the main fortress (see Figure 10.2). Women and 
children are running around in panic, tumbling over the city walls, with Christian 
soldiers striking down surrendering Ottoman soldiers. Numbers shown on the 
print refer to short descriptions in the accompanying text: at 22 we see ‘Veterani 
and Huesler … putting everyone to the sword’; at 24 ‘invading Hungarians, massa-
cring everything’ (note the lack of restraint as implied by the terms ‘everything’ and 
‘everyone’). Both in Bidloo’s play and in De Hooghe’s print, the Christian soldiers 
are described as cruel, uncontrollable, and above all unrestrained in their exercise 
of violence. In contrast, ‘the Turk’ is no longer simply the infant-killing caricature 
as found on sixteenth-century German propaganda prints. Instead, the Turkish 
soldier is described as the victim of the lawless violence ignited by intense warfare – 
massacred together with his wife and children and refused quarter by Christian war-
riors. This twist would readily find a place in the thriving print industry of the Low 
Countries, with De Hooghe as its most enthusiastic and productive trendsetter.
An economy of heads
De Hooghe’s highly detailed prints present many distinct elements to ana-
lyse, but I want to focus here on one specific aspect represented in most of De 
Figure 10.2 Detail of news print on the fall of Belgrade. Romeyn de Hooghe, Belgrado met syn 
slot en voor-steden stormenderhand verovert door de keyserlyke machten. Den 6 sept: 1688.
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Hooghe’s work: the Turkish trophy head. The taking of heads was a common 
occurrence in wars with the Ottoman Empire, practised by Christian and Muslim 
forces  alike.37 In this  vein, a printed journal concerning the Venetian siege 
of  Coron (1685)  would casually mention inventories of Turkish heads along-
side captured guns and ammunition.38 Presenting the reader with a figure of 130 
heads, the writer stresses that the Christian forces had in fact killed many more 
Turks, but were unable to advance far enough to avail the remaining corpses of 
their heads.
Before the Great Turkish war, the topos of trophy heads had alternately func-
tioned as a sign of Muslim brutality and Christian victory. Yet with the steady 
Austrian advance during the 1680s, its role as a sign of Christian triumph started 
to displace that of Muslim cruelty in imagery concerning Christian–Ottoman war-
fare.39 De Hooghe was especially generous with severed Turkish heads and they are 
to be found in almost all of his prints on the Great Turkish War. In this, war with the 
Ottoman Empire offered new ways to explore the visualization and glorification of 
violence. Even though beheading was a common practice in the execution culture 
of early modern Christian Europe, (visual) media would often present severed 
heads outside the context of the judicial system as signs of cruelty and barbarity.40 
In this light, it is important to note that De Hooghe consistently associated head-
hunting with the little known ‘warrior peoples’ of south-east Europe. In his famous 
print on the siege of Buda (see Figure 10.3), three ‘exotic’ looking soldiers stride 
up a hill overlooking the city. Identified as a ‘Rats’, ‘Tolpats’, and ‘Haiduk’ in the 
accompanying description (terms referring to Hungarian and Serbian irregulars),41 
these figures come to exchange Turkish heads for money, which is given to them by 
the well-dressed and wigged officers of the Holy League.
A similar sight can be found in De Hooghe’s print concerning the siege of 
Belgrade, where the foreground is filled with Croatian soldiers, some carrying 
lances with impaled Turkish heads, others in the act of decapitating Turks (see 
Figure 10.4). Finally, a small tower at the edge of the suburb of Belgrade captured by 
the besiegers presents a display of spiked heads along its ramparts.42
Effectively, De Hooghe presents these Croats, Hungarians, and Serbs as a 
mediating factor for the graphic violence associated with the victories of the Holy 
League. Visually, headhunting is isolated and projected solely on the south-east 
European irregulars, who give form to a practice that is deemed to be barbaric 
in the context of interconfessional Christian warfare. In this representation of 
headhunting, the prints contrast with the written sources on the sieges (as well 
as Bidloo’s siege play) in which headhunting is not associated with any particu-
lar military or ethnic group, but instead presented as a common practice among 
all  the forces of the Holy League. The highly detailed war journal describing 
the capture of Buda published by Oossaan, the same Amsterdam publisher who 
sold De  Hooghe’s prints of the fateful siege, presents several instances of head-
hunting without linking these to any specific military group. Austrian officers seem 
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Figure 10.4 Detail of news print on the fall of Belgrade. Romeyn de Hooghe, Belgrado met syn 
slot en voor-steden stormenderhand verovert door de keyserlyke machten. Den 6 sept: 1688.
Figure 10.3 Detail of news print on the capture of Buda by the Holy League in 1686. Romeyn de 
Hooghe, Belegering der sterke stad Buda of Offen, door de Keyserlycke en geallieerde machten. 1686.
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in fact to promote the practice, as they are reported to be paying money for any 
Turkish head brought to them (as is faithfully presented in De Hooghe’s print of 
Buda).43
In his emphasis on the practice of headhunting, De Hooghe thus did something 
distinctly different from the textual accounts of the sieges in question, associat-
ing it exclusively with the diverse array of ‘exotic’-looking south-east European 
irregulars. Here, De Hooghe’s prints fit in with the wider craze around ‘exoti-
cism’ at the turn of the eighteenth century in the Dutch Republic, as identified by 
Benjamin Schmidt. Schmidt has argued that after the Westphalian peace of 1648, 
Dutch printmakers and publishers increasingly positioned the theme of extreme 
violence as a non-European affair taking place in a broadly defined ‘exotic’ (i.e. 
non- European) world.44 De Hooghe’s prints on south-east Europe perfectly fit 
this trend. Pictured in outlandish clothing and with hairstyles matching those of 
the Turks, the south-east European irregulars present the spectator with a Dutch 
imagination of Europe’s fringes: exotic, dangerous, and violent. If Dutch sources 
at large portrayed south-east Europe as a region troubled by the violent excesses 
of local irregulars and the imported forces of the Holy League, De Hooghe’s 
 visualization already points to the eighteenth-century process of demarcating a 
(‘civilized’) Western Europe from a (‘barbaric’) Eastern Europe.45 In this sense, 
the trope of unrestrained violence was as much about the victories of the Holy 
League as it was about De Hooghe’s violent imagination of the Habsburg–
Ottoman  borderlands as an ‘exotic’ place.
Triumphalia and satire
As discussed earlier, a second type of prints made by De Hooghe can be catego-
rized as printed ‘triumphalia’, allegorical scenes that glorified the victories of the 
Holy League. A striking example is found in the series of etchings produced for the 
festival book commemorating the celebration in Brussels of the capture of Buda. 
While eight prints portray impressions of the celebrations in Brussels, the first one 
concerns a fictive triumphal entry of Leopold I into the city.46 Seated on a trium-
phal carriage and surrounded by representations of Christian and Roman virtues, 
the emperor runs over the vanquished Turks standing in his path (see Figure 10.5). 
Again, we find a large number of impaled Turkish heads, carried along by soldiers 
dressed in classical attire.
In contrast to the news prints, there are no Hungarian or Serbian irregulars 
present in this allegorical scene. Instead, the violence is channelled through 
soldiers in classical Roman attire and figures from Graeco-Roman mythology. 
Other allegorical prints by De Hooghe follow the same structure.47 They consist-
ently portray the Holy League in close connection to explicit violence against the 
subjugated Turk – whose body is crushed under the wheels of victory chariots, or 
reduced to a trophy head. At the same time, this type of violence clearly functions 
Figure 10.5 Fictive triumphal entry of Leopold I to celebrate the Holy League’s capture of Buda. Romeyn de Hooghe, 
Divo et invictissimo Leopoldo I […]. 1686–87.
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in the context of allegorical imagery. The headhunting irregulars so prominent in 
De Hooghe’s news prints are conspicuously absent. Instead, their place is taken 
by standardized figures representing classical virtues and Roman soldiers. Rather 
than commenting on the mores of south-east European warfare, the impaled heads 
blend in with the rest of the allegorical imagery, turning into symbols of Habsburg 
military might and Christian supremacy.
In a sense, of all three genres, triumphalia is the most straightforward in its use 
of the Turkish head; it is designated to serve within the clearly defined context 
of the glorification of religious, political, and military supremacy. In this aspect, 
it differs strongly from the third and final category, that of satirical prints. De 
Hooghe’s satirical prints are far more ambiguous in their message and heavily reli-
ant on both simple and complicated references to visual tropes.48 However, despite 
these characteristics, De Hooghe’s satirical work arguably shows most clearly how 
unrestrained violence became such an iconic part of his imagination of the Great 
Turkish War. This is most explicit in De Hooghe’s satirical ‘koning-spel’ on the year 
1687, a print which deals almost exclusively with events from the Great Turkish War 
(see Figure 10.6).49 The intricate broadsheet contains thirty-two small etchings with 
short accompanying verses and goes back to the older sixteenth-century tradition 
of the ‘koningsbrieven’ (king’s letters).50 These were prints usually created for the 
celebration of Three Kings’ Day and portrayed a number of roles within a fictive 
royal household. The different images would be cut out and divided by lot among a 
group of people, promoting one of the party to the role of king for the evening.51 In 
some cases, the verses of a koningsbrief would indicate instructions attached to the 
different roles,52 but this is not the case with De Hooghe’s print. Instead, the rhymes 
consist of political figures (Christians) taunting and intimidating their enemies or, 
conversely, pleading for their lives (the Turks).
It is unclear whether De Hooghe’s print was meant to be used in the context 
of the celebration of Three Kings’ Night. The print could very well be a piece of 
political satire that simply used the familiar format of the koningsbrief to create an 
accessible and appealing product.53 At the very least, the fact that the print in the 
Rijksmuseum collection has been preserved intact suggests that this particular copy 
of De Hooghe’s koningsbrief was never used in the traditional festivities associated 
with Three Kings’ Day.
Regardless of its function, De Hooghe’s print follows the traditional format 
of the koningsbrief. As with many other koningsbrieven, all figures come in pairs. 
Normally, this would be a man (left) and woman (right) in the same role (king 
and queen, etc.). Here, however, most of the pairs concern the Holy League (left) 
and the Ottoman Empire (right). In these contrasting pairs, the Holy League is 
consistently connected to extreme acts of violence, most prominently dismember-
ment, beheading, and cannibalism – all traits previously associated with the Turkish 
terror. The Ottomans, in contrast, are begging for mercy or running for their lives. 
For example, the Imperial general Dunnewald is portrayed as the ‘voor snijder’ 
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Figure 10.6 Satirical print on the events of the year 1687. Romeyn de Hooghe, Koning-Spel 
Courant op ‘t Jaer 1687, Amsterdam 1687–88.
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(carver), tasked with cutting the meat dish at the table (see Figure 10.7). Shown 
skewering a Turk on his spear, he asks:
Who would like a piece, in the style
Of Agha, Pasha, or Serasker? [Ottoman titles]
The famous Ernst Rüdiger von Starhemberg, commander of the Austrian forces 
during the siege of Vienna, is introduced as the court physician. Holding a severed 
head, he exclaims:
Away with you, Tartars and Cossacks,
My cure is, to cut everything off
The final print is the most striking and presents ‘knight Janko, cook’ – referring 
to Stojan Janković Mitrović, a Morlach commander fighting under the banner of 
Venice (see Figure 10.8). As a representative of the Dalmatian borderlands, his role 
will not surprise us. Standing next to a hearth filled with roasted limbs and heads, 
Janković states that:
Before this kitchen of the Morlachs
Even the Sultan would shit himself
The not so subtle message of this print is that even the Great Turk would not be 
able to stomach such a grisly sight.54 Janković’s Ottoman counterpart, the dwarf 
servant of the sultan’s cook, is insulted by being portrayed as an incompetent chef – 
yet he is not the one cooking human flesh. With Janković as cannibalistic cook, the 
Turkish terror has effectively become a Christian terror.
Interestingly, a number of variants and reprints of De Hooghe’s 1687 koning-
spel were produced, most of them by publishers from the Southern Netherlands.55 
Already in 1687, a variant of the print was published in Antwerp by Philibert 
Bouttats, a printmaker from the Southern Netherlands who had lived in Amsterdam 
and worked with De Hooghe some years before.56 Now with verses in both French 
and Dutch, the print adds a couple of new atrocities, most prominently those of 
the Venetian general Francesco Morosini, ‘cupbearer’, who is shown drinking the 
Figure 10.7 Detail of Figure 10.6. Dunnewald impales an Ottoman soldier on his spear.
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blood of his Turkish victims. The image of Morosini is flanked by an Ottoman cup-
bearer, who laments that his people grow thirsty as he is unable to provide them 
with ‘Christian blood’. Effectively, the print shows how Morosini is successful in 
his cruelty where the Turks are not, defeating the Ottomans at their own game. 
In another variant of the print by Joannes van Soest, the Imperial commander 
Commercy replaces Dunnewald as carver. Shown with an array of severed body 
parts, he states:
I cut, carve and skin
Turks and Tartars alike
And make no difference
In years young or old57
Clearly, these heavily referential satirical prints designated unrestrained violence as 
the hallmark of the Holy League, appropriating the tropes of typical Turkish cruel-
ties (cannibalism, dismemberment, flaying, drinking of blood) as Christian ones. 
Yet the koningsbrieven on the Great Turkish War did not simply represent a carni-
valesque reversal of a ‘normal’ order in which the Turkish terror became a Christian 
terror. In fact, carver Commercy’s rhyme that plays on the killing of children and 
the elderly has its counterpart in the aforementioned news prints and war journals 
on the sack of Belgrade and Neuhäusel by the forces of the Holy League. Similarly, 
the extensive use of dismemberment in these satirical prints was already present 
both in news prints and triumphalia. As such, these koningsbrieven merely magnified 
and played with existing descriptions of the atrocities taking place on the south-east 
European front. De Hooghe’s koningsbrief, however, did so in a manner that was 
decidedly different from its Southern Netherlandish counterparts. Whereas the 
koningsbrieven from the Southern Netherlands presented the atrocities in the light 
of the emperor’s victories and the triumph of Catholicism at large, De Hooghe’s 
koningsbrief also sought to connect the violence more broadly to tropes of Catholic 
Figure 10.8 Detail of Figure 10.6. On the left, Janković before a hearth with roasted Turkish 
heads and limbs. On the right, the dwarf servant of the sultan’s cook dropping his food in the 
ashes of the hearth.
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fanaticism and the religious persecution of Protestants in Imperial Hungary. Even 
though Leopold I was an indispensable ally for the Dutch Republic in the conflicts 
against France, concerns about the treatment of Hungarian Protestants surfaced 
both in print and theatre.58
The religious dimension to the depicted violence can be deduced from a number 
of differences between De Hooghe’s koningsbrief and those printed in the Southern 
Netherlands. The first subtle difference is the role played by Count Imre Thököly, 
leader of the Hungarian Protestant anti-Habsburg uprising. In De Hooghe’s print, 
Thököly stands out by his high status, being second in line after the sultan and bear-
ing the title of counsellor. Shown in Turkish dress, the count states:
For the country’s freedom and doctrine [‘de Leer’],
[I have] risked my peace, what else can I do?
The rhyme seems to refer to Thököly’s Protestant background and plays on the 
widespread sympathy for Protestant Hungarians in the Dutch Republic.59 In a strik-
ingly different tone, all the Southern Netherlandish prints show him as ‘the fool’, 
either in chains or contemplating surrender to his ‘rightful’ lord (the emperor). 
Other details that are only present in De Hooghe’s print reinforce this Protestant 
reading in which violence is connected to Catholic ‘fanaticism’. The print of the 
Imperial general Caraffa hints at the heavy-handed Habsburg subjugation of the 
Transylvanian (Siebenbürger) Protestants.60 Caraffa himself is shown ordering 
around men in Turkish dress who carry dishes, stating:
Set the table, you Siebenbürger cities
He who wields power, listens to no reason
Equally absent from the Flemish prints is De Hooghe’s ‘Roman cupbearer’ (Roomse 
als schenkers), who is shown offering up the ‘blood of heretics’ and is contrasted 
with a cryptic print titled ‘Protestants &’. The Dutch term ‘Roomse’ is in itself an 
interesting label, as it could both mean ‘Roman’, here in the context of the Holy 
Roman Empire, and ‘Roman Catholic’. Since the cupbearer is contrasted with a 
number of Protestants, the satirical print seems to favour a religious reading of the 
term. Naturally, this Catholic cupbearer thirsting for the blood of heretics is missing 
from all the Southern Netherlandish prints. Philibert Bouttat’s print, for example, 
replaced this ‘Roman’ cupbearer with the aforementioned Morosini, who drinks 
the blood of Turks, rather than that of Protestant heretics.61
The Southern Netherlandish counterparts to De Hooghe’s koningsbrief thus 
used the atrocity theme much more superficially in a strict Christian–Turk 
dichotomy. In contrast, De Hooghe’s presentation of the Holy League as a force 
with characteristics previously linked to the ‘Turkish terror’ is not only connected 
to a general Christian triumphalism, but also more narrowly to stereotypes of vio-
lent Catholics as cultivated in the Dutch Republic. In turn, these views connected 
to a negative image of the south-east European borderlands in general. As such, 
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De Hooghe was not only invested in portraying the Turks as a defeated enemy, but 
also in painting a spectacular and gruesome image of south-east Europe as a region 
beset by warlike border peoples and ruthless Christian soldiers. With De Hooghe’s 
satirical prints, we thus come full circle. The theme of unrestrained violence has 
completely shifted from the Turks to the commanders of the Holy League – now 
associated with the typical tropes of ‘Turkish cruelty’.
Conclusion
The works of De Hooghe show that his visualization of violence against the Turks 
was not simply a one-dimensional portrayal of Christian triumphalism. As with all 
representations of violence, the message across the different genres of news print, 
triumphalia, and satire is inherently ambiguous. It played on older tropes such as 
the cruel and uncontrollable soldier, as well as the stereotyped image of the ‘warlike’ 
peoples of Europe’s borderlands. All of this was captured by the diverse use of the 
Turkish head. In news prints, beheadings feature as a visual cue to the otherness of 
Hungarians and Croats; in triumphalia, the Turkish heads transform into an alle-
gorical sign underlining Habsburg military might; in satire, the dismembered and 
beheaded Turkish corpse serves as a prop in a morbid kitchen. Far from enforcing a 
more orderly and ‘clean’ representation of war, the different images of the victories 
of the Holy League all thrive and function in their own way through the visualiza-
tion of explicit and unrestrained violence. The changing fortunes on the field of 
battle favoured a visual reinterpretation in which ‘the Turk’ was a vanquished rather 
than a formidable enemy. In this shift, the place of violence changed accordingly, 
at times transposing tropes of the ‘Turkish terror’ one on one to a new ‘Christian 
terror’.
Through De Hooghe’s focus on unrestrained violence, a number of themes are 
brought to the fore. One prominent aspect lies in the creation of a diffuse image 
of south-east Europe as a particularly violent place – a vision that falls in line with 
a broader reorientation of a post-Westphalian Dutch press that sought to present 
extreme violence as a non-European phenomenon. Here, it is important to note 
that De Hooghe’s prints were not always in line with the more detailed and nuanced 
textual sources, which related violence more broadly to the Holy League at large 
rather than the south-east European irregulars specifically. At the same time, De 
Hooghe’s koningsbrief connected unrestrained violence in more general terms to 
older Protestant stereotypes of Catholics. Whereas similar satirical prints from 
the Southern Netherlands presented the violence of the Holy League in the posi-
tive light of the Catholic-Habsburg victory over Turks and heretics, De Hooghe 
played with the idea that these particular forms of unrestrained violence were part 
of a more sinister Catholic spirit. In a striking reversal of older visual traditions, 
tropes of unrestrained violence that had once been used to vilify the Turks were 
now projected onto the members of the Holy League – who De Hooghe depicted 
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as standing victorious among the dismembered, beheaded, and cooked remains of 
their Turkish enemies.
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Atlantic slave systems and violence
Trevor Burnard
Atlantic slavery was a violent institution. The Atlantic slave trade was even more 
violent. I hardly need to point out this basic fact. An essay about slavery and the 
slave trade can easily turn into a sickening litany of appalling acts of violence meted 
out by slave owners towards enslaved people and the less frequent but often equally 
violent response of enslaved people undertaking acts of resistance to enslavement, 
including armed revolt. Luxuriating in the violence of slavery is an easy trap for 
historians to fall into. Walter Johnson, for example, in an otherwise fine book on 
slavery in the antebellum Mississippi Valley, reaches for sensational language in 
describing the customary violence of slavery in this period and place. He layers 
evocative words – slaveholders ‘screaming execrations’, slaves ‘pleading, shriek-
ing, moaning, crying out for mercy’, omnipresent torture where whipped slaves 
expressed themselves in ‘choking, sobbing, spasmodic groans’ – and uses extensive 
bodily function imagery to try and evoke in the reader an emotional response about 
the horrors of nineteenth-century American slavery like that which abolitionists 
of the time tried to inspire in their readers, in the Victorian age of sentimental read-
ing. The American South in this and in other recent interpretations, was founded on 
‘blood, milk, semen and shit’.1
Similarly, Edward Baptist piles on example after example of horrific violence 
against enslaved people to make the argument that it was calibrated torture, as 
inflicted on the cotton plantations of the nineteenth-century American South, 
that allowed the Industrial Revolution to break through ‘the resource constraints 
that had imprisoned previous civilizations in a Malthusian cul-de-sac’. He uses 
the metaphor of a ‘whipping machine’ to argue that the discipline of torture as ‘a 
technology for controlling and exploiting human beings’ created a ‘vast archipelago 
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of slave labor camps’ where the ‘whipping machine’ made slaves endure an ‘unprec-
edented level and quality of field labor’ in a ‘dynamically evolving technology of 
 measurement, torture and forced innovation’.2
The problem with this highly emotional language, as Philip D. Morgan argues 
in a critical review of Johnson’s book, is not just that ‘rhetoric often substitutes for 
analysis’, but that ‘the effect of the piling on of horrors and the shock value of the 
imagery is the reverse of the one intended’.3 Such language hardens rather than 
softens the reader to the violence of slavery, especially when acts of brutality are 
catalogued and repeated at length, making it hard to engage fully with the subject. 
What is more important than enumerating the everyday and extraordinary vio-
lence in the Atlantic slave system that began in the mid fifteenth century, before 
Columbus’s voyages to the New World, and which lasted until 1888 when Brazil 
became the last society to abolish slavery, is to analyse the meanings for planters, 
traders, and enslaved people of the constant violence that enveloped this system.4 
In this chapter, I use violence as an analytic category in order to demonstrate how 
brutality, violence, and death were not mere by-products of the extremely lucrative 
early modern plantation system but were the sine qua non of that plantation world.
This approach requires understanding the visceral meaning of the systemic vio-
lence that was exerted against African people. That violence happened first in Africa 
as they were loaded onto slave ships – James Stanfield in a poem on ‘the Guinea 
Trade’ described them as part of a business that was a ‘vast machine’ that while 
‘assum[ing] the honours of a honest trade … had, beneath a prostituted glare [a] 
poison’d purpose’.5 It continued in the Americas, where Africans were transformed 
into slaves and were worked relentlessly, especially on sugar plantations, where 
conditions were harsh – Caribbean slaves endured the worst demographic experi-
ences of any enslaved peoples, with annual population attrition due to high mortal-
ity rates being consistently in the negative throughout the eighteenth century. And 
it persisted into the nineteenth century with legacies that continue into the present 
during what scholars now term a ‘second slavery’, in which new market-oriented 
forms of slavery were ‘parts of a distinct cycle of economic and geographic expan-
sion of the capitalist-world economic processes of industrialization, urbanization 
and the restructuring of world markets that occurred as merchant capitalism turned 
into industrial capitalism’.6
It is important to stress the long-lasting nature of slavery and its adaptability 
to modernity. The violence of slavery and the slave trade in the Atlantic world 
was not an atavistic throwback to pre-modern times that was thankfully ended as 
Enlightenment values and disavowal of violence as a means of conflict resolution 
became more prevalent in Atlantic societies in Europe and the Americas.7 The 
fundamental definition of slavery remains constant from its origins in the ancient 
world to its criminalized presence today – it is the complete and exploitative control 
of one person (the slave) by another (the slaveholder) in which the slave is treated 
as property. That definition allows us to know that slavery did not necessarily end 
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with legal declarations of slave emancipation and that it is intimately tied up with 
coercion and thus with violence.8 Being a slave was not just physically violent; it was 
psychologically devastating. It is for this reason, as much as more obvious forms of 
violence, that so many enslaved people – depressed by the reality of their hopeless-
ness in a system from which they were unlikely to escape physically unscathed – 
turned to suicide as one release from their predicament.9
One reason to avoid an excessive concentration on describing lurid aspects 
of violence in slavery and instead examine violence as an analytic concept, is 
that focusing on acts of violence can resemble voyeurism – perhaps even have a 
pornographic quality – in an approach which has a long and troubled history in 
abolitionist literature. One way in which anti-slavery discourse might be enlivened 
was to sensationalize and sexualize the whip, the most potent symbol of white 
authority in the slave colonies of the Americas. Karen Halttunen dubs such pruri-
ence the ‘pornography of pain’; this sensationalist approach can be overdone as 
much in present-day scholarship as in abolitionist literature. Zoe Trodd raises the 
issue precisely in an examination of prominent tropes, such as the kneeling slave 
of the Wedgwood medallion and the scourged back of an antebellum American 
enslaved man. She suggests that it is time for these images to be dropped. Urging 
contemporary anti-slavery artists to try and find ‘a less abusive usable past’, she 
argues that scenes of whipping too often put ‘slaves on display, reaching for shock 
value but risking sensationalism and objectification’.10 I am guilty myself of such 
sensationalism. My biography of Thomas Thistlewood, an English migrant who 
lived in Jamaica between 1750 and 1786 and whose extensive diaries provide a rare 
first-hand insight into the lived experience of slavery, albeit from the viewpoint of 
a master, tries to portray Thistlewood in the round, as a keen amateur scientist, 
avid reader, and man of the Enlightenment as much as a brutal and sadistic sexual 
predator and vicious slave manager. But it is my description of the worst examples 
of Thistlewood’s violence towards slaves, notably his invention of a punishment 
he called ‘Derby’s Dose’, in which an enslaved man defecated into another slave’s 
mouth which was then gagged shut, that attracted most attention in reviews and 
popular repetition.11
I address here the point of violence in Atlantic slavery and the slave trade and 
how the incidence of violence in these institutions varied over time. First, was vio-
lence central or incidental to the ideology of enslavement in the Atlantic world, and 
if so, to what extent did slavery underpin the whole character of Atlantic slave socie-
ties? Second, was violence effective in the way slave owners treated and controlled 
enslaved people, especially in those slave societies in the Greater Caribbean, north-
east Brazil, and parts of the more southerly regions of the American South where 
the demographic balance between enslaved blacks and free whites was most heavily 
weighted in favour of blacks? Was it also effective for enslaved people on the rela-
tively rare occasions when they contested the circumstances they found  themselves 
in through active acts of resistance and rebellion?
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Violence within slavery was foundational, purposeful, and so central to slavery 
that getting rid of it or even lessening its incidence or intensity threatened the whole 
basis of masterly dominance over enslaved people. Violence also generally pro-
duced efficacious results for slave owners in respect to how they maintained control 
over their enslaved property, how they were able to employ violence while not 
impeding their capacity to use slaves to make money for themselves, and how they 
kept themselves secure in societies in which they were often heavily outnumbered. 
However, it was less efficacious in convincing their rulers in Europe or their more 
powerful compatriots in non-slaveholding parts of their nation that their authority 
over their slaves was legitimate. The violence of Atlantic slavery and the slave trade 
was so obvious to everyone and so extreme in its many manifestations, especially 
when news of slave revolts and their suppression reached other places, that it pro-
voked consternation among populations increasingly outraged about the use of 
violence to control people: a growing hostility to what antebellum northerners in 
the United States called with disdain ‘the slave power’.12
Perhaps the most dramatic manifestation of outrage over violence in slavery 
and the slave trade came in the 1780s, with an infamous case of murder in the 
slave trade in 1781. A subsequent court case in Britain in 1783 about this murder 
percolated into an embryonic abolitionist movement, which erupted in 1787–88 
as the biggest social reform movement in British history, leading to the abolition 
of the British slave trade in 1807. Sailors on the Zong either deliberately or by 
accident found themselves leagues distant from the western shores of Jamaica in 
November 1781. They hatched a plan that they later claimed arose out of neces-
sity to prevent the possibility of captive Africans revolting and taking over the 
ship. It involved murdering 132 Africans by throwing them overboard. Such an 
act of violence was  hardly unusual in the slave trade. What brought the case to 
public attention, however, was that the crew of the Zong had the idea of claiming 
insurance for the  financial losses they had incurred in murdering African cap-
tives. The underwriters demurred and refused to pay, whereupon the ship owners 
sued for financial restitution. The abolitionist Granville Sharp was alerted to this 
civil case by a black  abolitionist, Oladuah Equiano, and was so outraged at the 
inhumanity by which a case of murder was treated as an instance of insurance 
fraud that he publicized the case. Although initially the British public were not 
very interested, by  the mid 1780s they came to see the Zong as indicative of the 
essential wickedness of the slave trade. What was particularly dreadful about this 
case, abolitionists like Thomas Clarkson and James Ramsay insisted, was that it 
was carried out by British sailors on a British ship and resulted in a case in a British 
court, decided inconclusively  and, it was argued, immorally by a famous British 
judge, Lord Mansfield. In 1788, Clarkson wrote of the Zong that it was an event 
‘Unparalleled in the memory of man … and of so black and complicated a nature, 
that were it to be perpetuated to future generations … it could not possibly be 
believed’.13
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The role of violence as exercised by enslaved people against slave owners is an 
especially ambivalent historical issue. On the one hand, it is difficult to see this vio-
lence as anything other than the understandable response of people pushed beyond 
endurance against oppression, using the tools that they had at their disposal, given 
that the powers of the state were all aligned on the side of their oppressors. On the 
other hand, these acts of violence removed the moral upper hand from enslaved 
people, confirming, usually unfairly, to their erstwhile supporters in Europe and 
North America, that slave owners’ assertion that enslaved people were barbarians 
was essentially correct.14
More to the point, violence employed by enslaved people seldom worked in 
the ways that slaves wanted. When enslaved people raised their hands against their 
masters, they were invariably killed and their friends and families were punished. 
The successful slave insurrection in Haiti starting in 1791 has become the emblem-
atic example of slave rebellion in the Atlantic world; but Haiti was the exception, 
not the rule, in a world where most emancipations occurred through legislative 
fiat from outside forces rather than through the actions of the enslaved. A more 
typical slave rebellion was Tacky’s Revolt in Jamaica in 1760, a major slave rebel-
lion involving thousands of slaves that resulted in the deaths of tens of whites and 
hundreds of blacks. Unlike the Haitian Revolution, Tacky’s Revolt was put down 
by the Jamaican state. Their revenge was immediate and gruesome. Rebel leaders 
were put to death by slow fire and by hanging in gibbets until they starved to death, 
while hundreds of slaves were transported to British Honduras. White Jamaicans 
learned from their near-death experience in 1760 that if they were sufficiently reso-
lute against any sign of slave rebellion and were prepared to use extreme violence to 
defend planter prerogatives, their safety would be secured.15 So too, planters took 
their revenge against slave rebels in the aftermath of the Berbice Rebellion of 1763, 
which was a major colony slave rebellion in which practically all enslaved people 
were involved as an apparently united force against the Dutch state and which 
resulted in rebel slaves taking over the colony for a remarkably long period of time. 
When the Dutch regained the colony in late 1763 they took their revenge in the 
usual fashion, executing 128 rebels, in often gruesome ways, and punishing through 
whippings and the transportation of thousands more.16
The major counterexample to this sad record of violent slave resistance result-
ing in more violence from a resurgent master class, supported by the imperial or 
national state, is the Haitian Revolution of 1791 to 1804. Yet the historical inter-
pretation of this event is itself highly problematic. It was an extraordinarily violent 
event, even by the standards of Atlantic rebellions involving slaves or indigenes. 
Laurent Dubois estimates that in 1802–03 alone 100,000 people died in Haiti, nearly 
four times as many people as died in the seven years of the American Revolution. 
It resulted in slavery ending forever in France’s richest colony, the birth of the first 
independent black colony in the Americas, but also, through Napoleon Bonaparte’s 
cession of most of France’s North American possessions in the Louisiana Purchase 
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of 1804, provided the territorial means through which slavery in the United States 
was able to expand spatially through the first half of the nineteenth century. The 
violence that led to the creation of Haiti out of the plantation colony of Saint 
Domingue, however, crippled the economy of the new nation. It also established 
patterns of dictatorial behaviour exhibited by its first leaders, notably Toussaint 
Louverture, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, and Henri Christophe, that have since echoed 
through Haitian history. Dessalines is the great hero in Haitian history, but he was 
also noticeably cruel and violent. His first act on taking control of the newly inde-
pendent Haiti in 1804 was to order a mass killing of most of the French whites who 
remained in the republic – perhaps several thousand people. Dessalines presented 
the killings as self-defence and as revenge for past crimes committed by French 
planters against enslaved Haitians. He declared that ‘yes, we have paid back these 
true cannibals crime for crime, outrage for outrage’. The legacy of Haiti as an exces-
sively violent place lives on: in Hollywood as the home of zombies and vodou 
and in its present-day ranking as one of the most ‘fragile states’ in the Western 
Hemisphere.17
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to suggest that acts of violent resistance by 
enslaved people were wrong, futile, or counterproductive. When enslaved people 
were violent, their violence demonstrated three things. First, it made clear to fellow 
enslaved people that at least a few slaves were so unhappy with their predicament 
that they were willing to show masters that accepting enslavement was not the 
same  thing as welcoming it. Their violent rejection of aspects of slavery demon-
strated that enslaved people rejected the idea promulgated by their masters that 
enslaved people were naturally suited to enslavement and happy in that condition. 
Slave resistance through violence happened at all stages of Atlantic slavery, perhaps 
most commonly on slave ships. David Richardson estimates that perhaps one in ten 
slave ships experienced an insurrection.18 A typical insurrection arose on a British 
slaving vessel, the Clare, in 1729, when the captives, ten leagues off the Gold Coast, 
‘rose and making themselves Masters of the Gunpowder and Fire Arms’ forced the 
white crew into a longboat and took over control of the ship, eventually making 
landfall and escaping back into their homeland.19 Of course, it was hard to control 
violence so that it was directed only against whites. Slave ships were frequently 
scenes of horrific violence between captives deranged by the horror of their con-
finement in fetid, crowded underground quarters. Henry Smeathman, in a particu-
larly vivid account of the appalling conditions that faced captives on crowded and 
smelly slave ships, detailed how in the 1770s on a trip to Antigua male captives tore 
each other apart through fighting, making sailors too afraid to venture into what 
they saw as a violent hell-hole.20
Second, violence committed by enslaved people demonstrated to opponents of 
slavery in metropolitan Europe and northern America the true realities of slavery, 
separate from the propaganda presented to them by proslavery advocates. Slave 
masters always insisted that enslaved people in the Americas were happy with 
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enslavement and that Africans preferred being in the Americas to the barbarous 
lives they had left behind in an essentially mythical ‘Africa’. The proslavery his-
torian Edward Long, for example, noted in response to questions about whether 
Africans preferred to live in Jamaica or Africa that he ‘once interrogated a Negro, 
who had lived several years in Jamaica, on this subject’. The man replied to Long 
that in Jamaica he had ‘food and clothing as much as he wanted, a good house and 
his family about him, but in Africa he would be destitute and helpless’.21 The vio-
lence that Jamaican slaves repeatedly carried out despite the strong likelihood that 
slavery would lead to cruelly imposed punishment showed that Long was fooling 
himself (or, more likely, had been fooled by a slave who told his interrogator what 
he thought his questioner wanted to hear).
It demonstrated also that slavery was not a benevolent institution but was per-
meated in every aspect of its being by coercion – sometimes purposeful, sometimes 
random – and it indicated that slaves responded to constant violence by being 
violent themselves. Planters only managed enslaved people through frequent pun-
ishment. The Jamaican overseer, Thomas Thistlewood, learned the importance of 
using violence on his arrival in Jamaica in 1750. Three months after starting work 
as an overseer, Thistlewood gave ‘old Titus’ fifty lashes for helping a runaway and 
after he ‘confess’d to have satt and eat’ with the runaway slave ‘several times’ he 
gave him another hundred lashes for this ‘villainy’. In 1756 – the year of ‘Derby’s 
Dose’ – Thistlewood administered fifty-seven whippings to a population of around 
sixty male slaves, gagged another four without whipping, and put eleven in stocks 
overnight.22 Even in the last days of slavery in the British West Indies and after 
abolitionist pressure on planters to reduce the punishment meted out to slaves, 
the amount of punishment endured by slaves just in the course of living and work-
ing on plantations was excessive. In the South American colony of Berbice, in the 
year 1830 alone, out of a population of 20,645 enslaved people, 2,118 men and 1,406 
women (3,524 individuals) were flogged, put in stocks, or otherwise disciplined.23 
When enslaved people fought back against the violence that surrounded them, it 
highlighted less what they had done, but just how vital coercion was in securing any 
measure of slave obedience.
Third, violence by slaves provoked sufficient outrage among abolitionists 
imbued  with Christian doctrines, in which the iconography of Christ’s martyr-
dom was  central, that they easily equated suffering slaves with their own suffer-
ing  saviour. It is important to note that this equation occurred before enslaved 
people – at least in the French, British, and Dutch Atlantic worlds – had themselves 
become Christian. Slavery was not in itself problematic for Christians – believers, 
after all, described themselves as ‘slaves of Christ’. But what Katherine Gerbner 
calls ‘Christian slavery’ placed on slave owners a duty to act towards slaves as good 
Christians, an invocation that presumed masters would not exercise unreasonable 
violence against their slaves. Quakers – not until the mid eighteenth century nota-
ble as abolitionists – played a crucial role in insisting that violence towards slaves 
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went against God’s will. Richard Pinder, a Quaker in Barbados, wrote a pamphlet 
in 1660 reminding slave owners that slaves ‘are of the same Blood and Mould, you 
are of’ and that if they ‘rul[ed] in such Tyranny over your Negroes … you will 
bring Blood upon you and the cry of their blood shall enter into the eares of the 
Lord of the Sabbath’. Pinder was an early ameliorationist, wanting to reform slavery 
along Christian lines. Quaker insistence that masters could not exercise unfettered 
dominion, including violence, over their enslaved property was one reason why 
they became a  persecuted sect in Barbados.24
The violence of the slave system and the slave trade was commonly seen by its 
opponents through a Christian lens. The eighteenth-century slave ship captain John 
Newton, who became, as well as the author of the enduring hymn ‘Amazing Grace’, 
an early abolitionist, explicitly shaped his lengthy reminiscences about the brutality of 
the slave trade within an insistent Christian discourse of attaining salvation through 
grace so that previous sins could be forgiven. Other abolitionists, including black 
abolitionists such as Oladuah Equiano, whose account of the horrors of the slave 
trade remains one of the few texts to describe in detail the systematic violence of the 
Middle Passage, also adopted the language of religious conversion to describe what 
slavery and the slave trade was like and to suggest that the way out of this violence for 
masters and slaves alike was through accepting Christian doctrines.25
What made slavery a sin was its violence, as many early abolitionists attested. 
Granville Sharp, for example, came to abolitionism mainly through seeing West 
Indian planters in London treating their enslaved property with extreme violence. 
Thomas Clarkson, James Ramsay, and Anthony Benezet were all early abolition-
ists who first decried the violence inherent in slavery before coming to see the 
slave trade and slavery itself as inherently immoral and sinful.26 When evangeli-
cal Christians learned of slave rebellions and the grisly ways in which slave rebels 
were put to death, as in the well-publicized aftermath of Tacky’s Revolt in 1761, 
they tended to see African rebels as Christian martyrs. Vincent Brown notes that 
‘news of the executions circulated amid prevailing sentimentalism and popular 
Christian martyrology, which helped the British to envisage their nation as a moral 
 community founded in persecution, death and religious virtue’.27
As enslaved persons became Christian in the early nineteenth century, this 
language of martyrdom became ever more prevalent. The most famous Christian-
inflected account of the travails that enslaved people put up with from evil and 
violent masters was Harriet Beecher Stowe’s bestselling Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852). 
In this novel, Stowe draws on stories of slave resistance from real-life fugitives to 
paint a vivid, if problematically racialist, abolitionist portrait of an American South 
suffused with violence. The eponymous hero is a Christ-like figure ennobled by his 
suffering, an enduring figure of black victimization and stoic resistance through 
non-violence. Although abolitionists welcomed the attention that Stowe’s novel 
received, some were critical of the submissive quality of Uncle Tom. William Lloyd 
Garrison, for example, asked ‘is there one law of submission and non-resistance for 
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the black man and another of rebellion and conflict for the white man?’ Thomas 
Wentworth Higginson lamented that Tom was not a hero who resisted more and 
suffered less.28 But what Stowe recognized was that, among a sentimentally inclined 
readership, tales of excessive violence, patient suffering, and implied redemption 
worked better than any other narrative strategy to inculcate sympathy among 
otherwise indifferent whites for the plight of enslaved blacks. Stowe wrote fully in 
the tradition of the first English-speaking abolitionist writers, like Thomas Day and 
John Bicknell. Day and Bicknell’s famous poem, Dying Negro (1773), was about 
an enslaved man who commits suicide rather than be transported into Caribbean 
enslavement, thus glorifying the African who chooses Christian redemption in 
death over servitude in life. As Celeste-Marie Bernier has argued, while white read-
ers could easily identify with slaves as passive victims, they found it much harder to 
connect to black men praised as heroes, especially if, like Toussaint Louverture, or 
Frederick Douglass, they were unafraid to use violence in resisting enslavement.29 
To some extent, that is a problem that has continued to the present.
Planters tended to either deny that the slave system was inherently violent 
or else insist that violence was necessary because otherwise naturally savage 
Africans would rise and kill them. The latter argument was prominent in the period 
when few Europeans challenged the idea that slavery was essential to produce 
luxury products that Europeans craved, such as tobacco and sugar, and when the 
morality of the enslavement of Africans was seldom challenged. In the seventeenth 
century, few planters in the Atlantic world bothered to try and explain why they 
were as cruel as they were towards enslaved people. If any explanation was given, 
it was that masters had to use violence against slaves because, as the English travel-
ler Richard Ligon declared in 1650, Africans were ‘a bloody people’ and would – if 
not kept under strict control – ‘commit some horrid massacre upon the Christian 
population, thereby to enfranchise themselves and become masters of the island’. 
Ligon’s fears were realized in plots discovered in 1659, 1675, 1686, and most seri-
ously in 1692. In that year, according to testimony later gained under torture from 
a slave named Ben, slaves conspired in an elaborate plan in which enough slaves to 
form four regiments would attack whites and seize white women, ‘to make wives of 
the handsomest, whores, cooks, and chambermaids of the others’. The Barbadian 
response was ferocious – after torture and court-martial, slaves were executed, 
castrated, and otherwise punished. The discovery of the plot did not inspire 
any reflection on the violence of the system. Instead, as contemporaneously in 
Jamaica, which experienced several small revolts resulting in the murder of several 
whites in 1678 and through the 1690s, the main thought was to punish rebels in as 
exemplary a fashion as possible. Hans Sloane described the series of brutal pun-
ishments used in 1688 – burning by a slow fire, castration, limb amputation, and 
whipping. Sloane elaborated: ‘after they are whipped till they are raw, some put 
on their skins Pepper and salt to make them smart’. The punishments were ‘harsh’ 
but Sloane thought that the slaves’ crimes meant they deserved what they got and 
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that gruesome punishment was ‘sometimes merited by the blacks, who are a very 
perverse generation of people’.30
By the early eighteenth century, planters became more conscious that metro-
politan Europeans found their behaviour intolerable – Charles Leslie, for example, 
wrote in 1740 of Jamaica that ‘no Country exceeds them in a barbarous Treatment 
of Slaves, or in the cruel Methods they put them to death’.31 In the French and 
British Atlantic worlds, the eighteenth-century plantation system was more suc-
cessful and probably more violent than what had gone before.32 Some became 
concerned that ruling by violence alone was insufficient to control angry and violent 
enslaved property. One important thinker who believed that the punishment of 
slaves needed to be accompanied by promises of good treatment and mercy was 
Daniel Defoe, who wrote extensively on slave punishment despite never having 
visited any American slave plantation. Although he accepted that Africans were 
naturally vicious and could only be ruled with a ‘rod of iron’, as they naturally took 
advantage of anyone who tried to treat them well, Defoe advocated that the usual 
terror exercised against enslaved people be tempered by mercy so that masters 
would be able to inculcate among their slaves a feeling of gratitude that punish-
ments were rational and intended to reform the slave. As George Boulukos argues 
regarding Defoe’s 1722 novel Colonel Jack, ‘he narrates what could be called the 
invention of slave-owner paternalism, the moment in which a policy of unashamed 
cruelty is abandoned from the suspicion that gentler ways might produce more 
efficacious results’.33
In most places in the Atlantic world, slave owners did not move far from 
the formulation begun by Defoe in the 1720s whereby it was assumed that slav-
ery was inherently violent because Africans could not be controlled otherwise. 
Some writers tried to fool metropolitan observers by claiming that slavery was 
mostly benign and the relationship between slaves and masters was harmoni-
ous. Edward Long, for example, unconvincingly tried to counter Charles Leslie’s 
negative view of Jamaican planters by stating that Creole Jamaicans were ‘humane 
and indulgent  masters’.34 But the evidence of planter cruelty and indifference 
to slave welfare  was so glaringly apparent that few Jamaican planters were will-
ing to corroborate Long’s fantasy. The violence of the plantation, as seen in the 
ubiquitous  use of the  whip, was accompanied by vast indifference to the living 
standards of enslaved people. The most extreme slave societies on the eve of the 
American Revolution – Jamaica and Saint Domingue – were probably the most 
unequal societies on earth, where enslaved people had a standard of living that 
even in good times barely kept them above subsistence and in bad times led to 
starvation and death.35 In the nineteenth century, the booming economy of Cuba 
assumed the mantle of most unequal society once held by Jamaica and Saint 
Domingue.36
Planters in these slave societies – societies which consumed enslaved 
people and in which violence and the threat of violence was neither hidden nor 
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denied  –  accepted  the reality that enslaved people hated them and that they 
could only get these adversaries to work and to not kill them through various 
forms of coercion, forms that changed and became subtler over time, but which 
remained forms of coercion throughout. Jamaica’s wealthiest early nineteenth-
century planter, Simon Taylor, for example, was a successful planter because he 
refused to overwork his slaves, but he was far from being a ‘kind’ master. He knew 
that he depended on the slave trade and was distraught when Britain abolished that 
trade in 1807. He did not punish slaves directly himself but hired overseers who he 
knew would treat enslaved people firmly, ignoring any claim from enslaved people 
that they were punished excessively and that they experienced significant degrees 
of sexual violence from rapacious whites. As Christer Petley notes, ‘he was part 
of an ever-vigilant white minority, alert to signs of unrest among the slaves on his 
 properties – people who had every reason to want to rise up, to free themselves and 
to harm or kill their oppressors in the process’.37
In the new United States, however, different demographic conditions shaped 
approaches to slavery. In particular, a majority white population in the slave states 
and a black population that grew after the mid eighteenth century from natural pop-
ulation increase (meaning that, after 1800, increasingly few enslaved persons had 
been born in Africa) encouraged planters to formulate proslavery ideologies predi-
cated on the idea that slavery was upheld not by violence but by a shared under-
standing of reciprocity between paternalistic masters and mistresses and grateful, 
obedient, and protected enslaved people. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Eugene 
Genovese have explored the dimensions of this idealistic (and unrealistic) ideol-
ogy, which they term ‘slavery in the abstract’. They conclude that white southerners 
adopted an ideology of generous paternalism based on personal intimacy between 
slave owner and slave, where racially superior whites supported – often, planters 
believed, against their better interests – racially inferior subordinates whose natural 
place was at the bottom of the social order. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney II of 
South Carolina, for example, declared in the early nineteenth century that ‘Beyond 
mere animal suffering the slave has nothing to dread. His family is provided in food, 
shelter and raiment, whether he live and die.’ The way that proslavery white south-
erners described it, slavery was a pleasant condition much better than a freedom 
that enslaved people were unprepared for, and preferable to the uncertainty, drudg-
ery, and exposure to dearth that they believed was the condition poor white people 
in the antebellum North daily experienced.38
Similar views about slavery as a beneficent, non-violent institution were 
expressed by planters in other nineteenth-century slave societies. Their views 
percolated down into how free people of colour were treated after emancipation. 
Sir John Gladstone, Britain’s largest slave owner in nineteenth-century Demerara 
and a pioneer in a second variation on the slave trade, the importation of inden-
tured labour from Asia into the eastern Caribbean from the late 1840s, was a firm 
supporter of gradual emancipation – so gradual, indeed, that it was unlikely ever 
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to happen. Ameliorative measures, especially government restraint on what he 
considered to be inevitable misuses of power by violent masters, ‘cannot fail to 
effect such a progressive change in the general character and habits of the slave 
population that when the distant period should arrive the transition from slavery to 
freedom will finally be accomplished without revulsion or danger’. The key word is 
‘distant’. His famous son, William, agreed with his father; as British Prime Minister, 
William Gladstone regretted that British emancipation had been precipitate, as 
people of African descent had to be kept in subjection, if not in slavery, because 
‘in the case of negro slavery … it was the case of a race of higher capacities ruling 
over a race of lower capacities’.39 When ex-slaveholders had power over ex-slaves, 
as in the Jim Crow American South, they implemented such beliefs in new forms of 
coercion, such as convict-leasing, and in pernicious forms of violence dressed up as 
social control, such as lynching, which exploded in the American South after 1890.40 
Freedom did not necessarily mean the end of racially motivated violence nor signi-
fied that whites were willing to allow ex-slaves and their descendants a place in the 
polities that emerged out of slavery.
That planters fooled themselves that slavery was not based on violence 
should not dismiss the essential truth that slavery did in fact improve, or at least 
become less obviously based on violence, over time. Such a statement does not 
absolve  nineteenth-century slaveholders from their crimes against enslaved people. 
Violence was everywhere in nineteenth-century slavery. But slavery was more 
violent before 1800 than it was after that date – the Christianization of slaves, the 
influence of ideas of freedom and human rights, and the example of Haiti as what 
happened when societies gave in completely to treating people as disposable com-
modities all made a difference. Lessening violence was most obvious in North 
America, as the stark code of patriarchalism changed from the late eighteenth cen-
tury into the less austere ideology of paternalism. As Philip Morgan explains, ‘patri-
archal masters stressed order, authority, unswerving obedience and were quick 
to resort to violence when their authority was questioned … [while paternalist 
masters] were more inclined to stress their solicitude, their generous treatment of 
their dependents’. Moreover, patriarchalists – men like Simon Taylor of Jamaica – 
had no illusions that their slaves loved them, as did paternalists. They knew very 
well that their slaves hated them, that they were capable of rebellions, and that they 
had to be considered dangerous aliens, ‘domestic enemies’, to be controlled prin-
cipally by violence and force.41 It was patriarchalists who were clear-sighted: slaves 
on nineteenth-century Louisiana or Cuban sugar plantations would have scoffed 
at suggestions that they lived under a mild form of paternalistic enslavement in 
which violence was replaced by kindness.42 But the paternalist vision of indulgent 
masters had considerable force. This is one reason why Harriet Beecher Stowe bal-
anced her evil and cruel Simon Legree character, tormenting Uncle Tom, with the 
kind and benevolent but weak Augustine St Clare, who exemplified the benevolent 
 aristocratic paternalist slave master.
 Atlantic slave systems and violence 213
This discussion leads us into the question of whether slavery in the Americas was 
more or less violent over time. In many ways, even asking such a question is not 
helpful in trying to understand the effects of enslavement on individuals. After all, it 
can be argued that it is misguided to try and quantify levels of violence in slavery and 
the slave trade, as violence is relational to individuals and psychological violence 
may be as devastating to the psyche as physical violence, as Nell Painter reminds 
us.43 But, bearing in mind this important caveat, if mortality rates can stand in as 
proxies for the violence of slavery, then the violence of slavery lessened over time. 
In the most violent part of the Atlantic slave system, the Middle Passage, mortality 
rates declined from a mortality rate of 22.6 per cent for slave ships sailing before 
1700 to 9.6 per cent between 1801 and 1820. Although the slave trade was far from 
finished in the nineteenth century, with millions transported to Iberian America 
until the mid 1860s, the abolition of the slave trade by most major European slave-
trading powers in the first two decades of the nineteenth century meant that fewer 
Africans suffered from the excessive violence of that trade than in the eighteenth 
century.44 And mortality rates also declined on slave plantations, even in major 
sugar producing societies. In the British Caribbean, annual mortality rates in 
Barbados declined from 5.8 per cent in the mid seventeenth century to 0.8 per cent 
in the late eighteenth century and to positive increase in the early nineteenth cen-
tury. In Jamaica, there was a similar decline from 4.6 per cent in the seventeenth 
century to 2.6 per cent in the last quarter of the eighteenth century.45 It seems that 
the true nadir of slavery, when slaves suffered most from endemic violence, was 
when plantations were being formed and when the large integrated plantation was 
becoming established in the early eighteenth century. Ira Berlin, who introduced 
the idea of a ‘plantation revolution’ in French and British America around 1700, 
notes that after that date ‘Chesapeake slaves faced the pillory, the whipping post 
and gallows far more frequently and in far larger numbers than ever before’. The 
Chesapeake was following the example of Barbados half a century earlier. Antoine 
Biet, who visited Barbados in 1654, was shocked at planter sadism towards slaves, 
such as a master cutting off a slave’s ear, roasting it, and forcing the slave to eat it. 
He lamented that ‘it is inhuman to treat [slaves] with so much harshness’, a view 
echoed a year later by Isaac Birkenhead who claimed that planters were happy to kill 
their slaves, ‘dogs and they being of one ranke with each other’.46
Planters who were honest with themselves recognized that this violence turned 
their societies into Hobbesian ones. This relied on the common view of Hobbes 
as describing social order as based on blind obedience to Leviathan – state-
sanctioned control over mechanisms of violence – without considering Hobbes’s 
careful theory of how such obedience was in the end based on consent (slaves 
never consented to their condition, so a slave society could never quite accord 
to Hobbesian principles).47 The Jamaican historian Bryan Edwards took this 
Hobbesian view of the proper relationship between masters and slaves when he 
argued that ‘the leading principle on which government is supported is fear, or 
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a sense of that absolute coercive necessity, which leaving no choice of action, 
 supersedes all sense of right’.48
A final case illustrates the centrality of violence to shaping the nature of slave 
societies and affecting every aspect of enslaved persons’ lives. Nicolas Lejeune, a 
psychopathic Saint Domingue planter, whose excessive cruelty to enslaved women 
was so outrageous that it led the French state to take the rare decision to prosecute 
a white man for violence done to black women, described the basis of planter power 
over slaves in the baldest fashion. In a 1788 speech made after his inevitable acquit-
tal by a white jury on charges of cruelty and murder, Lejeune explained why in a 
complete slave society like late eighteenth-century Saint Domingue slave owners 
needed to be given a torturer’s charter. White rule, Lejeune insisted, was depend-
ent on terror and the willingness of whites to use violence to keep slaves from 
‘buy[ing] their freedom with the blood of their masters’. ‘The unhappy condition of 
the Negro leads him’, he argued, ‘to naturally detest us. It is only force and violence 
that restrains him.’ He concluded that ‘it is not the fear and equity of the law that 
forbids the slave from stabbing his master, it is the consciousness of absolute power 
that he has over his person. Remove that bit, he will dare everything.’49 Three years 
after Lejeune’s speech, his ‘daring negroes’ removed that bit by force and started, 
as Lejeune feared, stabbing their masters, taking by force what masters maintained 
only through violence. 
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A ‘theatre of bloody carnage’: the revolt of Cairo 
and Revolutionary violence
Joseph Clarke
It is impossible to disentangle French Revolutionary history from the history of 
 violence. For both contemporary commentators and subsequent historians, the 
very chronology of the period is defined by its eruptions of mass violence, the 
journées that demarcate the Revolution’s different phases, while the interpreta-
tion of that violence has generated some of the historiography’s most heated 
debates. Without, as some have suggested, reducing the Revolution to killing 
pure and simple, violence remains, as Jean-Clément Martin and Bronisław Baczko 
have recently restated, an inextricable element of Revolutionary political culture.1 
Indeed, it is a measure of this preoccupation that Micah Alpaugh’s 2015 study 
of Non-Violence and the French Revolution was widely greeted as a radical depar-
ture in the historiography.2 And yet, for all the research that has been devoted to 
Revolutionary violence, that research has tended to revolve around two related but 
quite separate themes: the relationship between urban, typically Parisian, ‘crowd’ 
violence and authority, and the difference between Revolutionary violence and vio-
lence under the ancien régime.3 While the politics of popular violence still provokes 
debate, there is greater consensus on the latter point, and the difference between 
Revolutionary violence and earlier forms of Franco-French conflict remains critical 
to our understanding of the Revolution as a rupture with the past.
With little in the way of technological innovation to distinguish Revolutionary 
violence from that which preceded it, the basis for that distinction is primarily one 
of intention, a matter of the more ambitious aims that inspired communities to take 
up arms after the events of 1789 revealed that popular violence could bring about 
regime change. As William Beik’s survey of crowd violence from the sixteenth 
century to the Revolution concludes: ‘the difference between earlier instances of 
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collective action and the revolutionary instances lay in the new meaning which 
revolutionary participants attributed to the exercise of violence’.4 Certainly, crowd 
violence targeted many of the same victims – officials, clerics, merchants accused 
of hoarding – on either side of this caesura and many of the ritualized aspects of 
popular violence – the mutilation of enemies, the parading of body parts – appear 
unchanged across two centuries of popular protest. But such similarities are, in this 
view, superficial. As Donald Sutherland has recently argued, a fundamental dif-
ference exists between the massacres that took place in September 1792 and their 
‘sixteenth-century counterparts’ because ‘revolutionary atrocities took place in a 
secular and political context’.5
This insistence that the Revolution represents a watershed in the way that collec-
tive violence was understood and employed resonates across much of the scholar-
ship on the Revolutionary wars too. Whether those wars are calibrated in terms of 
scale or conceptualized according to von Clausewitz’s ‘absolute war’, assumed to 
anticipate later imperialisms or, more controversially, to prefigure the genocides 
of the twentieth century, Revolutionary warfare is generally seen as both quantita-
tively and qualitatively different from that which preceded it. The ‘master narrative’ 
of modern warfare that begins in 1792 and culminates in the totality of twentieth-
century conflict raises, as Roger Chickering has cautioned, ‘as many problems as it 
resolves’ and it certainly has its critics, but this narrative remains tenacious none-
theless.6 At the most basic level, the creation of the citizen army that emerged from 
1793’s levée en masse continues to define interpretations of this period and more 
recent work on the cultural history of Revolutionary warfare has tended to reinforce 
this sense of rupture with the past.7 Despite their very different points of departure, 
David Bell’s account of the ‘First Total War’ and Philip Dwyer’s pioneering work 
on massacres in the Revolutionary wars both arrive at a similar set of conclusions 
concerning what Bell describes as the ‘decline of religion as a cause of hostilities’ 
during the eighteenth century and what Dwyer defines as the ‘profoundly secular’ 
nature of Revolutionary repression.8 Like Sutherland, Dwyer sees an ‘important 
distinction’ between the religiously motivated massacres of the ancien régime and 
the ideologically inspired atrocities of the Revolutionary wars, and this distinction 
reflects a wider understanding of the Revolution as the dawn of a ‘resolutely secular’ 
political modernity.9
This interpretation also resonates with the recent imperative to view the 
Revolution and its wars as global phenomena, projecting and ‘pioneering’ new 
forms of imperialism beyond Europe.10 With this perspective in mind, Pierre Serna 
has traced the path that led men like Pierre François Boyer from the defence of 
the patrie in the 1790s to the conquest of Algeria in 1830. Boyer fought in Italy and 
Egypt in the late 1790s and earned his sobriquet, Pierre le Cruel, in Spain a decade 
later before going on to apply lessons learned there to an exceptionally brutal com-
mand in Oran in the 1830s.11 If, as Edward Said suggested, ‘the line that starts with 
Napoleon’ in Egypt in 1798 continued on throughout the colonial conflicts of the 
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nineteenth and twentieth centuries, then men like Boyer embody that connec-
tion as they carried the violence pioneered in the 1790s across a global stage in the 
 nineteenth century.12
Pierre le Cruel’s career is a useful point of departure because it exemplifies this 
tendency to view the Revolutionary wars as a foreshadowing of conflicts to come 
rather than as a reflection of violence as it was experienced in the 1790s. So, with his 
career as a cue, and Ute Planert’s caution that historians of the Revolutionary wars 
have taken ‘insufficient note of lines of continuity to early modern times’ in mind, 
this chapter examines the violence of the 1790s from the perspective of the men who 
inflicted most of it: the ‘armed missionaries’ that Robespierre warned of in January 
1792, the Revolution’s men in uniform.13 It explores how these soldiers calibrated 
the violence they were called on to commit and how they rationalized it at its worst, 
in order to understand the experiences that made men like Pierre Boyer cruel. Far 
from being unambiguously modern in either conception or conduct, the argument 
here is that these men’s experience of violence represents instead a complex inter-
play between the politics of the Revolutionary present and the cultural memory of 
past conflicts. One place to begin teasing out that complexity is, with due deference 
to Said, Cairo and what one French eyewitness described as ‘the theatre of bloody 
carnage’ that took place there in October 1798.14
Cairo, October 1798
It is impossible to say exactly how many died during the ‘two days of desperate fight-
ing’ that convulsed Cairo from the morning of 21 October 1798 and ended when 
French troops stormed the al-Azhar mosque the following evening.15 However, it 
is possible to say that what began as an anti-taxation demonstration quickly esca-
lated into a popular uprising that threatened to overthrow the occupation that had 
been established that summer, and that this threat prompted a brutal response.16 
Reports that the Porte had declared war on France certainly contributed to rising 
tensions, as did a summer of increasingly unpopular French reforms, even if these 
often opened with ‘God has commanded me’, but in Cairo, as across much of 
French-occupied Europe, it was the army’s rapacity that finally provoked resist-
ance.17 From the Rhineland in the mid 1790s to Spain over a decade later, the onset 
of a French occupation has been compared to ‘the arrival of a biblical plague of 
locusts’ or the descent of a wolf pack, and the Egyptian campaign was no different.18 
As elsewhere, the army’s arrival was accompanied by a steady stream of ‘contribu-
tions’ and ‘requisitions’ and, despite orders prohibiting pillage, it is clear from many 
soldiers’ testimonies that a poorly provisioned army provided for itself as best it 
could.19 This aspect of the French expedition has never attracted as much attention 
as Bonaparte’s ‘enlightened enterprise’ in Egypt, but the flip side of French occupa-
tion was an order based on wholesale extortion, sweeping exactions, and five or six 
executions a day in Cairo alone.20 By mid October, tensions were running high in 
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the capital and the proclamation of a new property tax on 20 October crystallized 
this discontent. The following morning, a demonstration in the al-Husayn quarter 
quickly turned to riot after the French general, Dominique Dupuy, was killed while 
attempting to restore order. His death triggered ‘a general revolt’ and as looting 
spread, attacks on Europeans, along with their local sympathizers, continued into 
the night.21 Facing the first real threat to their authority since their arrival in Cairo, 
the French were caught badly off guard. Bonaparte was not even in the city that 
morning, but on his return that afternoon preparations for a counteroffensive were 
quickly set in place.
The gloves came off the following day. Early that morning, Bonaparte ordered 
his men ‘to put anyone found armed to the sword’ and as his battle-hardened vet-
erans confronted crowds equipped, for the most part, with sticks and stones, the 
outcome was inevitable.22 As the troops moved in, corralling the insurgents in the 
area around the al-Azhar mosque, the repression was, in Lieutenant Chalbrand’s 
words, ‘rapid and terrible’.23 One dragoon wrote: ‘we swept through gloomy streets, 
massacring mercilessly all who were there with weapons in hand’, but Jean-Gabriel 
de Niello Sargy’s account suggests that the killing was even more indiscriminate.24 
He recalled that anyone found out of doors ‘was sacrificed without pity’ and this 
impression is confirmed in François Bernoyer’s letters describing ‘an awful massa-
cre’ as French cavalry, supported by cannon, ‘cut large crowds to pieces’ throughout 
the city.25 The climax came in the al-Azhar that afternoon when, after heavy shelling, 
the French stormed the mosque with orders to ‘exterminate everyone’ in it.26 The 
fighting there would be immortalized – and eroticized – a decade later in Girodet’s 
immense Révolte du Caire, but for those present at the time, there was nothing 
romantic about what took place in the al-Azhar. One soldier reported that ‘no quar-
ter was shown’ in the mosque, while François Vigo-Roussillon grimly concluded: 
‘there was great carnage’ there too.27
Carnage is the term most contemporaries used to describe these events, but 
if witnesses agreed on the scale of the bloodbath, they differed dramatically as to 
how many lives were lost. Alexandre Lacorre recalled seeing bodies ‘at every step’ 
as he walked through an eerily silent city the next day, but other accounts are less 
impressionistic and a week later Bonaparte wrote to Paris reporting fifty-seven 
French dead and between 2,000 and 2,500 civilian casualties.28 This is certainly an 
underestimate. Lieutenant Laval agreed that ‘very few French’ died but he put the 
civilian death toll at close to 6,000, an estimate Auguste Colbert echoed in his let-
ters home, while Corporal François reckoned the revolt cost 283 French dead and 
wounded, although once again this was dwarfed by his tally of over 4,000 civilian 
dead.29 More importantly, the killing did not stop there. With the revolt quashed, 
Bonaparte issued orders on 23 October that any insurgents captured alive were 
to be taken to the army’s stronghold, the Citadel, beheaded and their corpses 
cast into the Nile.30 Niello Sargy claimed that 300 died this way, including several 
prominent clerics charged with sedition, but Bernoyer put the number at 2,000; 
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in either case, the killings were still taking place long after Bonaparte proclaimed 
‘peace perfectly restored’.31
Like many later descriptions of colonial violence, the accounts that survive of this 
massacre were written from an overwhelmingly Western perspective. Bonaparte’s 
men were prolific letter-writers, diarists, and memoirists and, in contrast to sol-
diers in subsequent conflicts, they did not flinch from describing the violence they 
inflicted as well as that which they witnessed.32 By comparison, far fewer Cairenes 
left a record of these events. However, those that did, like the Arab Christian com-
mentator Nikula al-Turk or his Muslim contemporary Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti, 
describe the scale of the slaughter in very similar terms. For al-Jabarti, the death toll 
appeared so immense as to be incalculable, while al-Turk’s claim that ‘at least five 
thousand Muslims perished’ echoes the highest French estimates.33 The casualty 
figures differ from one account to another, although ethnicity did little to deter-
mine that difference, but the fact remains that somewhere between 2,500 and 8,000 
Cairenes died violent deaths in the space of just three days. To set those figures in 
context, it seems fair to say that the carnage in Cairo represents the largest single 
loss of civilian life during a decade of Revolutionary violence. Indeed, even the most 
conservative of those casualty figures, Bonaparte’s own, represents a far greater 
loss of life than the death toll of the bloodiest of Revolutionary journées, the 1,200 
to 1,400 men and women murdered in Paris during the prison massacres of 2–7 
September 1792. To put it another way, almost twice as many Cairenes were killed 
during those two days in 1798 as Parisians throughout the Terror, in a city half the 
size of the French capital.34
This was killing on a grand scale, but this very asymmetric violence was neither 
unique to Egypt nor unprecedented in the 1790s. It was certainly extreme in extent, 
but after five years of fighting counter-insurgency campaigns against Vendéens and 
chouans in France, barbetti in Piedmont, and ‘brigands’ across occupied Europe, 
this was an all too familiar way of waging war for the Revolution’s soldiers.35 It was 
especially familiar to those in the Army of the Orient, who had already accompa-
nied Bonaparte into Italy in 1796. Throughout that campaign, Bonaparte’s faith in 
the salutary effects of ‘a terrible example’ had been constant, and proclamations 
and even press notices repeatedly promised that resistance would provoke a spec-
tacular reckoning.36 Following the burning of Binasco and the massacre of its men-
folk in May 1796, for example, he published a ‘Proclamation to the inhabitants of 
Lombardy’ warning: ‘Let the example of Binasco open your eyes! Any villages 
persisting in revolt will share its fate’, and his men were as good as his word.37 Across 
Lombardy and the Veneto, massacre was an accepted means to an exemplary end 
in 1796 and the French occupation of Egypt was accompanied by the same orders 
to ‘make a terrible example’, the same scorched villages, the same trail of ‘streets 
covered in dead’.38 The army’s advance through Sharqia province in early October 
was typical. After suffering light losses to raids launched by ‘Arabs howling like 
wild beasts’, Corporal François casually noted that ‘we burned 23 villages, the most 
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rebellious ones … All of the inhabitants, except the women and children, were put 
to the sword. More than 900 were put to death.’39 Wherever it came, the French 
response to resistance was immediate and terrible, and in this respect the violence 
unleashed in Cairo differed from that inflicted on villages like Thévené – where the 
wounding of one French soldier led to the massacre of an entire village – only in 
scale.40 So much, it might be added, for the ‘paix aux chaumières!’ the Revolution 
had promised in 1792.
All of the ranks recognized this exemplary logic and congratulated themselves 
repeatedly on their thoroughness in following it through, at first in the countryside 
between Alexandria and Cairo and then in the capital. As Lieutenant Chalbrand 
concluded after the revolt there: ‘the repression was … terrible, but it impressed 
upon the Muslims an extraordinary idea of French strength and power and this … 
consolidated our domination’.41 This reasoning was widely shared. Joseph Moiret 
viewed ‘the severity we deployed’ in equally sanguine terms, concluding that ‘hap-
pily for us’ it would deter ‘those who might be tempted or incited to follow its 
[Cairo’s] example’, while others described it as a ‘lesson’ for all Egypt.42 In this 
sense, there was nothing unusual about the carnage these soldiers wrought in Cairo 
and none of their accounts attempt to excuse it by reference to the indiscipline or 
bloodlust that officers sometimes cited to excuse a city’s sacking after a siege. On 
the contrary, Bonaparte’s order to ‘exterminate’ everyone in the al-Azhar was an 
atrocity intended to subdue a whole city and, beyond that, an entire country, and 
its meaning was clear to all of his men. Grenadier Vigo-Roussillon summarized this 
rationale in stark terms: ‘only terror could keep us in a country where we were few in 
number and where all the inhabitants were, out of religious fanaticism, our irrecon-
cilable enemies’.43 This was slaughter as strategy, the deliberate use of massacre to 
consolidate a colonial occupation. And yet, however calculated this carnage might 
have been, Vigo-Roussillon’s reference to religious fanaticism suggests that there 
was more to this violence than simply impressing the locals with an object lesson in 
French military might.
Civilization and fanaticism
According to Henry Laurens, everything the French did in Egypt ‘was done in 
the name of civilization’: it was, he argues, ‘the key word of expeditionary dis-
course’.44 This may well have been true of the savants who aspired, in Jonathan 
Israel’s account, to ‘bring Egypt into a new era’ by dint of enlightened idéologie 
and  Republican reform and it unquestionably provided French propagandists 
(and some subsequent commentators) with a suitably selfless excuse for an 
unprovoked invasion.45 This civilizing mission may even have meant something to 
Bonaparte in his more messianic moments, but spreading ‘civilization’ meant little 
to most of his men. They had scant time for the savants – officers observed that 
‘a kind of fury … animated the soldiers’ against the intellectuals they blamed for 
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being in Egypt in the first place – and even less for their highfalutin ideas of enlight-
ened imperialism.46 While some officers echoed the official line, most soldiers were 
sceptical of this civilizing mission and after just a few weeks among this ‘sottish, 
slavish people’ Joseph Moiret probably spoke for many of his comrades when he 
concluded that ‘we soon saw the impossibility of civilizing them’.47 Whatever other 
ambitions these men may have entertained in Egypt, and surviving long enough to 
get home would probably have satisfied most of them after the French fleet was 
routed at Aboukir Bay, civilizing the Orient was not one of them. Indeed, soldiers 
rarely mentioned the idea in their journals or letters home, except in so far as they 
considered Egypt a ‘land where civilization seemed extinguished’.48
If the idea of civilization is often absent from these soldiers’ testimonies, the 
fear of fanaticism features prominently in most accounts of the expedition. That 
one word, along with its offshoots fanatic, fanatical, fanaticized, recurs repeatedly 
in their letters and diaries and it encapsulates how these men viewed what Sub-
Lieutenant Vertray described as ‘this fanatical and fatalistic people’.49 The contrast 
between Egypt’s antique past and what the French saw as its abject present;  the 
despotism its people supposedly submitted to; the poverty, dirt, and disease 
they endured; the oppression of its women; the want of wine and the absence of 
amenable female company: most soldiers attributed some if not all of what they 
saw as Egypt’s backwardness to Islam’s influence and ‘the moral brutalization’ it 
supposedly inspired.50 Pierre Gerbaud even blamed the ‘astonishing multitude of 
ugly, useless dogs’ roaming Egypt’s towns on the idiosyncrasies of a religion that 
supposedly prohibited killing them, before embarking on his own private war on 
Damietta’s dogs.51
The French blamed Islam, much more than Mamluk rule, for their alienation 
in Egypt and this antipathy only increased when the soldiers came face to face 
with Islam at its most exuberant during Cairo’s celebration of Mawlid that August. 
Edouard de Villiers du Terrage expressed a common view when he wrote that these 
devotions ‘inspired me with pity and contempt’.52 More importantly, these festivi-
ties also inspired fear – fear of the unknown certainly, but also fear of what many of 
the French saw as Islam’s essential extremism, an absence of restraint that some 
likened to insanity, especially when it was expressed with the unsettling enthusiasm 
of the  city’s Sufi mystics, ‘holy madmen’, ‘foaming at the mouth … running the 
streets … naked as apes’, that the French described seeing that August.53 For many of 
the French, Islam appeared to be unreason incarnate, but if some soldiers owed this 
jaundiced view of Islam as a kind of ‘perpetual delirium’ to the extracts from Volney’s 
Voyages en Egypte et en Syrie that were available in their messes, they were the well-
read few.54 Instead, for the majority, this intense antipathy was more ingrained than 
erudite. It stemmed from the ‘disenchantment’ they experienced from the moment 
they arrived in Egypt and the disconcerting ‘difference of moeurs and religion’ they 
encountered there.55 For that reason, Bonaparte’s attempts to draw Islam, or at least 
its elites, into the Republican fold proved contentious from the start.
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From the moment the French arrived in Egypt, Bonaparte had pursued a con-
certed, if not particularly convincing, attempt to win over Egyptian hearts and 
minds by appearing to embrace Islam. From his much-mocked declaration that ‘we 
too are true Muslims’ on arriving in Alexandria to his orders to show respect for 
Islam and its adherents, this policy defined the early stages of the expedition and it 
intensified when the French occupied Cairo in July.56 Further proclamations declar-
ing Bonaparte’s respect ‘for the religion of the Prophet which I love’ accompanied 
the army’s arrival in the capital and this policy climaxed a month later when the 
army was made to mark Mawlid with as much pomp as possible.57 Pierre Pelleport 
claimed that ‘nothing was forgotten to persuade the Egyptians that the army had the 
greatest reverence for the Prophet’, although he also admitted that the soldiers pri-
vately sniggered at the ‘comedy’ of it all.58 Sniggering may have been a price worth 
paying if this posturing had succeeded, but it seems clear that few Cairenes were 
convinced by these attempts to conscript Islam to the French cause. Al-Jabarti, for 
one, was scathing about Bonaparte’s ‘incoherent’ declarations of devotion, and the 
Egyptians’ adoption of the nickname Ali-Bonaparte was clearly a mark of ridicule 
rather than respect, even if the joke was largely lost on the French.59 More damaging 
still, this policy also took a toll on the men’s morale, their regard for their general, 
and maybe even their self-respect. All of those orders to avoid offending local reli-
gious sensibilities evidently failed because they had to be reissued repeatedly, while 
the sight of Bonaparte in ‘oriental costume’ during Mawlid unsettled some in the 
army.60 Lieutenant Chalbrand claimed that many of his men found these ‘acts of 
deference towards mahometanism’ ‘demeaning’ and Joseph Moiret’s verdict was 
even more damning.61 Reflecting on the pretence the army had been ordered to put 
on, he recalled his comrades complaining ‘that they had not shaken off the preju-
dices of Europe only to adopt those of the Orient’.62 Bonaparte’s policy, as his men 
saw it, of pandering to Islam clearly rankled. It ran counter to their own aversion 
to Egyptian culture, but perhaps more importantly it offended, as Moiret’s remark 
suggests, the soldiers’ sense of themselves as a Revolutionary army, a force freed of 
the prejudices of the old order and fighting to establish the new. By 1798, that self-
image was deeply ingrained.63 It had been forged in the defence of the patrie and 
honed on battlefields across Europe, but its roots lay back in France, in the rhetoric 
of Republican regeneration and the religious conflicts that had convulsed France 
since the Revolution began.
From the first major outbreaks of resistance to Revolutionary change in 1790, 
the new regime routinely attributed any form of popular opposition to ‘the clam-
ours of fanaticism’, a matter of clerical conspiracy and misguided religious fervour 
on the part of a ‘fanaticized countryside’.64 As the new authorities struggled to 
contain rising disaffection, this analysis became a commonplace in 1792, and when 
that disaffection exploded into civil war in the Vendée in March 1793 its outbreak 
was understood in the same terms. For the Republicans sent to repress the rising 
in the west that spring, the revolt there was represented not as a rural revolt against 
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enlistment, but as a Manichean struggle pitting liberty against backwardness and 
bigotry, a war in which the enemy always went into battle swathed in scapulars, 
urged on by their priests, ‘the apostles of fanaticism’ in General Turreau’s terms, 
with the promise of a martyr’s death.65 This image of relentless religious fanaticism 
and the ‘sacred fury’ it inspired was a recurring theme in Republican dispatches 
from the Vendée and it shaped many soldiers’ sense of both the nature of the revolt 
and the kind of repression it warranted.66 As one officer wrote from the west of 
France in August 1793:
It is a great mistake to employ tactics against men who fight, a scapular and a rosary in 
hand and who hurl themselves against our artillery armed only with sticks … As long 
as we wage a war against these fanatics other than that which they wage themselves, we 
are lost. We must follow their own methods … We can no longer hope to bring them 
to reason. We must kill them all, or they will kill us.67
This image of the enemy as irrational and implacable, and the orders for a war of 
‘extermination’ that it inspired, marked the Vendée out as radically different from 
the war France was fighting on its frontiers.68 In defining civil war as a war against 
fanaticism, the Revolution defined it, as Antoine Momoro insisted that autumn, as 
a conflict in which ‘an entire population can be considered an enemy’, a crusade in 
which compromise was inconceivable.69
Many historians have argued that the Revolutionary and Imperial authorities 
criminalized civilian resistance as ‘banditry’ and ‘brigandage’, but in defining civil 
war in this way, Republicans described the opposition they encountered in much 
more apocalyptic terms.70 In this discourse – and it was ubiquitous in 1793 – the 
fanatic was not simply an outlaw: he, or she, was demonized as something mon-
strous, a ‘ferocious beast’, a ‘hydra’, or described as a disease, a ‘gangrene’ that could 
only, as Bertrand Barère insisted that August, be excised with ‘fire and the sword’.71 
The Republican elite dehumanized civilian resistance and it seems clear that many 
soldiers embraced this message wholeheartedly. In their accounts, the civilians in 
the West appear inherently alien: ‘strangers to our moeurs, our laws’, ‘barbarians’, 
or simply inhuman, ‘fanatical brigands’ fit only to be dealt with ‘as one hunts wild 
boars’, as one volunteer claimed in June 1793.72 This may explain why soldiers like 
Corporal François Joliclerc felt able to write home that ‘men and women, they will 
all be run through. They must all perish, all except the little children’ or bragged, like 
Michel Raphanel in a letter to his father, of their intention to ‘exterminate all’ the 
Republic’s enemies.73 Just as the levée en masse began to assemble the largest army 
Europe had ever seen, Revolutionary discourse radically redefined these soldiers’ 
sense of what they were fighting for and, just as importantly, what they were fight-
ing against. In waging war on religious fanaticism, men like Joliclerc or Raphanel 
believed they were fighting a crusade in which the laws of war no longer applied.
Neither Joliclerc nor Raphanel ever reached Egypt, but many of their comrades 
did and they carried all of the preconceptions they had acquired about the nature of 
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civilian resistance and how to combat it with them from France into Egypt in 1798. 
Many in the Army of the Orient, from generals like Dumas and Kléber and junior 
officers like Vaxelaire or Colbert to ordinary soldiers like Louis Bricard, were vet-
erans of the Vendée. More, like Bonaparte himself, had honed these assumptions 
about enemies armed with ‘a dagger in one hand and the crucifix in the other’, in 
Italy during the triennio.74 For the French, the resistance they encountered in Italy 
seemed, as one soldier wrote from Lazio in 1798, ‘just like the Vendée’, and many of 
his comrades applied the same analogy once they reached Egypt.75 Admittedly some, 
like Dumas, held that the war there was even ‘worse than that of the Vendée’, but it 
is the choice of comparison that matters here because this readiness to view wars of 
conquest in the light of civil war at home determined how these soldiers concep-
tualized, and ultimately conducted, counter-insurgency in Egypt.76 It explains the 
wary eye the army kept on muezzins from the moment it arrived in Egypt and it 
makes sense of the uneasy census of Cairo’s 300-odd mosques many soldiers made 
as soon as they reached the city.77 As Dominique-Vivant Denon put it, the French 
saw Cairo’s mosques as ‘the refuge of crime’ and they appraised them accordingly, 
as they would an enemy army, because this is where they expected opposition to 
originate.78 Inevitably then, when the crisis finally came to a head in October, the 
identification of responsibility for the revolt was little more than a reflex.
There was unquestionably a religious dimension to the revolt of Cairo. Al-Jabarti 
admitted as much when he criticized a militant minority among the ulama for 
seizing on the sultan’s declaration of war to incite ‘the riff-raff’ to rise up, but for 
all that, the revolt of Cairo was a riot that spiralled out of control rather than the 
eruption of a holy war.79 Religious grievances may have fuelled resentment against 
French rule but, as across occupied Europe, it was the new regime’s rapacity, rather 
than religious zeal, that finally prompted resistance. The civilians who accompa-
nied the armies often recognized as much, although few soldiers saw things this 
way.80 At most, they saw the everyday affronts and unpopular exactions the occu-
pation engendered as minor irritants, ‘secondary circumstances … that came to 
the aid of the seditious’ according to Auguste Colbert, and most of his comrades 
agreed.81 Instead, both officers and men looked instinctively to the ‘crazed convul-
sionaries’ concealed in the city’s mosques and blamed their ‘fanatical preaching’ 
and ‘seditious sermons’ for the events that overtook them on 20 October.82 It was 
a reassuringly familiar explanation, and as in Europe it served to absolve an unwel-
come occupation, and its men, of responsibility for the resistance their presence 
had provoked.
When the fighting had finished, the violence that had begun, according to the 
French, in the mosques ended there too. Having identified religion once again as the 
root cause of revolt, the Revolution’s soldiers exorcised their anger in the al-Azhar 
itself. No soldiers described this aftermath in any detail – and that uncharacteristic 
silence is suggestive in itself – but al-Turk and al-Jabarti did, and their accounts fill 
that void. While al-Turk confined himself to describing how ‘distressed’ the city’s 
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residents were ‘to see the sacred sanctuary of their mosque violated’, al-Jabarti 
described what that ‘profanation’ amounted to in despairing detail:
the French trod in the Mosque of al-Azhar with their shoes, carrying swords and 
rifles … they ravaged the students’ quarters … They plundered whatever they found 
in the mosque … They treated the books and Qur’anic volumes as trash, throwing 
them on the ground, stamping them with their feet and shoes. Furthermore, they 
soiled the mosque, blowing their spit in it, pissing and defecating in it. And whoever 
they happened to meet in the mosque they stripped. They chanced upon someone in 
the students’ residence and slaughtered him. Thus they committed deeds in al-Azhar 
which are but little of what they are capable of, for they are enemies of the Religion.83
Iconoclasm and pillage were nothing new to these soldiers. The French left a trail 
of sacked churches, smashed saints’ statues, and stolen silverware across Western 
Europe too. And yet, however accustomed these men were to acts of sacrilege and 
symbolic violence, all of this desecration and defecation seems like an act of expia-
tion too. For an army that had so self-consciously, as Moiret put it, ‘shaken off the 
prejudices of Europe’, the three months that preceded the sacking of the al-Azhar 
had been an unsettling experience. They had been three months of putting up with 
a ‘victorious general debasing himself to feign religious sentiments contrary to his 
conscience’ and three months of orders to respect a religion most of these men 
despised.84 The ferocity of the violence in the al-Azhar is a measure of the toll this 
policy finally took and perhaps even a mark of the shame it inspired. It is as if all 
of that frenetic spitting and shitting and pissing was meant to purge the pollution 
of proximity to a religion these men found ‘repellent’ and undo the ignominy of 
Bonaparte’s assertion that ‘we too are true Muslims’.85
The Revolution’s ‘rites of violence’
There is much here that seems to prefigure the violence of later colonial cam-
paigns. The Army of the Orient’s systematic use of massacre in 1798 seems to 
foreshadow  the atrocities the French employed in Algeria in the 1830s, just as 
these soldiers’ use of the term ‘fanatic’ to describe their enemies anticipates the 
idiom colonial officials employed to the same end in British India throughout the 
nineteenth century.86 The ‘prose of counter-insurgency’, to borrow Ranajit Guha’s 
phrase, appears common to both contexts and in this sense Said was right.87 There 
is a line that connects the French presence in Egypt to these later colonial con-
texts, and from that perspective this violence does appear precociously modern. 
However, from the perspective of the soldiers who engaged in this slaughter, that 
line leads in a very different direction and it points backwards, not forwards, in time. 
These soldiers arrived in Egypt with their own experiences to draw on and their 
own entrenched understanding of the relationship between religion and violence. 
These had been established at home, in their experience of civil war and, beyond 
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that, in the cultural memory of the confessional conflicts that had convulsed France 
throughout the early modern period.
Rather than interpreting Revolutionary violence as unequivocally modern, let 
alone ‘profoundly secular’, focusing on these soldiers’ experiences in the 1790s 
presents instead lines of continuity that reach back from the repression in Cairo 
to the civil war in France, a civil war that contemporaries repeatedly conceptual-
ized by reference to the wars of religion. The men of the Revolution may have 
repudiated the French past, but they knew their history well and they repeatedly 
invoked it to explain the violence that engulfed them in the 1790s and to justify the 
extremes they employed in suppressing it. Allusions to Saint Bartholomew’s Day, 
the Michelade, and all the other ‘cruelties committed in the wars of religion’ loomed 
large in Revolutionary accounts of the war in the Vendée and the memory of the 
more recent religious war in the Cévennes proved just as serviceable.88 Mathieu 
Baudran, for example, doubtless disapproved of Louis XIV’s dragonnades – most 
good Republicans did – but he still recommended applying them as a model when 
he was sent west to suppress chouannerie in 1795.89 History had taught this generation 
that civil conflict was inherently confessional and they defined their enemies and 
calibrated their response to them accordingly. In interpreting counter-insurgency 
as a war waged against religious fanaticism, the Revolution embraced an earlier 
language of confessional conflict and this language carried within it a whole set of 
assumptions about the nature of the enemy and the violence it was permissible to 
deploy against it. The resonance of this language explains the ease with which those 
orders to ‘exterminate’ were issued and the enthusiasm with which they were car-
ried out. In defining their opponents as fanatics, these soldiers marked them out as 
fundamentally different from other combatants. Unlike conventional armies which 
might be defeated in battle, an enemy inspired by religious fanaticism could never 
be brought to terms or reasoned with because the fanatic was, by definition, unrea-
soning, ‘imbecilic’, ‘atrocious and insane’.90 Immune to reason and negotiation, the 
‘fanatic’ had forfeited the right to be regarded as a conventional opponent and was 
reduced instead to a ‘semi-savage’, a ‘barbarian’, or worse still, in language that was 
repeated from the Vendée to Egypt, a ‘ferocious beast’.91 In dehumanizing their ene-
mies in these terms, Republicans rationalized their recourse to extremes of violence 
that seemed, by the standards of the eighteenth century, to belong to another era.
This is why that final frenzy in the al-Azhar mosque is so revealing. The 
Revolution’s soldiers thought of their enemies as relics from the past and their 
‘rites of violence’ reflect something of that identification of resistance with religious 
war.92 The dehumanization of the enemy on religious grounds; the decision to 
exterminate those deemed beyond the pale by virtue of their religious beliefs; the 
singling out of clerics for special retribution; the resort to massacre and mutilation; 
the casting of corpses into water to be washed away; even that compulsion to des-
ecrate and defile sacred spaces: there is a pattern to this violence and that pattern 
is predicated on the soldiers’ perception of religious difference and the threat it 
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posed to the order they embodied. However much Revolutionary historians may 
think of 1789 as ‘the threshold of the modern age’, its ‘year zero’ even, and however 
much they insist that Revolutionary violence, like the politics of this particular 
 modernity, was radically different and ‘resolutely secular’, these ‘rites of violence’ 
suggest that the Revolution’s relationship to the past was more complicated.93 
These Revolution’s soldiers were not ‘warriors of God’ in the sense that their 
sixteenth-century predecessors were, but in imagining the wars of the 1790s as a 
‘war to the death’ against an enemy inspired by religious fanaticism, these men were 
fighting their own wars of religion.94
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Conquer, extract, and perhaps govern: 
organic economies, logistics, and violence in 
the pre-industrial world
Wayne E. Lee
Augustus Caesar would say, that he wondered that Alexander feared he should want 
work, having no more worlds to conquer: as if it were not as hard a matter to keep as 
to conquer.
Francis Bacon1
[The first emperor of China] failed to rule with humanity and righteousness and did 
not realize that the power to attack and the power to retain what one has thereby won, 
are not the same … Insuring peace and stability in the lands one has annexed calls for 
a respect for authority. Hence I say that seizing and guarding what you have seized, do 
not depend upon the same techniques.
The Grand Historian Sima Qian, critiquing China’s first emperor,  
Qin Shi Huangdi2
Since the old days the Tatar have fought our fathers and grandfathers. Now to get 
revenge for all the defeats, to get satisfaction for the deaths of our grandfathers and 
fathers, we’ll kill every Tatar man taller than the linch-pin on the wheel of a cart. We’ll 
kill them until they’re destroyed as a tribe. The rest we’ll make into slaves and disperse 
them among us.
Chinggis Khan, as recorded in the Secret History3
It was not plunder they [the Cherokees] wanted from them [the Creeks] but to go to 
war with them and cut them of[f] [kill them].
George Chicken, reporting on Cherokee motivations in 17154
Large-scale coordinated violence has nearly always sought to rearrange political 
authority; violence in self-defence is not an exception to this statement, as it merely 
seeks to maintain the status quo.5 The post-victory process of rearranging authority 
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and its subsequent maintenance, however, is less well studied than the immediate 
means of achieving that victory. In part, this is because military history has tradition-
ally focused on the narratives and variables of campaigns and battles, while political 
history tends to focus on long-term state formation through the lens of institutional 
development. As a result, analyses of the key role of force in the complex dynamic 
of consolidating and maintaining conquest after victory have fallen between the 
cracks.6 Furthermore, historians in general have focused on these dynamics within 
and among traditional sedentary states, eliding wide swathes of the human experi-
ence outside that social formation. Indeed, even the word ‘conquest’ is not quite 
right, as it implies some form of territorial capture or control. As we will see, not all 
war was about controlling or occupying territory.7
The theoretical model presented here, therefore, seeks to transcend states. 
It posits that victors in the pre-industrial world secured the long-term benefits 
of military success through a combination of four ‘pillars’: legitimacy, sanctity, 
bureaucracy, and the deployment of force in a security or ‘latent’ mode. The 
way victors deployed the last pillar, latent force, was heavily shaped by logistical 
considerations, which in turn reflected the fundamentals of the victor’s subsist-
ence system.  Rather than simply comparing different states, or even compar-
ing ‘barbarians’ with more settled polities, this chapter compares early modern 
societies according to their different systems of subsistence: agricultural states, 
nomadic pastoral clans on the Eurasian steppe, and Native American polities in 
the North American woodlands during the historic era.8 These are used to analyse 
different forms of ‘conquest’ – the ability to secure long-term benefits of military 
 success – thereby highlighting the structural relationship between logistics and 
the expected rewards of conquest. The chapter focuses first on conflict within each 
of these subsistence niches. Over time, patterns of conquest within each niche 
generated normative definitions of victory and associated expectations about the 
fate of defeated populations. When different systems clashed – for example, when 
the steppe invaded the sown or when the forces of a state marched into the North 
American woods – the resulting mismatch of expectations about the meaning of 
victory changed not only the violence of war, but also the violence of post-war 
consolidation.
Moving beyond a focus on settled states as the norm and instead systematically 
comparing a fuller range of sociopolitical formations can move us beyond sim-
plistic assumptions about the violence of ‘primitives’, ‘savages’, ‘barbarians’, or 
even intruding ‘colonists’. Culture and prejudice surely played profound roles in 
generating violence, including violence beyond what was considered normal.9 
This approach also lessens our dependence on contemporary representations and 
accounts of violence and allows us to investigate the relationship between structure 
and violence: the ways in which fundamental structural conflicts were embedded 
in different societies’ expectations of resource extraction in the wake of so-called 
victory.
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Hierarchical agricultural states
In the states of the pre-industrial world, one can discern three basic types of con-
quest wielded against other states, summarized in Table 13.1 (along with two forms 
of non-conquest outcomes):
This simple typology is messier in reality of course. Methods were used in 
varying combinations, depending on the victorious state’s calculation of risks and 
rewards. Furthermore, complete conquests were relatively rare. More common 
outcomes are reflected in the table by the two non-conquest types: one in which the 
losing side surrendered a slice of territory to the victor to bring an end to an expen-
sive or increasingly dangerous conflict, and the other when there was little thought 
of outright conquest and instead the combatants sought more short-term plunder 
or merely to exert political pressure through destruction. Finally, these conquest 
methods also often occurred in succession. A losing or weaker state might submit, 
thus becoming a tributary vassal or client, but then later rebel, leading to a more 
complete conquest and provincialization – a pattern common to Assyria, Egypt, 
China, Rome, and many other expansive states in the pre-industrial world. The 
larger point is that each of these methods of consolidating conquest was designed 
to capture resources from the territory and labour of the defeated state, largely for 
the benefit of the elite in the victorious state.
The elites of most pre-industrial states reaped the rewards of conquest person-
ally, but rulers also ‘reinvested’ in their military capacity, using conquest to help 
acquire more force. But here we must distinguish between ‘force’ and ‘power’.10 
Power in this sense was the ability to rule without the resort to force. When behav-
ioural assumptions and cultural norms of deference allowed for the peaceful collec-
tion of taxes (for example), a ruler’s fundamental power was greater than if he or she 
had to rely on force for that collection.
Consolidating power over conquered populations rested on four pillars. These 
pillars are not confined to states, but the state provides us with a familiar frame-
work within which to consider them and we will turn to their non-state mani-
festations later. The four pillars are legitimacy, sanctity, bureaucracy, and latent 
force.11 Power – rule without resort to violence – ultimately relied on legitimacy, 
and there were many frameworks for establishing this: the claim of blood descent, 
the imprimatur of an election, a cultural belief in victory as a sign from the divine, 
or even  simply a reputation for generosity to allies and kin in the aftermath 
of victory.  All were mechanisms for asserting the legitimacy of rule. Very fre-
quently, however, legitimacy was tied to a claim of sanctity. A claim of access to 
the divine was so significant and so common that we must consider it separately 
from legitimacy. Bureaucracy institutionalized the exercise of power without the 
resort to violence. It was more mechanistic than the cultural norms required for 
legitimacy or sanctity, but its regularized systems of extraction, especially when 
modulated by law, depersonalized the process. Bureaucracy distanced the ruler 
Table 13.1 Conquest types in war between sedentary agricultural states
Shorthand for political 
nature of victory
Political fate of losers Resource reallocation Spatial 
rearrangement
Consolidation requirements
Mass population removal Elite decapitated; population 
enslaved or displaced
Much moved to conqueror’s original 
resource area (or are forced to 
migrate away)
Conqueror must have a resource base that 
needs labour, or surplus population 
prepared to colonize (the latter 
becomes provincialization, but without 
a native population to control)
Tributary Elite submits or is co-opted 
under pressure; or a puppet 
ruler installed
Labour remains on conquered 
territory; surplus redirected to 
conqueror; local bureaucracy intact
No major garrisons required 
More profitable for conqueror but less 
politically reliable 
Requires some loyalty work
Partial territorial surrender Limited conquest: territorial 
slice surrendered
Central polity surrenders a territorial 
slice to provincialization; local elite 
usually replaced
Requires territorial garrisons and loyalty 




Elite decapitated; new elite 
imposed
Labour remains on conquered 
territory; some surplus to reward 
newly imposed elite, rest to 
conqueror state
Requires territorial garrisons and loyalty 
work
Plunder, devastation, raid No authority change, 
but regime legitimacy 
undermined, costs incurred
Plunder taken Not a form of conquest by itself
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or the elite from the resentment of the taxed and thus sustained the broader 
 legitimacy of rule.
In the long term, legitimacy, sanctity, and bureaucracy are cheaper and more effi-
cient pillars of rule than force, but establishing any of them among a newly defeated 
population represented a generational challenge. Creating a legitimate heritable or 
transferable dynasty beyond the immediate ‘rights of the victor’ required what we 
will call here more generally ‘loyalty work’. Establishing claims to a divine connec-
tion, for example, might require generations of cultivation. Fortunately for many 
new conquerors, bureaucracy, unlike sanctity or legitimacy, often proved somewhat 
easier to transfer to the victor.
Even more than bureaucracy, however, the readiest pillar for consolidating con-
trol in the immediate wake of state territorial conquest was the management and 
distribution of some form of latent force. Military forces, even if no longer actively 
fighting, provided a visible guarantee against continued resistance or future 
rebellion. In general, the precise ways that latent force was composed, used, and 
distributed depended on two key factors: the specific type of conquest (tributary, 
provincialization, and so on) and the military logistical system, which was in turn 
derived from the normal demographic operating environment of the conquer-
ing society. It is this latter tripartite relationship (demographic space – military 
 logistics – latent force management) that primarily concerns us here.
The logistics supporting an agricultural state’s military on campaign differed 
from those required for latent force. Campaign logistics depended primarily on the 
roads (rivers in some cases) and the food generated by the local organic economy: 
armies moved on locally built roads and ate locally produced food. In low-density, 
resource-scarce environments (deserts, mountains, and so on), wagons carrying 
supplies assumed greater importance, and sometimes roads had to be built as part 
of the campaign.
Latent force logistics, however, presents a somewhat different problem, visible 
in outline in the ‘consolidation requirements’ column of Table 13.1. We can dispose 
of the first two relatively quickly, because mass displacement and tributary submis-
sion typically avoided latent force costs. An enslaved population brought back to 
labour in the home territory, or sent to another province of the empire, required 
relatively little latent force (except possibly to escort them along the march). Such 
a population, beaten down, often dispersed, in an unfamiliar territory, and probably 
deprived of many of its adult men by defeat, was an unlikely immediate source of 
rebellion. Rather than outright force, enslaved populations were managed more 
by a rearrangement of the bureaucracy to provide slave codes and relatively cheap 
policing.
The next cheapest option was some form of submission followed by a tributary 
relationship. In this case, land and labour came together, almost entirely without 
administrative cost to the victor. The losing state continued to operate its own 
systems of collecting surplus and provided its own internal and external security, 
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only now the tributary state transmitted part of its surplus to the victor as tribute. 
Depending on the exact nature and terms of the submission, the victor might have 
to fund a puppet ruler, or even locate a small garrison in the loser’s territory, but 
compared to provincialization the logistical requirements were tiny.
Provincialization, however, either of a surrendered slice of territory or of the 
entire territory of a defeated state, put heavier demands on latent force. The usual 
requirement was some form of distributed garrisons around the defeated territory. 
There were other forms of latent force – such as the court as travelling armed camp, 
in which the king moved around his territory accompanied by the army, imposing 
costs on his local hosts, reminding them of his power, and keeping the army sup-
plied by moving – but garrisons were the more common method among agricultural 
states. The number and location of garrisons varied with geography and population 
distribution, but population control and the enforcement of surplus collection 
required a wide distribution of force. Like troops on campaign, those troops had to 
eat and move. In densely settled and well-developed areas, it was a relatively simple 
matter to put such garrisons into regional market towns and the loser’s capital, where 
roads came together and to which food was already being regularly transported by 
the normal functioning of the economy. In many cases, however, the occupiers had 
to split forces into smaller garrisons, since no one region could supply sufficient food 
for a large army for very long, except at the great expense of transporting it. English 
forces in Ireland in the sixteenth century made these kinds of calculations explicit – 
in peacetime they dispersed garrisons around the territory to ‘bridle’ the countryside, 
with each garrison dependent on local food and transportation networks. The garri-
sons were supposed to live from the ‘cess’ of the surrounding countryside – a kind of 
tax-in-kind – and meanwhile, if the locals rebelled, that same produce would be for-
feit to destructive raids by the garrison.12 English long-term plans in Ireland sought 
to build the other pillars of conquest by ‘shiring’ the Gaelic territories, imposing the 
English county structure, property law, and judicial systems.13
In densely populated core provinces, as the other three pillars of conquest took 
hold, latent force became less necessary. Frequently those forces then moved to 
the state’s periphery, where the local population might not be dense enough to 
sustain them. In such undeveloped regions the central government found itself 
paying for walls, roads, and for the long-distance transport of food to sustain the 
garrisons – one need only think of the Roman frontier and the Chinese steppe 
frontier, but other examples abound, not least in the Ottoman and Russian empires. 
Alternatively, as became common in medieval China, soldiers were required 
to grow their own food on the frontiers. These expensive frontier latent force 
requirements were only made possible by the shift to cheaper forms of legitimated 
 bureaucratic rule in the core provinces.
In sum: the military conquest of one agricultural state by another made it pos-
sible to extract new wealth from the additional territory (or from a newly enslaved 
labour pool). A tributary-type conquest did not require the victor to deploy force 
to extract that wealth, but it was less politically stable. If the victor opted for 
 provincialization – often the case after a rebellion – wealth extraction during the 
early stages of consolidation required the distribution of latent force in the form of 
garrisons around the new territory, typically fed by local foodstuffs moving through 
existing road and market networks. These relationships of demographic space to 
force distribution were established by the very nature of the agricultural organic 
economy as exploited by a hierarchical state. None of this is particularly surpris-
ing, but framing the issue in this way becomes more interesting as we turn to other 
demographic spaces.
Steppe nomadic pastoral tribes
The organic economy and political structures of nomadic pastoralists differed 
markedly, and in that demographic space military logistics rested on very different 
foundations and therefore so did the possibilities and requirements of latent force. 
Specific locations were relatively less important as neither surplus nor political 
power accumulated in any one location – at least until a steppe tribal confederation 
achieved imperial levels of success and conquered sedentary states. In intra-tribal 
conflicts, however, there were few strategic shortcuts of attacking cities or key tran-
sit points for surplus goods; one had to attack the people themselves. And adding 
defeated people tended to be the main point of success: as Bat-Ochir Bold noted, 
although the chronicles ‘often relate of one tribe conquering another and taking the 
conquered nutug [pasture] into its possession … the basic motivation for gaining 
possession of nutug was to use the conquered people as potential soldiers and not 
as labourers’.14
In this economy, ‘conquest’ meant capturing people and their flocks, with vary-
ing fates for the defeated elites – meaning the clan leaders, their immediate male 
kin and their closest followers (or nöker in Mongolian). Table 13.2 summarizes the 
types of conquest, of which the first three are all simply variants of incorporating a 
defeated people. These differ primarily in the extremeness of how the victor treats 
the losers – a choice determined by the probability of successfully incorporating 
the adult men, and influenced by the history of their rivalry and the ambitions 
of the victor. The first option was by far the preferred one, since it allowed for the 
 incorporation of a large number of the defeated men as warriors.
The final two represent the most typical form of steppe warfare, in which small-
scale clan-level raids netted plunder and people, but generally lacked the decisive 
outcome of a major battle. Such raids would be the normal pattern of war and 
only infrequently would they tip any regional balance of power. However, it is 
important to note that it was success in these raids that could build a young leader’s 
reputation and lead to further and further confederation through the remaining 
type of  conquest: voluntary subordination, or what political scientists refer to as 
 ‘bandwagoning’ – joining the winning side.
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Table 13.2 ‘Conquest’ types in war between steppe tribes
Form of military 
operations
Shorthand for political 
nature of victory
Political fate of losers Resource reallocation Spatial 
rearrangement
Consolidation requirements
Battle Decapitate and co-opt Decapitate narrow band of elite; 
co-opt remainder (men not 
killed)
Gain people, herds and 
pasture; enlarge army
No garrisons, but requires 
loyalty work
Battle Decapitate and 
subordinate
Decapitate broad band of elite; 
subordinate remainder (most 
men killed)
Gain people, herds and pasture No garrisons; only limited 




Eliminate wide swathe of 
population








Voluntary subordination to a 
winner
Gain people; enlarge army No garrisons; requires loyalty 
work
Raiding None (not a conquest 
strategy)
None; they raid in retaliation Gain herds, but that puts 
pressure on current pasture 
No garrisons or loyalty work
Persistent raiding Population 
displacement
Enemy migrates Gain herds and pasture No garrisons or loyalty work
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It was through raids and the consequent gradual acquisition of loyal followers, 
blood brothers, and a powerful nöker that Temujin slowly and painfully rose to 
become the head of a massive tribal confederation that would then become an 
empire under his new name of Chinggis Khan. The more powerful such a leader 
became, the more other tribes would voluntarily sign up to his cause, hoping 
to reap the rewards of further success. The empire’s political fragility remained, 
however, and holding it together required the loyalty work embedded in the 
other three pillars of political consolidation.15 Legitimacy and sanctity via proof 
of bloodline, success in battle, and proper adherence to key rituals were central 
to maintaining control, but neither bureaucracy nor latent force played much of 
a role. Even those defeated peoples who the sources say became ‘slaves’ of the 
victors (bo ‘ol in Mongolian) occupied a more complex status than is usually 
associated with that word; they were subordinated and incorporated, but with a 
future that could include advancement and even elite status, meaning that latent 
force played little role in enforcing obedience from a enslaved class.16 Successful 
nomadic conquerors could and did impose rule over others; their societies could 
and did stratify along lines of wealth, bloodline, and position, but the mechanisms 
of rule differed from the  territorial forms of agricultural states.17 Among other 
things, bureaucracy on the steppe was minimalist at best – although successful 
steppe conquerors of sedentary lands quickly adopted sedentary bureaucracies to 
serve them.18 As for latent force, the legitimacy of rule on the steppe depended on 
successful active force and there was little room for its use in a latent mode, except 
to the extent that one might consider military reputation to have acted as a kind of 
latent force check on rebellion.
Latent force on the steppe
As already discussed, victors rapidly accumulated force by incorporating the 
defeated into their own armies. This was a fundamental component of steppe life.19 
But turning nomads into something resembling a garrison-based latent force was 
harder to do. For one thing, garrisons could not control nomadic populations, 
much less extract surplus from them, since people were not tied to the land in a 
way that a static deployment of force could control. But even more important were 
the logistical obstacles to maintaining a large nomadic force in any single location. 
These problems boil down to the calories in a steppe warrior’s ration and the acres 
of grass required for a large herd of horses. To shortcut a lot of calculations (and a 
tremendous amount of uncertainty about pasture requirements), we can use a rela-
tively moderate estimate that each soldier would need 208 acres of steppe pasture to 
sustain the bare minimum string of five horses and one sheep for a year (in stockage 
terms this is twenty-six ‘sheep-equivalents’).20 To convey what that means graphi-
cally, consider the annual pasture requirement for a single 10,000-man Mongolian 
tümen (a division) superimposed on a map of Hungary (Map 13.1).21
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Furthermore, five horses and one sheep are an extreme minimum, which does 
not include breeding stock or account for any of the other realities of maintaining 
herds for more than a single year. This expansive requirement for pasture imme-
diately suggests the problem with setting up territorial garrisons: steppe forces 
needed to keep moving or disperse. Without garrisons, the role of force in post-
conquest consolidation among steppe tribes was reputational: if you rebel, we will 
again call up our loyal forces and defeat you. It was not preventative force; it was a 
retaliatory promise. This pattern of expectations showed itself most dramatically 
when nomadic conquerors used violence in conquered sedentary states. Having 
extracted the promise of submission, they then heavily punished disobedience with 
extreme retaliatory violence, as Chinggis Khan did to the Xi Xia empire when they 
began to refuse to cooperate as promised.22
Native Americans in eastern woodland North America
The notion of ‘conquest’ among North American indigenous peoples is harder 
to identify and define, in part because many anthropologists and historians long 
Map 13.1 Pasturage requirement for one year for one tümen of Mongolian warriors,  
at twenty-six sheep-equivalents per man.  The inner box represents a moderate estimate of 
8 acres/sheep-equivalent; the outer box is a more extreme 16 acres. Superimposed here on 
a map of the Great Hungarian Plain. Map drawn by Rebecca Seifried.
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resisted the idea that Native American warfare was indeed lethal and that it often 
aimed to enhance one group’s power at the expense of another.23 Many scholars 
now recognize the pre- and post-contact role of violent resource competition in 
Native American society, agreeing that Native Americans, in line with much of the 
rest of the world, fought with deadly intent and with both individual and group 
interests in mind. David Silverman, for example, recently summarized Native 
American motivations for war as ‘the defense or expansion of territory; the seizure 
of captives for enslavement and adoption; the negotiation of tributary relationships 
between communities; the revenge of insults; the protection of kin from outside 
aggressors; and the plunder of enemy wealth’.24
As with our other examples, military activity and the implications for consolidat-
ing victory into some form of gain were powerfully shaped by the Native North 
American organic economy and their fundamental sociopolitical organization. In 
approaching military logistics in the demographic space of native North America, 
we should remember that North America was not ‘wilderness’. It was an environ-
ment substantially shaped by human activity, albeit differently from what European 
settlers expected.25 Clusters of associated towns had many beaten paths between 
them, as well as out to their fields and primary gathering areas. The forest imme-
diately surrounding a town would have been punctuated by ‘oldfields’ – that is, 
abandoned farm fields left fallow and now often prime locations for nearby hunting 
(deer prefer to browse in meadows close to the cover of trees). In addition, paths 
to distant hunting grounds or for trade were clearly marked out and could stretch 
hundreds of miles – the so-called Warriors’ Path extending from upstate New York 
to the Cherokee and Catawba country in North and South Carolina is only the 
most famous. There were many such paths.26 Similarly, navigable waterways and 
the appropriate technology for traversing them and then portaging around fall lines 
were well known and portage paths well established.
This may not sound that far removed from agricultural states in the sense that 
we have villages surrounded by a network of fields and paths, but the differences 
were considerable. Paths in North America were designed for humans in single file. 
Draft animals and wagons were unknown before European contact and throughout 
the middle of the eighteenth century among the Native Americans of the eastern 
woodlands horses remained rare, especially in warfare. In addition, once away from 
the village cluster itself, the density of the route network would have dropped pre-
cipitously, confining military movement to remarkably predictable paths on both 
land and water.
In general, therefore, Native Americans had no means for bringing supplies along 
in their wake, although there are some accounts of laden canoes being left behind as 
a kind of supply cache. Evidence suggests that war parties often hunted en route, but 
once they were in enemy territory this was more difficult to do safely.27 As a result, 
when a war party arrived at an enemy town cluster at the end of a long march, they 
lacked the logistical means to remain there for very long. They could not conduct a 
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protracted siege, and if they succeeded in taking a town by assault or rapid siege, they 
had no way to resupply their forces to remain and hold the town in the face of rein-
forcements from other nearby related towns (a very strong possibility given the way 
they were clustered). Captured Europeans who narrated their experiences frequently 
attested to the logistical desperation on the return march to their captors’ home 
town.28 This reality not only affected how Native Americans perceived conquest, it 
also affected how they thought of using latent force to consolidate conquest.29
Beyond logistics, two key characteristics of Native American sociopolitical con-
figurations related to the other pillars of rule also affected campaigning and con-
quest. First was the strong pressure to avoid catastrophic losses. The relatively 
egalitarian and consensus-based authority structure in most historic period Native 
American societies meant that extreme casualties would dramatically undermine a 
leader’s legitimacy.30 Second, the blood revenge imperative was crucial in motivat-
ing individual warriors to join a war party and its requirements profoundly shaped 
the nature of their campaigning. Among other things, warriors who had assuaged its 
requirements might feel no compunction in returning home, regardless of the needs 
of the group.31 The feud’s prominence, however, has tended to obscure the extent to 
which many ongoing conflicts were about more than mere revenge – they were also 
about resources, even if only in the sense that maintaining a reputation for effectively 
taking revenge was key to both minimizing challenges and for consolidating ‘con-
quest’. Reputation management, as on the steppe, was a form of latent force.
To leap ahead into the argument, there were only two types of victory consoli-
dation in woodland war (see Table 13.3). The third type shown in the table, small-
scale raiding, is not a conquest strategy as such, much like the last type in Table 13.1. 
Although small-scale raiding may not have been intended to force major resource 
allocations (whether people, land, or other resources), it did successfully fulfil cul-
tural mandates for blood revenge while also maintaining the group’s reputation for 
strength, hopefully forestalling attacks on its home territory as a result. On the other 
hand, persistent raiding, even on a small scale, especially raids that ‘cut off’ one or 
more towns, could expect over time either to force population displacement or to 
achieve submission leading to a tributary arrangement. Note that either result could 
come about from the same type of campaigning; which one occurred depended 
on both sides’ assessment of their relative strength. Neither of these results neces-
sarily lends itself to traditional notions of conquest, but resources were certainly 
being reallocated as a result of victory. What is interesting here is the relatively low 
requirement for latent force to consolidate victory. Let us consider each in turn: 
displacement and tributary submission.
Displacement
As we have seen, a war party at the end of a long march was at the end of its logistical 
tether and operating within a kind of danger zone, surrounded by enemy towns in 
Table 13.3 ‘Conquest’ types in war between Eastern Woodlands Native Americans
Campaign types Shorthand for political 
nature of victory

















Loyalty work required 
(reputation 
management), but no 
garrisons
Persistent cutting-off 
attacks with complete 
village destruction(s) 
Population displaced Enemy migrates/
territory emptied
Expand buffer zone and/
or hunting grounds; 
some captives absorbed
No garrisons or loyalty 
work




No garrisons or loyalty 
work
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a regional cluster. Attackers tended to hit quickly and then return home. There was 
no logistical support – and neither was there cultural support through the blood-
feud dynamic – for ‘take-and-hold’ territorial war. On the other hand, persistent 
attacks or a few massively successful town attacks could force a threatened people 
to decamp and evacuate the region. In other words, wars could be fought in order 
to empty space. Iroquois attacks on the Huron in the late 1640s famously forced 
Huron migration, leaving their territory essentially empty. These migrations have 
often been seen as a victim’s response, but they were just as likely to have been the 
victor’s objective, even in intra-Indian warfare. Such emptiness produces a wider 
buffer zone in which game can flourish, effectively increasing the hunting territory 
safely available to the victor.
In the Creek–Cherokee War of 1715 to 1752, we can trace the impact fairly 
clearly. Map 13.2 conveys a sense of how much acreage was required to support a 
deer population large enough to sustain the Cherokee subsistence system, which 
depended on hunting in the winter.32 When compared with Map 13.3, which shows 
the depopulation or forced migration of the southern Cherokee towns during the 
long war, it is clear how this now vacant space represented a large accession of 
hunting grounds for the Creeks, as well as a deeper security buffer zone between 
themselves and the remaining Cherokees.33 It is rare to be able to reconstruct this 
kind of detailed version of territory being emptied by war, but one often finds it 
as an expectation among defeated peoples in the way many of them proceeded 
to migrate. We have already mentioned the departure of the Hurons after the 
Iroquois attacks in 1648 and 1649. Other defeated peoples’ migrations include the 
Tuscaroras, the Yamasees, the Delawares, the Shawnees/Savannahs, the Eries/
Westos and more.34 Historians have often interpreted these movements as part 
of coalescence in the face of defeat – and so they were. But they also signified the 
departure of the defeated from their original home territory. Rather than submit, 
they departed.
This form of victory consolidation by simply emptying territory is extremely 
cheap. It does not require any deployment of latent force, nor is any loyalty 
work  required to prop up the other three pillars of rule (legitimacy, sanctity, or 
bureaucracy). And in terms of reputation management, which we have called 
a form of latent force, the campaigns themselves functioned to shore up that 
reputation.
Tributary
For all the same logistical and sociopolitical reasons, warfare conducted to impose 
a tributary status also lacked the means to deploy latent force. Even during 
the  increasingly territorial and authoritarian rule of Powhatan over much of the 
Chesapeake Bay, there is no evidence for garrison distribution. Powhatan’s wars 
instead used both types discussed here: he warred to empty territory in fear of 
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threats to his authority and he warred to establish tributary relationships over 
other towns. Tribute, however, seems to have been his primary goal: that is, to 
force a group to submit to his authority at least to the point that they regularly 
sent him tribute in material form – both exotic goods and subsistence.35 Having 
imposed a tributary relationship on a submitted population, however, meant that 
the chief had to put a higher premium both on reputation management and on 
other forms of cultural work to control them. Powhatan’s control seems to have 
been relatively authoritarian, but the other well-known example, that between the 
Iroquois Confederacy and their defeated tributary ‘subordinate’ peoples, suggests 
a much milder form of control. Francis Jennings’s examination of the relationship 
between the Iroquois and the Delaware conveys the complexity of the problem. The 
Map 13.2 Cherokee town clusters as they were c.1715. The rectangle superimposed on the map 
comprises 8,820 square miles. Using figures from the most densely deer-populated county 
in modern Kentucky, such a territory might support a population of 414,540 deer. Even 
that number would only provide twenty-six deer per person to the c.1700 Cherokee 
population. Clearly a much larger hunting area was required for it  
to be sustainable.
Map 13.3 Cherokee towns as of about 1760. Each cross indicates a town site that had existed in 1715. The thick line approximates the 
amount of territory abandoned by the Cherokees.
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Delawares briefly admitted an Iroquois chief to live among them and they appear 
to have surrendered control of some of their foreign policy to the Iroquois. But 
they retained almost complete autonomy in their relations with Pennsylvania and 
control over their own territory – although the Iroquois would pressure them to sell 
to Pennsylvania in 1737 (The Walking Purchase). Indicative of the many shades of 
grey in the varieties of submission, however, was the fate of the Susquehannocks, 
whom the Iroquois more completely removed from their original home territory 
and absorbed into their central  population – not as slaves or subordinates, but as 
new kin.36
Within all these variations of submission, however, the need persisted to do 
cultural work in the submitted population, either to fully embed them as new kin or 
to persuade them of the finality of their submission. Bureaucracy as we understand 
it did not figure in that process, but issues of legitimacy and sanctity did play a role. 
We know, for example, that central to establishing legitimacy for the incorporation 
of individual captives was the mechanism of assigning kinship. In the mourning war 
tradition of the Iroquois peoples and among many other groups, individual cap-
tives were assigned specific familial roles, often replacing recently deceased family 
members.37 Such a kinship claim also probably played a role in maintaining the sub-
ordination of whole populations, in the way that the Delawares, for example, were 
called ‘nephews’ after their submission. With respect to latent force, one sees similar 
cultural mechanisms at work in reputation management rather than a physical gar-
rison or other distribution of force. One wonders, for example, how far the much-
discussed habit of the Iroquois of referring to the Delawares as ‘women’, and thus 
unable to make war, was a rhetorical means of enforcing subordination and enhanc-
ing Iroquois martiality.38 Or whether Powhatan’s mock battle, witnessed and 
described by John Smith, was something regularly conducted to persuade assorted 
audiences of his overwhelming power?39
The implications for the violence of conquest
Several implications emerge from this comparative discussion of the role of subsist-
ence systems and logistics in defining the nature of conquest and consolidation. 
The most significant for this volume on violence were the consequences when war 
occurred outside of the symmetrical pairs presented here. Each example explored 
thus far has been deliberately symmetrical: states against states, steppe tribes versus 
steppe tribes, and the intertribal conflicts in Native North America. Patterns of 
conflict repeated over time within those pairs created not just a material reality but 
also an ideological framework through which participants understood the  function 
of war and anticipated its rewards. War with a people outside that framework 
 generated both material and ideological challenges.
For example, the normal steppe nomad’s expectation of absorbing defeated 
nomads with a similar lifestyle meant that controlling peasants had no initial 
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appeal for them. This attitude generated the famous moments in which nomad 
victors considered converting conquered farmland into pasture (which of course 
would have left the peasants to starve or move).40 This was partly logistical, since 
they were well aware that a landscape of grain fields or rice paddies could not sus-
tain their horses. It was also a normal initial response for a steppe tribe that had 
not yet imagined becoming an expansive empire. Their more usual raids on peas-
ant communities along the steppe frontier could not lead to snowballing force; 
the standard forms of absorbing defeated tribes simply did not apply to those 
who were not also horsemen.41 The result tended to be a higher level of violence 
meted out to the sedentary population. For example, in an odd reversal of the usual 
steppe  decapitation strategy, ‘when the Turk-Khazars attacked Caucasian Albania 
in 628 as allies of Byzantium, the Qağan allowed those “nobles and leaders” who 
surrendered “to live and serve me”. As for the others, all males over fifteen years of 
age were to be killed and the women and children enslaved.’42 In this instance, the 
Qağan seems to have adopted the nomadic concept of folding defeated elites into 
his extended warrior household (or nöker) as part of the conquest of a sedentary 
state, but he found no use for the majority of the defeated male population. This 
mismatch of expectations of conquest may have led to wider swathes of adult men 
being killed than in similar defeats of nomadic peoples. When a steppe people 
became imperial conquerors they learned to modify their attitudes towards the 
conquered populations, building systems of bureaucratic rule and distributing 
garrisons composed of their defeated sedentary enemies’ forces. But in general, 
the endemic conflicts between sedentary and nomadic peoples produced extraor-
dinary levels of violence – partly due to a sense of cultural superiority on both 
sides, but also because of their very different senses of what victory was supposed 
to bring.
Likewise, recognizing much Native American conquest as war to produce empty 
space helps explain patterns of violence across the early modern period and beyond. 
Success put more distance between them and their enemy and expanded a fruitful 
hunting zone. There was no implied need for subjugation or population control. But 
it did require the enemy to move away. This meant that Native American warfare 
used violence to frighten – to create a sense of vulnerability. Their systems of warfare 
were not designed to allow for wholesale incorporation – individual adoptees yes, 
but they had no use for a generalized accession of territory with population, because 
they lacked the latent force potential to secure them. Thus the epigram at the open-
ing of this chapter explaining Cherokee motives: they wanted revenge and to terrify 
their opponents. But when used against state-sponsored settlers, Native American 
styles of violence designed to frighten ran into an enemy that did not want to move. 
The demographic wave of European settlers quickly refilled whatever land had been 
temporarily emptied by Native American attacks, and Native Americans may have 
felt compelled to escalate the frightfulness of their attacks. Early attacks, like the 
Powhatans against the Jamestown colonists, or the Tuscaroras in North Carolina, 
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or the Pequots in New England, have been interpreted as messaging attacks, not the 
onset of all-out territorial war. It was indeed real violence, but also symbolic and 
designed to strike fear. In this context they engaged in the posing of bodies, stuffing 
dirt or bread in the mouths of the dead and so on.43 It is not unreasonable to suggest 
that Indian violence escalated in the next generation’s warfare, having found that 
selective killing and pointed symbolism were not terrifying enough to push back 
white settlement.
European armies operating in North America were frustrated both by geographi-
cal obstacles to their usual logistical system and by the expectations of their oppo-
nents about what victory meant. As the English colonized North America they went 
through a series of reactions to the problems posed by its logistical environment, the 
nature of Indian resistance, and their own expectations of conquest. As we have seen, 
standard practice in state-on-state conquest often first attempted to impose a vassal 
or tributary status. It is easy enough to find such attempts in play in the early Virginia 
colony. The English literally labelled Powhatan a vassal of King James, complete 
with an intended submission ceremony, and they would attempt similar measures 
in many places around the continent. In some ways there was congruent conceptual 
ground here, since the Native Americans themselves had a somewhat parallel mech-
anism for tributary status.44 English expectations of tribute, however, were more 
expansive, hierarchical, and expected profit from the bulk delivery of goods, whereas 
Native American versions of tribute, with some exceptions, tended to focus on key 
status goods rather than bulk subsistence. The increasing English demands for com-
plete submission on their terms led to violence, which gave rise to Native resistance – 
quickly labelled ‘rebellion’. Alternatively, in some English colonies the English waged 
or spurred campaigns of enslavement to procure labour, sometimes for local use, 
sometimes for profitable export. Those efforts generated traumatic effects around the 
south-east, finally spurring such a backlash from the Indian population that African 
slaves became preferred.45 Indian resistance, labelled rebellion, then suggested a 
shift to the more comprehensive alternative of displacement followed by settler 
provincialization.
Repeatedly, over the course of the next two hundred years (at least), the English 
and later the Americans would win a perceived victory over a group of Native 
Americans, often concluded by a treaty surrendering territory to white settlement, 
and then face the challenge of provincialization, which seemed to require the dis-
tribution of latent force across a very expansive territory. In Native North America, 
however, that norm quickly broke down. First, the density of the white population 
on the frontier did not provide sufficient organic logistical support to sustain a garri-
son from local resources (both in the sense of transport routes and population den-
sity producing subsistence surpluses). Worse, when Native Americans launched 
attacks in that environment many settlers fled, further reducing nearby logistical 
capacity.46 Frontier forts proved expensive and vulnerable over and over again (as 
they had done in sixteenth-century Ulster too).
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The first attempted solution to this problem was to build the necessary infrastruc-
ture, as previous empires had done through frontier fortification and road systems. 
That too, in North America, proved expensive and vulnerable. In the words of a 
contemporary analyst:
Those who have only experienced the severities and dangers of a campaign in Europe, 
can scarcely form an idea of what is to be done and endured in an American war. 
To act in a country cultivated and inhabited, where roads are made, magazines are 
established and hospitals provided; where there are good towns to retreat to in case 
of misfortune; or, at the worst, a generous enemy to yield to … But in an American 
campaign every thing is terrible; the face of the country, the climate, the enemy. There 
is no refreshment for the healthy, nor relief for the sick. A vast unhospitable desart 
[sic], unsafe and treacherous, surrounds them, where victories are not decisive, but 
defeats are ruinous.47
Meanwhile and equally relevant, early seventeenth-century English hopes that con-
quest would capture labour (in addition to land) also fell flat as Native Americans 
followed their own pattern of moving away in the face of defeat. We should see early 
Virginia reservations or New England Christian Indian ‘praying towns’ as excep-
tions to a more prevalent Indian pattern of vacating territory.
Lacking the preventative control of widely distributed garrisons, the British or 
American state then resorted to the punishment campaign designed to force a full 
population displacement. In one sense it was a resort to attempted tributary sys-
tems, in which campaigns were designed to terrorize populations into submitting. 
Fire and destruction were seen as necessary tools to impose the state’s will. Since 
campaign armies, in the absence of their normal logistical system depending on 
local food production, could only pass through the territory and could not occupy 
it, they resorted to destruction. This strategy represented an escalation of violence 
driven by incompatible structures of conquest. To be sure, the strategy was not 
unfamiliar or unknown to Europeans. States in medieval Europe, for example, usu-
ally lacked the capacity for full territorial conquest and resorted to devastation raids 
(chevauchée) instead.48
To use a different region as another example, Thomas Robert Bugeaud, fighting 
in Algeria in the 1840s, argued for a scorched earth policy of razzias, designed to 
destroy settlements, crops, and so on. He argued that the only thing of value there 
would be ‘the agricultural interest spread over the whole surface of the country’.49 In 
an essay on Algeria, written in 1841, the famous Alexis de Tocqueville, understating 
the worst implications of razzias, characterized them as ‘unfortunate  necessities’.
If we do not burn harvests in Europe, it is because in general we wage war on govern-
ments and not on peoples … We shall never destroy Abd el-Kader’s power unless we 
make the position of the tribes who support him so intolerable that they abandon him. 
This is an obvious truth. We must conform to it or give up the game. For myself, I think 
that all means of desolating these tribes must be employed.50
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In the long term, state control in these environments emerged through the 
importation of enough colonists to create the demographic infrastructure to sus-
tain garrisons (and who themselves constituted a militia as a kind of latent force). 
Consider, for example, the changes wrought by settlement in Ohio. American 
military campaigns in Ohio in the 1780s and 1790s struggled or were outright 
destroyed. Anthony Wayne’s 1794 campaign finally resulted in battlefield victory, 
but the real change was demographic: in 1793 there were about 3,220 settlers in 
Ohio; this had increased to 5,000 by 1796, and by 1801 to 45,000.51 General Josiah 
Harmar, posted in eastern Ohio in 1785, set his lieutenant, Ebenezer Denny, to 
count the settlers moving on the river past the fort. Eventually there were enough 
settlers and Harmar moved his headquarters further downriver and built a new 
fort in present-day Cincinnati.52 Those settlers frequently ignored whatever fragile 
structures of law the state had created to regulate relations with the indigenous 
peoples and instigated violence to displace them yet further away.53 Native 
American displacement in such cases was normal to their form of warfare that 
sought to empty land, but from the state’s perspective it proved initially frustrating 
to hopes of control – although by the 1790s such displacement had become the 
primary goal of the new American state. A similar situation had plagued English 
colonists in Ireland, who were frustrated by the mobility of Irish labour, whose 
wealth was invested more in their cattle than their land. ‘Frustration’ in this case 
generated further violence. The mobility of the Irish became defined as part of 
their ‘savagery’, and it entered into the roll call of the rationalizations of violence. 
In the longer term it also led to the violence of deracination. The conqueror, rely-
ing on bureaucracy and often on missionary work to change the structures of sanc-
tity, both backed by latent force, forcibly acculturated the conquered. The losers 
had to be made to fit the winners’ expectations of conquest, no matter how violent 
that process might be.
The early modern world played host to a wide variety of subsistence systems 
with different expectations of military victory; globalizing contact, trade, and con-
flict after 1500 put many of those societies into contact for the first time. The model 
outlined here allows us to go beyond the war rhetoric of the literate and discern how 
violence also sprang from fundamental structural differences. Material constraints 
affected practice, practice became norms, and violated norms then produced vio-
lence qualitatively and even quantitatively unrelated to the nominal goals of the 
conflict. Over time, and sometimes very quickly, the playing out of such violence 
produced ideologically freighted words like ‘barbarian’, ‘savage’, and ultimately 
‘colonist’. The rhetoric, the processes, the institutions, and above all the violence of 
acculturation arose not just from cultural demonization or prejudice, but from the 
underlying logistics of conquest and the resultant set of expectations about what 
one gained from victory.
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